Newcastle Disease Virus-Vectored H7 and H5 Live Vaccines Protect Chickens from Challenge with H7N9 or H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses

Sporadic human infections by a novel H7N9 virus occurred over a large geographic region in China. In this study, we show that Newcastle disease virus (NDV)-vectored H7 (NDV-H7) and NDV-H5 vaccines are able to induce antibodies with high hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers and completely protect chickens from challenge with the novel H7N9 or highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses, respectively. Notably, a baculovirus-expressed H7 protein failed to protect chickens from H7N9 virus infection.     

Immunization of Chickens with Newcastle Disease Virus Expressing H5 Hemagglutinin Protects against Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses

Background

Highly-pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) and Newcastle disease virus (NDV) are the two most important poultry viruses in the world. Natural low-virulence NDV strains have been used as vaccines over the past 70 years with proven track records. We have previously developed a reverse genetics system to produce low-virulent NDV vaccine strain LaSota from cloned cDNA. This system allows us to use NDV as a vaccine vector for other avian pathogens.

Methodology/Principal Finding

Here, we constructed two recombinant NDVs (rNDVs) each of which expresses the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of HPAIV H5N1strain A/Vietnam/1203/2004 from an added gene. In one, rNDV (rNDV-HA), the open reading frame (ORF) of HA gene was expressed without modification. In the second, rNDV (rNDV-HAF), the ORF was modified so that the transmembrane and cytoplasmic domains of the encoded HA gene were replaced with those of the NDV F protein. The insertion of either version of the HA ORF did not increase the virulence of the rNDV vector. The HA protein was found to be incorporated into the envelopes of both rNDV-HA and rNDV-HAF. However, there was an enhanced incorporation of the HA protein in rNDV-HAF. Chickens immunized with a single dose of either rNDV-HA or rNDV-HAF induced a high titer of HPAIV H5-specific antibodies and were completely protected against challenge with NDV as well as lethal challenges of both homologous and heterologous HPAIV H5N1.

Conclusion and Significance

Our results suggest that these chimeric viruses have potential as safe and effective bivalent vaccines against NDV and. HPAIV. These vaccines will be convenient and affordable, which will be highly beneficial to the poultry industry. Furthermore, immunization with these vaccines will permit serological differentiation of vaccinated and avian influenza field virus infected animals.     

Estimation of Transmission Parameters of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in Chickens

Despite considerable research efforts, little is yet known about key epidemiological parameters of H5N1 highly pathogenic influenza viruses in their avian hosts. Here we show how these parameters can be estimated using a limited number of birds in experimental transmission studies. Our quantitative estimates, based on Bayesian methods of inference, reveal that (i) the period of latency of H5N1 influenza virus in unvaccinated chickens is short (mean: 0.24 days; 95% credible interval: 0.099–0.48 days); (ii) the infectious period of H5N1 virus in unvaccinated chickens is approximately 2 days (mean: 2.1 days; 95%CI: 1.8–2.3 days); (iii) the reproduction number of H5N1 virus in unvaccinated chickens need not be high (mean: 1.6; 95%CI: 0.90–2.5), although the virus is expected to spread rapidly because it has a short generation interval in unvaccinated chickens (mean: 1.3 days; 95%CI: 1.0–1.5 days); and (iv) vaccination with genetically and antigenically distant H5N2 vaccines can effectively halt transmission. Simulations based on the estimated parameters indicate that herd immunity may be obtained if at least 80% of chickens in a flock are vaccinated. We discuss the implications for the control of H5N1 avian influenza virus in areas where it is endemic.     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human Influenza Viruses Is Mainly Restricted to the Matrix and Neuraminidase Gene Segments

