Effectiveness of non-adjuvanted pandemic influenza A vaccines for preventing pandemic influenza acute respiratory illness visits in 4 U.S. communities

We estimated the effectiveness of four monovalent pandemic influenza A (H1N1) vaccines (three unadjuvanted inactivated, one live attenuated) available in the U.S. during the pandemic. Patients with acute respiratory illness presenting to inpatient and outpatient facilities affiliated with four collaborating institutions were prospectively recruited, consented, and tested for influenza. Analyses were restricted to October 2009 through April 2010, when pandemic vaccine was available. Patients testing positive for pandemic influenza by real-time RT-PCR were cases; those testing negative were controls. Vaccine effectiveness was estimated in logistic regression models adjusted for study community, patient age, timing of illness, insurance status, enrollment site, and presence of high-risk medical conditions. Pandemic virus was detected in 1,011 (15%) of 6,757 enrolled patients. Fifteen (1%) of 1,011 influenza positive cases and 1,042 (18%) of 5,746 test-negative controls had record-verified pandemic vaccination >14 days prior to illness onset. Adjusted effectiveness (95% confidence interval) for pandemic vaccines combined was 56% (23%, 75%). Adjusted effectiveness for inactivated vaccines alone (79% of total) was 62% (25%, 81%) overall and 32% (-92%, 76%), 89% (15%, 99%), and -6% (-231%, 66%) in those aged 0.5 to 9, 10 to 49, and 50+ years, respectively. Effectiveness for the live attenuated vaccine in those aged 2 to 49 years was only demonstrated if vaccination >7 rather than >14 days prior to illness onset was considered (61%∶ 12%, 82%). Inactivated non-adjuvanted pandemic vaccines offered significant protection against confirmed pandemic influenza-associated medical care visits in young adults.     

Avian influenza: an osteopathic component to treatment

Avian influenza is an infection caused by the H5N1 virus. The infection is highly contagious among birds, and only a few known cases of human avian influenza have been documented. However, healthcare experts around the world are concerned that mutation or genetic exchange with more commonly transmitted human influenza viruses could result in a pandemic of avian influenza. Their concern remains in spite of the fact that the first United States vaccine against the H5N1 virus was recently approved. Under these circumstances the fear is that a pandemic of avian influenza could result in the kind of mortality that was seen with the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918–1919, where the number of deaths was estimated to be as high as 40 million people. Retrospective data gathered by the American Osteopathic Association shortly after the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic have suggested that osteopathic physicians (DOs), using their distinctive osteopathic manipulative treatment (OMT) methods, observed significantly lower morbidity and mortality among their patients as compared to those treated by allopathic physicians (MDs) with standard medical care available at the time. In light of the limited prevention and treatment options available, it seems logical that a preparedness plan for the treatment of avian influenza should include these OMT procedures, provided by DOs and other healthcare workers capable of being trained to perform these therapeutic interventions. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the characteristics of avian influenza, describe the success of DOs during the 1918–1919 Spanish influenza pandemic, describe the evidence base for the inclusion of OMT as part of the preparedness plan for the treatment of avian influenza, and describe some of the specific OMT procedures that could be utilized as part of the treatment protocol for avian influenza patients.     

Positive-pressure ventilation equipment for mass casualty respiratory failure

In the event of an influenza pandemic, patients with severe acute respiratory failure (ARF) due to influenza will require positive-pressure ventilation (PPV) in order to survive. In countries with widely available critical care services, PPV is delivered almost exclusively through use of full-feature mechanical ventilators in intensive care units (ICUs) or specialized hospital wards. But the supply of these ventilators is limited even during the normal course of hospital functioning. Purchasing and maintaining additional full-feature mechanical ventilators to be held in reserve and used only during mass casualty events is too expensive to allow the stockpiling of such equipment. Consequently, planning and preparedness efforts to respond to a severe influenza pandemic have stimulated consideration of limited-feature, less-expensive ventilation devices to augment traditional PPV capacity. This article offers guidance to authorities charged with preparing for mass casualty PPV in deciding which PPV equipment would be adequate for ventilating patients for days, weeks, or even months during a medical catastrophe.     

FluTE,a Publicly Available Stochastic Influenza Epidemic Simulation Model

Mathematical and computer models of epidemics have contributed to our understanding of the spread of infectious disease and the measures needed to contain or mitigate them. To help prepare for future influenza seasonal epidemics or pandemics, we developed a new stochastic model of the spread of influenza across a large population. Individuals in this model have realistic social contact networks, and transmission and infections are based on the current state of knowledge of the natural history of influenza. The model has been calibrated so that outcomes are consistent with the 1957/1958 Asian A(H2N2) and 2009 pandemic A(H1N1) influenza viruses. We present examples of how this model can be used to study the dynamics of influenza epidemics in the United States and simulate how to mitigate or delay them using pharmaceutical interventions and social distancing measures. Computer simulation models play an essential role in informing public policy and evaluating pandemic preparedness plans. We have made the source code of this model publicly available to encourage its use and further development.     

