Categorial Compositionality: A Category Theory Explanation for the Systematicity of Human Cognition

Classical and Connectionist theories of cognitive architecture seek to explain systematicity (i.e., the property of human cognition whereby cognitive capacity comes in groups of related behaviours) as a consequence of syntactically and functionally compositional representations, respectively. However, both theories depend on ad hoc assumptions to exclude specific instances of these forms of compositionality (e.g. grammars, networks) that do not account for systematicity. By analogy with the Ptolemaic (i.e. geocentric) theory of planetary motion, although either theory can be made to be consistent with the data, both nonetheless fail to fully explain it. Category theory, a branch of mathematics, provides an alternative explanation based on the formal concept of adjunction, which relates a pair of structure-preserving maps, called functors. A functor generalizes the notion of a map between representational states to include a map between state transformations (or processes). In a formal sense, systematicity is a necessary consequence of a higher-order theory of cognitive architecture, in contrast to the first-order theories derived from Classicism or Connectionism. Category theory offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science, analogous to the one that Copernicus provided for astronomy, where representational states are no longer the center of the cognitive universe—replaced by the relationships between the maps that transform them.     

Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology

In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psychopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism – either human or non-human – capable of detecting its own misrepresentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, ex hypothesi, unable to detect error in such representations. To solve this problem, we argue that adding a historical dimension – as in Millikan’s view on mental representations – to Bickhard’s account of function makes mental misrepresentation of mentally-ill minds possible. Using Bickhard’s dynamic account of function, it is possible to explain why delusions and other mental disorders can be seen as locally functional. However, an etiological dimension can further explain why misrepresentations seem to be globally dysfunctional. Even if representational or biosemiotic hypotheses about non-human psychopathology are difficult to confirm empirically, we defend the view that they can enrich our understanding of the causes and development of such pathologies, and may constitute a new progressive research programme.     

Satisfaction conditions in anticipatory mechanisms

The purpose of this paper is to present a general mechanistic framework for analyzing causal representational claims, and offer a way to distinguish genuinely representational explanations from those that invoke representations for honorific purposes. It is usually agreed that rats are capable of navigation (even in complete darkness, and when immersed in a water maze) because they maintain a cognitive map of their environment. Exactly how and why their neural states give rise to mental representations is a matter of an ongoing debate. I will show that anticipatory mechanisms involved in rats’ evaluation of possible routes give rise to satisfaction conditions of contents, and this is why they are representationally relevant for explaining and predicting rats’ behavior. I argue that a naturalistic account of satisfaction conditions of contents answers the most important objections of antirepresentationalists.     

Learning and selection

Are learning processes selection processes? This paper takes a slightly modified version of the account of selection presented in Hull et al. (Behav Brain Sci 24:511–527, 2001) and asks whether it applies to learning processes. The answer is that although some learning processes are selectional, many are not. This has consequences for teleological theories of mental content. According to these theories, mental states have content in virtue of having proper functions, and they have proper functions in virtue of being the products of selection processes. For some mental states, it is plausible that the relevant selection process is natural selection, but there are many for which it is not plausible. One response to this (due to David Papineau) is to suggest that the learning processes by which we acquire non-innate mental states are selection processes and can therefore confer proper functions on mental states. This paper considers two ways in which this response could be elaborated, and argues that neither of them succeed: the teleosemanticist cannot rely on the claim that learning processes are selection processes in order to justify the attribution of proper functions to beliefs.     