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry industry in many countries of the eastern hemisphere. Occasionally H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. When this happens, there is a chance of reassortment between H5N1 and human influenza viruses. To assess the potential of H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2 and pandemic H1N1), we used an in vitro selection method to generate reassortant viruses, that contained the H5 hemagglutinin gene, and that have a replication advantage in vitro. We found that the neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses were preferentially selected by H5 viruses. However, these H5 reassortant viruses did not show a marked increase in replication in MDCK cells and human bronchial epithelial cells. In ferrets, inoculation with a mixture of H5N1-pandemic H1N1 reassortant viruses resulted in outgrowth of reassortant H5 viruses that had incorporated the neuraminidase and matrix gene segment of pandemic 2009 H1N1. This virus was not transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets to naïve recipient ferrets. Altogether, these data emphasize the potential of avian H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses. The neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses showed the highest genetic compatibility with HPAI H5N1 virus.     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets: a Public Health Risk Assessment

This study investigated whether transmissible H5 subtype human-avian reassortant viruses could be generated in vivo. To this end, ferrets were coinfected with recent avian H5N1 (A/Thailand/16/04) and human H3N2 (A/Wyoming/3/03) viruses. Genotype analyses of plaque-purified viruses from nasal secretions of coinfected ferrets revealed that approximately 9% of recovered viruses contained genes from both progenitor viruses. H5 and H3 subtype viruses, including reassortants, were found in airways extending toward and in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. However, only parental H5N1 genotype viruses were found in lung tissue. Approximately 34% of the recovered reassortant viruses possessed the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) gene, with five unique H5 subtypes recovered. These H5 reassortants were selected for further studies to examine their growth and transmissibility characteristics. Five H5 viruses with representative reassortant genotypes showed reduced titers in nasal secretions of infected ferrets compared to the parental H5N1 virus. No transmission by direct contact between infected and naïve ferrets was observed. These studies indicate that reassortment between H5N1 avian influenza and H3N2 human viruses occurred readily in vivo and furthermore that reassortment between these two viral subtypes is likely to occur in ferret upper airways. Given the relatively high incidence of reassortant viruses from tissues of the ferret upper airway, it is reasonable to conclude that continued exposure of humans and animals to H5N1 alongside seasonal influenza viruses increases the risk of generating H5 subtype reassortant viruses that may be shed from upper airway secretions.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype have caused devastating outbreaks in avian species during the past decade. After emerging in the Guangdong province of China in 1996, H5N1 viruses have extended their geographic distribution from Asia into Europe and Africa (45, 51). Sporadic transmission of H5N1 viruses from infected birds to humans has resulted in over 380 laboratory-confirmed infections and a case fatality rate of ∼60% since 2003 (48). Currently circulating H5N1 viruses lack the ability to undergo efficient and sustained transmission among humans although instances of limited human-to-human transmission have been reported (13, 41). If H5N1 viruses were to acquire genetic changes that confer efficient transmissibility among humans, then another pandemic would likely occur.The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 highlight the importance of genetic reassortment between avian and human influenza viruses as a mechanism for the generation of human pandemic strains (15, 46, 47). The structural separation of the influenza virus genome into eight independent genes allows formation of hybrid progeny viruses during coinfections. The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic viruses acquired the hemagglutinin (HA) and PB1 genes, with or without the neuraminidase (NA) gene, respectively, from an avian virus progenitor (14, 33). The remaining genes of these pandemic reassortants were derived from a contemporary human virus (14, 33). The host species in which such human pandemic strains were generated by reassortment between human and avian viruses is not known. However, coinfection of the same cell with both human and avian viruses must have occurred, even though human and avian influenza viruses have preferences for different sialic acid receptor structures present on cell surface glycoproteins and glycolipids (20, 30). The HA of human viruses preferentially binds α(2,6)-linked sialic acids while that of avian viruses preferentially bind α(2,3)-linked sialic acids (3, 12). Cells possessing both of these receptors could support coinfection of avian and human viruses, leading to reassortment.Human respiratory tract epithelial cells can possess surface glycans with α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids and as such represent a potential host for the generation of avian-human reassortant viruses (24, 35). The general distribution of surface α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids varies among cells of the human upper and lower respiratory tracts, which are anatomically separated by the larynx. Recent studies have shown that α(2,3)-linked sialic acids are present in tissues of the human lower respiratory tract (i.e., lung alveolar cells) (24, 35) as well as tissues of the human upper respiratory tract (24). Consistent with these findings, HPAI H5N1 viruses have been shown to attach to and infect tissues belonging to the lower respiratory tract (i.e., trachea, bronchi, and lung) (5, 25, 35, 40, 42, 43) as well as tissues belonging to the upper respiratory tract (i.e., nasopharyngeal, adenoid, and tonsillar) (25). Glycans with α(2,6)-linked sialic acids are more widespread on epithelial cells of the upper airways than lung alveoli (24, 35). In accordance, human seasonal influenza viruses preferentially attach to and infect cells of the upper respiratory tract (6, 25, 35, 43). If cells with both types of receptors are present in the human respiratory tract, simultaneous infection of a person with both human and avian viruses could generate reassortant viruses.Although viruses derived by reassortment between avian H5N1 and human H3N2 progenitors have been generated in vitro (17), reassortment between these avian and human strains in a coinfected mammalian host has not been shown. Furthermore, our knowledge of the genetic and phenotypic repertoire of such reassortants generated in vivo and their potential for transmission to uninfected hosts is limited (2, 17). In the present study, we used the ferret model to better understand the generation of reassortant viruses in a host coinfected with contemporary avian (H5N1) and human (H3N2) viruses and the extent to which such reassortants replicate and transmit from animal to animal. The domestic ferret (Mustela putoris) serves as an ideal small-animal model for influenza because ferrets are susceptible to human and avian influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 viruses, and reflect the relative transmissibility of human and avian influenza viruses in humans (9, 17, 18, 31, 36, 39, 53). Our study revealed that coinfection of ferrets reproducibly generated reassortant viruses that could be recovered from tissues within and extending toward the upper respiratory tract. Although H5 reassortant viruses were recovered from the upper airways, they displayed no transmissibility to contact ferrets, suggesting that additional functional changes are required for these viral subtypes to become pandemic within human populations.     

