Study bystanders and ethical treatment of study participants—A proof of concept

The ethics of research on human subjects is often construed as a fine balance between the interests of patients in need of novel health interventions, and those of study participants who should remain safe in the process. But there is a third group in the mix. Some people belong to neither category, yet research can affect or jeopardize them. Call such people “bystanders.” This article shows that thinking about bystander protection can question whether there is an upper limit on the risks that studies may legitimately visit upon their participants. Thus, thinking about appropriate bystander protection can shed light on the appropriate protection of study participants. Core research ethics, which focuses on the latter, must consider the former as well.     

Conducting Research with Human Subjects in International Settings: Ethical Considerations

Biomedical research in international settings is undergoing expansive growth andmay potentially result in far-reaching benefits, such as direction of researchresources toward solving basic health care needs of world populations. However,key ethical concerns surround this expansion and must be carefully considered byinternational researchers. International research is impacted by differences inlanguage, culture, regulatory structures, financial resources, and possiblyethical standards. Local community leadership involvement in the planning stagesof research is imperative. Especially in resource-poor countries, the researchagenda must be designed to address local needs and provide local benefit.Capacity strengthening efforts, aimed at improving institutional support forethical conduct of human subjects research, must continue to be supported bywealthier nations.     

International ethical regulations on placebo-use in clinical trials: a comparative analysis

The ethical aspects of placebo control in clinical trials have been extensively and controversially debated in the last decade. However, a thorough analytical comparison of the different existing international regulations, their terminologies and their ethical principles concerning placebo, is still missing. The central issue in the ongoing controversy is the justification of placebo-use, if proven treatment exists. All present versions of the examined guidelines propose such justifications, but each guideline differs from the others in relevant details. Therefore the conditions justifying placebo-use according to each guideline are the focus of our attention. We will first propose a formalized general principle that defines the ethical acceptability of placebo-use. Then we will analyse three categories of conditions put forward by the different documents: the risk of harm or burden, compelling scientific reasons, and the availability of proven treatment. The analysis shows important normative discrepancies and contradictions between the examined guidelines. Especially striking is the fact that some guidelines allow the participants in clinical trials to be exposed to a risk of serious harm, while others do not. Finally, we try to show how the normative difference of each guideline could influence the decision of researchers or IRBs concerning the ethical acceptability of placebo-use.     

WHAT ‘EMPIRICAL TURN IN BIOETHICS’?

Uncertainty as to how we should articulate empirical data and normative reasoning seems to underlie most difficulties regarding the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics. This article examines three different ways in which we could understand ‘empirical turn’. Using real facts in normative reasoning is trivial and would not represent a ‘turn’. Becoming an empirical discipline through a shift to the social and neurosciences would be a turn away from normative thinking, which we should not take. Conducting empirical research to inform normative reasoning is the usual meaning given to the term ‘empirical turn’. In this sense, however, the turn is incomplete. Bioethics has imported methodological tools from empirical disciplines, but too often it has not imported the standards to which researchers in these disciplines are held. Integrating empirical and normative approaches also represents true added difficulties. Addressing these issues from the standpoint of debates on the fact‐value distinction can cloud very real methodological concerns by displacing the debate to a level of abstraction where they need not be apparent. Ideally, empirical research in bioethics should meet standards for empirical and normative validity similar to those used in the source disciplines for these methods, and articulate these aspects clearly and appropriately. More modestly, criteria to ensure that none of these standards are completely left aside would improve the quality of empirical bioethics research and partly clear the air of critiques addressing its theoretical justification, when its rigour in the particularly difficult context of interdisciplinarity is what should be at stake.     

Compensation and reparations for victims and bystanders of the U.S. Public Health Service research studies in Tuskegee and Guatemala: Who do we owe what?

Using the infamous research studies in Tuskegee and Guatemala, the article examines the difference between victims and bystanders. The victims can include families, sexual partners, and children not just the participants. There are also the bystanders in the populations who are affected, even vaguely, decades after the initial studies took place. Differing reparations for victims and bystanders through lawsuits and historical acknowledgments has to be part of broader discussions of historical justice, and the weighing of the impact of racism and imperial research endeavors.