What aspects of autism predispose to talent?

In this paper, we explore the question, why are striking special skills so much more common in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) than in other groups? Current cognitive accounts of ASC are briefly reviewed in relation to special skills. Difficulties in ‘theory of mind’ may contribute to originality in ASC, since individuals who do not automatically ‘read other minds’ may be better able to think outside prevailing fashions and popular theories. However, originality alone does not confer talent. Executive dysfunction has been suggested as the ‘releasing’ mechanism for special skills in ASC, but other groups with executive difficulties do not show raised incidence of talents. Detail-focused processing bias (‘weak coherence’, ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’) appears to be the most promising predisposing characteristic, or ‘starting engine’, for talent development. In support of this notion, we summarize data from a population-based twin study in which parents reported on their 8-year-olds'' talents and their ASC-like traits. Across the whole sample, ASC-like traits, and specifically ‘restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests’ related to detail focus, were more pronounced in children reported to have talents outstripping older children. We suggest that detail-focused cognitive style predisposes to talent in savant domains in, and beyond, autism spectrum disorders.     

Effectiveness of a Video-Feedback and Questioning Programme to Develop Cognitive Expertise in Sport

The importance within sport expertise of cognitive factors has been emphasised in many research studies. Adaptations that take place in athletes’ long-term memories are going to condition their decision-making and performance, and training programmes must be developed that improve these adaptations. In our study, we provide a tactical-cognitive training programme based on video-feedback and questioning in order to improve tactical knowledge in tennis players and verify its effect when transferred to athletes’ decision-making. 11 intermediate tennis players participated in this study (12.9±0.7 years old), distributed into two groups (experimental, n = 5; control, n = 6). Tactical knowledge was measured by problem representation and strategy planning with a verbal protocol. Decision-making was measured by a systematic observation instrument. Results confirm the effectiveness of a combination of video-feedback and questioning on cognitive expertise, developing adaptations in long-term memory that produce an improvement in the quality of tactical knowledge (content, sophistication and structure). This, in turn, is transferred to the athletes’ decision-making capacity, leading to a higher percentage of successful decisions made during game play. Finally, we emphasise the need to develop effective programmes to develop cognitive expertise and improve athletes'' performance, and include it in athletes’ formative stages.     

Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making

An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents'' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times ‘overlook’ good solutions to fundamental social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making—virtual bargaining—in which individuals decide among a set of moves on the basis of what they would agree to do if they could openly bargain. The core principles of a formal account are outlined (vis-à-vis the notions of ‘feasible agreement’ and explicit negotiation) and further illustrated with the introduction of a new game, dubbed the ‘Boobytrap game’ (a modification on the canonical Prisoner''s Dilemma paradigm). In the first empirical data of how individuals play the Boobytrap game, participants'' experimental choices accord well with a virtual bargaining perspective, but do not match predictions from a standard Nash account. Alternative frameworks are discussed, with specific empirical tests between these and virtual bargaining identified as future research directions. Lastly, it is proposed that virtual bargaining underpins a vast range of human activities, from social decision-making to joint action and communication.     

Neural correlates of economic game playing

The theory of games provides a mathematical formalization of strategic choices, which have been studied in both economics and neuroscience, and more recently has become the focus of neuroeconomics experiments with human and non-human actors. This paper reviews the results from a number of game experiments that establish a unitary system for forming subjective expected utility maps in the brain, and acting on these maps to produce choices. Social situations require the brain to build an understanding of the other person using neuronal mechanisms that share affective and intentional mental states. These systems allow subjects to better predict other players' choices, and allow them to modify their subjective utility maps to value pro-social strategies. New results for a trust game are presented, which show that the trust relationship includes systems common to both trusting and trustworthy behaviour, but they also show that the relative temporal positions of first and second players require computations unique to that role.     

