The donation game with roles played between relatives

We consider a social game with two choices, played between two relatives, where roles are assigned to individuals so that the interaction is asymmetric. Behaviour in each of the two roles is determined by a separate genetic locus. Such asymmetric interactions between relatives, in which individuals occupy different behavioural contexts, may occur in nature, for example between adult parents and juvenile offspring. The social game considered is known to be equivalent to a donation game with non-additive payoffs, and has previously been analysed for the single locus case, both for discrete and continuous strategy traits. We present an inclusive fitness analysis of the discrete trait game with roles and recover equilibrium conditions including fixation of selfish or altruistic behaviour under both behavioural contexts, or fixation of selfish behaviour under one context and altruistic behaviour under the other context. These equilibrium solutions assume that the payoff matrices under each behavioural context are identical. The equilibria possible do depend crucially, however, on the deviation from payoff additivity that occurs when both interacting individuals act altruistically.     

Mutability as an altruistic trait in finite asexual populations

Mutation rate (MR) is a crucial determinant of the evolutionary process. Optimal MR may enable efficient evolutionary searching and therefore increase the fitness of the population over time. Nevertheless, individuals may favor MRs that are far from being optimal for the whole population. Instead, each individual may tend to mutate at rates that selfishly increase its own relative fitness. We show that in some cases, undergoing a mutation is altruistic, i.e., it increases the expected fitness of the population, but decreases the expected fitness of the mutated individual itself. In this case, if the population is uniform (completely mixed, undivided), immutability is evolutionary stable and is probably selected for. However, our examination of a segregated population, which is divided into several groups (or patches), shows that the optimal, altruistic MR may out-compete the selfish MR if the coupling between the groups is neither too strong nor too weak. This demonstrates that the population structure is crucial for the succession of the evolutionary process itself. For example, in a uniform population, the evolutionary process may be stopped before the highest fitness is reached, as demonstrated in a one-pick fitness landscape. In addition, we show that the dichotomy between evolutionary stable and optimal MRs can be seen as a special case of a more general phenomenon in which optimal behaviors may be destabilized in finite populations, since optimal sub-populations may become extinct before the benefit of their behavior is expressed.     

Evolutionary dynamics of n-player games played by relatives

One of the core concepts in social evolution theory is kin selection. Kin selection provides a perspective to understand how natural selection operates when genetically similar individuals are likely to interact. A family-structured population is an excellent example of this, where relatives are engaged in social interactions. Consequences of such social interactions are often described in game-theoretical frameworks, but there is a growing consensus that a naive inclusive fitness accounting with dyadic relatedness coefficients are of limited use when non-additive fitness effects are essential in those situations. Here, I provide a general framework to analyse multiplayer interactions among relatives. Two important results follow from my analysis. First, it is generally necessary to know the n-tuple genetic association of family members when n individuals are engaged in social interactions. However, as a second result, I found that, for a special class of games, we need only measures of lower-order genetic association to fully describe its evolutionary dynamics. I introduce the concept of degree of the game and show how this degree is related to the degree of genetic association.     

Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium

We study game dynamical interactions between two strategies, A and B, and analyse whether the average fitness of the population at equilibrium can be increased by adding mutation from A to B. Classifying all two by two games with payoff matrix [(a,b),(c,d)], we show that mutation from A to B enhances the average fitness of the whole population (i) if both a and d are less than (b + c)/2 and (ii) if c is less than b. Furthermore, we study conditions for maximizing the productivity of strategy A, and we analyse the effect of mutations in both directions. Depending on the biological system, a mutation in an evolutionary game can be interpreted as a genetic alteration, a cellular differentiation, a change in gene expression, an accidental or deliberate modification in cultural transmission, or a learning error. In a cultural context, our results indicate that the equilibrium payoff of the population can be increased if players sometimes choose the strategy with lower payoff. In a genetic context, we have shown that for frequency-dependent selection mutation can enhance the average fitness of the population at equilibrium.     

Human Beings as Evolved Nepotists

Inclusive fitness theory provides a compelling explanation for the evolution of altruism among kin. However, a completely satisfactory account of non-kin altruism is still lacking. The present study compared the level of altruism found among siblings with that found among friends and mates and sought to reconcile the findings with an evolutionary explanation for human altruism. Participants (163 males and 156 females) completed a questionnaire about help given to a sibling, friend, or mate. Overall, participants gave friends and mates as much or more help than they gave siblings. However, as the cost of help increased, siblings received a progressively larger share of the help, whereas friends and mates received a progressively smaller share, despite the fact that participants were closer emotionally to friends and mates than they were to siblings. These findings help to explain the relative standing of friends and mates as recipients of altruistic aid.

