Digitally supported public health interventions through the lens of structural injustice: The case of mobile apps responding to violence against women and girls

Mobile applications (apps) have gained significant popularity as a new intervention strategy responding to violence against women and girls. Despite their growing relevance, an assessment from the perspective of public health ethics is still lacking. Here, we base our discussion on the understanding of violence against women and girls as a multidimensional, global public health issue on structural, societal and individual levels and situate it within the theoretical framework of structural injustice, including epistemic injustice. Based on a systematic app review we previously conducted, we evaluate the content and functions of apps through the lens of structural injustice. We argue that technological solutions such as apps may be a useful tool in the fight against violence against women and girls but have to be situated within the broader frame of public health that considers the structural dimensions of such violence. Ultimately, the concerns raised by structural injustice are—alongside key concerns of safety, data privacy, importance of human supportive contact, and so forth—crucial dimensions in the ethical assessment of such apps. However, research on the role and relevance of apps as strategies to address the structural and epistemic dimensions of violence remains scarce. This article aims to provide a foundation for further discussion in this area and could be applicable to other areas in public health policy and practice.     

On a tendency in health economics to dwell on income inequality and underestimate social stress

Social stress can cause physical and mental harm. It is therefore not surprising that public health policy makers have sought to identify and implement policies aimed at tackling this social ill. A frequently prescribed remedy is to reduce social stress by reducing income inequality, which is typically measured by the Gini coefficient. Decomposing the coefficient into a measure of a population’s social stress and a population’s income makes it possible to show that steps taken to lower the coefficient can actually exacerbate social stress. We formulate conditions under which lowering the Gini coefficient coincides with increasing social stress. If the aim of public policy is to improve public health and increase social welfare, and if social welfare is reduced by social stress, then lowering the Gini coefficient may not be the right course of action.     

The Harm of Bioethics: A Critique of Singer and Callahan on Obesity

Debate concerning the social impact of obesity has been ongoing since at least the 1980s. Bioethicists, however, have been relatively silent. If obesity is addressed it tends to be in the context of resource allocation or clinical procedures such as bariatric surgery. However, prominent bioethicists Peter Singer and Dan Callahan have recently entered the obesity debate to argue that obesity is not simply a clinical or personal issue but an ethical issue with social and political consequences. This article critically examines two problematic aspects of Singer and Callahan's respective approaches. First, there is an uncritical assumption that individuals are autonomous agents responsible for health‐related effects associated with food choices. In their view, individuals are obese because they choose certain foods or refrain from physical activity. However, this view alone does not justify intervention. Both Singer and Callahan recognize that individuals are free to make foolish choices so long as they do not harm others. It is at this point that the second problematic aspect arises. To interfere legitimately in the liberty of individuals, they invoke the harm principle. I contend, however, that in making this move both Singer and Callahan rely on superficial readings of public health research to amplify the harm caused by obese individuals and ignore pertinent epidemiological research on the social determinants of obesity. I argue that the mobilization of the harm principle and corresponding focus on individual behaviours without careful consideration of the empirical research is itself a form of harm that needs to be taken seriously.     

Healing across Cultures: Learning from Traditions

The health and wellness of an individual are reliant on the integrated effects of mind, body, and spirit. This triad is intricately set within a backdrop of the environment, our earth. Western cultures often disregard this holism, especially this fourth component, in its considerations of wellness as described by modern medicine. This practice is unlike that of many of the traditional cultures in the world. These cultures focus more on balance in the context of environmental respect. Varied cultures share remarkable similarities in their healing modalities, especially considering the relative isolation from one to another—evidence that there is truth to the healing knowledge they possess. We are not disconnected from the natural world in terms of health, but dependent and interconnected within ourselves and to everything around us. Social change is required to assure that the practice of modern medicine evolves to incorporate this integral aspect of health and wellness, and this can be done through partnerships with traditional healers.There is a growing demand for wellness and earthly responsibility. It is time to appropriately learn from age-old societies and their healing traditions for they do have answers we are seeking in sustainability and harmony, environmental stewardship and planetary respect, and holistic health. For thousands of years, our ancestors have known the secrets of long life—this knowledge needs to be preserved through the apprenticeship of future generations. We propose a collaboration that develops mutually beneficial learning partnerships combining modern medical knowledge with the wisdom of traditional healers around the world.     

