Anthropological and Sociological Critiques of Bioethics

Anthropologists and sociologists offer numerous critiques of bioethics. Social scientists criticize bioethicists for their arm-chair philosophizing and socially ungrounded pontificating, offering philosophical abstractions in response to particular instances of suffering, making all-encompassing universalistic claims that fail to acknowledge cultural differences, fostering individualism and neglecting the importance of families and communities, and insinuating themselves within the “belly” of biomedicine. Although numerous aspects of bioethics warrant critique and reform, all too frequently social scientists offer ungrounded, exaggerated criticisms of bioethics. Anthropological and sociological critiques of bioethics are hampered by the tendency to equate bioethics with clinical ethics and moral theory in bioethics with principlist bioethics. Also, social scientists neglect the role of bioethicists in addressing organizational ethics and other “macro-social” concerns. If anthropologists and sociologists want to provide informed critiques of bioethics they need to draw upon research methods from their own fields and develop richer, more informed analyses of what bioethicists say and do in particular social settings.     

Bioethics and conflicts of interest

Bioethics has been subject to considerable social criticism in recent years. One criticism that has caused particular discomfort in the bioethics community is that bioethicists, because of the way their work is funded, are involved in profound conflicts of interest that undermine their title to be considered independent moral commentators on developments in biomedicine and biotechnology. This criticism draws its force from the assumption that bioethics is, or ought to be, a type of normative social criticism. Versions of this criticism come from both the political left and right. For instance, such criticisms include allegations that bioethics is inherently socially conservative, that it is inherently “pro-technology”, that it lays spurious claims to moral and social authority and expertise, that its focus on autonomy links it to neoliberal theories of choice, and that it is an ideological mystification of real social relationships and political power. This commentary paper analyses the problem of bioethical conflict of interest, and argues that the types of conflict of interest facing bioethics are inherent to the role of “public intellectual” that bioethicists generally wish to assume. The paper defends this conception of the role of the bioethicist, arguing that bioethicists should be interested and openly so.     

WHO'S ARGUING? A CALL FOR REFLEXIVITY IN BIOETHICS

In this paper we set forth what we believe to be a relatively controversial argument, claiming that ‘bioethics’ needs to undergo a fundamental change in the way it is practised. This change, we argue, requires philosophical bioethicists to adopt reflexive practices when applying their analyses in public forums, acknowledging openly that bioethics is an embedded socio‐cultural practice, shaped by the ever‐changing intuitions of individual philosophers, which cannot be viewed as a detached intellectual endeavour. This said, we argue that in order to manage the personal, social and cultural embeddedness of bioethics, philosophical bioethicists should openly acknowledge how their practices are constructed and should, in their writing, explicitly deal with issues of bias and conflict of interest, just as empirical scientists are required to do.     

IS IT TIME FOR BIOETHICS TO GO EMPIRICAL?

Observers who note the increasing popularity of bioethics discussions often complain that the social sciences are poorly represented in discussions about things like abortion and stem-cell research. Critics say that bioethicists should be incorporating the methods and findings of social scientists, and should move towards making the discipline more empirically oriented. This way, critics argue, bioethics will remain relevant, and truly reflect the needs of actual people. Such recommendations ignore the diversity of viewpoints in bioethics, however. Bioethics can gain much from the methods and findings from ethnographies and similar research. But it is misleading to suggest that bioethicists are unaware of this potential benefit. Not only that, bioethicists are justified in having doubts about the utility of the social science approach in some cases. This is not because there is some inherent superiority in non-empirical approaches to moral argument. Rather, the doubts concern the nature of the facts that the sciences would provide. Perhaps the larger point is that disagreements about the relationship between facts and normative arguments should be seen as part of the normal inquiry in bioethics, not evidence that reform is needed.     

Yoga and fetishism: reflections on Marxist social theory

Classical social theory – including Marxist social theory – is based on a critique of the relationship between religion and society. The philosophical underpinning of this is the question of consciousness and the projection of consciousness onto things. Drawing on contemporary anthropological and philosophical theories of fetishism, this article engages with Marx's critique of religion and the recovery of social value by way of an analysis of yoga. Two interrelated claims are made. First, yoga represents a paradigm shift in the historical development of religious consciousness. A critical analysis of this development extends the fetishization of social relations in things to the level of self-consciousness in the body. Second, a critique of yoga's fetishization of the body and consciousness extends and expands Marx's critique of obscured social value and enables a more holistic ecological politics concerning the value of life.     

