Some mistakes go unpunished: the evolution of "all or nothing" signalling

Many models of honest signaling, based on Zahavi's handicap principle, predict that if receivers are interested in a quality that shows continuous variation across the population of signalers, then the distribution of signal intensities will also be continuous. However, it has previously been noted that this prediction does not agree with empirical observation in many signaling systems, where signals are limited to a small number of levels despite continuous variation in the trait being signaled. Typically, there is a critical value of the trait, with all individuals with trait values on one side of the threshold using the same cheap signal, and all those with trait values on the other side of the threshold using the same expensive signal. It has already been demonstrated that these classical models naturally predict such "all-or-nothing signaling" if it is additionally assumed that receivers suffer from perceptual error in evaluating signal strength. We show that such all-or-nothing signaling is also predicted if receivers are limited to responding to the signals in one of two ways. We suggest that many ecological situations (such as the decision to attack the signaler or not, or mate with the signaler or not) involve such binary choices.     

CONSPIRATORIAL WHISPERS AND CONSPICUOUS DISPLAYS: GAMES OF SIGNAL DETECTION

Recent models of signaling have assumed that the expenditure required to ensure detection of a display is negligible and have concentrated instead on the costs that may be necessary to maintain honesty. Such models predict that individuals who share the same interests are likely to communicate using “conspiratorial whispers,” signals that are cheap and inconspicuous. Here, I present a game-theoretical model of signal detection (in a noisy environment, in the presence of potential eavesdroppers), which demonstrates that the idea of conspiratorial whispers is far too simplistic. It is true that in “cooperative” signaling systems (where signalers attempt to elicit responses that are beneficial for receivers), signal cost is not required to maintain honesty. However, some level of expenditure is still needed to ensure that a signal is reliably detected. Moreover, there exists a conflict of interest between signalers and receivers over the division of this expenditure. To predict the stable level of display in such cases, one needs to know how this conflict of interest will be resolved. The model reveals that the outcome may range from a whisper to a conspicuous and costly (though still conspiratorial) display. The more closely related the receiver is to the signaler, the greater the level of signal exaggeration that is expected—the opposite prediction to that of honest signaling models.     

THE COST OF SEXUAL SIGNALING IN YEAST

The handicap principle holds that costly sexual signals can reliably indicate mate quality. Only individuals of high quality can afford a strong signal—the cost of signaling is relatively lower for high‐quality signalers than for low‐quality signalers. This critical property is difficult to test experimentally because the benefit of signaling on mating success, and cost of signaling on other components of fitness, cannot easily be separated in obligate sexual organisms. We therefore studied the facultatively sexual yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, which produces pheromones to attract potential mates. To precisely measure the cost of signaling, the signal was reduced or removed by deleting one or both copies of the pheromone‐encoding genes and measuring asexual growth rate in competition with a wild‐type signaler. We manipulated signaler quality either by changing the quality of the assay environment or by changing the number of deleterious mutations carried. For both types of treatment, we found that the cost of signaling decreased as the quality of the signaler increased, demonstrating that the yeast pheromone signal has the key property required for selection under the handicap principle. We found that cells of high genetic quality produce stronger signals than low‐quality cells, verifying that the signal is indeed honest.     

Context-dependent discrimination and the evolution of mimicry

Many mimetic organisms have evolved a close resemblance to their models, making it difficult to discriminate between them on the basis of appearance alone. However, if mimics and models differ slightly in their activity patterns, behavior, or use of microhabitats, the exact circumstances under which a signaler is encountered may provide additional clues to its identity. We employ an optimality model of mimetic discrimination in which signal receivers obtain information about the relative risk of encountering mimics and models by observing an external background cue and flexibly adjust their response thresholds. Although such flexibility on the part of signal receivers has been predicted by theory and is supported by empirical evidence in a range of biological settings, little is known about the effects it has on signalers. We show that the presence of external cues that partly reveal signaler identity may benefit models and harm mimics, harm both, or even benefit both, depending on ecological circumstances. Moreover, if mimetic traits are costly to express, or mimics are related to their neighbors, context-dependent discrimination can dramatically alter the outcome of mimetic evolution. We discuss context-dependent discrimination among signal receivers in relation to small-scale synchrony in model and mimic activity patterns.     

How costly is the honest signaling of need?