Social Cognition in Individuals at Ultra-High Risk for Psychosis: A Meta-Analysis

Objective

Treatment in the ultra-high risk stage for a psychotic episode is critical to the course of symptoms. Markers for the development of psychosis have been studied, to optimize the detection of people at risk of psychosis. One possible marker for the transition to psychosis is social cognition. To estimate effect sizes for social cognition based on a quantitative integration of the published evidence, we conducted a meta-analysis of social cognitive performance in people at ultra high risk (UHR).

Methods

A literature search (1970-July 2015) was performed in PubMed, PsychINFO, Medline, Embase, and ISI Web of Science, using the search terms ‘social cognition’, ‘theory of mind’, ‘emotion recognition’, ‘attributional style’, ‘social knowledge’, ‘social perception’, ‘empathy’, ‘at risk mental state’, ‘clinical high risk’, ‘psychosis prodrome’, and ‘ultra high risk’. The pooled effect size (Cohen’s D) and the effect sizes for each domain of social cognition were calculated. A random effects model with 95% confidence intervals was used.

Results

Seventeen studies were included in the analysis. The overall significant effect was of medium magnitude (d = 0.52, 95% Cl = 0.38–0.65). No moderator effects were found for age, gender and sample size. Sub-analyses demonstrated that individuals in the UHR phase show significant moderate deficits in affect recognition and affect discrimination in faces as well as in voices and in verbal Theory of Mind (TOM). Due to an insufficient amount of studies, we did not calculate an effect size for attributional bias and social perception/ knowledge. A majority of studies did not find a correlation between social cognition deficits and transition to psychosis, which may suggest that social cognition in general is not a useful marker for the development of psychosis. However some studies suggest the possible predictive value of verbal TOM and the recognition of specific emotions in faces for the transition into psychosis. More research is needed on these subjects.

Conclusion

The published literature indicates consistent general impairments in social cognition in people in the UHR phase, but only very specific impairments seem to predict transition to psychosis.     

The hawk–dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird

The hawk–dove game famously introduced strategic game theory thinking into biology and forms the basis of arguments for limited aggression in animal populations. However, aggressive ‘hawks’ and peaceful ‘doves’, with strategies inherited in a discrete manner, have never been documented in a real animal population. Thus, the applicability of game-theoretic arguments to real populations might be contested. Here, we show that the head-colour polymorphism of red and black Gouldian finches (Erythrura gouldiae) provides a real-life example. The aggressive red morph is behaviourally dominant and successfully invades black populations, but when red ‘hawks’ become too common, their fitness is severely compromised (via decreased parental ability). We also investigate the effects of real-life deviations, particularly sexual reproduction, from the simple original game, which assumed asexual reproduction. A protected polymorphism requires mate choice to be sufficiently assortative. Assortative mating is adaptive for individuals because of genetic incompatibilities affecting hybrid offspring fitness, but by allowing red ‘hawks’ to persist, it also leads to significantly reduced population sizes. Because reductions in male contributions to parental care are generally known to lead to lower population productivity in birds, we expect zero-sum competition to often have wide ranging population consequences.     

Control of Neuronal Network in Caenorhabditis elegans

Caenorhabditis elegans, a soil dwelling nematode, is evolutionarily rudimentary and contains only ∼ 300 neurons which are connected to each other via chemical synapses and gap junctions. This structural connectivity can be perceived as nodes and edges of a graph. Controlling complex networked systems (such as nervous system) has been an area of excitement for mankind. Various methods have been developed to identify specific brain regions, which when controlled by external input can lead to achievement of control over the state of the system. But in case of neuronal connectivity network the properties of neurons identified as driver nodes is of much importance because nervous system can produce a variety of states (behaviour of the animal). Hence to gain insight on the type of control achieved in nervous system we implemented the notion of structural control from graph theory to C. elegans neuronal network. We identified ‘driver neurons’ which can provide full control over the network. We studied phenotypic properties of these neurons which are referred to as ‘phenoframe’ as well as the ‘genoframe’ which represents their genetic correlates. We find that the driver neurons are primarily motor neurons located in the ventral nerve cord and contribute to biological reproduction of the animal. Identification of driver neurons and its characterization adds a new dimension in controllability of C. elegans neuronal network. This study suggests the importance of driver neurons and their utility to control the behaviour of the organism.     

