State Dependent Valuation: The Effect of Deprivation on Risk Preferences

The internal state of an organism affects its choices. Previous studies in various non-human animals have demonstrated a complex, and in some cases non-monotonic, interaction between internal state and risk preferences. Our aim was to examine the systematic effects of deprivation on human decision-making across various reward types. Using both a non-parametric approach and a classical economic analysis, we asked whether the risk attitudes of human subjects towards money, food and water rewards would change as a function of their internal metabolic state. Our findings replicate some previous work suggesting that, on average, humans become more risk tolerant in their monetary decisions, as they get hungry. However, our specific approach allowed us to make two novel observations about the complex interaction between internal state and risk preferences. First, we found that the change in risk attitude induced by food deprivation is a general phenomenon, affecting attitudes towards both monetary and consumable rewards. But much more importantly, our data indicate that rather than each subject becoming more risk tolerant as previously hypothesized based on averaging across subjects, we found that as a population of human subjects becomes food deprived the heterogeneity of their risk attitudes collapses towards a fixed point. Thus subjects who show high-risk aversion while satiated shift towards moderate risk aversion when deprived but subjects who are risk tolerant become more risk averse. These findings demonstrate a more complicated interaction between internal state and risk preferences and raise some interesting implications for both day-to-day decisions and financial market structures.     

Voting Intention and Choices: Are Voters Always Rational and Deliberative?

Human rationality–the ability to behave in order to maximize the achievement of their presumed goals (i.e., their optimal choices)–is the foundation for democracy. Research evidence has suggested that voters may not make decisions after exhaustively processing relevant information; instead, our decision-making capacity may be restricted by our own biases and the environment. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which humans in a democratic society can be rational when making decisions in a serious, complex situation–voting in a local political election. We believe examining human rationality in a political election is important, because a well-functioning democracy rests largely upon the rational choices of individual voters. Previous research has shown that explicit political attitudes predict voting intention and choices (i.e., actual votes) in democratic societies, indicating that people are able to reason comprehensively when making voting decisions. Other work, though, has demonstrated that the attitudes of which we may not be aware, such as our implicit (e.g., subconscious) preferences, can predict voting choices, which may question the well-functioning democracy. In this study, we systematically examined predictors on voting intention and choices in the 2014 mayoral election in Taipei, Taiwan. Results indicate that explicit political party preferences had the largest impact on voting intention and choices. Moreover, implicit political party preferences interacted with explicit political party preferences in accounting for voting intention, and in turn predicted voting choices. Ethnic identity and perceived voting intention of significant others were found to predict voting choices, but not voting intention. In sum, to the comfort of democracy, voters appeared to engage mainly explicit, controlled processes in making their decisions; but findings on ethnic identity and perceived voting intention of significant others may suggest otherwise.     

A cognitive framework for mate choice and species recognition

Mating decisions contribute to both the fitness of individuals and the emergence of evolutionary diversity, yet little is known about their cognitive architecture. We propose a simple model that describes how preferences are translated into decisions and how seemingly disparate patterns of preference can emerge from a single perceptual process. The model proposes that females use error-prone estimates of attractiveness to select mates based on a simple decision rule: choose the most attractive available male that exceeds some minimal criterion. We test the model in the tungara frog, a well-characterized species with an apparent dissociation between mechanisms of mate choice and species recognition. As suggested by our model results, we find that a mate attraction feature alters assessments of species status. Next, we compare female preferences in one-choice and two-choice tests, contexts thought to emphasize species recognition and mate choice, respectively. To do so, we use the model to generate maximum-likelihood estimators of preference strengths from empirical data. We find that a single representation of preferences is sufficient to explain response probabilities in both contexts across a wide range of stimuli. In this species, mate choice and species recognition are accurately and simply summarized by our model. While the findings resolve long-standing anomalies, they also illustrate how models of choice can bridge theoretical and empirical treatments of animal decisions. The data demonstrate a remarkable congruity of perceptual processes across contexts, tasks, and taxa.     

