Wrath of God: religious primes and punishment

Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study, we investigated whether religious priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. A total of 304 participants played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes or control primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants--those who had previously donated to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially underpinning this effect. The first is a 'supernatural watcher' mechanism, whereby religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that not doing so will enrage or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a 'behavioural priming' mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their adherents.     

Prosocial primates: selfish and unselfish motivations

Non-human primates are marked by well-developed prosocial and cooperative tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression. The proximate motivation behind such behaviour is not to be confused with the ultimate reasons for its evolution. Even if a behaviour is ultimately self-serving, the motivation behind it may be genuinely unselfish. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn, therefore, between (i) altruistic and cooperative behaviour with knowable benefits to the actor, which may lead actors aware of these benefits to seek them by acting cooperatively or altruistically and (ii) altruistic behaviour that offers the actor no knowable rewards. The latter is the case if return benefits occur too unpredictably, too distantly in time or are of an indirect nature, such as increased inclusive fitness. The second category of behaviour can be explained only by assuming an altruistic impulse, which—as in humans—may be born from empathy with the recipient''s need, pain or distress. Empathy, a proximate mechanism for prosocial behaviour that makes one individual share another''s emotional state, is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies. This paper further reviews observational and experimental evidence for the reciprocity mechanisms that underlie cooperation among non-relatives, for inequity aversion as a constraint on cooperation and on the way defection is dealt with.     

Historical and ecological controls on phylogenetic diversity in Californian plant communities

An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other's actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral responses and in facilitating evolutionary transitions in individuality.     

Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.     

Working together may be better: activation of reward centers during a cooperative maze task

Humans use theory of mind when predicting the thoughts and feelings and actions of others. There is accumulating evidence that cooperation with a computerized game correlates with a unique pattern of brain activation. To investigate the neural correlates of cooperation in real-time we conducted an fMRI hyperscanning study. We hypothesized that real-time cooperation to complete a maze task, using a blind-driving paradigm, would activate substrates implicated in theory of mind. We also hypothesized that cooperation would activate neural reward centers more than when participants completed the maze themselves. Of interest and in support of our hypothesis we found left caudate and putamen activation when participants worked together to complete the maze. This suggests that cooperation during task completion is inherently rewarding. This finding represents one of the first discoveries of a proximate neural mechanism for group based interactions in real-time, which indirectly supports the social brain hypothesis.     

Friends without benefits: When we react negatively to helpful and generous friends

Being able to identify reliable friends and allies is key to surviving and thriving in the social world. Many cooperative accounts of friendship argue that people select friends based on how helpful and generous they are. While people certainly like helpful and generous others, here we explore a context in which people might respond negatively to a friend being prosocial: When one's friend is more helpful or generous toward another friend. We argue that such preferential prosociality prompts negative reactions, even when the alternative is a friend being less prosocial overall, because giving preferentially to another friend may be viewed as a threat of potential displacement of one's own friendship. In four studies (N?=?702), we predict and find that people respond negatively to a friend who was more helpful (Studies 1–2) and generous (Studies 3–4), preferring instead that a friend be less helpful and generous overall. Importantly, this preferential prosociality was viewed as particularly negative when the recipient was another friend and was seen as much less negative when the recipient was a relative (Study 1 and 4) or a romantic partner (Study 2). We discuss the implications of these results for cooperation and alliance-based accounts of friendship.     

Prosocial behaviour emerges independent of reciprocity in cottontop tamarins

The cooperative breeding hypothesis posits that cooperatively breeding species are motivated to act prosocially, that is, to behave in ways that provide benefits to others, and that cooperative breeding has played a central role in the evolution of human prosociality. However, investigations of prosocial behaviour in cooperative breeders have produced varying results and the mechanisms contributing to this variation are unknown. We investigated whether reciprocity would facilitate prosocial behaviour among cottontop tamarins, a cooperatively breeding primate species likely to engage in reciprocal altruism, by comparing the number of food rewards transferred to partners who had either immediately previously provided or denied rewards to the subject. Subjects were also tested in a non-social control condition. Overall, results indicated that reciprocity increased food transfers. However, temporal analyses revealed that when the tamarins'' behaviour was evaluated in relation to the non-social control, results were best explained by (i) an initial depression in the transfer of rewards to partners who recently denied rewards, and (ii) a prosocial effect that emerged late in sessions independent of reciprocity. These results support the cooperative breeding hypothesis, but suggest a minimal role for positive reciprocity, and emphasize the importance of investigating proximate temporal mechanisms underlying prosocial behaviour.     