Research integrity and rights of indigenous peoples: appropriating Foucault's critique of knowledge/power

In this paper I appropriate the philosophical critique of Michel Foucault as it applies to the engagement of Western science and indigenous peoples in the context of biomedical research. The science of population genetics, specifically as pursued in the Human Genome Diversity Project, is the obvious example to illustrate (a) the contraposition of modern science and 'indigenous science', (b) the tendency to depreciate and marginalize indigenous knowledge systems, and (c) the subsumption of indigenous moral preferences in the juridical armature of international human rights law. I suggest that international bioethicists may learn from Foucault's critique, specifically of the need for vigilance about the knowledge/power relation expressed by the contraposition of modern science and 'indigeneity'.     

Bioethics and Climate Change: A Response to Macpherson and Valles

Two articles published in Bioethics recently have explored the ways that bioethics can contribute to the climate change debate. Cheryl Cox Macpherson argues that bioethicists can play an important role in the climate change debate by helping the public to better understand the values at stake and the trade‐offs that must be made in individual and social choices, and Sean Valles claims that bioethicists can contribute to the debate by framing the issues in terms of the public health impacts of climate change. While Macpherson and Valles make valid points concerning a potential role for bioethics in the climate change debate, it is important to recognize that much more than ethical analysis and reflection will be needed to significantly impact public attitudes and government policies.     

Heterogeneous assemblages of bioethics and science: the “pre-embryo” debate in America

This paper explores the “pre-embryo” debate in America to analyze the relationship between scientific uncertainty and moral decision-making. This paper explores how an ethical debate among bioethicists around the term “pre-embryo” has been transformed into a scientific “fact” debate between developmental biology and embryology. This transformation is driven by the scientism of ethical reasoning that stresses scientific claims to increase the credibility of ethical claims. This paper concludes that the “pre-embryo” debate is not an ethical controversy over a unified science but rather credibility struggles between two heterogeneous assemblages of science and bioethics.     

WHICH NATURALISM FOR BIOETHICS? A DEFENSE OF MODERATE (PRAGMATIC) NATURALISM

There is a growing interest in various forms of naturalism in bioethics, but there is a clear need for further clarification. In an effort to address this situation, I present three epistemological stances: anti-naturalism, strong naturalism, and moderate pragmatic naturalism. I argue that the dominant paradigm within philosophical ethics has been a form of anti-naturalism mainly supported by a strong 'is' and 'ought' distinction. This fundamental epistemological commitment has contributed to the estrangement of academic philosophical ethics from major social problems and explains partially why, in the early 1980s, 'medicine saved the life of ethics'. Rejection of anti-naturalism, however, is often associated with strong forms of naturalism that commit the naturalistic fallacy and threaten to reduce the normative dimensions of ethics to biological imperatives. This move is rightly dismissed as a pitfall since ethics is, in part, a struggle against the course of nature. Rejection of naturalism has drawbacks, however, such as deterring bioethicists from acknowledging the implicit naturalistic epistemological commitments of bioethics. I argue that a moderate pragmatic form of naturalism represents an epistemological position that best embraces the tension of anti-naturalism and strong naturalism: bioethics is neither disconnected from empirical knowledge nor subjugated to it. The discussion is based upon historical writings in philosophy and bioethics.     

‘You Say You’re Happy, but…’: Contested Quality of Life Judgments in Bioethics and Disability Studies

In this paper, I look at several examples that demonstrate what I see as a troubling tendency in much of mainstream bioethics to discount the views of disabled people. Following feminist political theorists who argue in favour of a stance of humility and sensitive inclusion for people who have been marginalized, I recommend that bioethicists adopt a presumption in favour of believing rather than discounting the claims of disabled people. By taking their claims at face value and engaging with disabled people in open dialogue over impairment and disadvantage, bioethicists may take to heart an important lesson about human fragility and resilience.     

