Predicting decisions in human social interactions using real-time fMRI and pattern classification

Negotiation and trade typically require a mutual interaction while simultaneously resting in uncertainty which decision the partner ultimately will make at the end of the process. Assessing already during the negotiation in which direction one's counterpart tends would provide a tremendous advantage. Recently, neuroimaging techniques combined with multivariate pattern classification of the acquired data have made it possible to discriminate subjective states of mind on the basis of their neuronal activation signature. However, to enable an online-assessment of the participant's mind state both approaches need to be extended to a real-time technique. By combining real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and online pattern classification techniques, we show that it is possible to predict human behavior during social interaction before the interacting partner communicates a specific decision. Average accuracy reached approximately 70% when we predicted online the decisions of volunteers playing the ultimatum game, a well-known paradigm in economic game theory. Our results demonstrate the successful online analysis of complex emotional and cognitive states using real-time fMRI, which will enable a major breakthrough for social fMRI by providing information about mental states of partners already during the mutual interaction. Interestingly, an additional whole brain classification across subjects confirmed the online results: anterior insula, ventral striatum, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, known to act in emotional self-regulation and reward processing for adjustment of behavior, appeared to be strong determinants of later overt behavior in the ultimatum game. Using whole brain classification we were also able to discriminate between brain processes related to subjective emotional and motivational states and brain processes related to the evaluation of objective financial incentives.     

Changes of mind in an attractor network of decision-making

Attractor networks successfully account for psychophysical and neurophysiological data in various decision-making tasks. Especially their ability to model persistent activity, a property of many neurons involved in decision-making, distinguishes them from other approaches. Stable decision attractors are, however, counterintuitive to changes of mind. Here we demonstrate that a biophysically-realistic attractor network with spiking neurons, in its itinerant transients towards the choice attractors, can replicate changes of mind observed recently during a two-alternative random-dot motion (RDM) task. Based on the assumption that the brain continues to evaluate available evidence after the initiation of a decision, the network predicts neural activity during changes of mind and accurately simulates reaction times, performance and percentage of changes dependent on difficulty. Moreover, the model suggests a low decision threshold and high incoming activity that drives the brain region involved in the decision-making process into a dynamical regime close to a bifurcation, which up to now lacked evidence for physiological relevance. Thereby, we further affirmed the general conformance of attractor networks with higher level neural processes and offer experimental predictions to distinguish nonlinear attractor from linear diffusion models.     

The emergence of consequential thought: evidence from neuroscience

The ability to think counterfactually about the consequence of one's actions represents one of the hallmarks of the development of complex reasoning skills. The legal system places a great emphasis on this type of reasoning ability as it directly relates to the degree to which individuals may be judged liable for their actions. In the present paper, we review both behavioural and neuroscientific data exploring the role that counterfactual thinking plays in reasoning about the consequences of one's actions, especially as it pertains to the developing mind of the adolescent. On the basis of assimilation of both behavioural and neuroscientific data, we propose a brain-based model that provides a theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of counterfactual reasoning ability in the developing mind.     

Functional salutogenic mechanisms of the brain

Neuroscientists are typically interested in the brain in relation to disease, but much could also be learned by studying the brain in relation to health. The brain has processes, functional salutogenic mechanisms, that contribute to health by enabling one's outlook on life to benefit one's health. For example, the belief that things will work out as well as can reasonably be expected is a key aspect of the outlook of people who tend to stay well even when in potentially stressful situations. Believing in God, feeling happy, being mutually in love, and expecting things to change for the better are also outlooks that can be salutogenic. Beliefs need not even be rational or realistic in order for them to be salutogenic, as shown by phenomena such as faith healing and the placebo effect. Thus, the brain responds to stimuli and interprets them, mainly without one's awareness, in ways that can enhance one's well-being. Although little is presently known concerning neuropathways of functional salutogenic mechanisms, further research on relations between salutogenesis and brain function can be expected to provide new strategies for improving health worldwide.     

Mind wandering in chinese daily lives - an experience sampling study

MIND WANDERING HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED EXTENSIVE RESEARCH BECAUSE IT REVEALS AN IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF OUR CONSCIOUSNESS: conscious experience can arise internally and involuntarily. As the first attempt to examine mind wandering in a non-western population, the present study used experience-sampling method to collect the daily momentary mind wandering episodes in a Chinese sample. The results showed that mind wandering was also a ubiquitous experience among the Chinese population, and, instead of emerging out of nowhere, it was often elicited by external or internal cues. Furthermore, most of the mind wandering episodes involved prospective thinking and were closely related to one's personal life. Finally, the frequency of mind wandering was influenced by some contextual factors. These results taken together suggest that mind wandering plays an important role in helping people to maintain a continuous feeling of "self" and to prepare them to cope with the upcoming events.     

