Seeking healing transnationally: Australians,John of God and Brazilian Spiritism

João de Deus (John of God) is a Brazilian faith healer who has become increasingly well‐known outside Brazil. In 2006 alone he was invited to conduct healing events in Germany, the United States of America and New Zealand. He returned to the United States of America and New Zealand in 2007, and in 2008 was once again in the United States of America. There are plans for him to come to Australia in the near future. This article is based on ethnographic research conducted in Brazil, New Zealand and Australia and on interviews with Australians in Sydney. Here, I explore the stories of Australian followers of John of God and their reasons for seeking his healing system. I argue that Western New Age and alternative medicine concepts of healing produce a disposition ( Bourdieu 1972 ) towards ‘traditional’ healing from exotic lands. I show that the reinstatement of a connection between healing and religion, the construction of context that gives meaning to illness, and empowerment through surrendering to a higher power are three important factors that help to explain why people shun Western medicine in favour of alternative practices.     

Reimagining policy: Power,problems, and public stories

The authors of various practitioner and scholarly documents suggest markedly contrasting understandings about the nature of “policy.” These divergent conceptions raise the question: What is at stake by understanding the nature of policy in one way as opposed to another? The purpose of this philosophical inquiry is to interrogate the nature of “policy” as it relates to music education and to question the values that do and might underlie and propagate through contrasting understandings of “policy.” Subsequently, I examine two aspects of policy, problem identification and meaning-making, that have gone largely unexplored in the arts education literature.

Using Foucault's writings, I argue that power-laden policy texts often have the greatest impact, not when they are mandated, but when they go misrecognized as common sense. I also advocate for the consistent use of the terms “policy texts” and “policy actions,” including as an alternative to the imbalanced designations of “soft policies” and “hard policies.” Drawing on Dewey arts educators might form “publics” around problems having consequences that they deem far-reaching, recurrent, and irreparable. Individual and collective political narratives, including what Ganz explains as “stories of self,” “stories of us,” and “stories of now,” can foster the meaningful connections necessary for forming “publics” who address pressing problems in arts education.     

Imagining race and nation in multiculturalist America

Post-1965 demographic changes in the United States [US] have brought blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans into direct conflict, raising the question of how and whether law and public policy should attempt to adjudicate conflicts among racialized minority groups. I argue in this article that for the past few decades, national political leaders in the US have promoted an official multiculturalist discourse that actually discourages Americans from naming and addressing these intergroup tensions. This discourse superficially reimagines race and nation – by moving from a biracial, black-white focus to a formal acknowledgment of multiracial difference – while refusing to acknowledge the complex interminority inequalities and antagonisms generated by this new diversity. How might we refocus national attention on the serious interminority conflicts and racial justice struggles unfolding around us? I consider resurrecting the traditional notion of racial hierarchy as a counter-narrative to official multiculturalist discourse before arguing instead for one which involves a more complex notion of “racial positionality”.     

Unformed minds: Juveniles,neuroscience, and the law

Recently, the question of adolescent culpability has been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration. Neuroscience, adolescent advocates claim, is teaching us that young people cannot be found fully responsible for their actions. The reason: their brains are not fully formed. Here I consider the history of the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, a number of adolescent murder cases, and the data now emerging from neuroscience, and argue that when it comes to brains, judges, just like the rest of us, are unnecessarily impressed. Ultimately, how we determine culpability should rest on normative and ethical considerations rather than on scientific ones.     

Invasion of the New Zealand mud snail (Potamopyrgus antipodarum) in the Green River below Flaming Gorge Dam

Biological Invasions - New Zealand mud snails (Potamopyrgus antipodarum) were first introduced to the United States in 1987 and have subsequently invaded water bodies across the United States. At...     

PROFITS AND PLAGIARISM: THE CASE OF MEDICAL GHOSTWRITING

This paper focuses on medical ghostwriting in the United States. I argue that medical ghostwriting often involves plagiarism and, in those cases, can be treated as an act of research misconduct by both the federal government and research institutions. I also propose several anti‐ghostwriting measures, including: 1) journals should implement guarantor policies so that researchers may be better held accountable for their work; 2) research institutions and the federal government should explicitly prohibit medical ghostwriting and outline appropriate penalties; and 3) a publicly available database should be created to record researchers' ethics violations.     

Covert moral bioenhancement,public health,and autonomy

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy‐based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.     

Compulsory moral bioenhancement should be covert

Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter of public health, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. I argue that the covert administration of a compulsory moral bioenhancement program better conforms to public health ethics than does an overt compulsory program. In particular, a covert compulsory program promotes values such as liberty, utility, equality, and autonomy better than an overt program does. Thus, a covert compulsory moral bioenhancement program is morally preferable to an overt moral bioenhancement program.     

Making Sense of Child Welfare When Regulating Human Reproductive Technologies

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test.     

Moral expertise: a problem in the professional ethics of professional ethicists

Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decision-making in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the 'Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology' in the UK in 1982-4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water supply in 1990; and many of us are serving on ethics committees of various sorts. Not only are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential. The involvement of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question of professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosopher's own moral perspective or judgements play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s/he makes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to offer. It also prompts reflection on how processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper.     

MORAL EXPERTISE: A PROBLEM IN THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICISTS

Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decision-making in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the ‘Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology’ in the UK in 1982–4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water supply in 1990; and many of us are serving on ethics committees of various sorts. Not only are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential. The involvement of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question of professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosopher's own moral perspective or judgements play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s/he makes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to offer. It also prompts reflection on how processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper.     