ESS models of biological signaling have shown that costly signals can provide honest information. In the context of parent-offspring conflict over the allocation of resources by parents to their young, the theory explains costly offspring solicitation behavior as an accurate signal of offspring need to parents who cannot assess offspring condition directly. In this paper, we provide a simple but general characterization of the honest signaling of need in models of parent-offspring conflict: the offspring's signaling cost is proportional to the parent's fitness loss from satisfying the offspring's resource requirement. The factor of proportionality is given by a measure of the extent of parent-offspring conflict that depends only on coefficients of relatedness. These results hold for interbrood conflict with uniparental investment even if the relationship between offspring condition and resource requirement is not monotonic, and extend to cases of biparental care, uncertainty concerning the parent's condition, and intra-brood conflict. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Phylogenetic analysis of the evolution of a signal of aggressive intent in northern swordtail fishes

The initiation of a coevolutionary relationship between signal and response can be explained by either the receiver taking advantage of information inadvertently provided by the sender or the sender taking advantage of a perceptual bias in the receiver. In addition, once both signal and response are present, the exchange of information may or may not be cooperative. We examined the evolution of a signal of aggressive intent (expression of vertical bars) across all the northern swordtail fishes (Xiphophorus) in a phylogenetic context. We found that the signal was present before responses evolved, which suggests that this coevolutionary relationship was initiated by the receiver taking advantage of information inadvertently provided by the signaler. In addition, we introduce a novel method for examining the cooperative nature of signaling systems and provide some evidence to suggest that in this signaling system, receivers may be exploiting an honest signal in some species.     

Dynamically engaged smiling predicts cooperation above and beyond average smiling levels

Smiling has been conceptualized as a signal of cooperative intent, yet smiles are easy to fake. We suggest that contextually appropriate, dynamically engaged smiling imposes an attentional cost, thereby making engaged smiling a plausible “honest signal” of cooperative intent. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 123 pairs of same-sex strangers having “getting-to-know-you” conversations who subsequently played a one-shot prisoner's dilemma together. We calculated the strength of engagement in smiling using a cross-lagged auto-regressive model for dyadic data. We found that when an individual's partner (the signaler) tended to smile in a more responsive way, that individual (the receiver) was more likely to cooperate. Conversely, when a signaler tended to smile in a less responsive way, the receiver was less likely to cooperate. These effects were present over-and-above the effects of average levels of smiling and self-reported liking, which also predicted likelihood of cooperation. However, dynamically engaged smiling did not predict cooperation on the part of the signaler, suggesting that receivers weight the importance of engagement more highly than they should, or even that engaged smiling might be a manipulative display. These results illustrate how conversational dynamics can influence evolutionary signaling.     

Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability

We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of lower-quality males (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium.     

Costly signaling and cooperation.

We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms.     

Sexual selection and the evolution of costly female preferences: spatial effects

Abstract.— Models of Fisher's runaway process show that if there is a cost to female preference, no preference or male trait exaggeration will evolve. Surprisingly, this is true no matter how small the cost, which reveals that these models of Fisher's process are structurally unstable (Bulmer 1989). Here a model of Fisher's runaway process is presented to demonstrate that costly female preference evolves very easily when space is explicitly included in the model. The only requirement is that the optimal male phenotype changes across the species' range. The model shows that the spatial average of the female preference and male trait reach an evolutionary equilibrium that is identical to those of nonspatial models, but that the preference and male trait can deviate greatly from these averages at any point in space. For example, if random mating results in the lowest cost to females, then at equilibrium the spatial average preference will be zero. Nevertheless, there will be some locations at which females prefer males with larger ornaments and others where they prefer males with smaller ornaments. Results also show that the structural instability of nonspatial models of Fisher's process is less of a problem in spatial models. In particular, many of the main qualitative features of cost-free spatial models of Fisher's process remain valid even when there are small costs of female preference. Finally, the model shows that abrupt changes in the optimal male phenotype across space can result in an amplification of this pattern when preference has a small cost, but it can also result in a pattern similar to reproductive character displacement. Which of these occurs depends on the magnitude of the cost of female preference. This suggests that some patterns of reproductive character displacement in nature might be explained simply by sexual selection rather than by hybrid dysgenesis and reinforcement.     

Immune challenge affects sexual coloration of male Iberian wall lizards

Sexual signals can be evolutionarily stable if they are honest and condition dependent or costly to the signaler. One possible cost is the existence of a trade-off between maintaining the immune system and the elaboration of ornaments. We experimentally challenged the immune system of male Iberian wall lizards, Podarcis hispanica, with a bacterial antigen (lipopolysaccharide) without pathogenic effects to explore whether the immune activation affected sexually dimorphic visual ornaments. Ventrolateral coloration changed in all males, but immune activation affected some characteristics of coloration of experimental males (i.e., challenged males failed to increase brightness and medium wavelengths over time as control males did, and the proportion of yellow pigments decreased after the immune activation) but not others (i.e., proportion of blue, green and red pigments changed equally in all males). Results suggested the existence of a trade-off between physiological regulation of the immune system and the allocation of essential compounds (probably carotenoids) to sexual ornaments. We suggest that this trade-off may allow one to honestly signal individual male quality via characteristics of coloration in lizards, which may have an important role in both intra- and intersexual selection processes.     