On the mathematical modelling of pain

In this review a case is presented for the use of mathematical modelling in the study of pain. The philosophy of mathematical modelling is outlined and a recommendation is made for the use of modern nonlinear techniques and computational neuroscience in the modelling of pain. Classic and more recent examples of modelling in neurobiology in general and pain in particular, at three different levels—molecular, cellular and neural networks—are described and evaluated. Directions for further progress are indicated, particularly in plasticity and in modelling brain mechanisms. Major advantages of mathematical modelling are that it can handle extremely complex theories and it is non-invasive, and so is particularly valuable in the investigation of chronic pain. Special issue dedicated to Dr. Herman Bachelard     

Arousal increases the representational capacity of cortical tissue

Arousal patently transforms the faculties of complex organisms. Although typical changes in cortical activity such as seen in EEG and LFP measurements are associated with change in state of arousal, it remains unclear what in the constitution of such state dependent activity enables this profound enhancement of ability. We put forward the hypothesis that arousal modulates cortical activity by rendering it more fit to represent information. We argue that representational capacity is of a dual nature—it requires not only that cortical tissue generate complex activity (i.e. spatiotemporal neuronal events), but also a complex cortical activity space (which is comprised of such spatiotemporal events). We explain that the topological notion of complexity—homology—is the pertinent measure of the complexity of neuronal activity spaces, as homological structure indicates not only the degree to which underlying activity is inherently clustered but also registers the effective dimensionality of the configurations formed by such clusters. Changes of this sort in the structure of cortical activity spaces can serve as the basis of the enhanced capacity to make perceptual/behavioral distinctions brought about by arousal. To show the feasibility of these ideas, we analyzed voltage sensitive dye imaging (VSDI) data acquired from primate visual cortex in disparate states of arousal. Our results lend some support to the theory: first as arousal increased so did the complexity of activity (that is the complexity of VSDI movies). Moreover, the complexity of structure of activity space (that is VSDI movie space) as measured by persistent homology—a multi scale topological measure of complexity—increased with arousal as well.     

Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience

Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a ‘selection process’ to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning—that is, to include structures that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature.     

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures?in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.     

The engram formation and the global oscillations of CA3

The investigation on the conditions which cause global population oscillatory activities in neural fields, originated some years ago with reference to a kinetic theory of neural systems, as been further deepened in this paper. In particular, the genesis of sharp waves and of some rhythmic activities, such as theta and gamma rhythms, of the hippocampal CA3 field, behaviorally important for their links to learning and memory, has been analyzed with more details. To this aim, the modeling-computational framework previously devised for the study of activities in large neural fields, has been enhanced in such a way that a greater number of biological features, extended dendritic trees—in particular, could be taken into account. By using that methodology, a two-dimensional model of the entire CA3 field has been described and its activity, as it results from the several external inputs impinging on it, has been simulated. As a consequence of these investigations, some hypotheses have been elaborated about the possible function of global oscillatory activities of neural populations of Hippocampus in the engram formation.     

Evolutionary ethics,Darwinian ethics and ethical naturalism

The relevance of evolutionary theory to ethics goes back to Darwin but until recently discussion employed evolutionary theory to justify ethical, social and political positions. Recently, evolutionary theory has been used to explain the existence of moral systems and moral propensities and, thereby, to provide a naturalistic basis for ethics. I argue that this approach has advanced our understanding of the basis of moral systems and moral propensities but does not as yet adequately incorporate the role of cognition in its account. Cognition has the effect of decoupling to some extent — though, of course, far from fully — human moral systems from their evolutionary origins. In an adequate account, evolutionary theory will play a crucial role but so also will our evolved cognitive abilities.     

Plant transpiration and net entropy exchange on the Earth’s surface in a Czech watershed

The influence of plant transpiration on the entropy exchange was quantified as associated with the degradation of solar energy on the Earth’s surface covered by plants. Two surfaces were studied: (1) productive surface — plant transpiration taken as equal to the potential one, (2) non-productive surface — plant transpiration taken as equal to zero. The entropy exchanges associated with the absorption of solar radiation and with the conversion of absorbed solar radiation into the sensible heat and latent heat were taken into account. These processes were examined in the experimental watershed Liz (828–1074 m a.s.l.) located in the Bohemian Forest (Czech Republic). We found that in the growing season 1992 the net entropy exchange in humid hydrologic period (the Earth’s surface is productive) was considerably higher than in the arid one (the Earth’s surface was productive in 39% of days, and non-productive in 61% of days). Considering that the biotic effect on the Earth’s functioning can be measured with the help of the net entropy exchange, we can assume that the theory that biotic activities — represented by plant transpiration here — are the cause of the self-organizing processes in Earth’s environment is proved in the watershed scale. Presented at the International Conference on Bioclimatology and Natural Hazards, Poľana nad Detvou, Slovakia, 17–20 September 2007.     