Can Perceptuo-Motor Skills Assessment Outcomes in Young Table Tennis Players (7–11 years) Predict Future Competition Participation and Performance? An Observational Prospective Study

Forecasting future performance in youth table tennis players based on current performance is complex due to, among other things, differences between youth players in growth, development, maturity, context and table tennis experience. Talent development programmes might benefit from an assessment of underlying perceptuo-motor skills for table tennis, which is hypothesized to determine the players’ potential concerning the perceptuo-motor domain. The Dutch perceptuo-motor skills assessment intends to measure the perceptuo-motor potential for table tennis in youth players by assessing the underlying skills crucial for developing technical and tactical qualities. Untrained perceptuo-motor tasks are used as these are suggested to represent a player’s future potential better than specific sport skills themselves as the latter depend on exposure to the sport itself. This study evaluated the value of the perceptuo-motor skills assessment for a talent developmental programme by evaluating its predictive validity for competition participation and performance in 48 young table tennis players (7–11 years). Players were tested on their perceptuo-motor skills once during a regional talent day, and the subsequent competition results were recorded half-yearly over a period of 2.5 years. Logistic regression analysis showed that test scores did not predict future competition participation (p >0.05). Yet, the Generalized Estimating Equations analysis, including the test items ‘aiming at target’, ‘throwing a ball’, and ‘eye-hand coordination’ in the best fitting model, revealed that the outcomes of the perceptuo-motor skills assessment were significant predictors for future competition results (R² = 51%). Since the test age influences the perceptuo-motor skills assessment’s outcome, another multivariable model was proposed including test age as a covariate (R² = 53%). This evaluation demonstrates promising prospects for the perceptuo-motor skills assessment to be included in a talent development programme. Future studies are needed to clarify the predictive value in a larger sample of youth competition players over a longer period in time.     

Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas

People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious “dominant” strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals’ strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players’ choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.     

How social network structure affects decision-making in Drosophila melanogaster

Animals use a number of different mechanisms to acquire crucial information. During social encounters, animals can pass information from one to another but, ideally, they would only use information that benefits survival and reproduction. Therefore, individuals need to be able to determine the value of the information they receive. One cue can come from the behaviour of other individuals that are already using the information. Using a previous extended dataset, we studied how individual decision-making is influenced by the behaviour of conspecifics in Drosophila melanogaster. We analysed how uninformed flies acquire and later use information about oviposition site choice they learn from informed flies. Our results suggest that uninformed flies adjust their future choices based on how coordinated the behaviours of the informed individuals they encounter are. Following social interaction, uninformed flies tended either to collectively follow the choice of the informed flies or to avoid it. Using social network analysis, we show that this selective information use seems to be based on the level of homogeneity of the social network. In particular, we found that the variance of individual centrality parameters among informed flies was lower in the case of a ‘follow’ outcome compared with the case of an ‘avoid’ outcome.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Insights into Sexism: Male Status and Performance Moderates Female-Directed Hostile and Amicable Behaviour