General practice and pandemic influenza: a framework for planning and comparison of plans in five countries

Background

Although primary health care, and in particular, general practice will be at the frontline in the response to pandemic influenza, there are no frameworks to guide systematic planning for this task or to appraise available plans for their relevance to general practice. We aimed to develop a framework that will facilitate planning for general practice, and used it to appraise pandemic plans from Australia, England, USA, New Zealand and Canada.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We adapted the Haddon matrix to develop the framework, populating its cells through a multi-method study that incorporated the peer-reviewed and grey literature, interviews with general practitioners, practice nurses and senior decision-makers, and desktop simulation exercises. We used the framework to analyse 89 publicly-available jurisdictional plans at similar managerial levels in the five countries. The framework identifies four functional domains: clinical care for influenza and other needs, public health responsibilities, the internal environment and the macro-environment of general practice. No plan addressed all four domains. Most plans either ignored or were sketchy about non-influenza clinical needs, and about the contribution of general practice to public health beyond surveillance. Collaborations between general practices were addressed in few plans, and inter-relationships with the broader health system, even less frequently.

Conclusions

This is the first study to provide a framework to guide general practice planning for pandemic influenza. The framework helped identify critical shortcomings in available plans. Engaging general practice effectively in planning is challenging, particularly where governance structures for primary health care are weak. We identify implications for practice and for research.     

Ethics and severe pandemic influenza: maintaining essential functions through a fair and considered response

The response to severe pandemic influenza will be managed by experts in public health and infectious disease and by government officials to whom the public will turn for information and direction. Nonetheless, there remain important ethical considerations that can shape what goals are given priority, how scarce resources are distributed, how the public is included, and how we treat the most vulnerable in our response to a pandemic. This article assumes that the secondary consequences of severe pandemic influenza could be greater than deaths and illness from influenza itself. Response plans, then, must consider threats to societal as well as medical infrastructures. While some have suggested that scarce medical countermeasures be allocated primarily to first responders and then to the sickest, we suggest that an ethical public health response should set priorities based on essential functions. An ethical response also will engage the public, will coordinate interdependent sectors as a core preparedness priority, and will address how plans affect and can be understood by the least well off.     

Preparing for an influenza pandemic: ethical issues

In the near future, experts predict, an influenza pandemic will likely spread throughout the world. Many countries have been creating a contingency plan in order to mitigate the severe health and social consequences of such an event. Examination of the pandemic plans of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, from an ethical perspective, raises several concerns. One: scarcity of human and material resources is assumed to be severe. Plans focus on prioritization but do not identify resources that would be optimally required to reduce deaths and other serious consequences. Hence, these plans do not facilitate a truly informed choice at the political level where decisions have to be made on how much to invest now in order to reduce scarcity when a pandemic occurs. Two: mass vaccination is considered to be the most important instrument for reducing the impact of infection, yet pandemic plans do not provide concrete estimates of the benefits and burdens of vaccination to assure everyone that the balance is highly favorable. Three: pandemic plans make extraordinary demands on health care workers, yet professional organizations and unions may not have been involved in the plans' formulation and they have not been assured that authorities will aim to protect and support health care workers in a way that corresponds to the demands made on them. Four: all sectors of society and all individuals will be affected by a pandemic and everyone's collaboration will be required. Yet, it appears that the various populations have been inadequately informed by occasional media reports. Hence, it is essential that plans are developed and communication programs implemented that will not only inform but also create an atmosphere of mutual trust and solidarity; qualities that at the time of a pandemic will be much needed.     

Influenza pandemic waves under various mitigation strategies with 2009 H1N1 as a case study

A significant feature of influenza pandemics is multiple waves of morbidity and mortality over a few months or years. The size of these successive waves depends on intervention strategies including antivirals and vaccination, as well as the effects of immunity gained from previous infection. However, the global vaccine manufacturing capacity is limited. Also, antiviral stockpiles are costly and thus, are limited to very few countries. The combined effect of antivirals and vaccination in successive waves of a pandemic has not been quantified. The effect of acquired immunity from vaccination and previous infection has also not been characterized. In times of a pandemic threat countries must consider the effects of a limited vaccine, limited antiviral use and the effects of prior immunity so as to adopt a pandemic strategy that will best aid the population. We developed a mathematical model describing the first and second waves of an influenza pandemic including drug therapy, vaccination and acquired immunity. The first wave model includes the use of antiviral drugs under different treatment profiles. In the second wave model the effects of antivirals, vaccination and immunity gained from the first wave are considered. The models are used to characterize the severity of infection in a population under different drug therapy and vaccination strategies, as well as school closure, so that public health policies regarding future influenza pandemics are better informed.     