Subjective optimality in finite sequential decision-making

Many decisions in life are sequential and constrained by a time window. Although mathematically derived optimal solutions exist, it has been reported that humans often deviate from making optimal choices. Here, we used a secretary problem, a classic example of finite sequential decision-making, and investigated the mechanisms underlying individuals’ suboptimal choices. Across three independent experiments, we found that a dynamic programming model comprising subjective value function explains individuals’ deviations from optimality and predicts the choice behaviors under fewer and more opportunities. We further identified that pupil dilation reflected the levels of decision difficulty and subsequent choices to accept or reject the stimulus at each opportunity. The value sensitivity, a model-based estimate that characterizes each individual’s subjective valuation, correlated with the extent to which individuals’ physiological responses tracked stimuli information. Our results provide model-based and physiological evidence for subjective valuation in finite sequential decision-making, rediscovering human suboptimality in subjectively optimal decision-making processes.     

Economic Behavior under the Influence of Alcohol: An Experiment on Time Preferences,Risk-Taking,and Altruism

We report results from an incentivized laboratory experiment undertaken with the purpose of providing controlled evidence on the causal effects of alcohol consumption on risk-taking, time preferences and altruism. Our design disentangles the pharmacological effects of alcohol intoxication from those mediated by expectations, as we compare the behavior of three groups of subjects: those who participated in an experiment with no reference to alcohol, those who were exposed to the possibility of consuming alcohol but were given a placebo and those who effectively consumed alcohol. All subjects participated in a series of economic tasks administered in the same sequence across treatments. After controlling for both the willingness to pay for an object and the potential misperception of probabilities as elicited in the experiment, we detect no effect of alcohol in depleting subjects’ risk tolerance. However, we find that alcohol intoxication increases impatience and makes subjects less altruistic.     

An association between prediction errors and risk-seeking: Theory and behavioral evidence

Reward prediction errors (RPEs) and risk preferences have two things in common: both can shape decision making behavior, and both are commonly associated with dopamine. RPEs drive value learning and are thought to be represented in the phasic release of striatal dopamine. Risk preferences bias choices towards or away from uncertainty; they can be manipulated with drugs that target the dopaminergic system. Based on the common neural substrate, we hypothesize that RPEs and risk preferences are linked on the level of behavior as well. Here, we develop this hypothesis theoretically and test it empirically. First, we apply a recent theory of learning in the basal ganglia to predict how RPEs influence risk preferences. We find that positive RPEs should cause increased risk-seeking, while negative RPEs should cause risk-aversion. We then test our behavioral predictions using a novel bandit task in which value and risk vary independently across options. Critically, conditions are included where options vary in risk but are matched for value. We find that our prediction was correct: participants become more risk-seeking if choices are preceded by positive RPEs, and more risk-averse if choices are preceded by negative RPEs. These findings cannot be explained by other known effects, such as nonlinear utility curves or dynamic learning rates.     

No Effects of Psychosocial Stress on Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal choices - involving decisions which trade off instant and delayed outcomes - are often made under stress. It remains unknown, however, whether and how stress affects intertemporal choice. We subjected 142 healthy male subjects to a laboratory stress or control protocol, and asked them to make a series of intertemporal choices either directly after stress, or 20 minutes later (resulting in four experimental groups). Based on theory and evidence from behavioral economics and cellular neuroscience, we predicted a bidirectional effect of stress on intertemporal choice, with increases in impatience or present bias immediately after stress, but decreases in present bias or impatience when subjects are tested 20 minutes later. However, our results show no effects of stress on intertemporal choice at either time point, and individual differences in stress reactivity (changes in stress hormone levels over time) are not related to individual differences in intertemporal choice. Together, we did not find support for the hypothesis that psychosocial laboratory stressors affect intertemporal choice.     

Risk sensitivity for amounts of and delay to rewards: adaptation for uncertainty or by-product of reward rate maximising?

