Optimal control strategy for prevention of avian influenza pandemic

The spread of H5N1 virus to Europe and continued human infection in Southeast Asia have heightened pandemic concern. Although, fortunately, sustained human-to-human transmissions have not been reported yet, it is said that a pandemic virus which can be easily transmitted among humans certainly emerges in the future. In this study, we extended the previous studies for the prevention of the pandemic influenza to evaluate the time-dependent optimal prevention policies, which are associated with elimination policy and quarantine policy, considering its execution cost. Actually, the execution cost affects the optimal strategy of prevention policies and the prevention of the disease spread. We found that the quarantine policy is very important rather than the elimination policy during the disease spread, even if the unit execution cost of the quarantine policy is more expensive than that of the elimination policy. And also, the change of the unit execution cost does affect the total cumulative cost of the optimal prevention policies but does not affect the relative frequency of each cumulative execution cost. Furthermore, interestingly, we revealed that an optimal strategy to reduce the number of total infected humans might increase a chance of invadability of the mutant influenza.     

Genesis of pandemic influenza

During the last decade the number of reported outbreaks caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in domestic poultry has drastically increased. At the same time, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) strains, such as H9N2 in many parts of the Middle East and Asia and H6N2 in live bird markets in California, have become endemic. Each AI outbreak brings the concomitant possibility of poultry-to-human transmission. Indeed, human illness and death have resulted from such occasional transmissions with highly pathogenic avian H7N7 and H5N1 viruses while avian H9N2 viruses have been isolated from individuals with mild influenza. The transmission of avian influenza directly from poultry to humans has brought a sense of urgency in terms of understanding the mechanisms that lead to interspecies transmission of influenza. Domestic poultry species have been previously overlooked as potential intermediate hosts in the generation of influenza viruses with the capacity to infect humans. In this review, we will discuss molecular and epidemiological aspects that have led to the recurrent emergence of avian influenza strains with pandemic potential, with a particular emphasis on the current Asian H5N1 viruses.     

The role of health care workers and antiviral drugs in the control of pandemic influenza

Until a vaccine against the new strain becomes available, the response to newly emerged pandemic influenza will consist of the use of antiviral drugs and measures that limit exposure to infectious individuals. These first-line defence measures include isolating cases upon diagnosis, reducing close contacts, the use of personal protective equipment and hygiene, and using antiviral drugs for treatment and prophylaxis. There are significant 'costs' associated with control measures, so to justify such interventions it is important to assess their potential to reduce transmission. In this paper, we determine the effect that a number of different antiviral interventions have on the reproduction number of infectives and the probability that an imported infection fades out, and determine parameter scenarios for which these interventions are able to eliminate an emerging pandemic of influenza. We also assess the role that health care workers play in transmission and the extent to which providing them with antiviral prophylaxis and personal protective equipment modifies this role. Our results indicate that this class requires protection to avoid a greatly disproportionate contribution to early infective numbers, and for the maintenance of a stable health care system. Further, we show that the role children play in increasing transmission is moderate, in spite of closer mixing with other children.     

Effective, robust design of community mitigation for pandemic influenza: a systematic examination of proposed US guidance

Background

The US government proposes pandemic influenza mitigation guidance that includes isolation and antiviral treatment of ill persons, voluntary household member quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis, social distancing of individuals, school closure, reduction of contacts at work, and prioritized vaccination. Is this the best strategy combination? Is choice of this strategy robust to pandemic uncertainties? What are critical enablers of community resilience?

Methods and Findings

We systematically simulate a broad range of pandemic scenarios and mitigation strategies using a networked, agent-based model of a community of explicit, multiply-overlapping social contact networks. We evaluate illness and societal burden for alterations in social networks, illness parameters, or intervention implementation. For a 1918-like pandemic, the best strategy minimizes illness to <1% of the population and combines network-based (e.g. school closure, social distancing of all with adults'' contacts at work reduced), and case-based measures (e.g. antiviral treatment of the ill and prophylaxis of household members). We find choice of this best strategy robust to removal of enhanced transmission by the young, additional complexity in contact networks, and altered influenza natural history including extended viral shedding. Administration of age-group or randomly targeted 50% effective pre-pandemic vaccine with 7% population coverage (current US H5N1 vaccine stockpile) had minimal effect on outcomes. In order, mitigation success depends on rapid strategy implementation, high compliance, regional mitigation, and rigorous rescinding criteria; these are the critical enablers for community resilience.