Corporate preparedness for pandemic influenza: a survey of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in Montgomery County, Maryland

Objectives: We conducted a survey of corporate preparedness for pandemic influenza among biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in Montgomery County, Maryland, to determine the level of preparedness for this industry and geographic region. Methods: The survey, based on the HHS Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist, established whether a company had a preparedness plan specific to pandemic influenza, the contents of its plan, or its reasons for a lack of a plan. Results: A total of 50 companies participated in the survey. Of these, 40 did not have any type of preparedness plan, 3 were drafting plans, 6 had general preparedness plans that could be applied to an influenza pandemic, and only 1 company had a preparedness plan specifically designed to address pandemic influenza. Conclusions: Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in this geographic region are currently not well prepared for pandemic influenza. Public health officials should offer more help, possibly in the form of a model small business preparedness plan, and collaboration between companies should be encouraged to foster sharing of preparedness plans.     

Ethical reasoning in pandemic preparedness plans: Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific

The emergence of H1N1 in 2009 shows that it is a mistake to regard the scenario of having to implement pandemic plans as merely hypothetical. This recent experience provides an opportunity to inquire into the current state of pandemic preparedness plans with regard to their ethical adequacy. One aspect that deserves consideration in this context is the disclosure of ethical reasoning. Accordingly, the following is an analysis of examples of pandemic plans and drafts of plans from Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. It is an analysis of the occurrence of explicit ethical reflection in these documents as well an inquiry into the related question of how ethical reflection can be understood as a constitutive element of ethical pandemic preparedness. In the analysis, different fields of ethical consideration concerning equity, personal rights and accountability are distinguished. There are both pragmatic and genuinely ethical reasons to explicitly address issues of these types in pandemic plans. The extent to which ethical language appears in the national plans in South East Asia and the Western Pacific suggests that there is limited awareness of ethical considerations, or at least insufficient ethical substantiation of pandemic action. The aim of the analysis is to show that further inclusion of ethical considerations into pandemic plans is ethically demanded. It is of particular significance that these considerations are formulated and remain discernible as instances of ethical deliberation.     

Pandemic policy and planning considerations for universities: findings from a tabletop exercise

The potential for a novel influenza virus to cause a pandemic represents a significant threat to global health. Planning for pandemic flu, as compared to planning for other types of hazards, presents some unique challenges to businesses, communities, and education institutions. To identify and address the challenges that may be faced by major metropolitan universities during a flu pandemic, a tabletop exercise was developed, offered, and evaluated. Its purpose was to assess existing University of Washington (UW) plans and policies for responding to an influenza pandemic. On May 31, 2006, more than 50 participants, including UW administrators and unit leaders and a number of key external partners, participated in a tabletop exercise designed to simulate all phases of an influenza pandemic. This exercise revealed existing gaps in university pandemic influenza plans and policies, including issues related to isolation and quarantine, continuity of operations, disaster mental health services, integration of volunteers into a disaster response, tracking travel of university students and personnel, communication problems, and ways to meet the needs of resident and foreign students and faculty during an outbreak. Policy and planning recommendations are offered that address each of these challenges faced by UW as well as other major research universities and colleges.     

Optimal control for pandemic influenza: The role of limited antiviral treatment and isolation

The implementation of optimal control strategies involving antiviral treatment and/or isolation measures can reduce significantly the number of clinical cases of influenza. Pandemic-level control measures must be carefully assessed specially in resource-limited situations. A model for the transmission dynamics of influenza is used to evaluate the impact of isolation and/or antiviral drug delivery measures during an influenza pandemic. Five pre-selected control strategies involving antiviral treatment and isolation are tested under the “unlimited” resource assumption followed by an exploration of the impact of these “optimal” policies when resources are limited in the context of a 1918-type influenza pandemic scenario. The implementation of antiviral treatment at the start of a pandemic tends to reduce the magnitude of epidemic peaks, spreading the maximal impact of an outbreak over an extended window in time. Hence, the controls’ timing and intensity can reduce the pressures placed on the health care infrastructure by a pandemic reducing the stress put on the system during epidemic peaks. The role of isolation strategies is highlighted in this study particularly when access to antiviral resources is limited.     

