The Origin of Mind: The Mind-matter Continuity Thesis

Living things are autonomous agents distinguished from nonliving things in having the purpose to actively maintain their existence. All living things, including single-celled organisms, have certain degrees of freedom from physical causality to choose their actions with intentions to fulfill their purpose. This circumstance is analogous to that of human intention-actions guided by mind, and points to the ubiquitous presence of the dimension of mind in the living world. The primordial form of mind in single-celled organisms eventually evolved into the human mind by virtue of the adaptive value of mind for survival. Life seems to have originated from nonliving matter in processes that are continuous. Thus the dimension of mind must extend to the nonliving world, and the origin of mind should be taken to relate to the origin of matter. Inasmuch as matter exists in a hierarchy of levels of complexity extending from quarks up to the whole universe, mind must also be presumed to exist in a hierarchy of levels of complexity associated with matter.     

The Self as Social Artifice: Some Consequences of Stanislavski

Practice commonly develops independent of theory: only rarely does some heritable informational structure knowingly emerge. With this in mind, Biosemiotic theory is well served by an informed synthesis with Constantin Stanislavski’s theatrical technique. For it is not enough merely to catalog signage by studying the consequence of its function, we also seek to generate signs with knowing intent. This implies more than the strategic use of signs, which all complex living things do, and of which our many subjective selves emerge. It calls for an objective artifice of signs, that is, some set of techniques competent to produce subjectivity, and capable of being objectified such that it can become a knowable standard. This is precisely what Stanislavski offers, ways of knowingly creating novel, actual, believably generative, signs. Within the realm of human action and in terms of human knowing, he positively exemplifies applied semiotic theory: his approach to dramatizing fictional characters also expresses how self-consciousness comes to be. What Stanislavski implies, Charles Tilly presumes and this essay asserts: our own biotic evolution has been influenced by post-biotic or metaphoric evolution, which results from the ‘living’ interaction of certain classes of non-living things. These derive from the pragmatic a priori made implicit by Chauncey Wright, which is the motivation of living things to act on specific needs within specific situations. The need to breathe is one example; the need to make competent use of existing epistemic structures is another. But such structures have their own needs, and ‘act’ to fill them. When this is compounded culturally, it may result in self-consciousness – a self-constructed artifice of semiosis with great consequence to biotic processes. Tilly supplies evidence that such compounding happens within human society, as well as a theoretical basis for its expression as a semiotic sociology. This essay uses pragmatic semiotics to explore the strong parallels that exist between the deliberately objective motivations upon which science, sanity and self-consciousness all depend, Stanislavski’s practicable artifice of signaling pathways and social emergence, and Tilly’s approach to society as ongoing performance.     

Autopoiesis, Life, Mind and Cognition: Bases for a Proper Naturalistic Continuity

The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory of cognition, I introduce a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. I argue that cognition corresponds to the natural behaviour that every living being exhibits in the realization of its existence, and that, viewed in that way, cognition is a dynamic process of structural coupling that, unlike mental phenomena, involves no representational contents. On the basis of this distinction, I try to show that while life suffices for cognition, it does not suffice for mind. That is, that the strong continuity is not between life and mind but between life and cognition.     

Structure for energy cycle: a unique status of the second law of thermodynamics for living systems

Distinguishing things from beings, or matters from lives, is a fundamental question. Extending E. Schr?dinger's neg-entropy and I. Prigogine's dissipative structure, we propose a chemical kinetic view that the earliest "live" process is embedded essentially in a special interaction between a pair of specific components under a particular, corresponding environmental conditions. The interaction exists as an inter-molecular-force-bond complex(IMFBC) that couples two separate chemical processes: one is the spontaneous formation of the IMFBC driven by a decrease of Gibbs free energy as a dissipative process; while the other is the disassembly of the IMFBC driven thermodynamically by free energy input from the environment. The two chemical processes coupled by the IMFBC originated independently and were considered non-living on Earth, but the IMFBC coupling of the two can be considered as the earliest form of metabolism: the first landmark on the path from things to a being. The dynamic formation and disassembly of the IMFBC, as a composite individual, follows a principle designated as "… structure for energy for structure for energy…", the cycle continues; and for short it will be referred to as "structure for energy cycle". With additional features derived from this starting point, the IMFBC-centered "live" process spontaneously evolved into more complex living organisms with the characteristics currently known.     