Conclusions

Systematic evaluation of feasible, recommended pandemic influenza interventions generally confirms the US community mitigation guidance yields best strategy choices for pandemic planning that are robust to a wide range of uncertainty. The best strategy combines network- and case-based interventions; network-based interventions are paramount. Because strategies must be applied rapidly, regionally, and stringently for greatest benefit, preparation and public education is required for long-lasting, high community compliance during a pandemic.     

Emergence of drug resistance: implications for antiviral control of pandemic influenza

Given the danger of an unprecedented spread of the highly pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1 in humans, and great challenges to the development of an effective influenza vaccine, antiviral drugs will probably play a pivotal role in combating a novel pandemic strain. A critical limitation to the use of these drugs is the evolution of highly transmissible drug-resistant viral mutants. Here, we develop a mathematical model to evaluate the potential impact of an antiviral treatment strategy on the emergence of drug resistance and containment of a pandemic. The results show that elimination of the wild-type strain depends crucially on both the early onset of treatment in indexed cases and population-level treatment. Given the probable delay of 0.5-1 day in seeking healthcare and therefore initiating therapy, the findings indicate that a single strategy of antiviral treatment will be unsuccessful at controlling the spread of disease if the reproduction number of the wild-type strain (R0s) exceeds 1.4. We demonstrate the possible occurrence of a self-sustaining epidemic of resistant strain, in terms of its transmission fitness relative to the wild-type, and the reproduction number R0s. Considering reproduction numbers estimated for the past three pandemics, the findings suggest that an uncontrollable pandemic is likely to occur if resistant viruses with relative transmission fitness above 0.4 emerge. While an antiviral strategy is crucial for containing a pandemic, its effectiveness depends critically on timely and strategic use of drugs.     

The practical performance of cholera control measures in the USSR during the 7th pandemic

The critical analysis of anticholera measures carried out in the USSR since 1965 till the present time is presented. The grounds for the abolition or considerable reduction of a number of measures are considered from the viewpoint of their scientific substantiation, the adequacy of means and efforts spent for their realization and their antiepidemic effectiveness. Special attention is paid to the necessity of differentiated approach to these measures, depending on concrete local climatic and geographical, sanitary, hygienic and other factors which determine the epidemic potential of a given administrative territory.     

Mitigation measures for pandemic influenza in Italy: an individual based model considering different scenarios

Background

Individual-based models can provide the most reliable estimates of the spread of infectious diseases. In the present study, we evaluated the diffusion of pandemic influenza in Italy and the impact of various control measures, coupling a global SEIR model for importation of cases with an individual based model (IBM) describing the Italian epidemic.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We co-located the Italian population (57 million inhabitants) to households, schools and workplaces and we assigned travel destinations to match the 2001 census data. We considered different R₀ values (1.4; 1.7; 2), evaluating the impact of control measures (vaccination, antiviral prophylaxis -AVP-, international air travel restrictions and increased social distancing). The administration of two vaccine doses was considered, assuming that first dose would be administered 1-6 months after the first world case, and different values for vaccine effectiveness (VE). With no interventions, importation would occur 37–77 days after the first world case. Air travel restrictions would delay the importation of the pandemic by 7–37 days. With an R₀ of 1.4 or 1.7, the use of combined measures would reduce clinical attack rates (AR) from 21–31% to 0.3–4%. Assuming an R₀ of 2, the AR would decrease from 38% to 8%, yet only if vaccination were started within 2 months of the first world case, in combination with a 90% reduction in international air traffic, closure of schools/workplaces for 4 weeks and AVP of household and school/work close contacts of clinical cases. Varying VE would not substantially affect the results.

Conclusions

This IBM, which is based on country-specific demographic data, could be suitable for the real-time evaluation of measures to be undertaken in the event of the emergence of a new pandemic influenza virus. All preventive measures considered should be implemented to mitigate the pandemic.     