Provision of dental care in aged care facilities,NSW, Australia – Part 1 as perceived by the Directors of Nursing (care providers)

doi: 10.1111/j.1741‐2358.2012.00670.x Provision of dental care in aged care facilities, NSW, Australia – Part 1 as perceived by the Directors of Nursing (care providers) Objective: To ascertain the Directors of Nursing (DONs) perception of the provision of dental care and the difficulties in oral health maintenance for residents in New South Wales (NSW) aged care facilities (ACFs). Background: There were no specific figures relating to DONs’ perceptions of oral health needs and dental care nor obstructions to dental care of residents. Materials and methods: A total of 414 questionnaires, encoded for confidentiality, were posted to all DONs of ACFs in NSW and the data analysed. Results: Questionnaires were returned from 255 ACFs (response rate 61.6%) representing 16 861 residents with a male‐to‐female ratio of 1:3.45. Of these residents, 48% had a dental assessment on admission by qualified dental staff. In 74.2% of facilities, no regular visits by dental staff took place, and 58.6% considered the perceived unwillingness of dental professionals to visit residents a barrier to good oral health. DONs reported that 53.6% of residents had dentures only, while 18.3% had natural teeth only. The most frequent difficulties reported by staff were residents’ use of abusive language (78.2%) and residents refusing to open mouth (60.9%). Conclusion: Lack of involvement of dental professionals in admission assessment and in ongoing programmes was of concern to DONs in ACFs.     

Efficacy of vaccination with different combinations of MF59-adjuvanted and nonadjuvanted seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines against pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza virus infection in ferrets

Serum antibodies induced by seasonal influenza or seasonal influenza vaccination exhibit limited or no cross-reactivity against the 2009 pandemic swine-origin influenza virus of the H1N1 subtype (pH1N1). Ferrets immunized once or twice with MF59-adjuvanted seasonal influenza vaccine exhibited significantly reduced lung virus titers but no substantial clinical protection against pH1N1-associated disease. However, priming with MF59-adjuvanted seasonal influenza vaccine significantly increased the efficacy of a pandemic MF59-adjuvanted influenza vaccine against pH1N1 challenge. Elucidating the mechanism involved in this priming principle will contribute to our understanding of vaccine- and infection-induced correlates of protection. Furthermore, a practical consequence of these findings is that during an emerging pandemic, the implementation of a priming strategy with an available adjuvanted seasonal vaccine to precede the eventual pandemic vaccination campaign may be useful and life-saving.     

Perspectives on antiviral use during pandemic influenza.

Antiviral agents could potentially play a major role in the initial response to pandemic influenza, particularly with the likelihood that an effective vaccine is unavailable, by reducing morbidity and mortality. The M2 inhibitors are partially effective for chemoprophylaxis of pandemic influenza and evidence from studies of interpandemic influenza indicate that the neuraminidase inhibitors would be effective in prevention. In addition to the symptom benefit observed with M2 inhibitor treatment, early therapeutic use of neuraminidase inhibitors has been shown to reduce the risk of lower respiratory complications. Clinical pharmacology and adverse drug effect profiles indicate that the neuraminidase inhibitors and rimantadine are preferable to amantadine with regard to the need for individual prescribing and tolerance monitoring. Transmission of drug-resistant virus could substantially limit the effectiveness of M2 inhibitors and the possibility exists for primary M2 inhibitor resistance in a pandemic strain. The frequency of resistance emergence is lower with neuraminidase inhibitors and mathematical modelling studies indicate that the reduced transmissibility of drug-resistant virus observed with neuraminidase inhibitor-resistant variants would lead to negligible community spread of such variants. Thus, there are antiviral drugs currently available that hold considerable promise for response to pandemic influenza before a vaccine is available, although considerable work remains in realizing this potential. Markedly increasing the quantity of available antiviral agents through mechanisms such as stockpiling, educating health care providers and the public and developing effective means of rapid distribution to those in need are essential in developing an effective response, but remain currently unresolved problems.     

Risk of severe outcomes among patients admitted to hospital with pandemic (H1N1) influenza

Background

We describe the disease characteristics and outcomes, including risk factors for admission to intensive care unit (ICU) and death, of all patients in Canada admitted to hospital with pandemic (H1N1) influenza during the first five months of the pandemic.

Methods

We obtained data for all patients admitted to hospital with laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza reported to the Public Health Agency of Canada from Apr. 26 to Sept. 26, 2009. We compared inpatients who had nonsevere disease with those who had severe disease, as indicated by admission to ICU or death.