Two Agendas for Bioethics: Critique and Integration

Many bioethicists view the primary task of bioethics as ‘value clarification’. In this article, I argue that the field must embrace two more ambitious agendas that go beyond mere clarification. The first agenda, critique, involves unmasking, interrogating, and challenging the presuppositions that underlie bioethical discourse. These largely unarticulated premises establish the boundaries within which problems can be conceptualized and solutions can be imagined. The function of critique, then, is not merely to clarify these premises but to challenge them and the boundaries they define. The second agenda, integration, involves honoring and unifying what is right in competing values. Integration is the morally ideal response to value conflict, offering the potential for transcending win/lose outcomes. The function of integration, then, is to envision actions or policies that not only resolve conflicts, but that do so by jointly realizing many genuine values in deep and compelling ways. My argument proceeds in stages. After critically examining the role and dominant status of value clarification in bioethical discourse, I describe the nature and value of the two agendas, identify concrete examples of where each has been and could be successful, and explain why a critical integrative bioethics – one that appreciates the joint necessity and symbiotic potential of the two agendas – is crucial to the future of the field. The ultimate goal of all of this is to offer a more compelling vision for how bioethics might conduct itself within the larger intellectual and social world it seeks to understand and serve.     

什么是生命伦理学？——从历史发展的视角

生命伦理学是20世纪60年代兴起于美国的一门新兴学科,旨在应对生命科学和生物技术的发展或医疗保健的演变使人类面临的种种伦理难题。生命伦理学的兴起有着特殊的社会历史背景。它在发展过程中出现的一些里程碑式的案例,对生命伦理学的发展产生了深远的影响。从其发展特征上看,生命伦理学和医学伦理学紧密联系,有着更为广泛的研究内容和独特的专业特性。生命伦理学要有效回应现代医学和生命科学的发展给人类带来的伦理难题,既要准确地界定伦理问题,又要以适当的方式将伦理学基础理论应用到具体问题当中。对生命伦理学的基本理论进行概述。     

The Nature and Value of Bioethics Expertise

In this article, I address the extent to which experts in bioethics can contribute to healthcare delivery by way of aid in clinical decision‐making and policy‐formation. I argue that experts in bioethics are moral experts, in that their substantive moral views are more likely to be correct than those of non‐bioethicists, all else being equal, but that such expertise is of use in a relatively limited class of cases. In so doing, I respond to two recent arguments against the view that bioethicists are moral experts, one by Christopher Cowley and another by David Archard. I further argue that bioethics experts have significant additional contributions to make to healthcare delivery, and highlight a hitherto neglected aspect of that contribution: amelioration of moral misconception among clinicians. I describe in detail several aspects of moral misconception, and show how the bioethicist is in a prime position to resolve that sort of error.     

How rational should bioethics be? The value of empirical approaches

Rational justification of claims with empirical content calls for empirical and not only normative philosophical investigation. Empirical approaches to bioethics are epistemically valuable, i.e., such methods may be necessary in providing and verifying basic knowledge about cultural values and norms. Our assumptions in moral reasoning can be verified or corrected using these methods. Moral arguments can be initiated or adjudicated by data drawn from empirical investigation. One may argue that individualistic informed consent, for example, is not compatible with the Asian communitarian orientation. But this normative claim uses an empirical assumption that may be contrary to the fact that some Asians do value and argue for informed consent. Is it necessary and factual to neatly characterize some cultures as individualistic and some as communitarian? Empirical investigation can provide a reasonable way to inform such generalizations. In a multi-cultural context, such as in the Philippines, there is a need to investigate the nature of the local ethos before making any appeal to authenticity. Otherwise we may succumb to the same ethical imperialism we are trying hard to resist. Normative claims that involve empirical premises cannot be reasonable verified or evaluated without utilizing empirical methods along with philosophical reflection. The integration of empirical methods to the standard normative approach to moral reasoning should be reasonably guided by the epistemic demands of claims arising from cross-cultural discourse in bioethics.     

An African theory of bioethics: reply to MacPherson and Macklin

In a prior issue of Developing World Bioethics, Cheryl Macpherson and Ruth Macklin critically engaged with an article of mine, where I articulated a moral theory grounded on indigenous values salient in the sub-Saharan region, and then applied it to four major issues in bioethics, comparing and contrasting its implications with those of the dominant Western moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism. In response to my essay, Macpherson and Macklin have posed questions about: whether philosophical justifications are something with which bioethicists ought to be concerned; why something counts as 'African'; how medicine is a moral enterprise; whether an individual right to informed consent is consistent with sub-Saharan values; and when thought experiments help to establish firm conclusions about moral status. These are important issues for the field, and I use this reply to take discussion of them a step or two farther, defending my initial article from Macpherson's and Macklin's critical questions and objections.     