Evaluating the effectiveness of road mitigation measures

The last 20 years have seen a dramatic increase in efforts to mitigate the negative effects of roads and traffic on wildlife, including fencing to prevent wildlife-vehicle collisions and wildlife crossing structures to facilitate landscape connectivity. While not necessarily explicitly articulated, the fundamental drivers behind road mitigation are human safety, animal welfare, and/or wildlife conservation. Concomitant with the increased effort to mitigate has been a focus on evaluating road mitigation. So far, research has mainly focussed on assessing the use of wildlife crossing structures, demonstrating that a broad range of species use them. However, this research has done little to address the question of the effectiveness of crossing structures, because use of a wildlife crossing structure does not necessarily equate to its effectiveness. The paucity of studies directly examining the effectiveness of crossing structures is exacerbated by the fact that such studies are often poorly designed, which limits the level of inference that can be made. Without well performed evaluations of the effectiveness of road mitigation measures, we may endanger the viability of wildlife populations and inefficiently use financial resources by installing structures that are not as effective as we think they are. In this paper we outline the essential elements of a good experimental design for such assessments and prioritize the parameters to be measured. The framework we propose will facilitate collaboration between road agencies and scientists to undertake research programs that fully evaluate effectiveness of road mitigation measures. We discuss the added value of road mitigation evaluations for policy makers and transportation agencies and provide recommendations on how to incorporate such evaluations in road planning practices.     

The evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza

Pandemic influenza remains a serious public health threat and the processes involved in the evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza strains remain incompletely understood. Here, we develop a stochastic model for the evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza, and use it to address three main questions. (i) What is the minimum annual number of avian influenza virus infections required in humans to explain the historical rate of pandemic emergence? (ii) Are such avian influenza infections in humans more likely to give rise to pandemic strains if they are driven by repeated cross-species introductions, or by low-level transmission of avian influenza viruses between humans? (iii) What are the most effective interventions for reducing the probability that an influenza strain with pandemic potential will evolve? Our results suggest that if evolutionary emergence of past pandemics has occurred primarily through viral reassortment in humans, then thousands of avian influenza virus infections in humans must have occurred each year for the past 250 years. Analyses also show that if there is epidemiologically significant variation among avian influenza virus genotypes, then avian virus outbreaks stemming from repeated cross-species transmission events result in a greater likelihood of a pandemic strain evolving than those caused by low-level transmission between humans. Finally, public health interventions aimed at reducing the duration of avian virus infections in humans give the greatest reduction in the probability that a pandemic strain will evolve.     

Developing vaccines against pandemic influenza.

Pandemic influenza presents special problems for vaccine development. There must be a balance between rapid availability of vaccine and the safeguards to ensure safety, quality and efficacy of vaccine. Vaccine was developed for the pandemics of 1957, 1968, 1977 and for the pandemic alert of 1976. This experience is compared with that gained in developing vaccines for a possible H5N1 pandemic in 1997-1998. Our ability to mass produce influenza vaccines against a pandemic threat was well illustrated by the production of over 150 million doses of 'swine flu' vaccine in the USA within a 3 month period in 1976. However, there is cause for concern that the lead time to begin vaccine production is likely to be about 7-8 months. Attempts to reduce this time should receive urgent attention. Immunogenicity of vaccines in pandemic situations is compared over the period 1968-1998. A consistent feature of the vaccine trials is the demonstration that one conventional 15 microg haemagglutinin dose of vaccine is not sufficiently immunogenic in naive individuals. Much larger doses or two lower doses are needed to induce satisfactory immunity. There is some evidence that whole-virus vaccines are more immunogenic than split or subunit vaccines, but this needs substantiating by further studies. H5 vaccines appeared to be particularly poor immunogens and there is evidence that an adjuvant may be needed. Prospects for improving the development of pandemic vaccines are discussed.     

Optimal control for pandemic influenza: The role of limited antiviral treatment and isolation

The implementation of optimal control strategies involving antiviral treatment and/or isolation measures can reduce significantly the number of clinical cases of influenza. Pandemic-level control measures must be carefully assessed specially in resource-limited situations. A model for the transmission dynamics of influenza is used to evaluate the impact of isolation and/or antiviral drug delivery measures during an influenza pandemic. Five pre-selected control strategies involving antiviral treatment and isolation are tested under the “unlimited” resource assumption followed by an exploration of the impact of these “optimal” policies when resources are limited in the context of a 1918-type influenza pandemic scenario. The implementation of antiviral treatment at the start of a pandemic tends to reduce the magnitude of epidemic peaks, spreading the maximal impact of an outbreak over an extended window in time. Hence, the controls’ timing and intensity can reduce the pressures placed on the health care infrastructure by a pandemic reducing the stress put on the system during epidemic peaks. The role of isolation strategies is highlighted in this study particularly when access to antiviral resources is limited.