Observations that humans and other species are sensitive to variability in the outcome of their choices has led to the widespread assumption that this sensitivity reflects adaptations to cope with risk (stochasticity of action consequences). We question this assumption in experiments with starlings. We show that choices between outcomes that are risky in both amount and delay to food are predictable from preferences in the absence of risk. We find that the overarching best predictor of an option's value is the average of the ratios of amount to delay across its (frequency weighted) outcomes, an expression known as “Expectation of the Ratios”, or EoR. Most tests of risk sensitivity focus on the predicted impact of energetic state on preference for risk. We show instead that under controlled state conditions subjects are variance- and risk-neutral with respect to EoR, and this implies variance neutrality for amounts and variance-proneness for delays. The weak risk aversion for amounts often reported requires a small modification of EoR. EoR is consistent with associative learning: acquisition of value for initially neutral stimuli is roughly proportional to the magnitude of their consequences and inversely proportional to the interval between the stimulus and its consequence's onset. If, as is likely, the effect of amount on acquisition is sublinear, the result is a deviation from EoR towards risk aversion for amount. In 3 experiments, we first establish individual birds’ preferences between pairs of fixed options that differ in both amount and delay (small-sooner vs. large-later), and then examine choices between stochastic mixtures that include these options. Experiment 1 uses a titration to establish certainty equivalents, while experiments 2 and 3 measure degree of preference between options with static parameters. The mixtures differ in the coefficient of variation of amount, delay, or both, but EoR is sufficient to predict all results, with no additional explanatory role for riskiness.     

Cortical and Hippocampal Correlates of Deliberation during Model-Based Decisions for Rewards in Humans

How do we use our memories of the past to guide decisions we''ve never had to make before? Although extensive work describes how the brain learns to repeat rewarded actions, decisions can also be influenced by associations between stimuli or events not directly involving reward — such as when planning routes using a cognitive map or chess moves using predicted countermoves — and these sorts of associations are critical when deciding among novel options. This process is known as model-based decision making. While the learning of environmental relations that might support model-based decisions is well studied, and separately this sort of information has been inferred to impact decisions, there is little evidence concerning the full cycle by which such associations are acquired and drive choices. Of particular interest is whether decisions are directly supported by the same mnemonic systems characterized for relational learning more generally, or instead rely on other, specialized representations. Here, building on our previous work, which isolated dual representations underlying sequential predictive learning, we directly demonstrate that one such representation, encoded by the hippocampal memory system and adjacent cortical structures, supports goal-directed decisions. Using interleaved learning and decision tasks, we monitor predictive learning directly and also trace its influence on decisions for reward. We quantitatively compare the learning processes underlying multiple behavioral and fMRI observables using computational model fits. Across both tasks, a quantitatively consistent learning process explains reaction times, choices, and both expectation- and surprise-related neural activity. The same hippocampal and ventral stream regions engaged in anticipating stimuli during learning are also engaged in proportion to the difficulty of decisions. These results support a role for predictive associations learned by the hippocampal memory system to be recalled during choice formation.     

Dynamic Integration of Value Information into a Common Probability Currency as a Theory for Flexible Decision Making

Decisions involve two fundamental problems, selecting goals and generating actions to pursue those goals. While simple decisions involve choosing a goal and pursuing it, humans evolved to survive in hostile dynamic environments where goal availability and value can change with time and previous actions, entangling goal decisions with action selection. Recent studies suggest the brain generates concurrent action-plans for competing goals, using online information to bias the competition until a single goal is pursued. This creates a challenging problem of integrating information across diverse types, including both the dynamic value of the goal and the costs of action. We model the computations underlying dynamic decision-making with disparate value types, using the probability of getting the highest pay-off with the least effort as a common currency that supports goal competition. This framework predicts many aspects of decision behavior that have eluded a common explanation.     

