Procreation machines: Ectogenesis as reproductive enhancement,proper medicine or a step towards posthumanism?

Full ectogenesis as the complete externalization of human reproduction by bypassing the bodily processes of gestation and childbirth can be considered the culmination of genetic and reproductive technologies. Despite its still being a hypothetical scenario, it has been discussed for decades as the ultimate means to liberate women from their reproductive tasks in society and hence finally end fundamental gender injustices generally. In the debate about the application of artificial wombs to achieve gender equality, one aspect is barely mentioned but is of crucial relevance from a medical-ethical perspective: whether and how could full ectogenesis be justified as a proper use of medicine? After characterizing the technology as a special form of human enhancement and as an extension of medical practice that goes beyond the traditional field of medicine, this paper critically assesses the theoretical possibilities of legitimizing this extension. We identify two ways of justification: either one argues that ectogenesis fulfils a proper goal of medicine (a justification we call pathologization), or one argues that the application of ectogenesis achieves a non-medical goal (which we call medicalization). Because it is important from a medical-ethical point of view to avoid an inappropriate instrumentalization or misuse of medicine and thus an undue medicalization of non-medical problems, a set of necessary conditions has to be met. It is doubtful whether full ectogenesis for non-medical purposes could fulfil these conditions. Rather, its comprehensive usage could be seen as a revolutionary modification of what it means to be human.     

The ethics of ectogenesis-aided foetal treatment

In this paper, we aim to stimulate ethical debate about the morally relevant connection between ectogenesis and the foetus as a potential beneficiary of treatment. Ectogenesis could facilitate foetal interventions by treating the foetus independently of the pregnant woman and provide easier access to the foetus if interventions are required. The moral relevance hereof derives from the observation that, together with other developments in genetic technology and prenatal treatment, this may catalyse the allocation of a patient status to the foetus. The topic of foetal medicine is of growing interest to clinicians, and it also deserves due attention from an ethical perspective. To the extent that these developments contribute to the allocation of a patient status to the foetus (and to its respective interests for medical treatment), normative questions arise about how moral responsibilities towards foetal interests should be balanced against the interests of the pregnant woman. We conclude that, even if ectogenesis could facilitate foetal therapy, it is important to remain sensitive to the fact that it would not circumvent the key ethical concerns that come with in utero foetal treatment and that it may even exacerbate potential conflicts between directive treatment recommendations and the pregnant woman’s autonomous decision to the contrary.     

The Perfect Womb: Promoting Equality of (Fetal) Opportunity

This paper aims to address how artificial gestation might affect equality of opportunity for the unborn and any resultant generation of “ectogenetic” babies. It will first explore the current legal obstacles preventing the development of ectogenesis, before looking at the benefits of allowing this technology to control fetal growth and development. This will open up a discussion of the treatment/enhancement divide regarding the use of reproductive technologies, a topic featured in various bioethical debates on the subject. Using current maternity practices in Western society as a comparator, this paper will conclude that neither naturally nor artificially gestated fetuses have interests that can conflict with those of potential parents who might want to use this technology to control fetal development. Such control may include selective implantation of embryos of a desired gender, deliberate choice of genetic traits, or maintenance of an ideal incubation environment to avoid fetal damage. Objections on the basis of disability as well as concerns regarding eugenics will be addressed. The paper will conclude that none of these objections are compelling grounds to prevent the development and use of ectogenesis technologies for the purpose of achieving specific reproductive goals, particularly when compared to current practices in pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and selective abortion on the grounds of undesired traits. As such, when deciding whether to support ectogenesis research, the enduring interests of parents must be the primary consideration, with societal concerns regarding potential misuse the only valid secondary consideration.     