Me,Myself, and Semiotic Function: Finding the “I” in Biology

This essay argues that stable, heritable, habituated semiotics on one scale of life allows for opportunism, origination, and the solving of novel problems on others. This is grounded in how interpretation is neither caused nor determined by its object, such that success at interpretation simply cannot be defined by any comparison between an interpretation and its object. Rather, an interpretation is a reciprocated incorporation of a living thing and its environment, and successful if it furthers the living, interpreting thing. By applying biosemiotic theory to seemingly disparate studies of parasitic infections (Jaroslav Flegr), autonomic nervous systems (Stephen Porges), and social change (Charles Tilly) as well as the classical pragmatic notion that biology, psychology and sociology are disparate approaches to the singular, radically continuous, and perennial question of who (or what) am I (Dewey, James, Mead). I argue that the distinction (e.g.,) between voluntary and autonomic behavior is but a ghost of older dualisms, the pseudo-contradictions of matter v. mind, body v. soul, but also self v. not self. Moreover, all such pseudo-contradictions (individual v. social, sensation v. response, parasite v. host, and etc.) are resolved as scale thick, self-similar examples of semiotic transaction wherein degeneration or habituation on one scale of life allows for generative or novel interaction on another.     

Ecosphere,biosphere, or Gaia? What to call the global ecosystem

The terms biosphere, ecosphere, and Gaia are used as names for the global ecosystem. However, each has more than one meaning. Biosphere can mean the totality of living things residing on the Earth, the space occupied by living things, or life and life-support systems (atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and pedosphere). Ecosphere is used as a synonym of biosphere and as a term for zones in the universe where life as we know it should be sustainable. Gaia is similar to biosphere (in the sense of life and life-support systems) and ecosphere (in the sense of biosphere as life and life-support systems), but, in its most extreme form, refers to the entire planet as a living entity. A case is made for avoiding the term Gaia (at least as a name for the planetary ecosystem), restricting biosphere to the totality of living things, and adopting the ecosphere as the most apt name for the global ecosystem.     

The Cost of Being Fijian in the United Kingdom

This paper is the first within Fijian migration studies to discuss why indigenous Fijians migrate to the United Kingdom (UK) and the socio-economic challenges they face. The majority of these Fijians form a well-organised community based on similar principles as in Fiji (kinship, church, and chieftainship) and do their utmost to live ‘in the Fijian way’ (na ivakarau ni bula vakaviti), a lifestyle also known as living ‘in the manner of the land’ (i tovo vakavanua). I argue this way of life is a central aspect of being a Fijian person, which is characterised, amongst other things, by supporting kin as part of one's kinship obligations in the form of exchange and tribute. The tributes Fijian migrants make are predominantly in the form of services, goods, and especially monetary contributions towards church, communal, and ritual events to both kin in Fiji and in the UK. These monetary contributions regularly interfere with payments, such as utility bills and car insurances. As a consequence, electricity and phone lines are cut or cars are towed away. In Fiji, migrated relatives and friends are thought of as being millionaires, but this article illustrates that the reality is very different. Living costs in the UK are high and prioritising which bills to pay, how much one should contribute to church, communal, and ceremonial events, and how much money to remit to kin in Fiji can be very stressful. I discuss the pressures and motivation for these decisions in this article.     

The Intelligent Egg, and How It Got That Way: from Genes to Genius in a Few Easy Lessons

A seed has no flowers or leaves, and an egg no fingers or lungs. Yet plants and animals not only have these things but they resemble their parents in detail throughout their bodies. Something is inherited, but what is it? Life is based on the activities of cells. An organism has large numbers of them—a human has trillions! Cells live as separate units, which enables them each to do its own thing within its particular organ, but to be an organism they must work together. A cell can only detect its immediate local environment, but that includes various kinds of signals or information from nearby or far away within the body—or even from the external environment. It is by being local but responding globally in this way that an egg becomes an organism, an organism manages its way through life, and organisms make up species and ecosystems that interact with each other. The evolution of these abilities has produced the glorious array of living forms that populate the world. In these ways, an egg may have no thoughts but is a highly intelligent being.     