Quantifying Health Across Populations

In this article, I argue that as a theoretical matter, a population's health‐level is best quantified via averagism. Averagism asserts that the health of a population is the average of members’ health‐levels. This model is better because it does not fall prey to a number of objections, including the repugnant conclusion, and because it is not arbitrary. I also argue that as a practical matter, population health‐levels are best quantified via totalism. Totalism asserts that the health of a population is the sum of members’ health‐levels. Totalism is better here because it fits better with cost‐benefit analysis and such an analysis is the best practical way to value healthcare outcomes. The two results are compatible because the theoretical and practical need not always align, whether in general or in the context of population health.     

Community engagement in global health research that advances health equity

Community engagement is gaining prominence in global health research. So far, a philosophical rationale for why researchers should perform community engagement during such research has not been provided by ethics scholars. Its absence means that conducting community engagement is still often viewed as no more than a ‘good idea’ or ‘good practice’ rather than ethically required. In this article, we argue that shared health governance can establish grounds for requiring the engagement of low‐ and middle‐income country (LMIC) community members in global health research, where such research aims to help reduce health disparities. This philosophical basis has important implications for the ethical goals ascribed to engagement and the approach adopted to undertake it. We suggest the ethical goals of engagement in equity‐oriented global health research should include: (a) generating research topics and questions that reflect the key problems disadvantaged groups face in accessing healthcare, services and broader social determinants of health and (b) promoting the translation of research findings into policy and practice in ways that benefit the health of disadvantaged groups. We propose engagement practice should have the following features: deliberation with LMIC community members to make a range of project decisions, beginning with setting research topics and questions; inclusion of members of disadvantaged groups and those with the power to change policy and practice to benefit them; and purposeful structuring of deliberations to minimize the impact of power disparities between LMIC community members. Finally, we reflect on how these features differ from those typical of much current community engagement practice in LMICs.     

No conscientious objection without normative justification: Against conscientious objection in medicine

Most proponents of conscientious objection accommodation in medicine acknowledge that not all conscientious beliefs can justify refusing service to a patient. Accordingly, they admit that constraints must be placed on the practice of conscientious objection. I argue that one such constraint must be an assessment of the reasonability of the conscientious claim in question, and that this requires normative justification of the claim. Some advocates of conscientious object protest that, since conscientious claims are a manifestation of personal beliefs, they cannot be subject to this kind of public justification. In order to preserve an element of constraint without requiring normative justification of conscientious beliefs, they shift the justificatory burden from the belief motivating the conscientious claim to the condition of the patient being refused service. This generally involves a claim along the lines that conscientious refusals should be permitted to the extent that they do not cause unwarranted harm to the patient. I argue that explaining what would constitute warranted harm requires an explanation of what it is about the conscientious claim that makes the harm warranted. ‘Warranted’ is a normative operator, and providing this explanation is the same as providing normative justification for the conscientious claim. This shows that resorting to facts about the patient’s condition does not avoid the problem of providing normative justification, and that the onus remains on advocates of conscientious objection to provide normative justification for the practice in the context of medical care.     

A sufficiency threshold is not a harm principle: A better alternative to best interests for overriding parental decisions

Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child’s best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This ‘harm principle’ has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema’s negative point to be right—our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child—but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema’s proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill’s harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or ‘good enough’) and inadequate (or ‘substandard’) parenting.     

STIGMATIZATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS

Encouraged by the success of smoking denormalization strategies as a tobacco‐control measure, public health institutions are adopting a similar approach to other health behaviors. For example, a recent controversial ad campaign in New York explicitly aimed to denormalize HIV/AIDS amongst gay men. Authors such as Scott Burris have argued that efforts like this are tantamount to stigmatization and that such stigmatization is unethical because it is dehumanizing. Others have offered a limited endorsement of denormalization/stigmatization campaigns as being justified on consequentialist grounds; namely, that the potential public health benefits outweigh any stigmatizing side effects. In this paper, I examine and reject the blanket condemnation of stigmatization efforts in public health. I argue that the moral status of such efforts are best evaluated within a contractualist, as opposed to a consequentialist, framework. Contractualism in public health ethics asks whether a particular stigmatizing policy could be justified to reasonable individuals who do not know whether they will be affected by that policy. Using this approach, I argue that it is sometimes permissible for public health institutions to engage in health‐related stigmatization.     