Fluctuation in the physical environment as a mechanism for reinforcing evolutionary transitions

We hypothesize a mechanism for reinforcing transitions between levels of selection, involving physiological homeostasis and amplification of variation in the physical environment. Groups experience a stronger selection pressure than individuals for homeostasis with respect to reproductively limiting variables, because their greater longevity exposes them more often to suboptimal physical conditions, and greater physical size means they encompass a larger fraction of any resource/nutrient gradient. Groups achieve homeostasis by differentiation into microcosms with specialist functions, e.g. cell types. Such differentiation is more limited in individuals due to their smaller size and shorter lifespan. Hence tolerance of fluctuation in certain physical variables is proposed to be weaker in individuals than in groups. We show that a trait providing increased tolerance (alpha) to fluctuation (V-V(opt)) in a limiting abiotic variable (V), at relative fitness cost (C), can increase from rarity if the condition alpha.mid R:V-V(opt)|>C is met. Groups also sequester larger absolute quantities of resource than individuals, and group death is less frequent, hence the population dynamics of groups cause resource/nutrient availability to fluctuate with greater amplitude than that of individuals. Increasing the amplitude of fluctuation in a reproductively limiting environmental variable is proposed as a mechanism by which a group can limit reproduction of parasitic "cheat" individuals. Enhancing physical fluctuation is frequency dependent, hence only an increase in tolerance to fluctuation can explain the group's increase from rarity. However, once groups reach intermediate frequencies, a positive feedback process can be initiated in which a differentiated group enhances physical fluctuation beyond the tolerance of any "cheat", and in so doing enhances the selection pressure it experiences for homeostasis. This may help explain the persistence of transitions in individuality, and the coincidence of some such transitions with periods of change and oscillation in global scale environmental variables.     

A generalization of Pontryagin's maximum principle for dynamic evolutionary games among relatives

We present two theorems that generalize Pontryagin's maximum principle to the setting of dynamic evolutionary games between genetically related individuals. The two theorems correspond to two types of interactions among individuals: patch-structured populations in which individuals locally "play the field" and pairwise interactions. These generalizations can be used in the same way that Pontryagin's maximum principle is used and they are valid for diploid organisms under a single locus, diallelic genetic model. These generalizations involve an interesting, dynamic version of Hamilton's Rule from inclusive fitness theory. We illustrate how these theoretical results can be applied by modeling the evolution of lifetime resource allocation to growth and reproduction in an annual plant when there is competition for resources among related individuals.     

Sex-biased dispersal of adults mediates the evolution of altruism among juveniles

Population viscosity has been proposed as an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The idea is that if individuals do not disperse far during the course of their lives, they will tend to interact with their genealogical relatives, which may give kin-selected benefits for cooperation. However, in the simplest model of population structure, the evolution of cooperation is unaffected by the rate of dispersal, owing to dispersal also mediating competition between social partners. This surprising result has generated much research interest in recent years. Here I show that dispersal does matter if there is a sex difference in dispersal rate, even when the expression of cooperation is not conditional upon the actor's dispersal status or sex. In particular, I show that cooperation among juveniles is relatively favoured when there is a small sex bias in adult dispersal in favour of the sex with the greatest variance in reproductive success, and is relatively disfavoured when this sex bias is large or in the opposite direction. This is because dispersal by individuals of each sex can have different consequences for the genetic structure of the population.     

Hamilton's missing link

Hamilton's famous rule was presented in 1964 in a paper called "The genetical theory of social behaviour (I and II)", Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 1-16, 17-32. The paper contains a mathematical genetical model from which the rule supposedly follows, but it does not provide a link between the paper's central result, which states that selection dynamics take the population to a state where mean inclusive fitness is maximized, and the rule, which states that selection will lead to maximization of individual inclusive fitness. This note provides a condition under which Hamilton's rule does follow from his central result.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies

We develop a new method for studying stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of mixed strategies. We consider the general situation: there are n pure strategies whose interactions are described by an n×n payoff matrix. Players can use mixed strategies, which are given by the vector (p₁,…,p_n). Each entry specifies the probability to use the corresponding pure strategy. The sum over all entries is one. Therefore, a mixed strategy is a point in the simplex S_n. We study evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed population of finite size. Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff. We consider the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to overall fitness. Reproduction can be subject to mutation; a mutant adopts a randomly chosen mixed strategy. We calculate the average abundance of every mixed strategy in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process. We find the crucial conditions that specify if a strategy is favored or opposed by selection. One condition holds for low mutation rate, another for high mutation rate. The result for any mutation rate is a linear combination of those two. As a specific example we study the Hawk-Dove game. We prove general statements about the relationship between games with pure and with mixed strategies.     