Results

A total of 1479 patients were admitted to hospital with confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza during the study period. Of these, 1171 (79.2%) did not have a severe outcome, 236 (16.0%) were admitted to ICU and survived, and 72 (4.9%) died. The median age was 23 years for all of the patients, 18 years for those with a nonsevere outcome, 34 years for those admitted to ICU who survived and 51 years for those who died. The risk of a severe outcome was elevated among those who had an underlying medical condition and those 20 years of age and older. A delay of one day in the median time between the onset of symptoms and admission to hospital increased the risk of death by 5.5%. The risk of a severe outcome remained relatively constant over the five-month period.

Interpretation

The population-based incidence of admission to hospital with laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza was low in the first five months of the pandemic in Canada. The risk of a severe outcome was associated with the presence of one or more underlying medical conditions, age of 20 years or more and a delay in hospital admission.The first cases of pandemic (H1N1) influenza in Canada were reported on Apr. 26, 2009. Retrospective case-finding determined that the onset of symptoms in the first Canadian case, involving a traveller returning from Mexico, occurred on Apr. 12, 2009. The first patient admitted to hospital began to experience symptoms on Apr. 18.During the first few weeks of the outbreak, in-depth follow-up and reporting of cases was conducted in keeping with the World Health Organization’s pandemic plans for each country to comprehensively assess its first 100 cases.¹ By mid-May, many Canadian jurisdictions moved away from this approach because it became increasingly taxing on both public health human resources and laboratory capacity. It was decided that reporting of individual cases would continue nationally only for patients who were admitted to hospital or who died. We provide a detailed review of the disease characteristics and outcomes, including risk factors for admission to intensive care unit (ICU) and death, of patients admitted to hospital in Canada during the first five months of the pandemic.     

Adversaries at the Bedside: Advance Care Plans and Future Welfare

Advance care planning refers to the process of determining how one wants to be cared for in the event that one is no longer competent to make one's own medical decisions. Some have argued that advance care plans often fail to be normatively binding on caretakers because those plans do not reflect the interests of patients once they enter an incompetent state. In this article, we argue that when the core medical ethical principles of respect for patient autonomy, honest and adequate disclosure of information, institutional transparency, and concern for patient welfare are upheld, a policy that would allow for the disregard of advance care plans is self‐defeating. This is because when the four principles are upheld, a patient's willingness to undergo treatment depends critically on the willingness of her caretakers to honor the wishes she has outlined in her advance care plan. A patient who fears that her caretakers will not honor her wishes may choose to avoid medical care so as to limit the influence of her caretakers in the future, which may lead to worse medical outcomes than if she had undergone care. In order to avoid worse medical outcomes and uphold the four core principles, caregivers who are concerned about the future welfare of their patients should focus on improving advance care planning and commit to honoring their patients’ advance care plans.     

The medical aspects of civil defense in California

Medical care for persons injured in atomic bomb attack or other far-reaching enemy action occupies an important place in civil defense plans that have been set up in California. Preparations have been made on the basis of suppositions as to where attacks might occur and estimates of the number of casualties. State and federal funds have been allocated for aid station equipment, antibiotics, plasma, blankets and litters. In the table of organization, use of all physicians, nurses and hospitals in the state is contemplated. Communities at the center of attacks would borrow facilities and medical personnel from areas not directly affected.County medical societies in California have appointed civil defense committees to work out local plans. Each physician has a part in these plans. If he does not know what his assignment is, be ought to get in touch with his county medical society headquarters immediately.     

Finding optimal vaccination strategies for pandemic influenza using genetic algorithms

In the event of pandemic influenza, only limited supplies of vaccine may be available. We use stochastic epidemic simulations, genetic algorithms (GA), and random mutation hill climbing (RMHC) to find optimal vaccine distributions to minimize the number of illnesses or deaths in the population, given limited quantities of vaccine. Due to the non-linearity, complexity and stochasticity of the epidemic process, it is not possible to solve for optimal vaccine distributions mathematically. However, we use GA and RMHC to find near optimal vaccine distributions. We model an influenza pandemic that has age-specific illness attack rates similar to the Asian pandemic in 1957-1958 caused by influenza A(H2N2), as well as a distribution similar to the Hong Kong pandemic in 1968-1969 caused by influenza A(H3N2). We find the optimal vaccine distributions given that the number of doses is limited over the range of 10-90% of the population. While GA and RMHC work well in finding optimal vaccine distributions, GA is significantly more efficient than RMHC. We show that the optimal vaccine distribution found by GA and RMHC is up to 84% more effective than random mass vaccination in the mid range of vaccine availability. GA is generalizable to the optimization of stochastic model parameters for other infectious diseases and population structures.