Novel Reassortant Highly Pathogenic H5N2 Avian Influenza Viruses in Poultry in China

There has been multiple evidence that domestic poultry may act as a vessel for the generation of novel influenza A viruses. In this study, we have analyzed the evolution and pathogenicity of 4 H5N2 avian influenza viruses isolated from apparently healthy poultry from H5N1 virus endemic areas in China. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that two of these viruses, A/duck/Eastern China/1111/2011 (DK/EC/1111/11) and A/goose/Eastern China/1112/2011 (GS/EC/1112/11) were derived from reassortment events in which clade 2.3.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses acquired novel neuraminidase and nonstructural protein genes. Another two isolates, A/chicken/Hebei/1102/2010 (CK/HB/1102/10) and A/duck/Hebei/0908/2009 (DK/HB/0908/09), possess hemagglutinin (HA) gene belong to clade 7 H5 viruses and other genes from endemic H9N2 viruses, or from viruses of various subtypes of the natural gene pool. All of these H5N2 isolates bear characteristic sequences of HPAI virus at the cleavage site of HA, and animal experiments indicated that all of these viruses but DK/HB/0908/09 is highly pathogenic to chickens. In particular, DK/EC/1111/11 and GS/EC/1112/11 are also highly pathogenic to ducks and moderately pathogenic to mice. All of these 4 viruses were able to replicate in domestic ducks and mice without prior adaptation. The emergence of these novel H5N2 viruses adds more evidence for the active evolution of H5 viruses in Asia. The maintenance of the highly pathogenic phenotype of some of these viruses even after reassortment with a new NA subtypes, their ability to replicate and transmit in domestic poultry, and the pathogenicity in the mammalian mouse model, highlight the potential threat posed by these viruses to both veterinary and public health.     

Phylogeography of Highly Pathogenic H5 Avian Influenza Viruses in China

Virologica Sinica - The spread of H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses poses serious threats to the poultry industry, wild bird ecology and human health. Circulation of H5 viruses between...     