The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations

Evolutionary theory often resorts to weak selection, where different individuals have very similar fitness. Here, we relate two ways to introduce weak selection. The first considers evolutionary games described by payoff matrices with similar entries. This approach has recently attracted a lot of interest in the context of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. The second way to introduce weak selection is based on small distances in phenotype space and is a standard approach in kin-selection theory. Whereas both frameworks are interchangeable for constant fitness, frequency-dependent selection shows significant differences between them. We point out the difference between both limits of weak selection and discuss the condition under which the differences vanish. It turns out that this condition is fulfilled by the popular parametrization of the prisoner's dilemma in benefits and costs. However, for general payoff matrices differences between the two frameworks prevail.     

Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games

In the animal world, performing a given task which is beneficial to an entire group requires the cooperation of several individuals of that group who often share the workload required to perform the task. The mathematical framework to study the dynamics of collective action is game theory. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors in a population in which groups of individuals engage in N-person, non-excludable public goods games. We explore an N-person generalization of the well-known two-person snowdrift game. We discuss both the case of infinite and finite populations, taking explicitly into consideration the possible existence of a threshold above which collective action is materialized. Whereas in infinite populations, an N-person snowdrift game (NSG) leads to a stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors, the introduction of a threshold leads to the appearance of a new interior fixed point associated with a coordination threshold. The fingerprints of the stable and unstable interior fixed points still affect the evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, despite evolution leading the population inexorably to a monomorphic end-state. However, when the group size and population size become comparable, we find that spite sets in, rendering cooperation unfeasible.     

Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games

We analyze the influence of the update dynamics on symmetric 2-player evolutionary games, which are among the most used tools to study the emergence of cooperation in populations of interacting agents. A synchronous dynamics means that, at each time step, all the agents of the population update their strategies simultaneously. An extreme case of asynchronism is sequential dynamics, in which only one agent is updated each time. We first show that these two opposite update dynamics can lead to very different outcomes and that sequential dynamics is detrimental to the emergence of cooperation only when the probability of imitating the most successful neighbors is high. In this sense, we can say that, when the update dynamics has some influence, in general asynchronism is beneficial to the emergence of cooperation. We then explore the consequences of using intermediate levels of asynchronism, where only a fraction of the agents update their behavior each time. In general, the level of cooperation changes smoothly and monotonically as we gradually go from synchronous to sequential dynamics. However, there are some exceptions that should be taken into account. In addition, the results show that the possibility of agents taking irrational decisions has a key role in the sensitivity of these models to changes in the update dynamics. Explanations for the observed behaviors are advanced.     

MATHEMATICS OF KIN‐ AND GROUP‐SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?

Evolutionary game theory is a general mathematical framework that describes the evolution of social traits. This framework forms the basis of many multilevel selection models and is also frequently used to model evolutionary dynamics on networks. Kin selection, which was initially restricted to describe social interactions between relatives, has also led to a broader mathematical approach, inclusive fitness, that can not only describe social evolution among relatives, but also in group structured populations or on social networks. It turns out that the underlying mathematics of game theory is fundamentally different from the approach of inclusive fitness. Thus, both approaches—evolutionary game theory and inclusive fitness—can be helpful to understand the evolution of social traits in group structured or spatially extended populations.     

Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions

Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay auctions”, the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological second price all-pay auctions”, the cost for everyone other than the winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both auctions. In both cases, the average bid is a declining function of the number of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction the smaller is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided.     

Group selection in plant populations

Summary Several mechanisms have been proposed for group selection, to account for the evolution of altruistic traits. One type, Neighbourhood models, suggests that individuals react with those immediately around them, but with no recognition mechanism. The organization of plant populations seems especially favorable for this type of selection. The possibility of Neighbourhood selection was investigated by simulating a plant population. It was possible for an altruistic trait to evolve, though only under restricted conditions. The main requirement was gene flow only by very restricted pollen dispersal, and a high benefit : cost ratio in the altruistic relationship. Under conditions favourable for such evolution, the starting frequency of the allele, the initial pattern, and the population size, had little effect. Inbreeding tended to prevent the increase of the altruism allele, though this depended on the mechanism of selfing. Known ecological features of plants are discussed that could be considered altruistic and hence require some form of group selection for their evolution, and whether the benefit : cost requirements are likely to be met. Neighbourhood models of group selection are a possibility in plant populations, and we therefore cannot exclude the possibility of altruism in plants. However, Neighbourhood selection is weak force, unlikely to be effective in the face of opposing individual selection. It may be more important as reinforcement of individual selection.     

Evolutionary stability on graphs

Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. Recent studies have revealed that population structure can considerably affect evolutionary dynamics. Here we derive the conditions of evolutionary stability for games on graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for regular graphs of degree k>2. Those theoretical predictions are compared with computer simulations for random regular graphs and for lattices. We study three different update rules: birth-death (BD), death-birth (DB), and imitation (IM) updating. Evolutionary stability on sparse graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population, nor vice versa. We provide a geometrical interpretation of the ESS condition on graphs.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n×n games in the limit of weak selection.