Skin conductance response to the pain of others predicts later costly helping

People show autonomic responses when they empathize with the suffering of another person. However, little is known about how these autonomic changes are related to prosocial behavior. We measured skin conductance responses (SCRs) and affect ratings in participants while either receiving painful stimulation themselves, or observing pain being inflicted on another person. In a later session, they could prevent the infliction of pain in the other by choosing to endure pain themselves. Our results show that the strength of empathy-related vicarious skin conductance responses predicts later costly helping. Moreover, the higher the match between SCR magnitudes during the observation of pain in others and SCR magnitude during self pain, the more likely a person is to engage in costly helping. We conclude that prosocial motivation is fostered by the strength of the vicarious autonomic response as well as its match with first-hand autonomic experience.     

Empathy as a driver of prosocial behaviour: highly conserved neurobehavioural mechanisms across species

Empathy reflects the natural ability to perceive and be sensitive to the emotional states of others, coupled with a motivation to care for their well-being. It has evolved in the context of parental care for offspring, as well as within kinship bonds, to help facilitate group living. In this paper, we integrate the perspectives of evolution, animal behaviour, developmental psychology, and social and clinical neuroscience to elucidate our understanding of the proximate mechanisms underlying empathy. We focus, in particular, on processing of signals of distress and need, and their relation to prosocial behaviour. The ability to empathize, both in animals and humans, mediates prosocial behaviour when sensitivity to others'' distress is paired with a drive towards their welfare. Disruption or atypical development of the neural circuits that process distress cues and integrate them with decision value leads to callous disregard for others, as is the case in psychopathy. The realization that basic forms of empathy exist in non-human animals is crucial for gaining new insights into the underlying neurobiological and genetic mechanisms of empathy, enabling translation towards therapeutic and pharmacological interventions.     

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

Why aren’t we all hutterites?

In this paper I explore the psychology of ritual performance and present a simple graphical model that clarifies several issues in William Irons’s theory of religion as a “hard-to-fake” sign of commitment. Irons posits that religious behaviors or rituals serve as costly signals of an individual’s commitment to a religious group. Increased commitment among members of a religious group may facilitate intra-group cooperation, which is argued to be the primary adaptive benefit of religion. Here I propose a proximate explanation for how individuals are able to pay the short-term costs of ritual performance to achieve the long-term fitness benefits offered by religious groups. The model addresses three significant problems raised by Irons’s theory. First, the model explains why potential free-riders do not join religious groups even when there are significant net benefits that members of religious groups can achieve. Second, the model clarifies how costly a ritual must be to achieve stability and prevent potential free-riders from joining the religious group. Third, the model suggests why religious groups may require adherents to perform private rituals that are not observed by others. Several hypotheses generated from the model are also discussed. Richard Sosis is an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Connecticut. His research interests include the evolution of cooperation, utopian societies, and the behavioral ecology of religion. In collaboration with Bradley Ruffle (Ben Gurion University) he is currently investigating the impact of privatization and religiosity on intra-group trust within Israeli Kibbutzim.     

Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory

ABSTRACT  Experiments have become a popular method to study altruism and cooperation in laboratory and, more recently, in field settings. However, few studies have examined whether behavior in experiments tells us anything about behavior in the "real world." To investigate the external validity of several common experimental economics games, we compare game behavior with prosocial behavior among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of lowland Bolivia. We find that food-sharing patterns, social visitation, beer production and consumption, labor participation, and contributions to a feast are not robustly correlated with levels of giving in the economics games. Payoff structure and socioecological context may be more important in predicting prosocial behavior in a wide variety of domains than stable personality traits. We argue that future experimental methods should be tailored to specific research questions, show reduced anonymity, and incorporate repeat measures under a variety of conditions to inform and redirect ethnographic study and build scientific theory. [Keywords: altruism, cooperation, experimental economics, Tsimane]     

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect

The evolution of cooperation—costly behavior that benefits others—faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the “Hankshaw effect” after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent‐based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely.     