Biogenetic ties and parent‐child relationships: The misplaced critique

According to an almost axiomatic standard in bioethics, moral commitment should ground parents’ relationship with their children, rather than biogenetic relatedness. This standard has been used lately to express skepticism about extending existing assisted reproductive treatments (ARTs) to same‐sex couples and to research into novel fertility interventions for those couples, but this skepticism is misplaced on several grounds. As a matter of access and equity, same‐sex couples seem presumptively entitled to genetic relatedness to their children as far as possible both in regard to existing ARTs and to novel ARTs under investigation. For those worried about the effects of trying to secure biogenetic relatedness for same‐sex couples, it may be noted that same‐sex couples will only ever be a fraction of the parents implicated in propping up “biologism,” as the expectation of biogenetic relatedness it is sometimes called. The cultural force of biologism would survive almost intact even if no same‐sex couples were ever to have genetically related children. It is therefore hard to see why same‐sex couples should forfeit aspirations to biogenetic relationships with their children or enjoy less subsidy for ARTs than the subsidy given to different‐sex couples. As matter of moral consistency, the full implications of the biologism critique have yet to be evaluated relative to different‐sex couples.     

The ‘tyranny of reproduction’: Could ectogenesis further women’s liberation?

This paper imagines what the liberatory possibilities of (full) ectogenesis are, insofar as it separates woman from female reproductive function. Even before use with human infants, ectogenesis productively disrupts the biological paradigm underlying current gender categories and divisions of labour. I begin by presenting a theory of women’s oppression drawn from the radical feminisms of the 1960s, which sees oppression as deeply rooted in biology. On this view, oppressive social meanings are overlaid upon biology and body, as artefacts of culture and history. I then argue that ectogenesis should be pursued to replace two modes of assisted gestation that can be seen as outgrowths of oppressive assumptions about women's function, ectogenesis should be pursued to replace two modes of assisted gestation. These are gestational surrogacy and uterine transplant, which arise partly from gendered, pronatalist, and geneticist norms. These practices are supported by assumptions about women’s identity and value. Pursuing technologies such as ectogenesis, which weaken the presumed link between biology and gender, is beneficial to (trans-inclusionary radical) feminist aims, as part of a broad project of challenging dominant power relations resting on and maintaining gender categories. By allowing the conceptual separation of female reproductive function from ‘woman’, ectogenesis raises questions about how we determine who counts in this gender identity, and also how we value those who claim the identity ‘woman’. I conclude that ectogenesis has the potential to challenge traditional patriarchal family structures, and thence all other male-dominated structures (of work, education, cultural production), allowing a reimagining of the family and society in more radical ways than we have yet achieved.     

Rethinking parenthood within assisted reproductive technology: The need for regulation in Nigeria

In Nigeria, reproduction is highly valued, with many people desiring to produce a child ‘in their own image and likeness’. Previously, aspiring parents often resorted to adoption. Today, the availability of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has provided options other than adoption for those desiring to procreate. Through ARTs, aspirations for a family may be attained through an exchange of reproductive goods and services, and not necessarily through traditional heterosexual relationships. ARTs have altered the perception of parenthood as it exists in Nigeria, and courts face a difficult task in defining parenthood within Nigerian jurisprudence, as they can only adjudicate based on extant law. Although ARTs provide greater individual choices for fulfilling the desire to procreate, they raise a number of ethical and legal issues that evolving legal systems, such as that in Nigeria, are ill-equipped to manage. This paper describes the traditional assignment of parenthood under indigenous laws and other sources of law within the Nigerian jurisprudence. We carried out an in-depth study of the Nigerian legislative framework and found that there are no laws directly regulating parenthood, procreation and ARTs in Nigeria. We also found that the extant laws are only tangentially related and do not answer the relevant questions sufficiently well, especially concerning succession, nationality and assignment of responsibility in collaborative reproduction. We conclude by highlighting the need for and recommending a regulatory framework on ARTs with a particular focus on providing a definition for parenthood achieved through ARTs in Nigeria.     

Preimplantational Ectogenesis: Science and Speculation Concerning In Vitro Fertilization and Related Procedures

In recent years, technical advances have made preimplantational ectogenesis (in vitro maturation, fertilization and early embryonic development) more than a theoretical concept. Such procedures hold great promise in medical research. However, despite our newly-acquired skills in tissue culture and microsurgical manipulation, and contrary to many sensational articles in the lay press, it is not likely that preimplantational ectogenesis will soon attain wide clinical use in humans. Adverse societal attitudes, based largely upon moral and ethical dilemmas, will probably combine with still-unresolved technical difficulties to restrict the clinical applications.     