Effects of parental public health insurance eligibility on parent and child health outcomes

Many states expanded their Medicaid programs to low-income adults under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). These expansions increased Medicaid coverage among low-income parents and their children. Whether these improvements in coverage and healthcare use lead to better health outcomes for parents and their children remains unanswered. We used longitudinal data on a large, nationally representative cohort of elementary-aged children from low-income households from 2010 to 2016. Using a difference-in-differences approach in state Medicaid policy decisions, we estimated the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansions on parent and child health. We found that parents’ self-reported health status improved significantly post-expansion in states that expanded Medicaid through the ACA by 4 percentage points (p < 0.05), a 4.7% improvement. We found no significant changes in children’s use of routine doctor visits or parents’ assessment of their children’s health status. We observed modest decreases in children’s body mass index (BMI) of about 2% (p < 0.05), especially for girls.     

Covert moral bioenhancement,public health,and autonomy

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy‐based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.     

On the reconceptualization of Alzheimer’s disease

In the hope of future treatments to prevent or slow down the disease, there is a strong movement towards an ever‐earlier detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). In conjunction with scientific developments, this has prompted a reconceptualization of AD, as a slowly progressive pathological process with a long asymptomatic phase. New concepts such as ‘preclinical’ and ‘prodromal’ AD have been introduced, raising a number of conceptual and ethical questions. We evaluate whether these new concepts are theoretically defensible, in light of theories of health and disease, and whether they should be understood as disease or as an at‐risk state. We introduce a pragmatic view on disease concepts and argue that an evaluation of the reconceptualization of AD should also take its aims and effects into account, and assess their ethical acceptability. The reconceptualization of AD is useful to coordinate research into preventive strategies, and may potentially benefit future patients. However, in the short term, early detection and labelling of ‘preclinical AD’ can potentially harm people. Since there is no treatment available and the predictive value is unclear, it may only create a group of ‘patients‐in‐waiting’ who may suffer from anxiety, uncertainty and stigmatization, but will never actually develop dementia. We conclude that only if the promise of preventive medication materializes, will the reconceptualization of AD turn out unequivocally to be for the better. Otherwise, the reconceptualization may do more harm than good.     

REFOCUSING THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIREMENT

Many guidelines for international research require that studies be responsive to host community health needs or health priorities. Although responsiveness possesses great intuitive and rhetorical appeal, existing conceptions are confusing and difficult to apply. Not only are there few examples of what research the responsiveness requirement permits and what it rejects, but its application can lead to contradictory results. Because of the practical difficulties in applying responsiveness and the danger that misapplying responsiveness could harm the interests of developing countries, we argue that responsiveness should be refocused in three ways: in terms of (1) who enforces it, (2) under what standard, and (3) in what cases. We conclude that responsiveness should be applied by host country officials at the policy level with the exercise of judgment when externally funded research threatens to displace scarce local resources.     

Genetics and personal responsibility for health

Advances in genetic medicine may have implications for how we should think about personal responsibility for health, because they may show how it is possible to exert some control over risk factors that were previously thought as beyond the individual's control. Although we cannot control the genes that we are born with, we can often make decisions concerning genetic testing, disease prevention, and treatment. One might argue, therefore, that individuals should be treated as morally responsible for taking effective action in response to genetic risks factors, since genetically based health risks are similar to other health risks. While this argument makes sense as an abstract, philosophical position, it is not a useful guide to public policy. Given these concerns, there is little society can or should do to encourage individuals to address their genetic risk factors, other than praising those who make prudent choices.     

BEYOND ALTRUISTIC AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACT MOTHERHOOD: THE PROFESSIONAL MODEL

It has become common to distinguish between altruistic and commercial contract motherhood (or ‘surrogacy’). Altruistic arrangements are based on the ‘gift relationship’: a woman is motivated by altruism to have a baby for an infertile couple, who are free to reciprocate as they see fit. By contrast, in commercial arrangements both parties are motivated by personal gain to enter a legally enforceable agreement, which stipulates that the contract mother or ‘surrogate’ is to bear a child for the intending parents in exchange for a fee. She is required to undergo medical examinations and to refrain from behaviour that could harm the foetus. The intending parents are the child's legal parents from the outset. The parties to the contract can, but are not expected to, maintain contact after the transaction is completed. We argue that contract motherhood should not be organized according to the norms of the gift relationship, and that contract mothers should be compensated for their labour. However, we accept that there are good reasons for rejecting the commercial model as a suitable framework for contract pregnancy, and argue, instead, in favour of viewing it as a profession.     