Biophysics; fifty years after Schrödinger

E. Schrödinger described his mechanistic view on life in his book “What is Life?” published in 1944. H. Yukawa stated that life is like a building of bricks. Is life understandable in this manner?In 1950–1960 the generation of structure and function in living cells was shown to be analyzable, step by step, within the theoretical framework of physics. In the 1970's the concept of a molecular machine or unit machine in living cells was clearly presented and the effort to experimentally define unit machines was promoted. Recently, new techniques to directly observe their behaviors have been developed. The machines are not always rigid. In sliding machines, the influx-efflux coupling has been found to be loose. For loose coupling, intramachine flexibility seems to be useful.Living cells can be regarded as an organized system composed of many unit machines, some of which exhibit deterministic behaviors while others exhibit probabilistic behaviors. The cells do not always show a definite response to a given input. We need new statistical mechanics for the study of unit machines and their systems which have complex spatial and temporal structures. They may have a mechanism beyond a simple building of bricks.     

Phylloxera and the grapevine: a sense of common purpose?

The purpose of life is its continuation: survival is the reason things live. Here we explore this 'basic' of biology, by reference to the extraordinary life-cycle of the aphid-like pest phylloxera, and the complexity of its relationship with its host the grapevine. The effort and ingenuity that phylloxera employs to continue itself leads to a doubt that survival alone is sufficient reason. It has frequently been suggested that the reduction of life to a catalogue of facts (by science) creates this doubt, because it robs existence of its essence (which is something other than its mechanics). The part that science is said to steal is what Robert Pirsig calls Quality-the harmonious balance of things. Pirsig seems to imply that this is something inherent in things-and independent from us. A more mundane explanation is that the difference between facts and the complete reality is us-the tendency of mind to connect freely between different kinds of information. This possibility is briefly illustrated here by a myth based on the facts of phylloxera.     

Responsibilities in elderly care: Mr Powell's narrative of duty and relations

In Western countries a considerable number of older people move to a residential home when their health declines. Institutionalization often results in increased dependence, inactivity and loss of identity or self-worth (dignity). This raises the moral question as to how older, institutionalized people can remain autonomous as far as continuing to live in line with their own values is concerned. Following Walker's meta-ethical framework on the assignment of responsibilities, we suggest that instead of directing all older people towards more autonomy in terms of independence, professional caregivers should listen to the life narrative of older people and attempt to find out how their personal identity, relations and values in life can be continued in the new setting. If mutual normative expectations between caregivers and older people are not carefully negotiated, it creates tension. This tension is illustrated by the narrative of Mr Powell, a retired successful public servant now living in a residential home. The narrative describes his current life, his need for help, his independent frame of mind, and his encounters with institutional and professional policies. Mr Powell sees himself as a man who has always cared for himself and others, and who still feels that he has to fulfil certain duties in life. Mr Powell's story shows that he is not always understood well by caregivers who respond from a one-sided view of autonomy as independence. This leads to misunderstanding and an underestimation of his need to be noticed and involved in the residential community.     

Delectable Creatures and the Fundamental Reality of Metaphor: Biosemiotics and Animal Mind

This article argues that organisms, defined by a semi-permeable membrane or skin separating organism from environment, are (must be) semiotically alert responders to environments (both Innenwelt and Umwelt). As organisms and environments complexify over time, so, necessarily, does semiotic responsiveness, or ‘semiotic freedom’. In complex environments, semiotic responsiveness necessitates increasing plasticity of discernment, or discrimination. Such judgements, in other words, involve interpretations. The latter, in effect, consist of translations of a range of sign relations which, like metaphor, are based on transfers (carryings over) of meanings or expressions from one semiotic ‘site’ to another. The article argues that what humans describe as ‘metaphor’ (and believe is something which only pertains to human speech and mind and, in essence, is ‘not real’) is, in fact, fundamental to all semiotic and biosemiotic sign processes in all living things. The article first argues that metaphor and mind are immanent in all life, and are evolutionary, and, thus, that animals certainly do have minds. Following Heidegger and then Agamben, the article continues by asking about the place of animal mind in humans, and concludes that, as a kind of ‘night science’, ‘humananimal’ mind is central to the semiotics of Peircean abduction.     

Making the case for human life extension: personal arguments

In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all.     