Community and justice: the challenges of bicultural partnership to policy on assisted reproductive technology

Listening to other cultures offers challenges to our fundamental assumptions and world views. In New Zealand public policy on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) is being worked out in a society committed to the development of bicultural partnership honouring the Treaty of Waitangi, a treaty with the indigenous people.
Strong claims to the cultural significance of genetic heritage by Maori have made apparent to non-Maori (Pakeha) their own assumptions. These claims also resist reductive understandings of genetics.
In this paper I review, as a Pakeha ethicist, initiatives taken in New Zealand, and the impact of bicultural development on public policy on ART. I also discuss some of the issues this raises for western bioethics as it relates to non-western approaches and include reference to the significance of genetic heritage as it is affecting guidelines for donor insemination and surrogacy.     

And How Are We Supposed to Pay for Health Care? Views of the Poor and the Near Poor on Welfare Reform

The welfare reform debate focuses on the characteristics of who gets government benefits and who pays for them. People perceive the welfare reform debate as the white middle class denying benefits to poor people of color. But larger questions regarding the U.S. lack of comprehensive social policy for health care, education, and child care lurk behind these concerns. Drawing on research with public assistance recipients and working- and middle-class people, in this paper I explore the ways that people interact with and perceive government social programs. I argue that both attitudes and proposed solutions toward welfare reflect different access to government programs and resources such as jobs, savings, and social supports among people who have and have not accessed welfare. Since economic disparity in the United States correlates highly with race, the debate over welfare reform also involves racial attitudes. Changing both the welfare debate and poverty in the United States must start by providing universal benefits, [ public policy, poverty, welfare reform, race, United States ]     

Extended Producer Responsibility in the United States

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy approach that requires manufacturers to finance the costs of recycling or safely disposing of products consumers no longer want. This article describes the evolution of EPR policies in the United States, focusing on the role of states as policy actors. For their part, federal lawmakers have not embraced EPR policies except to remove some barriers to state‐level initiatives. In the two‐decade period from 1991 to 2011, U.S. states enacted more than 70 EPR laws. In addition, manufacturers have implemented voluntary programs to collect and recycle products, but those efforts have proven largely ineffective in capturing significant quantities of waste products. With the help of new coalitions of diverse interest groups, recently states have renewed efforts to establish effective EPR programs, enacting 40 laws in the period 2008–2011. Several state initiatives suggest a more promising future for EPR.     

Reforming Women in the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand: A Comparative Ethnography of Welfare Reform in Global Context

Historically, the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand symbolize opposite poles of an individualist-collectivist welfare state continuum. Until recently, Aotearoa/New Zealand was known as a "cradle-to-grave" welfare state, with "universal" employment and coverage in health and education. U.S. history, in contrast, is marked by an unabashed individualism and a residualist approach to welfare. Recent neoliberal reforms, however, have engendered a convergence between the two countries in the conceptualization and organization of assistance for poor single mothers. Most notable are the "workfare" provisions of legislative changes made in 1996 in the two countries, which work to reconstitute poor mothers as potential able-bodied workers. In this article we analyze welfare reform in the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand, with particular reference to how poor single mothers respond to, comply and cope with, or resist neoliberal strategies. Analysis is based on participant-observation, interviews, and focus groups conducted between 1989 and 1999. [welfare reform, neoliberalism, globalization, gender, the United States, Aotearoa/New Zealand]     

Objective and subjective probability in gene expression

In this paper I address the question of whether the probabilities that appear in models of stochastic gene expression are objective or subjective. I argue that while our best models of the phenomena in question are stochastic models, this fact should not lead us to automatically assume that the processes are inherently stochastic. After distinguishing between models and reality, I give a brief introduction to the philosophical problem of the interpretation of probability statements. I argue that the objective vs. subjective distinction is a false dichotomy and is an unhelpful distinction in this case. Instead, the probabilities in our models of gene expression exhibit standard features of both objectivity and subjectivity.     

Confidence in crisis? Understanding trust in government and public attitudes toward mandatory state health powers

In response to the possibility of a bioterror attack using smallpox, many states have updated and revised their current public health laws in line with the Model Act, which would effectively give states the right to invoke mandatory state health powers, such as quarantine or vaccine. Previous studies have supported the importance of allying with the public in creating and implementing effective bioterror response policies. Historical case studies and recent research suggest that when the public is not supportive of government health policies, they may be less willing to comply. In this study we analyze a recent survey to determine the effects of a set of variables, including aspects of trust in government that have been found in previous studies to influence public opposition to compulsory government health policies, on opinions about compulsory vaccination and quarantine.     

A reassessment of the role of propagule pressure in influencing fates of passerine introductions to New Zealand

Several studies have argued that principal factor in determining the fate of bird introductions is introduction effort. In large part, these studies have emerged from analyses of historical records from a single place—New Zealand. Here we raise two concerns about these conclusions. First, we argue that although many bird species were introduced repeatedly to New Zealand, in many cases the introductions apparently occurred only after the species were already successfully naturalized. The inclusion of such seemingly superfluous introductions may exaggerate the importance of propagule pressure. And second, we question the reliability of the records themselves. In many cases these records are equivocal, as inconsistencies appear in separate studies of the same records. Our analysis indicates that species were successful not because they were introduced frequently and in high numbers, but rather it is likely that they were introduced frequently and in high numbers because the initial releases were successful.