Intangibility in intertemporal choice

Since the advent of the discounted utility (DU) model, economists have thought about intertemporal choice in very specific terms. DU assumes that people make explicit trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at different points in time. While this explicit trade-off perspective is simple and tractable, and has stimulated productive research, it does not provide a very realistic representation of a wide range of the most important intertemporal trade-offs that people face in daily life. If one considers the most important and commonly discussed examples of intertemporal choices, a striking pattern emerges: in almost all cases, early outcomes tend to be concrete (e.g. purchasing this latte), but later outcomes tend to be much less tangible (e.g. the unknown item that could have been purchased later with the money spent on this latte). We propose that people rely on anticipatory emotions as a proxy for intangible outcomes when trade-offs are implicit. This paper reviews neuroeconomic evidence that has begun to elucidate the role of anticipatory emotions in decisions involving intangible outcomes. Although most progress has been made in the domain of spending and saving, we discuss how the existing neuroeconomic research could be extended to other domains where trade-offs are ill defined.     

Facial attractiveness: evolutionary based research

Face preferences affect a diverse range of critical social outcomes, from mate choices and decisions about platonic relationships to hiring decisions and decisions about social exchange. Firstly, we review the facial characteristics that influence attractiveness judgements of faces (e.g. symmetry, sexually dimorphic shape cues, averageness, skin colour/texture and cues to personality) and then review several important sources of individual differences in face preferences (e.g. hormone levels and fertility, own attractiveness and personality, visual experience, familiarity and imprinting, social learning). The research relating to these issues highlights flexible, sophisticated systems that support and promote adaptive responses to faces that appear to function to maximize the benefits of both our mate choices and more general decisions about other types of social partners.     

Too much of a good thing? Variety is confusing in mate choice

Choice variety is supposed to increase the likelihood that a chooser's preferences are satisfied. To assess the effects of variety on real-world mate choice, we analysed human dating decisions across 84 speed-dating events (events in which people go on a series of sequential 'mini-dates'). Results showed that choosers made fewer proposals (positive dating decisions) at events in which the available dates showed greater variety across such attributes as age, height, occupation and education, and this effect was particularly strong when choosers were confronted with a larger number of opposite-sex speed daters. Additionally, participants attending events in which the available options showed greater variety across these attributes were less likely to choose the consensually preferred mate option and more likely to choose no one at all. In contexts in which time is a limited resource, choice variety-rather than facilitating choice quality or increasing choosiness-is confusing and potentially detrimental to choice quality.     

Risk-seeking or impatient? Disentangling variance and time in hazardous behaviors

Individual observations of risky behaviors present a paradox: individuals who take the most risks in terms of hazards (smoking, speeding, risky sexual behaviors) are also less likely to take risks when it comes to innovation, financial risks or entrepreneurship. Existing theories of risk-preferences do not explain these patterns. From a simple model, we argue that many decisions involving risk have a temporal dimension, and that this dimension is often the main determinant of individual choices. In many real life instances, risk taking amounts to damaging the individual's capital (whether embodied capital, financial capital, social reputation, etc.), which would affect her over a long period of time after the risky decision. In evolutionary terms, the marginal cost of this type of risky behavior depends on the relative importance of the future in the individual's fitness (e.g. her time horizon). Individuals with short time horizons will give less importance to a degradation of their capital because this degradation will be paid effectively for a shorter period of time. This approach explains patterns of behaviors observed across socio-economic groups and puts forward new approaches to prevent hazardous behaviors such as smoking.     

Do plant secondary compounds determine feeding preferences of snowshoe hares?

Summary We investigated the food preferences of captive snowshoc hares (Lepus americanus) in winter to test three hypotheses proposed to explain food choices by hares: (1) that food choice is related to the protein content of twigs; 92) that defensive chemicals present in twigs are negatively correlated with hare food preferences; and (3) that hares eat less-preferred but protein-rich twigs when their diet is buffered by large amounts of palatable food. Hares exhibited striking and consistent preferences for different species and, in general, preferred mature twigs to juvenile growth stages. Preferences across species among mature twigs were not, however, the same as preferences for juvenile growth stages across species. None of the three hypotheses adequately explained food choice by hares. Hares did not (1) select twigs that were high in protein content. They also did not (2) consistently select twigs that were low in resins or phenols. Finally (3), hares generally ate less, not more of non-preferred twigs in the presence of a protein and energy rich alternative food, commercial rabbit chow. Food preferences of hares must presumably have some chemical basis, but no simple theory has yet explained what this is. We suggest that hares may not be under severe dietary constraints imposed by chemical defenses in winter.     