Toward a cross-species neuroscientific understanding of the affective mind: do animals have emotional feelings?

Do we need to consider mental processes in our analysis of brain functions in other animals? Obviously we do, if such BrainMind functions exist in the animals we wish to understand. If so, how do we proceed, while still retaining materialistic-mechanistic perspectives? This essay outlines the historical forces that led to emotional feelings in animals being marginalized in behavioristic scientific discussions of why animals behave the way they do, and why mental constructs are generally disregarded in modern neuroscientific analyses. The roots of this problem go back to Cartesian dualism and the attempt of 19th century physician-scientists to ground a new type of medical curriculum on a completely materialistic approach to body functions. Thereby all vitalistic principles were discarded from the lexicon of science, and subjective experience in animals was put in that category and discarded as an invalid approach to animal behavior. This led to forms of rigid operationalism during the era of behaviorism and subsequently ruthless reductionism in brain research, leaving little room for mentalistic concepts such as emotional feelings in animal research. However, modern studies of the brain clearly indicate that artificially induced arousals of emotional networks, as with localized electrical and chemical brain stimulation, can serve as "rewards" and "punishments" in various learning tasks. This strongly indicates that animal brains elaborate various experienced states, with those having affective contents being easiest to study rigorously. However, in approaching emotional feelings empirically we must pay special attention to the difficulties and vagaries of human language and evolutionary levels of control in the brain. We need distinct nomenclatures from primary (unconditioned phenomenal experiences) to tertiary (reflective) levels of mind. The scientific pursuit of affective brain processes in other mammals can now reveal general BrainMind principles that also apply to human feelings, as with neurochemical predictions from preclinical animal models to self-reports of corresponding human experiences. In short, brain research has now repeatedly verified the existence of affective experience-various reward and punishment functions-during artificial arousal of emotional networks in our fellow animals. The implications for new conceptual schema for understanding human/primate affective feelings and how such knowledge can impact scientific advances in biological psychiatry are also addressed.     

Dissociation of subjectively reported and behaviorally indexed mind wandering by EEG rhythmic activity

Inattention to current activity is ubiquitous in everyday situations. Mind wandering is an example of such a state, and its related brain areas have been examined in the literature. However, there is no clear evidence regarding neural rhythmic activities linked to mind wandering. Using a vigilance task with thought sampling and electroencephalography recording, the current study simultaneously examined neural oscillatory activities related to subjectively reported and behaviorally indexed mind wandering. By implementing time-frequency analysis, we found that subjectively reported mind wandering, relative to behaviorally indexed, showed increased gamma band activity at bilateral frontal-central areas. By means of beamformer source imaging, we found subjectively reported mind wandering within the gamma band to be characterized by increased activation in bilateral frontal cortices, supplemental motor area, paracentral cortex and right inferior temporal cortex in comparison to behaviorally indexed mind wandering. These findings dissociate subjectively reported and behaviorally indexed mind wandering and suggest that a higher degree of executive control processes are engaged in subjectively reported mind wandering.     

Organ transplantation: contemporary Sunni Muslim legal and ethical perspectives

The problems that organ transplantation poses to the Muslim mind may be summarized as follows: firstly, a Muslim believes that whatever he owns or possesses has been given to him as an amanah (trust) from Allah. Would it not be a breach of trust to give consent for the removal of parts of one's body, while still alive, for transplantation to benefit one's child, sibling or parent? Secondly, the Shari'ah (Islamic Law) emphasizes the sacredness of the human body. Would it not then be an act of aggression against the human body, tantamount to its mutilation, if organs were to be removed after death for the purpose of transplantation? In this paper I attempt to illustrate how the Muslim jurists have tried to resolve the dilemma of Muslims by providing them with certain guidelines based on the original sources of Islam, namely, the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition. In order to assist the followers of other religious traditions to grasp the gravity of the problem posed by organ transplantation to the Muslim mind, I begin by discussing the opinions of Muslim jurists on the issue of utilization of human parts. Thereafter, I touch upon the resolutions taken by the various Islamic Juridical Academies on the issue in question. Finally, I shed light upon the inclusion of organ donation in a Muslim Will and the enforceable nature of such a will.     

OUR BRAINS ARE NOT US

Many neuroscientists have claimed that our minds are just a function of and thus reducible to our brains. I challenge neuroreductionism by arguing that the mind emerges from and is shaped by interaction among the brain, body, and environment. The mind is not located in the brain but is distributed among these three entities. I then explore the implications of the distributed mind for neuroethics.     