Systems Bioethics and Stem Cell Biology

The complexities of modern science are not adequately reflected in many bioethical discussions. This is especially problematic in highly contested cases where there is significant pressure to generate clinical applications fast, as in stem cell research. In those cases a more integrated approach to bioethics, which we call systems bioethics, can provide a useful framework to address ethical and policy issues. Much as systems biology brings together different experimental and methodological approaches in an integrative way, systems bioethics integrates aspects of the history and philosophy of science, social and political theory, and normative analysis with the science in question. In this paper we outline how a careful analysis of the science of stem cell research can help to refocus the discussions related to the clinical applications of stem cells. We show how inaccurate or inadequate scientific assumptions help to create a set of unrealistic expectations and badly inform ethical deliberations and policy development. Systems bioethics offers resources for moving beyond the current impasse.     

The presence and influence of religion in American bioethics

From the inception of the relatively short history of American bioethics in the mid-to-late 1960s, the place of religion in this field has been complex and controversial. It has also been a subject of more than casual interest and concern to bioethicists, and to an array of medical and non-medical groups in U.S. society for whom the activities and issues in which bioethics is engaged have ongoing import. The questions and the tensions linked to the status and influence of religion in the sphere of bioethics have ramifications that extend beyond bioethics and biomedicine into matters involving the relationship of religion to the institutional structure of American society--most particularly its political, legal foundations, and realm of public affairs--and to its cultural attributes and tradition. It is within this larger perspective that we will consider the association between American bioethics and religion. Our analysis includes two case studies: (1) how, in the early years of bioethics, a pioneering organization in the field dealt with the "redefinition of death" in its discussions and in a major medical journal publication; and (2) the way in which the most recently appointed federal bioethics commission, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, involved religion in its work on cloning and stem cell research.     

The responsibilities of the engaged bioethicist: Scholar,advocate, activist

The work of a bioethicist carries distinctive responsibilities. Alongside those of any worker, there are responsibilities associated with giving guidance to practitioners, policy makers and the public. In addition, bioethicists are professionally exposed to and required to identify situations of moral trouble, and as a result may find themselves choosing to work as advocates or activists, with responsibilities that are distinct from those generally acknowledged within academia. The requirement for bioethics to make normative judgements entails taking a stance, which means there cannot be a sharp line between ‘academic’ or ‘objective’ bioethics, and advocacy/activism, but a continuum of bioethicists’ engagement and an associated continuum of responsibilities.     

Beyond the Sterility of a Distinct African Bioethics: Addressing the Conceptual Bioethics Lag in Africa

In the current debate on the future of bioethics in Africa, several authors have argued for a distinct communitarian African bioethics that can counter the dominancy of Western atomistic principlism in contemporary bioethics. In this article I examine this rather contentious argument and evaluate its validity and viability. Firstly, I trace the contextual origins of contemporary bioethics and highlight the rise and dominance of principlism. I particularly note that principlism was premised on a content‐thin notion of the common morality that is in need of enrichment. I also contend that bioethics is essentially two‐dimensional, being both conceptual and empirical, and indicate the lag in Africa with regard to conceptual bioethics. I then appeal for authentic engagement by 1) African health care professionals, 2) African health care training institutions, 3) Africa's bioethics development partners, and 4) African bioethicists and philosophers, towards addressing this critical lag. I underline the need to maintain the essential universality of bioethics as a discipline. I particularly argue against the pursuit of a distinct African bioethics, as it appears to be rooted in sterile African ethno‐philosophy. Rather, African bioethicists and philosophers would do well to elucidate the universalisability of insights from traditional African thought, for the benefit of bioethics as a whole. Thus we must engage beyond the sterility of a distinct African bioethics ‐ authentically reflecting on the essentially universal contemporary bioethical concerns ‐ to effectively articulate a viable trajectory for bioethics in Africa.