Evidence for Shared Cognitive Processing of Pitch in Music and Language

Language and music epitomize the complex representational and computational capacities of the human mind. Strikingly similar in their structural and expressive features, a longstanding question is whether the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underlying these abilities are shared or distinct – either from each other or from other mental processes. One prominent feature shared between language and music is signal encoding using pitch, conveying pragmatics and semantics in language and melody in music. We investigated how pitch processing is shared between language and music by measuring consistency in individual differences in pitch perception across language, music, and three control conditions intended to assess basic sensory and domain-general cognitive processes. Individuals’ pitch perception abilities in language and music were most strongly related, even after accounting for performance in all control conditions. These results provide behavioral evidence, based on patterns of individual differences, that is consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive mechanisms for pitch processing may be shared between language and music.     

A teleosemantic approach to information in the brain

The brain is often taken to be a paradigmatic example of a signaling system with semantic and representational properties, in which neurons are senders and receivers of information carried in action potentials. A closer look at this picture shows that it is not as appealing as it might initially seem in explaining the function of the brain. Working from several sender-receiver models within the teleosemantic framework, I will first argue that two requirements must be met for a system to support genuine semantic information: 1. The receiver must be competent—that is, it must be able to extract rewards from its environment on the basis of the signals that it receives. 2. The receiver must have some flexibility of response relative to the signal received. In the second part of the paper, this initial framework will be applied to neural processes, pointing to the surprising conclusion that signaling at the single-neuron level is only weakly semantic at best. Contrary to received views, neurons will have little or no access to semantic information (though their patterns of activity may carry plenty of quantitative, correlational information) about the world outside the organism. Genuine representation of the world requires an organism-level receiver of semantic information, to which any particular set of neurons makes only a small contribution.     

The psychology of social chess and the evolution of attribution mechanisms: explaining the fundamental attribution error

Theory of mind is the field devoted to understanding how organisms discern the mental states of others. Because mental states are not directly observable, they can only be inferred from observable features of the actor (such as behavior) and the situational context that the actor is in. Social psychologists, who study theory of mind processes under the rubric of attribution research, have shown that people often make a logical error of inference: The “fundamental attribution error” (FAE) is the tendency to assume that an actor's behavior and mental state correspond to a degree that is logically unwarranted by the situation. The social environment in which theory of mind capacities evolved may have influenced attributional processing in ways that could explain the error. In particular, the error could be caused by a psyche that is designed (1) to consider only those noncorresponding mental states (such as deception) that could have fitness consequences to the mind reader; (2) to bias inferences in a way that reduces the costs of erroneous inferences; or (3) to bias inferences in a way that yields reputational benefits. The existing literature is reviewed in light of these hypotheses.     

Relations of homology between higher cognitive emotions and basic emotions

In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology rather than in terms of shared function. This poses a direct challenge to the dominant philosophical view of how to define psychological categories, viz., ‘functionalism’. Although the implications of this position extend to all psychological traits, the debate has centered around ‘emotion’ as an example of a psychological category ripe for reinterpretation within this new framework of classification. I address arguments by Griffiths that emotions should be divided into at least two distinct classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and that these two classes require radically different theories to explain them. Griffiths argues that while basic emotions in humans are homologous to the corresponding states in other animals, higher cognitive emotions are dependent on mental capacities unique to humans, and are therefore not homologous to basic emotions. Using the example of shame, I argue that (a) many emotions that are commonly classified as being higher cognitive emotions actually correspond to certain basic emotions, and that (b) the “higher cognitive forms” of these emotions are best seen as being homologous to their basic forms.     