Ecological factors influencing the evolution of insects' chemical defenses

How insect defense chemicals have evolved has remained relativelyunderstudied, compared with the evolution of aposematic signalsof such defenses. Because there is mounting evidence that chemicaldefenses can generally be expected to be costly, understandingthe evolution of such defenses and their maintenance in theface of the potential for automimicry (signaling by individualsthat do not invest in defense) is nontrivial. One potentialexplanation is that chemically defended insects suffer lessfrom predation than those that do not invest in chemical defenses.Here, we use a series of models to explore aspects of the evolutionof such costly chemical defenses. Our models predict that investmentin costly defenses can occur across a wide range of predationintensities; however, if predation intensity is low, then thedefense has to be very effective to be selected, unless thedefense is very cheap. Furthermore, the evolution of antipredatorydefenses will be relatively insensitive to the severity of anymechanism, whereby prey pay a cost every time they use theirdefense against an attacking predator even if they survive theattack, but sensitive to the form of the relationship betweeninitial investment in constituting the defense and survivalbenefit. Once defense becomes common in the prey population,prey may get a frequency-dependent benefit if predators learnto avoid prey of this type after several attacks. Finally, wepredict that increasing the rate of avoidance learning by predatorsencourages reduced investment in antipredatory defenses by prey.The potential for these predictions to be tested empiricallyis discussed.     

Effect of the number of grey levels on the detectability of a simple line signal in visual noise

The number of grey levels, G, contained in a digitized image of an external event must affect the fidelity of reproduction of that event for physical reasons. The question arises as to whether there is a separate perceptual effect of G. Three experiments are described which investigate the effect of G on the visibility of a straight-line signal in visual noise using a signal detection analysis to separate the physical and perceptual effects of G. The results show that, for the type of displays employed, and for the specific task of detection of lines in visual noise, there was no effect of G on efficiency, which suggests that G had no separate perceptual effect.     

Signals found in the grooming interactions of wild Japanese monkeys of the koshima troop

Signaling behaviors appearing in grooming interactions of wild Japanese monkeys were analysed. Vocal signals found in the grooming interactions had the content of asking the objective animal “if the vocal signaler may groom the recipient animal.” They could be divided into two categories of vocal sounds, VG-1 and VG-2. The former was uttered in common by all the troop members. The latter was uttered just before grooming by the groomer and is considered to have deeper connection with grooming. Each individual uttered mainly one kind of vocal sound out of VG-2, and the preferred vocal sounds for each individual differed. Furthermore, VG-2 differed in different troops. Behavioral signals had the content of showing “the acceptance of grooming” or showing “the request to be groomed.” The appearance of these signaling behaviors was closely related to the inter-individual relationships of grooming partners, especially as to whether or not they had blood relationships. Basically the monkeys have a system in which they must avoid each other, except in the case of mothers and their offspring, and if they had to approach too closely against this basic system, as in grooming interactions, there appeared signaling behaviors as mentioned above.     

The cost of dishonesty

The handicap principle states that stable biological signals must be honest and costly to produce. The cost of the signal should reflect the true quality of the signaller. Here, it is argued that honest signalling may be maintained although the used signals are not handicaps. A game theoretic model in the form of a game of signalling is presented: all the existing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are found. Honest and cheap signalling of male quality is shown to be evolutionarily stable if females divorce the mate if it turns out that he has cheated about his quality. However, for this ESS to apply, the cost of lost time must not be too great. The stability of the honest signalling is based on deceivers being prevented from spreading in the population because they suffer from a cost of divorce. Under some fairly strict conditions, a mixed polymorphism of dishonesty and honesty represents another possible ESS.     

