Psychological and Evolutionary Evidence for Altruism

Sober and Wilson have recentlyclaimed that evolutionary theory can do whatneither philosophy nor experimental psychologyhave been able to, namely, ``break the deadlock'in the egoism vs. altruism debate with anargument based on the reliability of altruisticmotivation. I analyze both their reliabilityargument and the experimental evidence ofsocial psychology in favor of altruism in termsof the folk-psychological ``laws' and inferencepatterns underlying them, and conclude thatthey both rely on the same patterns. I exposethe confusions that have led Sober and Wilsonto defend a reliability argument whilerejecting the experimental evidence of socialpsychology.     

Two Explanations of Evolutionary Progress

Natural selection explains how living forms are fitted to theirconditions of life. Darwin argued that selection also explains what hecalled the gradual advancement of the organisation, i.e.evolutionary progress. Present-day selectionists disagree. In theirview, it is happenstance that sustains conditions favorable to progress,and therefore happenstance, not selection, that explains progress. Iargue that the disagreement here turns not on whether there exists aselection-based condition bias – a belief now attributed to Darwin – but on whether there needs to be such a bias for selection to count as explaining progress. In Darwin's own view, selection explained progressso far as more complex organisms have the selective advantage whenselection operates unimpeded. I show that these two explanations ofevolutionary progress, selection and happenstance, answer for theirobjectivity to different standards, and for their truth or falsehood todifferent features of the world.     

Evolutionary Psychology – Towards a More Integrative Model

Aspects of the history of behavioural science are reviewed, pointing to its fragmented and faction-ridden nature. The emergence of evolutionary psychology (EP) is viewed in this context. With the help of a dual-layered model of behavioural control, the case is made for a more integrative perspective towards EP. The model's application to both behaviour and complex human information processing is described. Similarities in their control are noted. It is suggested that one layer of control (‘on-line’) corresponds to the encapsulated modules of EP whereas the off-line controls provide the plasticity and flexibility suggested by its critics.     

Some Recent Developments in Evolutionary Approaches to the Study of Human Cognition and Behavior

In this paper I review some theoretical exchanges and empiricalresults from recent work on human behavior and cognition in thehope of indicating some productive avenues for critical engagement.I focus particular attention on methodological debates between Evolutionary Psychologists and behavioral ecologists. I argue for a broader and more encompassing approach to the evolutionarily based study of human behavior and cognition than either of these two rivals present.     

Choosing between the Emotional Dog and the Rational Pal: A Moral Dilemma with a Tail

ABSTRACT

Neuroscientific studies indicate moral cognition involves a cognitive struggle between two systems in the brain: the emotional “hot” system and the rational “cold” system. Past research has shown that when presented with personal dilemmas, individuals showed greater brain activity in the hot system areas. However, when further probed about their decisions, moral dumbfounding often occurs. Family selection may help explain moral judgments. Oftentimes, people consider their pets as part of their family. Based on the past research on moral decision-making, the current study presented a novel approach to exploring moral decision-making by forcing participants to choose to save the life between biological family and psychological-kin. Participants (n = 573) were given moral dilemmas and forced to decide whether to save humans or pets from imminent death. The level of relationship between the human shifted six times (foreign tourist, hometown stranger, distant cousin, best friend, grandparent, and sibling), while relationship to the pet had two levels (your pet, someone else's pet). Willingness to save a pet over a human consistently decreased as level of relationship between the participant and the human in the scenario increased. Participants were also more likely to save their own pet over a human life than someone else's pet over a human life. The results suggest that pets are often viewed as psychological-kin. Females were found to be more likely to save their pets over non-immediate family members than males (all ps < 0.05), suggesting that males and females may differ in the structure of their moral reasoning.     