Why Restrictions on the Immigration of Health Workers Are Unjust

Some bioethicists and political philosophers argue that rich states should restrict the immigration of health workers from poor countries in order to prevent harm to people in these countries. In this essay, I argue that restrictions on the immigration of health workers are unjust, even if this immigration results in bad health outcomes for people in poor countries. I contend that negative duties to refrain from interfering with the occupational liberties of health workers outweighs rich states' positive duties to prevent harm to people in sending countries. Furthermore, I defend this claim against the objection that health workers in poor countries acquire special duties to their compatriots that render them liable to coercive interference.     

Conflicting demands on a modern healthcare service: Can Rawlsian justice provide a guiding philosophy for the NHS and other socialized health services?

We explore whether a Rawlsian approach might provide a guiding philosophy for the development of a healthcare system, in particular with regard to resolving tensions between different groups within it. We argue that an approach developed from some of Rawls’ principles – using his ‘veil of ignorance’ and both the ‘difference’ and ‘just savings’ principles which it generates – provides a compelling basis for policy making around certain areas of conflict. We ask what policies might be made if those making them did not know if one was patient, doctor, nurse or manager – in this generation or the next. We first offer a brief summary of Rawls’ approach and how we intend to extrapolate from it. We examine how this adapted Rawlsian framework could be applied to specific examples of conflict within healthcare; we demonstrate how this framework can be used to develop a healthcare service which is both sustainable (in its training and treatment of staff, and in encouraging research and innovation) and open (to protect the powers and opportunities of those using the health service). We conclude that while Rawls’ approach has previously been rejected as a means to address specific healthcare decisions, an adapted veil of ignorance can be a useful tool for the consideration of how a just health service should be constructed and sustained. Turning the theoretical into the practical (and combining Rawls’ thought experiment with Scanlonian contractarianism), managers, doctors, patients, carers and nurses could come together and debate conflicting issues behind a hypothetical veil.     

Vaccine mandates,value pluralism,and policy diversity

Political communities across the world have recently sought to tackle rising rates of vaccine hesitancy and refusal, by implementing coercive immunization programs, or by making existing immunization programs more coercive. Many academics and advocates of public health have applauded these policy developments, and they have invoked ethical reasons for implementing or strengthening vaccine mandates. Others have criticized these policies on ethical grounds, for undermining liberty, and as symptoms of broader government overreach. But such arguments often obscure or abstract away from the diverse values that are relevant to the ethical justifications of particular political communities’ vaccine‐mandate policies. We argue for an expansive conception of the normative issues relevant to deciding whether and how to establish or reform vaccine mandates, and we propose a schema by which to organize our thoughts about the ways in which different kinds of vaccine‐mandate policies implicate various values.     

A more-than-human approach to bioethics: The example of digital health

Digital health technologies are often advocated as a way of helping people monitor, promote and manage their health, care for others and reduce the burden on healthcare systems. Yet these technologies have also been subject to criticism for limiting human flourishing and exacerbating socioeconomic disadvantage. Bioethical appraisals of digital health technologies tend to take a conventional risk-benefit approach, positioning the human subject as a rational, autonomous agent who is acted on by technologies. In this paper, I present a case for adopting an alternative more-than-human perspective on bioethics. A more-than-human approach considers human-technological assemblages and agencies as distributed, relational, situated and emergent. To illustrate the insights that this perspective can offer, I draw on the findings of four empirical projects I have conducted on people’s use of digital devices and platforms used for health-related purposes, including social media groups and online forums, mobile apps and wearable devices. I conclude with the argument that a more-than-human approach to bioethics can begin to incorporate a new ‘zoë ethics’ that can acknowledge and address the deeper affective, multisensory and relational dimensions of humans’ encounters with and enactments of material things and nonhuman creatures.