Too Lonely to Die Alone: Internet Suicide Pacts and Existential Suffering in Japan

Most striking in the recent rise of suicide in Japan are the increase in suicide among young Japanese and the emergence of Internet suicide pacts. An ethnography of suicide-related Web sites reveals a distinctive kind of existential suffering among visitors that is not reducible to categories of mental illness and raises questions regarding the meaning of an individual “choice” to die, when this occurs in the context of an intersubjective decision by a group of strangers, each of whom is too afraid to die alone. Anthropology’s recent turn to subjectivity enables analyses of individual suffering in society that provide a more nuanced approach to the apparent dichotomy between agency and structure and that connect the phenomenon of suicide in Japan to Japanese conceptions of selfhood and the afterlife. The absence of ikigai [the worth of living] among suicide Web site visitors and their view of suicide as a way of healing show, furthermore, that analyses of social suffering must be expanded to include questions of meaning and loss of meaning and, also, draw attention to Japanese conceptions of self in which relationality in all things, including the choice to die, is of utmost importance.

2 The Soul's Frail Dwelling-House

Essentially, there is only one thing in life that interests us: the content of the mind. Millions of pages are filled with a portrayal of man's inner world; but the product of this labor—the laws of man's inner life—is still not in our possession.     

Phylogenetic hypotheses, taxonomic sameness and the reference of taxon names

When scientists use a taxon name like Mammalia, it is important that they talk about the same thing. But, what does it mean to be the same thing in different phylogenetic hypotheses? And, how is taxonomic reference maintained across hypotheses? Here, we discuss the differences between real and hypothetical clades, and how such a distinction relates to the sameness problem. Since hypotheses influence how we perceive things and pursue science, we find it important to have a functioning nomenclatural system for clades as perceived in phylogenetic hypotheses. As a solution to the sameness problem for such clades, we argue that a taxon name does not primarily refer to a single clade that somehow mirror the reality of branches in the tree of life. Instead we suggest that a taxon name refers to a set, or natural kind, of counterfactual and reconstructed clades.     

Phénoménologie de la subjectivité : Tatossian et la clinique psychiatrique

The human sciences are now celebrating the return of the Subject. However, as a form of resistance to science, the issue of subjectivity justifies a methodological resort to a phenomenological posture. This posture consists in “seeing” and “showing” the experience of foundations. In Arthur Tatossian’s distinction between Subject and subjectivity, the Subject carries out the synthesis of forms in which the subjectivity expresses and alienates itself. These forms include: the Self, the consciousness, the inner mind, etc. Subjectivity is what makes the Subject possible. Subjectivity is time, space, the body and the Other, and is shaped by time into a living present, by space into a common place, by the body into flesh, and by the Other as alterity. In psychiatric disorders, the patient fails to be a Subject. Whoever he or she is, a Self without subjectivity, as with a melancholic or a maniac, or subjectivity without Self, as with a schizophrenic, the issue of human identity arises. The central problem of the human condition, which is at the heart of psychiatric disorders, is the challenge of being a Self while retaining a degree of subjectivity. This in turn merges with another central problem: that of freedom. Subjectivity is the other face of freedom because it is the power to create meaning.     

The Origin of Life in the Context of Inanimate Nature

Biophysics - Questions about the nature of life and the ability of living things to evolve are still attracting attention of scientists from different backgrounds. The idea that all living...     

Should I want to live to 100?

Is it virtuous for someone to try to live to 100? Casting aside questions of intergenerational justice and internal obligations in families, what about the basic desire itself? Discussions of longevity and aging in bioethics are skewed to controversial end‐of‐life decisions, largely avoiding questions of how to age well before such decisions arise. Respected writers such as Atul Gawande, Daniel Callahan, and Ezekiel Emanuel champion accepting a natural life span and not trying to live beyond it. The Stoic Seneca says a desire to live to 100 is foolish because, however long people live, they waste most of their lives, so if they lived a thousand years, they would still waste most of it. Against Seneca and Emanuel, we argue that a functional, not a chronological, view of aging should guide us and that for some seniors, hoping to be centenarians may be neither foolish nor misguided. Using Cicero, we argue that the pleasures of seniors are not necessarily inferior to those of youth and may even surpass them. Finally, we agree with Emanuel that the “symptom burden” of some lives makes living to 100 unpalatable and with Seneca that, given life’s vicissitudes, we should not plan on living to 100, but heeding his wisdom, try to make the most of the time given to us.