Evolutionary rescue under demographic and environmental stochasticity

Populations suffer two types of stochasticity: demographic stochasticity, from sampling error in offspring number, and environmental stochasticity, from temporal variation in the growth rate. By modelling evolution through phenotypic selection following an abrupt environmental change, we investigate how genetic and demographic dynamics, as well as effects on population survival of the genetic variance and of the strength of stabilizing selection, differ under the two types of stochasticity. We show that population survival probability declines sharply with stronger stabilizing selection under demographic stochasticity, but declines more continuously when environmental stochasticity is strengthened. However, the genetic variance that confers the highest population survival probability differs little under demographic and environmental stochasticity. Since the influence of demographic stochasticity is stronger when population size is smaller, a slow initial decline of genetic variance, which allows quicker evolution, is important for population persistence. In contrast, the influence of environmental stochasticity is population-size-independent, so higher initial fitness becomes important for survival under strong environmental stochasticity. The two types of stochasticity interact in a more than multiplicative way in reducing the population survival probability. Our work suggests the importance of explicitly distinguishing and measuring the forms of stochasticity during evolutionary rescue.     

Evolutionary domestication in Drosophila subobscura

The domestication of plants and animals is historically one of the most important topics in evolutionary biology. The evolutionary genetic changes arising from human cultivation are complex because of the effects of such varied processes as continuing natural selection, artificial selection, deliberate inbreeding, genetic drift and hybridization of different lineages. Despite the interest of domestication as an evolutionary process, few studies of multicellular sexual species have approached this topic using well-replicated experiments. Here we present a comprehensive study in which replicated evolutionary trajectories from several Drosophila subobscura populations provide a detailed view of the evolutionary dynamics of domestication in an outbreeding animal species. Our results show a clear evolutionary response in fecundity traits, but no clear pattern for adult starvation resistance and juvenile traits such as development time and viability. These results supply new perspectives on the confounding of adaptation with other evolutionary mechanisms in the process of domestication.     

Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber‘s The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics

In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I identify three major, historically relevant forms of the naturalistic fallacy, the (1) the deductive, (2) genetic, and (3) open question forms and argue that none of them pose an intrinsic problem for evolutionary ethics. I conclude that on this score at least there is no reason to resist temptation.     

Evolutionary inevitability of sexual antagonism

Sexual antagonism, whereby mutations are favourable in one sex and disfavourable in the other, is common in natural populations, yet the root causes of sexual antagonism are rarely considered in evolutionary theories of adaptation. Here, we explore the evolutionary consequences of sex-differential selection and genotype-by-sex interactions for adaptation in species with separate sexes. We show that sexual antagonism emerges naturally from sex differences in the direction of selection on phenotypes expressed by both sexes or from sex-by-genotype interactions affecting the expression of such phenotypes. Moreover, modest sex differences in selection or genotype-by-sex effects profoundly influence the long-term evolutionary trajectories of populations with separate sexes, as these conditions trigger the evolution of strong sexual antagonism as a by-product of adaptively driven evolutionary change. The theory demonstrates that sexual antagonism is an inescapable by-product of adaptation in species with separate sexes, whether or not selection favours evolutionary divergence between males and females.     

Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the Standard Social Science Model

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small advantageover competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality.     

Evolutionary mismatch along salinity gradients in a Neotropical water strider

The evolution of local adaptation is crucial for the in situ persistence of populations in changing environments. However, selection along broad environmental gradients could render local adaptation difficult, and might even result in maladaptation. We address this issue by quantifying fitness trade‐offs (via common garden experiments) along a salinity gradient in two populations of the Neotropical water strider Telmatometra withei—a species found in both fresh (FW) and brackish (BW) water environments across Panama. We found evidence for local adaptation in the FW population in its home FW environment. However, the BW population showed only partial adaptation to the BW environment, with a high magnitude of maladaptation along naturally occurring salinity gradients. Indeed, its overall fitness was ~60% lower than that of the ancestral FW population in its home environment, highlighting the role of phenotypic plasticity, rather than local adaptation, in high salinity environments. This suggests that populations seemingly persisting in high salinity environments might in fact be maladapted, following drastic changes in salinity. Thus, variable selection imposed by salinization could result in evolutionary mismatch, where the fitness of a population is displaced from its optimal environment. Understanding the fitness consequences of persisting in fluctuating salinity environments is crucial to predict the persistence of populations facing increasing salinization. It will also help develop evolutionarily informed management strategies in the context of global change.     