Follow the straggler: zebrafish use a simple heuristic for collective decision-making

Animal groups often make decisions sequentially, from the front to the back of the group. In such cases, individuals can use the choices made by earlier ranks, a form of social information, to inform their own choice. The optimal strategy for such decisions has been explored in models which differ on, for example, whether or not agents take into account the sequence of observed choices. The models demonstrate that choices made later in a sequence are more informative, but it is not clear if animals use this information or rely instead on simpler heuristics, such as quorum rules. We show that a simple rule ‘copy the last observed choice'', gives similar predictions to those of optimal models for most likely sequences. We trained groups of zebrafish to choose one arm of a Y-maze and used them to demonstrate various sequences to naive fish. We show that the naive fish appear to use a simple rule, most often copying the choice of the last demonstrator, which results in near-optimal choices at a fraction of the computational cost.     

Cognitive mechanisms of risky choice: is there an evaluation cost?

We contrast two classes of choice processes, those assuming time-consuming comparisons and those where stimuli for each option act independently, competing for expression by cross censorship. The Sequential Choice Model (SCM) belongs in the latter category, and has received empirical support in several procedures involving deterministic alternatives. Here we test this model in risky choices. In two treatments, each with five conditions, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) faced choices between options with unpredictable outcomes and risk-free alternatives. In the delay treatment the five conditions involved choices between a variable option offering two equiprobable delays to reward and a fixed option with delay differing between conditions. The amount treatment was structurally similar, but amount of reward rather than delay was manipulated. As assumed (and required) by the SCM, latency to respond in no-choice trials reflected each option's richness with respect to the background alternatives, and, crucially, preferences in simultaneous choices were predictable from latencies to each option in forced trials. However, we did not detect reliable differences in response times between forced and choice trials, neither the lengthening expected from evaluation models nor the shortening expected from the SCM.     

Female Preferences for Male Vocal and Facial Masculinity in Videos

Vocal and facial masculinity are cues to underlying testosterone in men and influence women’s mate preferences. Consistent with the proposal that facial and vocal masculinity signal common information about men, prior work has revealed correlated female preferences for male facial and vocal masculinity. Previous studies have assessed women’s preferences for male facial and vocal masculinity by presenting faces and voices independently and using static face stimuli. By contrast, here we presented women with short video clips in which male faces and voices were simultaneously manipulated in masculinity. We found that women who preferred masculine faces also preferred masculine voices. Furthermore, women whose faces were rated as relatively more attractive preferred both facial and vocal masculinity more than did women whose faces were rated as less attractive. These findings complement other evidence for cross‐modal masculinity preferences among women and demonstrate that preferences observed in studies using still images and/or independently presented vocal stimuli are also observed when dynamic faces and voices are displayed simultaneously in video format.     

Massive genomic rearrangement acquired in a single catastrophic event during cancer development

Cancer is driven by somatically acquired point mutations and chromosomal rearrangements, conventionally thought to accumulate gradually over time. Using next-generation sequencing, we characterize a phenomenon, which we term chromothripsis, whereby tens to hundreds of genomic rearrangements occur in a one-off cellular crisis. Rearrangements involving one or a few chromosomes crisscross back and forth across involved regions, generating frequent oscillations between two copy number states. These genomic hallmarks are highly improbable if rearrangements accumulate over time and instead imply that nearly all occur during a single cellular catastrophe. The stamp of chromothripsis can be seen in at least 2%-3% of all cancers, across many subtypes, and is present in ～25% of bone cancers. We find that one, or indeed more than one, cancer-causing lesion can emerge out of the genomic crisis. This phenomenon has important implications for the origins of genomic remodeling and temporal emergence of cancer.