Genetics,Receptor Binding,and Virulence in Mice of H10N8 Influenza Viruses Isolated from Ducks and Chickens in Live Poultry Markets in China

We analyzed eight H10N8 viruses isolated from ducks and chickens in live poultry markets from 2009 to 2013 in China. These viruses showed distinct genetic diversity and formed five genotypes: the four duck isolates formed four different genotypes, whereas the four chicken viruses belong to a single genotype. The viruses bound to both human- and avian-type receptors, and four of the viruses caused 12.7% to 22.5% body weight loss in mice.     

Risk Assessment of H2N2 Influenza Viruses from the Avian Reservoir

H2N2 influenza A viruses were the cause of the 1957-1958 pandemic. Historical evidence demonstrates they arose from avian virus ancestors, and while the H2N2 subtype has disappeared from humans, it persists in wild and domestic birds. Reemergence of H2N2 in humans is a significant threat due to the absence of humoral immunity in individuals under the age of 50. Thus, examination of these viruses, particularly those from the avian reservoir, must be addressed through surveillance, characterization, and antiviral testing. The data presented here are a risk assessment of 22 avian H2N2 viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds over 6 decades. Our data show that they have a low rate of genetic and antigenic evolution and remained similar to isolates circulating near the time of the pandemic. Most isolates replicated in mice and human bronchial epithelial cells, but replication in swine tissues was low or absent. Multiple isolates replicated in ferrets, and 3 viruses were transmitted to direct-contact cage mates. Markers of mammalian adaptation in hemagglutinin (HA) and PB2 proteins were absent from all isolates, and they retained a preference for avian-like α2,3-linked sialic acid receptors. Most isolates remained antigenically similar to pandemic A/Singapore/1/57 (H2N2) virus, suggesting they could be controlled by the pandemic vaccine candidate. All viruses were susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors and adamantanes. Nonetheless, the sustained pathogenicity of avian H2N2 viruses in multiple mammalian models elevates their risk potential for human infections and stresses the need for continual surveillance as a component of prepandemic planning.     

禽流感H5N1亚型病毒感染恒河猴模型的建立及禽流感发病机制初探

[目的]建立禽流感H5N1病毒感染恒河猴的动物模型,探讨禽流感在哺乳类动物的发病机制。[方法]通过“环甲膜穿刺术”经气管注射鸡胚培养的禽流感H5N1病毒(AF148678;ACGoose/Guangdong/11961H5N1)感染恒河猴,观察恒河猴染毒后出现的临床体征,用显微计数法检测外周血白细胞的动态变化,用ELISA检测禽流感病毒特异性抗体变化规律,用流式细胞仪检测外周血T淋巴细胞及其亚群的动态变化。在染毒后第1天、第3天、第10天和第14天分别剖杀染毒组恒河猴1只,HE染色观察主要组织器官的病理变化,用病毒分离、免疫组化和RT-PCR三种方法分析禽流感病毒侵袭机体的特点。[结果]临床症状和体征:急性起病,表现为发热,呼吸困难,精神状态下降,活动度明显减少,食欲下降,咳嗽,紫绀等,肺部听诊双肺可闻及干、湿音。1、病理特点:以肺部损伤为主,伴多器官病变。肺部的病变主要表现为弥漫性肺泡损伤,先后经历渗出期、增生期和纤维化期;在肝脏、肾脏和中枢神经系统中也观察到变性、坏死等病理变化。2、病毒侵袭机体的特点:病毒只在呼吸系统中复制,不在呼吸道以外的组织器官中复制;肺内支气管上皮细胞、肺泡上皮细胞和肺巨噬细胞是禽流感病毒侵犯的主要细胞类型。3、外周血象特点:外周血白细胞总数、淋巴细胞数出现短暂的下降,中性粒细胞数先升后降,但均于感染第7天后逐渐恢复到正常水平。4、抗体变化特点:感染后第7~11天,抗体水平持续快速升高;感染第11天后,抗体水平呈逐渐缓慢升高趋势(观察到染毒后50天为止)。5、细胞免疫特点:细胞免疫功能受损,表现为CD3+T淋巴细、CD3+CD4+T淋巴细胞和CD3+CD8+T淋巴细胞均出现短暂的下降,但这种细胞免疫功能受损是可逆的,到感染第7天后逐渐恢复回升至正常。[结论]1、恒河猴感染后的临床特点、病理变化、外周血象、免疫反应等均与人禽流感严重病例相类似,表明该模型是成功的,可为禽流感病毒在人体内致病机理的研究以及抗禽流感病毒的药物和疫苗评价提供最近似于人类的动物模型。2、综合本研究的实验结果,我们认为,H5N1禽流感毒主要攻击的对象为呼吸系统,不在呼吸道以外的组织器官中复制。禽流感病毒感染引起的急性弥漫性肺损伤是发病的中心环节,其发病可能经过病毒侵入、复制阶段,免疫损伤阶段和多器官功能损伤阶段。     

