Distinctions among reciprocal altruism,kin selection,and cooperation and a model for the initial evolution of beneficent behavior

Reciprocal altruism is usually regarded as distinct from kin selection. However, because reciprocators are likely to establish long-term relations and to deliver most of their aid to other individuals genetically predisposed to reciprocation, most acts of reciprocal altruism should involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness, at least as regards alleles for reciprocation. Thus, as usually defined, reciprocal altruism is not clearly distinct from kin selection because both involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness. We propose a new definition for reciprocal altruism that makes the phenomenon distinct from kin selection and allows for reciprocation between nonrelatives in which current costs exceed future benefits returned to the reciprocal altruist. Cooperation and reciprocal altruism are often considered synonymous or different only in the timing of donating and receiving aid. We show, however, that there are other critical differences between reciprocal altruism and other forms of cooperation, most importantly, the latter often involve no clearly identifiable aid. We propose a four-category system to encompass the range of cooperative and beneficent behaviors that occur in nature (reciprocal altruism, pseudoreciprocity, simultaneous cooperation and by-product beneficence). Reciprocal altruism must involve aid that is returned to an original donor as a result of behavior that has a net cost to an original recipient. Our simplest category of cooperative/beneficent behavior, “by-product beneficence,” occurs when a selfish act also benefits another individual and requires no prior or subsequent interactions between the individuals involved. By-product beneficence may be the primitive state from which more complicated types of cooperative/beneficent behavior evolved. We show via simple models that by-product beneficence can allow for the initial increase of helping behavior in a completely unstructured population although the individuals showing such behavior pay all the costs while sharing the benefits with other individuals. Previous models that attempted to explain the initial increase of cooperative/beneficent behavior were much more complex and were based on the prisoner's dilemma, which does not accurately reflect most forms of cooperation and beneficence that occur in nature.     

Models of the evolution of altruism

There are two ways of calculating the spread of a gene for altruism. One, originally proposed by Hamilton, is to allow for the effects of the gene on the survival and reproduction of collateral relatives of the individual carrying it (i.e., “inclusive fitness”); this leads to the condition k > 1/r for the spread of the gene, where k is a benefit/cost ratio. The other is to count only the direct offspring of a carrier, but to allow for the altruistic acts performed toward the carrier by its relatives (“neighbour modulated fitness” or “personal fitness”). A recent personal fitness model (L. L. Cavalli Sforza and M. W. Feldman, 1978, Theor. Pop. Biol.14, 268–280) analyses parent-offspring and sib-sib altruism and concludes that k > 1/r is applicable only when fitness components are combined additively. The present paper analyses some simple models in which the phenotypic effects are carefully specified. It is concluded that it is sometimes, but not always, appropriate to combine fitness components additively. The relative roles of inclusive and personal fitness models are compared. The former have the virtue of being easier to think about in causal terms; and the latter of incorporating the evolution of altruism into the corpus of population genetics as an example of frequency-dependent selection.     

A systematic bias against altruism due to an inevitable hitchhiking process in the hymenoptera (a sequel to the elevator effect)

A model is demonstrated with three genetic. loci. One is an altruism/selfishness allele pair, the other two affect individual fitness. Two main studies were conducted. One tried to repeat an experiment by Stroebeck, Maynard Smith and Charlesworth which showed genes for high crossover rates can hitchhike up more often than down. But here the altruism/selfishness locus replaced the recombination-rate locus. The other started out with “good, bad” and “bad, good” chromosomes looking to see if altruism would hitchhike, up on “good, good” or down on “bad, bad”, or not hitchhike at all, once crossing over has been going on. In all experiments altruism tended to hitchhike down on the most deleterious genotypes available at the other loci. This means the current study failed to shed light on the question of the cost of oogenesis.     

Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group selection

Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group selection. In this paper, we argue that the original interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because it is individually advantageous.     