Mechanisms of bacterial morphogenesis: Evolutionary cell biology approaches provide new insights

How Darwin's “endless forms most beautiful” have evolved remains one of the most exciting questions in biology. The significant variety of bacterial shapes is most likely due to the specific advantages they confer with respect to the diverse environments they occupy. While our understanding of the mechanisms generating relatively simple shapes has improved tremendously in the last few years, the molecular mechanisms underlying the generation of complex shapes and the evolution of shape diversity are largely unknown. The emerging field of bacterial evolutionary cell biology provides a novel strategy to answer this question in a comparative phylogenetic framework. This relatively novel approach provides hypotheses and insights into cell biological mechanisms, such as morphogenesis, and their evolution that would have been difficult to obtain by studying only model organisms. We discuss the necessary steps, challenges, and impact of integrating “evolutionary thinking” into bacterial cell biology in the genomic era.     

演化计算的应用研究

介绍了演化计算的基本思想、特点及主要分支。在统一的枢架下给出了演化算法的设计方法和基本结构,并给出了演化计算在旅行商问题中的应用。最后讨论了演化计算的发展前景。     

The acquisition of conscience and Developmental Systems Theory

Summary Proponents of Developmental Systems Theory (DST) argue that it offers an alternative to current research programs in biology that are built on the historic disjunction between evolutionary and developmental biology. In this paper I illustrate how DST can be used to account for the acquisition of an important component of moral agency, conscience. Susan Oyama, a major proponent of DST, has set moral issues outside the compass of DST. Thus, I examine her reasons for restricting DST to non-moral matters, and argue that they are not decisive. On the positive side, I argue that DST not only is compatible with attempts to describe and explain moral agency but also aids us in understanding it. In particular, I show how DST can provide a fruitful perspective for viewing some significant current findings and theories in moral developmental psychology about the acquisition of conscience. The familiar dichotomies resisted by DST, those between genes and environment, inherited and acquired, innate and learned, and biological and cultural, have also plagued human developmental psychology, including moral development. By bringing a DST perspective to the study of moral development, I illustrate how a DST perspective might offer a promising way to reconceive that phenomenon, and provide some insights into how further work in understanding the development of moral agency might proceed. Thus, I hope to contribute to the current efforts of proponents of DST to integrate developmental and evolutionary considerations.     

Evolutionary naturalistic justifications of morality: A matter of faith and works

Robert Richards has presented a detailed defense of evolutionary ethics, a revised version of Darwin's views and a major modification of E. O. Wilson's. He contends that humans have evolved to seek the community welfare by acting altruistically. And since the community welfare is the highest moral good, humans ought to act altruistically. Richards asks us to take his empirical premises on faith and aims to show how they can justify an ethical conclusion. He identifies two necessary conditions for a naturalistic justification of morality (NJ): its premises (1) must be empirical and (2) concerned with morally relevant causal factors. I argue that these two conditions are insufficient. An NJ must also appeal to teleogical or teleonomic laws which identify proper effects and reliable causes of these effects. So I supplement biological faith with an NJ that I believe has a better chance of working since faith without works is dead.     

进化生态学的产生与发展

进化论、遗传学与生态学是在不同时期发展起来的独立学科,然而,随着科学的发展,们越来越认识到它们之间存在着密切的关系。Petrusewicz(1959)(见Shvarts,1977)曾写过《达尔文进化论是一种生态理论》一书,强调进化在本质上是一生态过程。Hutchinson(1965)写了一部题名为《生态学舞台和进化节目》一书,认为生态的布景可以作为进化过程的舞台。但是,最早提出进化生态学这一概念的则是Orians(1962)。进化生态学从产生到现在虽然只有20多年的历史,但已成为生态学研究的重要领域。下面从几个方面谈谈进化生态学的产生与发展。