Spatiotemporal Structure of Molecular Evolution of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses in Vietnam

Background

Vietnam is one of the countries most affected by outbreaks of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. First identified in Vietnam in poultry in 2001 and in humans in 2004, the virus has since caused 111 cases and 56 deaths in humans. In 2003/2004 H5N1 outbreaks, nearly the entire poultry population of Vietnam was culled. Our earlier study (Wan et al., 2008, PLoS ONE, 3(10): e3462) demonstrated that there have been at least six independent H5N1 introductions into Vietnam and there were nine newly emerged reassortants from 2001 to 2007 in Vietnam. H5N1 viruses in Vietnam cluster distinctly around Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. However, the nature of the relationship between genetic divergence and geographic patterns is still unclear.

Methodology/Principal Findings

In this study, we hypothesized that genetic distances between H5N1 viruses in Vietnam are correlated with geographic distances, as the result of distinct population and environment patterns along Vietnam''s long north to south longitudinal extent. Based on this hypothesis, we combined spatial statistical methods with genetic analytic techniques and explicitly used geographic space to explore genetic evolution of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses at the sub-national scale in Vietnam. Our dataset consisted of 125 influenza viruses (with whole genome sets) isolated in Vietnam from 2003 to 2007. Our results document the significant effect of space and time on genetic evolution and the rise of two regional centers of genetic mixing by 2007. These findings give insight into processes underlying viral evolution and suggest that genetic differentiation is associated with the distance between concentrations of human and poultry populations around Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Conclusions/Significance

The results show that genetic evolution of H5N1 viruses in Vietnamese domestic poultry is highly correlated with the location and spread of those viruses in geographic space. This correlation varies by scale, time, and gene, though a classic isolation by distance pattern is observed. This study is the first to characterize the geographic structure of influenza viral evolution at the sub-national scale in Vietnam and can shed light on how H5N1 HPAIVs evolve in certain geographic settings.     

禽流感H5N1亚型病毒感染ICR小鼠的动物模型

目的 建立H5N1禽流感病毒感染ICR小鼠的疾病动物模型.方法 将100 μL H5N1 禽流感病毒原液(EID50为105.37/0.2 mL) 鼻腔接种ICR小鼠,设生理盐水组、正常尿囊液组对照,接毒后14 d内每隔12 h观察一次,主要观测指标有临床体征、体重和体温变化、死亡率、病理变化、病毒分离和血清抗体检测 (ELISA方法).结果 被感染的ICR小鼠的病程可以划分为潜伏期 (第0～1天)、急性感染期 (第2～7天)、恢复期 (第8～14天),急性感染期表现出活动明显减少,弓背,反应性差,扎堆;接毒后第1天开始体温和体重下降,第6天体温和体重停止下降;接毒组ICR小鼠累计的死亡率为60%;急性感染期ICR小鼠的肺部病变最严重,表现为间质性肺炎,肺间质充血、水肿和淋巴细胞浸润,毛细血管扩张,上皮细胞变性、坏死、脱落,并有充血和单核细胞浸润;接毒后第1天至第8天可在小鼠的肺、脑、气管和心、肝、脾、肾分离到病毒;接毒后第6天从ICR小鼠血清中检测到抗体.结论 本实验室建立的H5N1禽流感病毒感染ICR小鼠的模型在临床表现、体重变化、死亡率、病理变化、病毒复制指标能达到禽流感病毒疾病模型的造模要求,符合人类禽流感感染疾病的基本特征.