Reciprocal altruism in bats and other mammals

In this paper five conditions are specified which must be met before reciprocal altruism, rather than kin selection, should be invoked. Four purported mammalian examples— social grooming in coati, cluster position in roosting pallid bats, information exchange among greater spear-nosed bats, and blood regurgitation among vampire bats—are examined to determine if reciprocal altruism is necessary to plausibly explain each situation. Results from a computer simulation which apportions the relative selective advantage of vampire bat food sharing to kin selection and reciprocal altruism are then presented. The results demonstrate that the increase in individual survivorship due to reciprocal food sharing events in this species provides a greater increase in inclusive fitness than can be attributed to aiding relatives. This analysis suggests that reciprocal altruism can be selectively more important than kin selection when altruistic behaviors in a relatively large social group occur frequently and provide a major fitness benefit to the recipient even when that recipient is related to the donor.     

Unifying the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism

Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are widely thought to be distinct explanations for how altruism evolves. Here we show that they rely on the same underlying mechanism. We demonstrate this commonality by applying Hamilton's rule, normally associated with inclusive fitness, to two simple models of reciprocal altruism: one, an iterated prisoner's dilemma model with conditional behavior; the other, a mutualistic symbiosis model where two interacting species differ in conditional behaviors, fitness benefits, and costs. We employ Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule because the traditional version of this rule does not apply when genotype and phenotype frequencies differ or when fitness effects are nonadditive, both of which are true in classic models of reciprocal altruism. Queller's equation is more general in that it applies to all situations covered by earlier versions of Hamilton's rule but also handles nonadditivity, conditional behavior, and lack of genetic similarity between altruists and recipients. Our results suggest changes to standard interpretations of Hamilton's rule that focus on kinship and indirect fitness. Despite being more than 20 years old, Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule is not sufficiently appreciated, especially its implications for the unification of the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.     

Exact versus heuristic models of kin selection

This paper examines the conditions under which the classical inclusive fitness formulation of Hamilton (1964) provides an adequate approximation to the dynamics of gene frequency change and to conditions for genetic equilibrium, in the “additive” model of altruism between sibs of Uyenoyama and Feldman (1981). It is concluded that the classical formulation is adequate, provided that either the effect of the gene on the probability of behaving altruistically is low or the costs and benefits of altruism are small, unless the benefit/cost ratio k is very close to 2, the value that must be exceeded for altruism to be favoured. In addition, the gene for altruism must be underdominant, recessive or partially recessive in its effect on the probability of behaving altruistically, for the inclusive fitness predictions to break down significantly.     

Social dynamics of mammals: Reproductive success, kinship and individual fitness

Apparent altruism, in which an individual seemingly decreases its evolutionary fitness by assisting others, can confer benefits if the individual assists kin. Thus, an animal can increase its total or inclusive fitness by producing offspring (direct fitness) and/or helping kin to reproduce (indirect fitness). Although kin selection has been suggested as the mechanism underlying the formation of mammalian societies, many species act as if they attempt to maximize the direct fitness component of their inclusive fitness.     

Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism

The complexity of human's cooperative behavior cannot be fully explained by theories of kin selection and group selection. If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic behavior, it would have to depart from direct reciprocity, which requires dyads of individuals to interact repeatedly. For indirect reciprocity to rationalize cooperation among genetically unrelated or even culturally dissimilar individuals, information about the reputation of individuals must be assessed and propagated in a population. Here, we propose a new framework for the evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: information selectively retrieved from and propagated through dynamically evolving networks of friends and acquaintances. We show that for indirect reciprocity to be evolutionarily stable, the differential probability of trusting and helping a reputable individual over a disreputable individual, at a point in time, must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. In other words, the benefit received by the trustworthy must out-weigh the cost of helping the untrustworthy.     

Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection

From an evolutionary perspective, social behaviours are those which have fitness consequences for both the individual that performs the behaviour, and another individual. Over the last 43 years, a huge theoretical and empirical literature has developed on this topic. However, progress is often hindered by poor communication between scientists, with different people using the same term to mean different things, or different terms to mean the same thing. This can obscure what is biologically important, and what is not. The potential for such semantic confusion is greatest with interdisciplinary research. Our aim here is to address issues of semantic confusion that have arisen with research on the problem of cooperation. In particular, we: (i) discuss confusion over the terms kin selection, mutualism, mutual benefit, cooperation, altruism, reciprocal altruism, weak altruism, altruistic punishment, strong reciprocity, group selection and direct fitness; (ii) emphasize the need to distinguish between proximate (mechanism) and ultimate (survival value) explanations of behaviours. We draw examples from all areas, but especially recent work on humans and microbes.     