CARE ETHICS AND THE GLOBAL PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL SURROGACY

This essay will focus on the moral issues relating to surrogacy in the global context, and will critique the liberal arguments that have been offered in support of it. Liberal arguments hold sway concerning reproductive arrangements made between commissioning couples from wealthy nations and the surrogates from socioeconomically weak backgrounds that they hire to do their reproductive labor. My argument in this paper is motivated by a concern for controlling harms by putting the practice of globalized commercial surrogacy into the context of care ethics. As I will argue, the unstable situations into which children of global surrogacy arrangements are born is symbolic of the crisis of care that the practice raises. Using the Baby Manji case as my touch point, I will suggest that liberalism cannot address the harms experienced by Manji and children like her who are created through the global practice of assisted reproductive technology. I will argue that, if commissioning couples consider their proposed surrogacy contracts from a care ethics point of view, they will begin to think relationally about their actions, considering the practice from an ethical lens, not just an economic or contractual one.     

Reproductive technologies in developing countries

Are there any ethical concerns about reproductive technologies that are specific or unique to developing countries? Three ethical concerns often mentioned specifically in regard to developing countries are (1), the "overpopulation argument"; (2) the limited resources argument; and (3) the ethical problem of poorly trained practitioners offering their services to unsuspecting and uninformed infertile individuals or couples. Each argument is explored in some detail, with the conclusion that ethical problems do, in fact, exist but are not unique to developing countries. Nevertheless, the difficulties relating to reproductive technologies are likely to be greater in developing countries than in developed ones because of limited resources and a larger number of poor people residing there.     

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Are there any ethical concerns about reproductive technologies that are specific or unique to developing countries? Three ethical concerns often mentioned specifically in regard to developing countries are (1), the “overpopulation argument”; (2) the limited resources argument; and (3) the ethical problem of poorly trained practitioners offering their services to unsuspecting and uninformed infertile individuals or couples. Each argument is explored in some detail, with the conclusion that ethical problems do, in fact, exist but are not unique to developing countries. Nevertheless, the difficulties relating to reproductive technologies are likely to be greater in developing countries than in developed ones because of limited resources and a larger number of poor people residing there.     

Birds Do It. Bees Do It. So Why Not Single Women and Lesbians?

Infertile couples have come to take assisted reproductive technologies (ART) for granted. An increasing number of single women and lesbian couples also desire to have children and turn to ART, especially donor insemination, to fulfill this desire. While most married couples find that access to ART is limited primarily by the ability to pay, for single women and lesbian couples, the story may be much different. In the United States, they may find that doctors and infertility clinics view their desires as immoral and refuse to accept them as patients, although other doctors and clinics readily accept them. In most other countries, however, it is against the law for single women and lesbian couples to make use of ART, including donor insemination.
In this paper I will argue that marital status and sexual orientation should not serve as a barrier to accessing the world of reproductive medicine. I will base this conclusion on two arguments. First, that justice requires that we treat like cases alike. Just as we would not accept or reject patients for cardiac rehabilitation programs based on factors such as a history of poor eating habits, so too we should not look at nonmedical factors such as marital status when deciding whether to treat infertility. For the second justification for the conclusion of equal access to ART, I will examine the concept of the family. I will argue that it is morally acceptable for single women and lesbian couples to have children and to head families.     

Birds do it. Bees do it. So why not single women and lesbians?