Mental training affects distribution of limited brain resources

The information processing capacity of the human mind is limited, as is evidenced by the so-called “attentional-blink” deficit: When two targets (T1 and T2) embedded in a rapid stream of events are presented in close temporal proximity, the second target is often not seen. This deficit is believed to result from competition between the two targets for limited attentional resources. Here we show, using performance in an attentional-blink task and scalp-recorded brain potentials, that meditation, or mental training, affects the distribution of limited brain resources. Three months of intensive mental training resulted in a smaller attentional blink and reduced brain-resource allocation to the first target, as reflected by a smaller T1-elicited P3b, a brain-potential index of resource allocation. Furthermore, those individuals that showed the largest decrease in brain-resource allocation to T1 generally showed the greatest reduction in attentional-blink size. These observations provide novel support for the view that the ability to accurately identify T2 depends upon the efficient deployment of resources to T1. The results also demonstrate that mental training can result in increased control over the distribution of limited brain resources. Our study supports the idea that plasticity in brain and mental function exists throughout life and illustrates the usefulness of systematic mental training in the study of the human mind.     

The role of the thalamus in motor control

Two characteristics of the thalamus--its apparently simple relay function and its daunting multinuclear structure--have been customarily viewed as good reasons to study something else. Yet, now that many other brain regions have been explored and neurophysiologists are turning to questions of how larger circuits operate, these two characteristics are starting to seem more attractive. First, the relay nature of thalamic neurons means that recording from them, like tapping into a wire, can reveal the signals carried by specific circuits. Second, the concentration of like relay neurons into nuclei means that inactivating or stimulating them can efficiently test the functions of the circuits. Recent studies implementing these principles have revealed pathways through the thalamus that contribute to generating movements and to monitoring one's own actions (corollary discharge).     

Oxidative stress is involved in the permeabilization of the inner membrane of brain mitochondria exposed to hypoxia/reoxygenation and low micromolar Ca2+

From in vivo models of stroke it is known that ischemia/reperfusion induces oxidative stress that is accompanied by deterioration of brain mitochondria. Previously, we reported that the increase in Ca2+ induces functional breakdown and morphological disintegration in brain mitochondria subjected to hypoxia/reoxygenation (H/R). Protection by ADP indicated the involvement of the mitochondrial permeability transition pore in the mechanism of membrane permeabilization. Until now it has been unclear how reactive oxygen species (ROS) contribute to this process. We now report that brain mitochondria which had been subjected to H/R in the presence of low micromolar Ca2+ display low state 3 respiration (20% of control), loss of cytochrome c, and reduced glutathione levels (75% of control). During reoxygenation, significant mitochondrial generation of hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) was detected. The addition of the membrane permeant superoxide anion scavenger TEMPOL (4-hydroxy-2,2,6,6-tetramethylpiperidine-N-oxyl) suppressed the production of H2O2 by brain mitochondria metabolizing glutamate plus malate by 80% under normoxic conditions. TEMPOL partially protected brain mitochondria exposed to H/R and low micromolar Ca2+ from decrease in state 3 respiration (from 25% of control to 60% of control with TEMPOL) and permeabilization of the inner membrane. Membrane permeabilization was obvious, because state 3 respiration could be stimulated by extramitochondrial NADH. Our data suggest that ROS and Ca2+ synergistically induce permeabilization of the inner membrane of brain mitochondria exposed to H/R. However, permeabilization can only partially be prevented by suppressing mitochondrial generation of ROS. We conclude that transient deprivation of oxygen and glucose during temporary ischemia coupled with elevation in cytosolic Ca2+ concentration triggers ROS generation and mitochondrial permeabilization, resulting in neural cell death.     

Thinking in circuits: toward neurobiological explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive theory has decomposed human mental abilities into cognitive (sub) systems, and cognitive neuroscience succeeded in disclosing a host of relationships between cognitive systems and specific structures of the human brain. However, an explanation of why specific functions are located in specific brain loci had still been missing, along with a neurobiological model that makes concrete the neuronal circuits that carry thoughts and meaning. Brain theory, in particular the Hebb-inspired neurocybernetic proposals by Braitenberg, now offers an avenue toward explaining brain–mind relationships and to spell out cognition in terms of neuron circuits in a neuromechanistic sense. Central to this endeavor is the theoretical construct of an elementary functional neuronal unit above the level of individual neurons and below that of whole brain areas and systems: the distributed neuronal assembly (DNA) or thought circuit (TC). It is shown that DNA/TC theory of cognition offers an integrated explanatory perspective on brain mechanisms of perception, action, language, attention, memory, decision and conceptual thought. We argue that DNAs carry all of these functions and that their inner structure (e.g., core and halo subcomponents), and their functional activation dynamics (e.g., ignition and reverberation processes) answer crucial localist questions, such as why memory and decisions draw on prefrontal areas although memory formation is normally driven by information in the senses and in the motor system. We suggest that the ability of building DNAs/TCs spread out over different cortical areas is the key mechanism for a range of specifically human sensorimotor, linguistic and conceptual capacities and that the cell assembly mechanism of overlap reduction is crucial for differentiating a vocabulary of actions, symbols and concepts.     

Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates

To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mirrors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes) and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image. Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for traditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of “mind” which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.     

Quantum-like brain: "Interference of minds"

We present a contextualist statistical realistic model for quantum-like representations in physics, cognitive science, and psychology. We apply this model to describe cognitive experiments to check quantum-like structures of mental processes. The crucial role is played by interference of probabilities for mental observables. Recently one such experiment based on recognition of images was performed. This experiment confirmed our prediction on the quantum-like behavior of mind. In our approach "quantumness of mind" has no direct relation to the fact that the brain (as any physical body) is composed of quantum particles. We invented a new terminology "quantum-like (QL) mind." Cognitive QL-behavior is characterized by a nonzero coefficient of interference lambda. This coefficient can be found on the basis of statistical data. There are predicted not only cos theta-interference of probabilities, but also hyperbolic cosh theta-interference. This interference was never observed for physical systems, but we could not exclude this possibility for cognitive systems. We propose a model of brain functioning as a QL-computer (there is a discussion on the difference between quantum and QL computers).     

Biological nonlocality and the mind-brain interaction problem: comments on a new empirical approach

Up to now, we have been faced with an age old fundamental dilemma posed by the mind-brain interaction problem, i.e. how is it that the mind which is subjective and immaterial, can interact with the brain which is objective and material? Analysis of recent experiments appears to indicate that quantum mechanics may have a role to play in the resolution of the mind-brain interaction problem in the form of biological entanglement and nonlocality. In addition to this analysis, when coupled with ongoing and proposed experiments, may help us to simultaneously resolve related issues such as whether mental events can initiate neural events, the transference of conscious subjective experience, the measurement problem and the binding problem.     

Vatted dreams: neurophilosophy and the politics of phenomenal internalism

Despite much social‐scientific work on the neurosciences, little ethnographic and historical attention has been paid to the field of neurophilosophy. Yet anthropologists studying brain research occasionally critique neurophilosophers for reducing the mind to the brain while affirmatively citing philosophers of mind who present the mind as emerging from interactions between brain, body, and environment. This article examines the ostracized camp of so‐called ‘phenomenal internalists’ – neurophilosophers who believe that consciousness can supervene on the brain alone. This ontological commitment is driven by certain existential and political experiences from false awakenings to disenchantment with the counterculture of the 1970s. But it also draws from neuroscientific research on the dreaming brain. The inquiry concludes with a plea to anthropologists to attend to relations of detachment, both social and neural, and to reconsider their own ontological commitment to externalism in the light of dream research.     

Ascribing beliefs to ingroup and outgroup political candidates: neural correlates of perspective-taking, issue importance and days until the election

We used the five weeks leading up to the 2008 presidential election as a backdrop to examine the ways that the brain processes attitudes and beliefs under different circumstances. We examined individual differences in personal issue importance and trait perspective-taking, as well as the temporal context in which attitude representation took place (i.e. number of days until the election). Finally, we examined the extent to which similar or dissimilar processes were recruited when considering the attitudes of political ingroup and outgroup candidates. Brain regions involved in social cognition and theory of mind, and to a lesser extent the limbic system, were modulated by these factors. Higher issue importance led to greater recruitment of neural regions involved in social cognition, across target perspectives. Higher trait perspective-taking was also associated with greater recruitment of several regions involved in social cognition, but differed depending on target perspective; greater activity was observed in prefrontal regions associated with social cognition when considering the perspective of one's own candidate compared with the opponent, and this effect was amplified closer to the election. Taken together, these results highlight ways in which ability and motivational relevance modulate socio-affective processing of the attitudes of others.     

Single-neuron theory of consciousness

By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: (i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; (ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; (iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts non-linearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; (iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron.     

Nothing Iffy about HIF in the Hypothalamus

Two crucial biological processes are (1) the sensing and coordination of responses to low oxygen levels and (2) the control of food intake and energy expenditure. The hypoxia-inducible factor (HIF) family of proteins is known to regulate responses to low oxygen, whereas neuropeptides derived from proopiomelanocortin (POMC) are implicated in the control of food intake and energy expenditure. It is now becoming apparent that these two apparently disparate processes may be linked, with the exciting discovery that HIF proteins can act in the brain to regulate food intake and energy expenditure as reported in the current issue of PLoS Biology. This primer discusses the traditional role of HIF proteins in terms of responding to oxygen levels in the periphery and also their new role in coordinating responses to nutrients in the brain through regulation of POMC.