Further remarks on Darwinian selection and “altruism”

In a recent note, Maynard Smith (Theor. Pop. Biol., in press) has claimed that there are certain difficulties in applying the method developed by us (Theor. Pop. Biol.14, 268–280) which incorporates the evolution of altruism into the population genetic theory of frequency-dependent selection. Of the four examples presented by Maynard Smith, the case of alarm calls was shown to have a natural expression in our multiplicative framework, and to produce conclusions different from those expected under the usual additive assumptions. We show here that the examples of the sterile worker, and of parental care are both simply expressible in terms of our conditional probability approach. The fourth example, the case of incest taboos, will be discussed elsewhere. Using Maynard Smith's examples important differences between the results for the additive and multiplicative fitness constructions are revealed. It is concluded that the heuristic approach using “inclusive fitness” offers no substantive advantages over exact population genetic modelling.     

The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models

One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is the origin and persistence of intraspecific cooperation and altruism in humans and other species. Hundreds of theoretical models have been proposed and there is much confusion about the relationship between these models. To clarify the situation, we developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be fulfilled: direct benefits to the focal individual performing a cooperative act; direct or indirect information allowing a better than random guess about whether a given individual will behave cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions; preferential interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be identified. When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or cooperation can evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and cooperative acts is greater than a threshold value. The cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion, punishment and policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the evolution of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing us to classify them into four general categories.     

How might Gyrodactylus parasitism modify trade-offs between female preference and susceptibility of males to predation in Trinidadian guppies?

A number of examples exist of trade-offs between mating success and survival; that is, success in one fitness component comes at the cost of success in the other fitness component. However, these expected trade-offs are – perhaps even more commonly – not observed. One explanation for this apparent paradox of missing trade-offs could be that the other factors generating fitness variation across individuals confound or obscure the expected trade-off. These confounding effects could arise in two general ways: (i) the additional source of variation could positively (or negatively) influence both fitness components (“shared confounder” hypothesis), or (ii) the additional source of variation could influence only one fitness component (“non-shared confounder” hypothesis). We tested whether parasitism by Gyrodactylus spp. could be a confounder of trade-offs between female preference and susceptibility to predation for male Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata). As in previous work, we did not find the expected trade-off; that is, the males preferred by females were not more likely to be eaten by predators. Because half of the experimental males were infected by Gyrodactylus in a paired design, we were able to show that females discriminated against infected males, but that infected males were not more susceptible to predation. Our results thus provide support for the non-shared confounder hypothesis. That is, by negatively affecting one fitness component (female choice) but not the other (susceptibility to predation), parasitism by Gyrodactylus could obscure the expected trade-off between female preference and susceptibility to predation.     

Questioning the cultural evolution of altruism

The evolutionary foundations of helping among nonkin in humans have been the object of intense debates in the past decades. One thesis has had a prominent influence in this debate: the suggestion that genuine altruism, strictly defined as a form of help that comes at a net fitness cost for the benefactor, might have evolved owing to cultural transmission. The gene–culture coevolution literature is wont to claim that cultural evolution changes the selective pressures that normally act to limit the emergence of altruistic behaviours. This paper aims to recall, however, that cultural transmission yields altruism only to the extent that it relies on maladaptive mechanisms, such as conformist imitation and (in some cases) payoff‐biased transmission. This point is sometimes obscured in the literature by a confusion between genuine altruism, maladaptive by definition, and mutualistic forms of cooperation, that benefit all parties in the long run. Theories of cultural altruism do not lift the selective pressures weighing on strictly altruistic actions; they merely shift the burden of maladaptation from social cognition to cultural transmission.     

Altruism and fairness: Unnatural selection?