Gender inequality and sexist behaviour is prevalent in almost all workplaces and rampant in online environments. Although there is much research dedicated to understanding sexist behaviour, we have almost no insight into what triggers this behaviour and the individuals that initiate it. Although social constructionist theory argues that sexism is a response towards women entering a male dominated arena, this perspective doesn’t explain why only a subset of males behave in this way. We argue that a clearer understanding of sexist behaviour can be gained through an evolutionary perspective that considers evolved differences in intra-sexual competition. We hypothesised that female-initiated disruption of a male hierarchy incites hostile behaviour from poor performing males who stand to lose the most status. To test this hypothesis, we used an online first-person shooter video game that removes signals of dominance but provides information on gender, individual performance, and skill. We show that lower-skilled players were more hostile towards a female-voiced teammate, especially when performing poorly. In contrast, lower-skilled players behaved submissively towards a male-voiced player in the identical scenario. This difference in gender-directed behaviour became more extreme with poorer focal-player performance. We suggest that low-status males increase female-directed hostility to minimize the loss of status as a consequence of hierarchical reconfiguration resulting from the entrance of a woman into the competitive arena. Higher-skilled players, in contrast, were more positive towards a female relative to a male teammate. As higher-skilled players have less to fear from hierarchical reorganization, we argue that these males behave more positively in an attempt to support and garner a female player’s attention. Our results provide the clearest picture of inter-sexual competition to date, highlighting the importance of considering an evolutionary perspective when exploring the factors that affect male hostility towards women.     

Conceptual learning by miniature brains

Concepts act as a cornerstone of human cognition. Humans and non-human primates learn conceptual relationships such as ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘larger than’, ‘better than’, among others. In all cases, the relationships have to be encoded by the brain independently of the physical nature of objects linked by the relation. Consequently, concepts are associated with high levels of cognitive sophistication and are not expected in an insect brain. Yet, various works have shown that the miniature brain of honeybees rapidly learns conceptual relationships involving visual stimuli. Concepts such as ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘above/below of’ or ‘left/right are well mastered by bees. We review here evidence about concept learning in honeybees and discuss both its potential adaptive advantage and its possible neural substrates. The results reviewed here challenge the traditional view attributing supremacy to larger brains when it comes to the elaboration of concepts and have wide implications for understanding how brains can form conceptual relations.     

Interactions between personality and institutions in cooperative behaviour in humans

Laboratory attempts to identify relationships between personality and cooperative behaviour in humans have generated inconsistent results. This may partially stem from different practices in psychology and economics laboratories, with both hypothetical players and incentives typical only in the former. Another possible cause is insufficient consideration of the contexts within which social dilemmas occur. Real social dilemmas are often governed by institutions that change the payoff structure via rewards and punishments. However, such ‘strong situations’ will not necessarily suppress the effects of personality. On the contrary, they may affect some personalities differentially. Extraversion and neuroticism, reflecting variation in reward and punishment sensitivity, should predict modification of cooperative behaviour following changes to the payoff structure. We investigate interactions between personality and a punishment situation via two versions of a public goods game. We find that, even in a strong situation, personality matters and, moreover, it is related to strategic shifts in cooperation. Extraversion is associated with a shift from free-riding to cooperation in the presence of punishment, agreeableness is associated with initially higher contributions regardless of game, and, contrary to our predictions, neuroticism is associated with lower contributions regardless of game. Results should lead to new hypotheses that relate variation in biological functioning to individual differences in cooperative behaviour and that consider three-way interactions among personality, institutional context and sociocultural background.     

Monte Carlo Planning Method Estimates Planning Horizons during Interactive Social Exchange

Reciprocating interactions represent a central feature of all human exchanges. They have been the target of various recent experiments, with healthy participants and psychiatric populations engaging as dyads in multi-round exchanges such as a repeated trust task. Behaviour in such exchanges involves complexities related to each agent’s preference for equity with their partner, beliefs about the partner’s appetite for equity, beliefs about the partner’s model of their partner, and so on. Agents may also plan different numbers of steps into the future. Providing a computationally precise account of the behaviour is an essential step towards understanding what underlies choices. A natural framework for this is that of an interactive partially observable Markov decision process (IPOMDP). However, the various complexities make IPOMDPs inordinately computationally challenging. Here, we show how to approximate the solution for the multi-round trust task using a variant of the Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm. We demonstrate that the algorithm is efficient and effective, and therefore can be used to invert observations of behavioural choices. We use generated behaviour to elucidate the richness and sophistication of interactive inference.     