The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.     

Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness: Disentangling the signaling benefits of altruistic acts

It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.     

Strict or Graduated Punishment? Effect of Punishment Strictness on the Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Public Goods Games

Whether costly punishment encourages cooperation is one of the principal questions in studies on the evolution of cooperation and social sciences. In society, punishment helps deter people from flouting rules in institutions. Specifically, graduated punishment is a design principle for long-enduring common-pool resource institutions. In this study, we investigate whether graduated punishment can promote a higher cooperation level when each individual plays the public goods game and has the opportunity to punish others whose cooperation levels fall below the punisher’s threshold. We then examine how spatial structure affects evolutionary dynamics when each individual dies inversely proportional to the game score resulting from the social interaction and another player is randomly chosen from the population to produce offspring to fill the empty site created after a player’s death. Our evolutionary simulation outcomes demonstrate that stricter punishment promotes increased cooperation more than graduated punishment in a spatially structured population, whereas graduated punishment increases cooperation more than strict punishment when players interact with randomly chosen opponents from the population. The mathematical analysis also supports the results.     

Recipients affect prosocial and altruistic choices in jackdaws, Corvus monedula

Other-regarding preferences are a critical feature of human cooperation but to what extent non-human animals exhibit these preferences is a matter of intense discussion. We tested whether jackdaws show prosocial behaviour (providing benefits to others at no cost to themselves) and altruism (providing benefits to others while incurring costs) with both sibling and non-sibling recipients. In the prosocial condition, a box was baited on both the actor's and the recipient's side (1/1 option), whereas another box provided food only for the actor (1/0 option). In the altruistic condition, the boxes contained food for either the actor (1/0 option) or the recipient (0/1 option). The proportion of selfish (1/0 option) and cooperative (1/1 and 0/1 option, respectively) actors' choices was significantly affected by the recipients' behaviour. If recipients approached the boxes first and positioned themselves next to the box baited on their side, trying to access the food reward (recipient-first trials), actors were significantly more cooperative than when the actors approached the boxes first and made their choice prior to the recipients' arrival (actor-first trials). Further, in recipient-first trials actors were more cooperative towards recipients of the opposite sex, an effect that was even more pronounced in the altruistic condition. Hence, at no cost to the actors, all recipients could significantly influence the actors' behaviour, whereas at high costs this could be achieved even more so by recipients of different sex. Local/stimulus enhancement is discussed as the most likely cognitive mechanism to account for these effects.     

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation based on helping those who help others. However, the use of ‘image scores’ to summarize individuals’ past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Explaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all previous treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors. Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group, or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of helping those who help others can work.     

On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality

In any given species, cooperation involves prosocial acts that usually return a fitness benefit to the actor. These acts are produced by a set of psychological rules, which will be similar in related species if they have a similar natural history of cooperation. Prosocial acts can be (i) reactive, i.e. in response to specific stimuli, or (ii) proactive, i.e. occur in the absence of such stimuli. We propose that reactive prosocial acts reflect sensitivity to (i) signals or signs of need and (ii) the presence and size of an audience, as modified by (iii) social distance to the partner or partners. We examine the evidence for these elements in humans and other animals, especially non-human primates, based on the natural history of cooperation, quantified in the context of food sharing, and various experimental paradigms. The comparison suggests that humans share with their closest living relatives reactive responses to signals of need, but differ in sensitivity to signs of need and cues of being watched, as well as in the presence of proactive prosociality. We discuss ultimate explanations for these derived features, in particular the adoption of cooperative breeding as well as concern for reputation and costly signalling during human evolution.