Infertile couples have come to take assisted reproductive technologies (ART) for granted. An increasing number of single women and lesbian couples also desire to have children and turn to ART, especially donor insemination, to fulfill this desire. While most married couples find that access to ART is limited primarily by the ability to pay, for single women and lesbian couples, the story may be much different. In the United States, they may find that doctors and infertility clinics view their desires as immoral and refuse to accept them as patients, although other doctors and clinics readily accept them. In most other countries, however, it is against the law for single women and lesbian couples to make use of ART, including donor insemination.
In this paper I will argue that marital status and sexual orientation should not serve as a barrier to accessing the world of reproductive medicine. I will base this conclusion on two arguments. First, that justice requires that we treat like cases alike. Just as we would not accept or reject patients for cardiac rehabilitation programs based on factors such as a history of poor eating habits, so too we should not look at nonmedical factors such as marital status when deciding whether to treat infertility. For the second justification for the conclusion of equal access to ART, I will examine the concept of the family. I will argue that it is morally acceptable for single women and lesbian couples to have children and to head families.     

Conscience claims,metaphysics, and avoiding an LGBT eugenic

Novel assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are poised to present our society with strange new ethical questions, such as whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) couples should be allowed to produce children biologically related to both parents, or whether trans‐women who want to experience childbirth should be allowed to receive uterine transplants. Clinicians opposed to offering such technologies to LGBT couples on moral grounds are likely to seek legal shelter through the conscience clauses enshrined in U.S. law. This paper begins by briefly discussing some novel ART on the horizon and noting that it is unclear whether current conscience clauses will permit fertility clinics to deny such services to LGBT individuals. A compromise approach to conscience is any view that sees the value of respecting conscience claims within limits. I describe and critique the constraints proposed in the recent work of Wicclair, NeJaime and Siegel as ultimately begging the question. My purpose is to strengthen their arguments by suggesting that in the controversial situations that elicit claims of conscience, bioethicists should engage with the metaphysical claims in play. I argue that conscience claims against LGBT individuals ought to be constrained because the underlying metaphysic—that God has decreed the LGBT lifestyle to be sinful—is highly implausible from the perspective of a naturalized metaphysic, which ought to be the lens through which we evaluate conscience claims.     

Failures of Imagination: Disability and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction

The article addresses the problem of disability in the context of reproductive decisions based on genetic information. It poses the question of whether selective procreation should be considered as a moral obligation of prospective parents. To answer this question, a number of different ethical approaches to the problem are presented and critically analysed: the utilitarian; Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence; the rights‐based. The main thesis of the article is that these approaches fail to provide any appealing principles on which reproductive decisions should be based. They constitute failures of imagination which may result in counter‐intuitive moral judgments about both life with disability and genetic selection. A full appreciation of the ethical significance of recognition in procreative decisions leads to a more nuanced and morally satisfying view than other leading alternatives presented in the article.     

Ectogenesis, justice and utility: a reply to James

In one chapter of their 1984 book The Reproductive Revolution (published in North America as Making Babies), Wells and Peter Singer make a case for the development of ectogenesis, the complete gestation of a human fetus outside the womb. David N. James responded with "Ectogenesis: a reply to Singer and Wells" (Bioethics, 1987 Jan; 1(1): 80-99), in which he refuted one of their arguments at length, opposed two briefly, and set two aside. Here Wells answers James, devoting most of his essay to reiterating an argument for ectogenesis based on the justice of remedying a correctable disability (infertility) by allocating resources to develop a biotechnology (ectogenesis). Wells then touches upon James's response to the Wells/Singer argument for ectogenesis as a possible solution to the abortion dilemma. He concludes by commenting briefly on the arguments about ectogenesis and parenting, and on ectogenesis as a source of transplantable tissue and organs.     

CLONING, PARENTHOOD, AND GENETIC RELATEDNESS

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents.     

Artificial womb technology and clinical translation: Innovative treatment or medical research?