Conflicts of interest and the evolution of decision sharing

Social animals regularly face consensus decisions whereby they choose, collectively, between mutually exclusive actions. Such decisions often involve conflicts of interest between group members with respect to preferred action. Conflicts could, in principle, be resolved, either by sharing decisions between members (‘shared decisions’) or by one ‘dominant’ member making decisions on behalf of the whole group (‘unshared decisions’). Both, shared and unshared decisions, have been observed. However, it is unclear as to what favours the evolution of either decision type. Here, after a brief literature review, we present a novel method, involving a combination of self-organizing system and game theory modelling, of investigating the evolution of shared and unshared decisions. We apply the method to decisions on movement direction. We find that both, shared and unshared, decisions can evolve without individuals having a global overview of the group''s behaviour or any knowledge about other members'' preferences or intentions. Selection favours unshared over shared decisions when conflicts are high relative to grouping benefits, and vice versa. These results differ from those of group decision models relating to activity timings. We attribute this to fundamental differences between collective decisions about modalities that are disjunct (here, space) or continuous (here, time) with respect to costs/benefits.     

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of ‘currency’, it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully ‘symbolize’ economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.     

Trust and cooperation among economic agents

The units that are subject to selection pressure in evolutionary biology are ‘strategies’, which are conditional actions (‘Do P if X occurs, otherwise do Q’). In contrast, the units in economics select strategies from available menus so as to further their projects and purposes. As economic agents do not live in isolation, each agent''s optimum choice, in general, depends on the choices made by others. Because their projects and purposes involve the future, not just the present, each agent reasons about the likely present and future consequences of their respective choices. That is why beliefs, about what others may do and what the consequences of those choices could be, are at the basis of strategy selection. A catalogue of social environments is constructed in which agents not only promise each other''s cooperation, but also rationally believe that the promises will be kept. Unfortunately, non-cooperation arising from mistrust can be the outcome in those same environments: societies harbour multiple ‘equilibria’ and can skid from cooperation to non-cooperation. Moreover, a pre-occupation among analysts with the Prisoners'' Dilemma game has obscured the fact that cooperative arrangements can harbour not only inequality, but also exploitation. The analysis is used to discuss why international cooperation over the use of global public goods has proved to be so elusive.     

A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game ‘institutional evolution’ with the more familiar within-game ‘behavioural evolution’. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on ‘attractor’ games. Agents use their ‘institutional preferences'' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.     

How to Become a Mentalist: Reading Decisions from a Competitor’s Pupil Can Be Achieved without Training but Requires Instruction

Pupil dilation is implicated as a marker of decision-making as well as of cognitive and emotional processes. Here we tested whether individuals can exploit another’s pupil to their advantage. We first recorded the eyes of 3 "opponents", while they were playing a modified version of the "rock-paper-scissors" childhood game. The recorded videos served as stimuli to a second set of participants. These "players" played rock-paper-scissors against the pre-recorded opponents in a variety of conditions. When players just observed the opponents’ eyes without specific instruction their probability of winning was at chance. When informed that the time of maximum pupil dilation was indicative of the opponents’ choice, however, players raised their winning probability significantly above chance. When just watching the reconstructed area of the pupil against a gray background, players achieved similar performance, showing that players indeed exploited the pupil, rather than other facial cues. Since maximum pupil dilation was correct about the opponents’ decision only in 60% of trials (chance 33%), we finally tested whether increasing this validity to 100% would allow spontaneous learning. Indeed, when players were given no information, but the pupil was informative about the opponent’s response in all trials, players performed significantly above chance on average and half (5/10) reached significance at an individual level. Together these results suggest that people can in principle use the pupil to detect cognitive decisions in another individual, but that most people have neither explicit knowledge of the pupil’s utility nor have they learnt to use it despite a lifetime of exposure.