The evolutionary stability of attenuators that mask information about animals that social partners can exploit

Signals and cues are fundamental to social interactions. A well‐established concept in the study of animal communication is an amplifier, defined as a trait that does not add extra information to that already present in the original cue or signal, but rather enhances the fidelity with which variation in the original cue or signal is correctly perceived. Attenuators as the logical compliment of amplifiers: attenuators act to reduce the fidelity with which variation in a signal or cue can be reliably evaluated by the perceivers. Where amplifiers reduce the effect of noise on the perception of variation, attenuators add noise. Attenuators have been subject to much less consideration than amplifiers; however, they will be the focus of our theoretical study. We utilize an extension of a well‐established model incorporated signal or cue inaccuracy and costly investments by emitter and perceiver in sending and attending to the signal or cue. We present broad conditions involving some conflict of interest between emitter and perceiver where it may be advantageous for emitters to invest in costly attenuators to mask cues from potential perceivers, and a subset of these conditions where the perceiver may be willing to invest in costly anti‐attenuators to mitigate the loss of information to them. We demonstrate that attenuators can be evolutionary stable even if they are costly, even if they are sometimes disadvantageous and even if a perceiver can mount counter‐measures to them. As such, we feel that attenuators of cues may be deserving of much more research attention.     

Costly signaling,ritual and cooperation: evidence from Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion

The apparent wastefulness of religious ritual represents a puzzle for rational choice theorists and evolutionary scholars. In recent years, it has been proposed that such rituals represent costly signals that promote intragroup cooperation precisely because of the effort and resources they require. This hypothesis was tested over the course of a 14-month long ethnographic study in the northeast of Brazil. The research focused on adherents of Candomblé, an African diasporic religion organized in autonomous congregations primarily located in low-income urban areas. Individuals who reported higher levels of religious commitment behaved more generously in a public goods economic game and revealed more instances of provided and received cooperation within their religious community. This suggests that ritual as a costly signaling may effectively predict willingness to cooperate with other group members and that the signaler may accrue benefits in the form of received cooperation. Socioeconomic variables are also shown to mediate religious signaling. This raises the possibility that signalers strategically alter their expressions of commitment as their needs and circumstances change.     

QUORUM SENSING AND GROUP SELECTION

Bacteria respond to cell density by expressing genes whose products are beneficial to the population as a whole. This response is brought about through the release into the medium of signaling molecules of the class N-acyl homoserine lactones, the concentration of which determines the level of gene expression. This form of communication between cells has been termed “quorum sensing,” and has been found to operate in the control of many functions in a variety of gram-negative bacteria. As with all signaling between individuals, if fitness costs are associated with the release of and response to the signal, the inclusive fitness of alleles responsible for the phenomenon depends upon genetic relatedness between signaler and responder. The situation is considered in explicit models for bacterial population genetics, in which the critical parameter determining the success of quorum sensing is the mean number of cells founding a population sharing a patch of resource. It is found that extensive polymorphism for the presence or absence of quorum sensing is expected for a wide range of parameter space. If local communities of bacteria contain diverse species, community stability may be the consequence of these interactions rather than polymorphism.     

Threshold assessment,categorical perception,and the evolution of reliable signaling

Animals often use assessment signals to communicate information about their quality to a variety of receivers, including potential mates, competitors, and predators. But what maintains reliable signaling and prevents signalers from signaling a better quality than they actually have? Previous work has shown that reliable signaling can be maintained if signalers pay fitness costs for signaling at different intensities and these costs are greater for lower quality individuals than higher quality ones. Models supporting this idea typically assume that continuous variation in signal intensity is perceived as such by receivers. In many organisms, however, receivers have threshold responses to signals, in which they respond to a signal if it is above a threshold value and do not respond if the signal is below the threshold value. Here, we use both analytical and individual-based models to investigate how such threshold responses affect the reliability of assessment signals. We show that reliable signaling systems can break down when receivers have an invariant threshold response, but reliable signaling can be rescued if there is variation among receivers in the location of their threshold boundary. Our models provide an important step toward understanding signal evolution when receivers have threshold responses to continuous signal variation.     

Cost,expenditure and vulnerability

The handicap principle (HP) stipulates that signal reliability can be maintained if signals are costly to produce. Yet empirical biologists are typically unable to directly measure evolutionary costs, and instead appeal to expenditure (the time, energy and resources associated with signaling behavior) as a sensible proxy. However the link between expenditure and cost is not always as straightforward as proponents of HP assume. We consider signaling interactions where whether the expenditure associated with signaling is converted into an evolutionary cost is in some sense dependent on the behavior of the intended recipient of the signal. We illustrate this with a few empirical examples and demonstrate that on this alternative expenditure to cost mapping the traditional predictions of HP no longer hold. Instead of full information transfer, a partially informative communication system like those uncovered by Wagner (Games 4(2):163–181, 2013) and Zollman et al. (Proc R Soc B 20121878, 2012) is possible.