Darwin admitted that the evolution of moral phenomena such as altruism and fairness, which are usually in opposition to the maximization of individual reproductive success, was not easily accounted for by natural selection. Later, authors have proposed additional mechanisms, including kin selection, inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism. In the present work, we explore the extent to which sexual selection has played a role in the appearance of human moral traits. It has been suggested that because certain moral virtues, including altruism and kindness, are sexually attractive, their evolution could have been shaped by the process of sexual selection. Our review suggests that although it is possible that sexual selection played such a role, it is difficult to determine the extent of its relevance, the specific form of this influence, and its interplay with other evolutionary mechanisms.     

Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle

Current work on cooperation is focused on the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, reciprocity is just one way of getting a return on an investment in altruism and is difficult to apply to many examples. Reciprocity theory addresses how animals respond dynamically to others so as to cooperate without being exploited. I discuss how introducing differences in individual generosity together with partner choice into models of reciprocity can lead to an escalation in altruistic behaviour. Individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may become ostracized. I refer to this phenomenon as competitive altruism and propose that it can represent a move away from the dynamic responsiveness of reciprocity. Altruism may be rewarded in kind, but rewards may be indirectly accrued or may not involve the return of altruism at all, for example if altruists tend to be chosen as mates. This variety makes the idea of competitive altruism relevant to behaviours which cannot be explained by reciprocity. I consider whether altruism might act as a signal of quality, as proposed by the handicap principle. I suggest that altruistic acts could make particularly effective signals because of the inherent benefits to receivers. I consider how reciprocity and competitive altruism are related and how they may be distinguished.     

A quantitative test of Hamilton's rule for the evolution of altruism

The evolution of altruism is a fundamental and enduring puzzle in biology. In a seminal paper Hamilton showed that altruism can be selected for when rb - c > 0, where c is the fitness cost to the altruist, b is the fitness benefit to the beneficiary, and r is their genetic relatedness. While many studies have provided qualitative support for Hamilton's rule, quantitative tests have not yet been possible due to the difficulty of quantifying the costs and benefits of helping acts. Here we use a simulated system of foraging robots to experimentally manipulate the costs and benefits of helping and determine the conditions under which altruism evolves. By conducting experimental evolution over hundreds of generations of selection in populations with different c/b ratios, we show that Hamilton's rule always accurately predicts the minimum relatedness necessary for altruism to evolve. This high accuracy is remarkable given the presence of pleiotropic and epistatic effects as well as mutations with strong effects on behavior and fitness (effects not directly taken into account in Hamilton's original 1964 rule). In addition to providing the first quantitative test of Hamilton's rule in a system with a complex mapping between genotype and phenotype, these experiments demonstrate the wide applicability of kin selection theory.     

The adaptive dynamics of altruism in spatially heterogeneous populations

Abstract.— We study the spatial adaptive dynamics of a continuous trait that measures individual investment in altruism. Our study is based on an ecological model of a spatially heterogeneous population from which we derive an appropriate measure of fitness. The analysis of this fitness measure uncovers three different selective processes controlling the evolution of altruism: the direct physiological cost, the indirect genetic benefits of cooperative interactions, and the indirect genetic costs of competition for space. In our model, habitat structure and a continuous life cycle makes the cost of competing for space with relatives negligible. Our study yields a classification of adaptive patterns of altruism according to the shape of the costs of altruism (with decelerating, linear, or accelerating dependence on the investment in altruism). The invasion of altruism occurs readily in species with accelerating costs, but large mutations are critical for altruism to evolve in selfish species with decelerating costs. Strict selfishness is maintained by natural selection only under very restricted conditions. In species with rapidly accelerating costs, adaptation leads to an evolutionarily stable rate of investment in altruism that decreases smoothly with the level of mobility. A rather different adaptive pattern emerges in species with slowly accelerating costs: high altruism evolves at low mobility, whereas a quasi-selfish state is promoted in more mobile species. The high adaptive level of altruism can be predicted solely from habitat connectedness and physiological parameters that characterize the pattern of cost. We also show that environmental changes that cause increased mobility in those highly altruistic species can beget selection-driven self-extinction, which may contribute to the rarity of social species.     

Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young children

People often act on behalf of others. They do so without immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives, such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two comparative studies, semi–free ranging chimpanzees helped an unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants, irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study, chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence suggested.