In 2017 and 2019, two research teams claimed ‘proof of principle’ for artificial womb technology (AWT). AWT has long been a subject of speculation in bioethical literature, with broad consensus that it is a welcome development. Despite this, little attention is afforded to more immediate ethical problems in the development of AWT, particularly as an alternative to neonatal intensive care. To start this conversation, I consider whether experimental AWT is innovative treatment or medical research. The research–treatment distinction, pervasive in regulation worldwide, is intended to isolate research activities and subject them to a greater degree of oversight. I argue that there is a tendency in the literature to conceptualize AWT for partial ectogenesis as innovative treatment. However, there are sufficiently serious ethical concerns with experimental AWT that mean that it must not be first used on humans on the basis that it is a ‘beneficial treatment’. First, I outline the prospects for translation of AWT animal studies into treatment for human preterms. Second, I challenge the conceptualizations of experimental AWT as innovative treatment. It must be considered medical research to reflect the investigatory nature of the process and guarantee sufficient protections for subjects. Identifying that AWT is research is crucial in formulating further ethico-legal questions regarding the experimental use of AWT. Third, I demonstrate that clinical trials will be a necessary part of the clinical translation of AWT because of requirements laid out by regulators. I consider the justification for clinical trials and highlight some of the crucial ethical questions about the conditions under which they should proceed.     

Antibiotic resistance as a tragedy of the commons: An ethical argument for a tax on antibiotic use in humans

To the extent that antibiotic resistance (ABR) is accelerated by antibiotic consumption and that it represents a serious public health emergency, it is imperative to drastically reduce antibiotic consumption, particularly in high‐income countries. I present the problem of ABR as an instance of the collective action problem known as ‘tragedy of the commons’. I propose that there is a strong ethical justification for taxing certain uses of antibiotics, namely when antibiotics are required to treat minor and self‐limiting infections, such as respiratory tract infections, in otherwise healthy individuals. Taxation would allow a reduction in consumption (given certain behavioural economics assumptions) and/or ensure that individuals internalize or compensate for their contribution to the erosion of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness. I suggest that revenue from the tax could be used to fund conservation and innovation strategies. Taxation might be a coercive policy, especially for certain individuals, but the ethical case for coercive policies is very strong when the good to be preserved is important enough and when they force individuals to do something they have a moral obligation to do anyway. I argue that, in the case of mild and self‐limiting infections, individuals have a moral duty of easy rescue and a moral duty of fairness to make their contribution to the preservation of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness by foregoing antibiotics. I also suggest that taxing antibiotics in such cases is an all things considered ethically justified policy even if it would introduce inequalities in access to healthcare.     

Ectogenesis: a reply to Singer and Wells

The possibility of achieving ectogenesis, or the growing of a human fetus to term in an artificial womb, is approaching reality as a result of advances in treatment of premature newborns and in in vitro fertilization techniques. In their 1984 book, The Reproductive Revolution, issued in North America as Making Babies, Peter Singer and Deane Wells offered several arguments for ectogenesis. James examines their arguments and rejects two of them, that ectogenesis offers a less problematic alternative to surrogate motherhood, and that ectogenesis could make it possible to reconcile fetal rights with the right to abortion on demand. He grants Singer and Wells' argument that the childless have a claim to state support of their desire to nurture, but contends that government-supported ectogenesis should still be rejected because the adoption of unwanted children is a preferable alternative to the use of an exotic, expensive, and still unproven technology.     

Formula feeding can help illuminate long-term consequences of full ectogenesis

Breastfeeding is analogous to pregnancy as an experience, in its exclusiveness to women, and in its cost and the effects it has on equitable share of labor. Therefore, the history of formula feeding provides useful insights into the future of full ectogenesis, which could evolve into a more severe version of what formula feeding is today: simplify life for some women and provide couples with a more equitable share of work at the cost of stigma, guilt and a daily diet of studies purporting to show the benefits of natural pregnancy. Making pregnancy an optional route to motherhood would make women's life trajectory more similar to men's and thus put pressure on women to compete with men on the ground shaped by men's preferences. Despite being a treasured experience of many women today, bearing children could become the luxury of the few, the province of the very poor and a choice working women will pay a high price for as women who choose pregnancy become stigmatized as self-indulgent or unprofessional and penalized for it in the workplace. At the same time, scarce societal resources that could be used to support pregnant women and working mothers would instead be directed toward proving to women or even forcing them to gestate children “the right way.” While not necessarily threatening on its own, when added to formula feeding, IVF, stem-cell produced ova and sex robots, full ectogenesis could diminish men's stake in women's wellbeing and even existence.