Population thinking and natural selection in dual-inheritance theory

A deflationary perspective on theories of cultural evolution, in particular dual-inheritance theory, has recently been proposed by Lewens. On this ‘pop-culture’ analysis, dual-inheritance theorists apply population thinking to cultural phenomena, without claiming that cultural items evolve by natural selection. This paper argues against this pop-culture analysis of dual-inheritance theory. First, it focuses on recent dual-inheritance models of specific patterns of cultural change. These models exemplify population thinking without a commitment to natural selection of cultural items. There are grounds, however, for doubting the added explanatory value of the models in their disciplinary context—and thus grounds for engaging in other potentially explanatory projects based on dual-inheritance theory. One such project is suggested by advocates of the theory. Some of the motivational narratives that they offer can be interpreted as setting up an adaptationist project with regard to cumulative change in cultural items. We develop this interpretation here. On it, dual-inheritance theory features two interrelated selection processes, one on the level of genetically inherited learning mechanisms, another on the level of the cultural items transmitted through these mechanisms. This interpretation identifies a need for further modelling efforts, but also offers scope for enhancing the explanatory power of dual-inheritance theory.     

Espaces de représentation et psychopathologie

A subjective world can be conceptualized as a “representational space” — that is, as a universe displayed from memory, in which the subject “is sailing”. Recent cognitive theory provides some conceptual tools for describing such a space in a relevant way for clinical purposes. The construction of a representational space is based on mental representations: (a) analogical representations, which display a content in working memory; (b) symbolic representations, which code and link up analogical representations to form a represented world. The dynamics of representations and affects is ruled by a principle of unification of representational space. The topology of a representational space depends on objective and subjective constraints which cause some “folds” and limit the display of such a space. The interaction between an event and a subjective memory can be analyzed within this framework, so that the concepts of trauma and defence processes can be defined. Clinical syndromes are defensive configurations that tend to close the representational space.     

The neural crest and neural crest cells: discovery and significance for theories of embryonic organization

The neural crest has long fascinated developmental biologists, and, increasingly over the past decades, evolutionary and evolutionary developmental biologists. The neural crest is the name given to the fold of ectoderm at the junction between neural and epidermal ectoderm in neurula-stage vertebrate embryos. In this sense, the neural crest is a morphological term akin to head fold or limb bud. This region of the dorsal neural tube consists of neural crest cells, a special population(s) of cell, that give rise to an astonishing number of cell types and to an equally astonishing number of tissues and organs. Neural crest cell contributions may be direct — providing cells — or indirect — providing a necessary, often inductive, environment in which other cells develop. The enormous range of cell types produced provides an important source of evidence of the neural crest as a germ layer, bringing the number of germ layers to four — ectoderm, endoderm, mesoderm, and neural crest. In this paper I provide a brief overview of the major phases of investigation into the neural crest and the major players involved, discuss how the origin of the neural crest relates to the origin of the nervous system in vertebrate embryos, discuss the impact on the germ-layer theory of the discovery of the neural crest and of secondary neurulation, and present evidence of the neural crest as the fourth germ layer. A companion paper (Hall, Evol. Biol. 2008) deals with the evolutionary origins of the neural crest and neural crest cells.     

A word in the hand: action, gesture and mental representation in humans and non-human primates

The movements we make with our hands both reflect our mental processes and help to shape them. Our actions and gestures can affect our mental representations of actions and objects. In this paper, we explore the relationship between action, gesture and thought in both humans and non-human primates and discuss its role in the evolution of language. Human gesture (specifically representational gesture) may provide a unique link between action and mental representation. It is kinaesthetically close to action and is, at the same time, symbolic. Non-human primates use gesture frequently to communicate, and do so flexibly. However, their gestures mainly resemble incomplete actions and lack the representational elements that characterize much of human gesture. Differences in the mirror neuron system provide a potential explanation for non-human primates' lack of representational gestures; the monkey mirror system does not respond to representational gestures, while the human system does. In humans, gesture grounds mental representation in action, but there is no evidence for this link in other primates. We argue that gesture played an important role in the transition to symbolic thought and language in human evolution, following a cognitive leap that allowed gesture to incorporate representational elements.