At the Margins of Moral Personhood

In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view that only intrinsic psychological capacities are relevant to moral personhood: that is, that relational properties are generally not relevant. In addition, McMahan depends on an argument that species membership is irrelevant for moral consideration and a contention that privileging species membership is equivalent to a virulent nationalism (these will be discussed below). In consequence, the CSMR are excluded from moral personhood and their deaths are less significant as their killing is less wrong than that of persons. To throw doubt on McMahan’s conclusions about the moral status and wrongness of killing the CSMR I question the exclusive use of intrinsic properties in the metaphysics of personhood, the dismissal of the moral importance of species membership, and the example of virulent nationalism as an apt analogy. I also have a lot to say about McMahan’s empirical assumptions about the CSMR.     

The Social Value Requirement Reconsidered

It is widely assumed that it is ethical to conduct research with human subjects only if the research has social value. There are two standard arguments for this view. The allocation argument claims that public funds should not be devoted to research that lacks social value. The exploitation avoidance argument claims that subjects are exploited if research has no social value. The primary purpose of this article is to argue that these arguments do not succeed. The allocation argument has little relevance to commercial research. Social value is not necessary to avoid exploitation if subjects benefit from participation. Although the standard arguments for a social value requirement do not succeed, that view might be justified in a different way. It might be justified by appeal to the importance of social trust or the integrity of physician investigators. It is possible but doubtful that these arguments succeed.     

HUMAN GENE THERAPY: DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE?

The strength of a slippery slope argument is a matter of some dispute. Some see it as a reasonable argument pointing out what probably or inevitably follows from adopting some practice, others see it as essentially a fallacious argument. However, there seems to be a tendency emerging to say that in many cases, the argument is not actually fallacious, although it may be unsubstantiated. I shall not try to settle this general discussion, but merely seek to assess the strength of the slippery slope argument applied to human gene therapy. The structure of my argument will be the following. First, I shall distinguish between three different versions of the slippery slope argument; two logical versions and an empirical one. Next, I will address human gene therapy in terms of each of the three versions, partly relying on slippery slope arguments against this practice that have already surfaced in the literature. I shall argue that neither version pulls through. The logical versions fail primarily because relevant distinctions can be made between different uses of gene therapy, contrary to what the proponents of the arguments claim. The empirical version fails because there seems to be no evidence supporting the claim that we shall in fact slide down the slope if we engage in gene therapy, and because if we accepted the conclusion that we should not allow gene therapy on the basis of the empirical argument, we should have to make very far-reaching and undesirable modifications in health care in general, in order to be consistent. Or at least so I shall argue.     

Why test animals to treat humans? On the validity of animal models

Critics of animal modeling have advanced a variety of arguments against the validity of the practice. The point of one such form of argument is to establish that animal modeling is pointless and therefore immoral. In this article, critical arguments of this form are divided into three types, the pseudoscience argument, the disanalogy argument, and the predictive validity argument. I contend that none of these criticisms currently succeed, nor are they likely to. However, the connection between validity and morality is important, suggesting that critical efforts would be instructive if they addressed it in a more nuanced way.     

The Ashley Treatment: Improving Quality of Life or Infringing Dignity and Rights?

The ‘Ashley treatment’ (growth attenuation, removal of the womb and breasts buds of a severely disabled child) has raised much ethical controversy. This article starts from the observation that this debate suffers from a lack of careful philosophical analysis which is essential for an ethical assessment. I focus on two central arguments in the debate, namely an argument defending the treatment based on quality of life and an argument against the treatment based on dignity and rights. My analysis raises doubts as to whether these arguments, as they stand in the debate, are philosophically robust. I reconstruct what form good arguments for and against the treatment should take and which assumptions are needed to defend the according positions. Concerning quality of life (Section 2), I argue that to make a discussion about quality of life possible, it needs to be clear which particular conception of the good life is employed. This has not been sufficiently clear in the debate. I fill this lacuna. Regarding rights and dignity (section 3), I show that there is a remarkable absence of references to general philosophical theories of rights and dignity in the debate about the Ashley treatment. Consequently, this argument against the treatment is not sufficiently developed. I clarify how such an argument should proceed. Such a detailed analysis of arguments is necessary to clear up some confusions and ambiguities in the debate and to shed light on the dilemma that caretakers of severely disabled children face.     

‘You are inferior!’ Revisiting the expressivist argument

According to the expressivist argument the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. The argument has stirred a lively debate and has recently received renewed attention. This article starts with presenting the expressivist argument and its core elements. It then goes on to present and examine the counter‐arguments before it addresses some aspects that have gained surprisingly little attention. The analysis demonstrates that the expressivist argument has a wide range of underpinnings and that counter‐arguments tend to focus on only a few of these. It also reveals an important aspect that appears to have been ignored, i.e., that people do not select foetuses based on chromosomes or other biological traits, but based on characteristics of living persons with specific disabilities. This makes it more difficult to undermine the claim that negative selection of foetuses expresses a disvaluing of persons with such disabilities. It leaves the expressivist argument with a strong bite still.     

Teaching Scientific Core Ideas through Immersing Students in Argument: Using Density as an Example

Argumentation is one of the central practices in science learning and helps deepen students’ conceptual understanding. Students should learn how to communicate ideas including procedure tests, data interpretations, and investigation outcomes in verbal and written forms through argument structure. This article presents a negotiation model to show how argument can be a vehicle to drive students to learn core ideas of density. The negotiation model consists of five phases: (1) creating a testable question, (2) constructing an argument in groups, (3) critiquing arguments publicly, (4) advancing students’ arguments, and (5) writing and reflecting individually.     

Biodiversity is a chimera,and chimeras aren’t real

A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer (Biol Philos, 2017) provides compelling arguments that biodiversity is either a natural kind or a pragmatically-valid scientific entity. I call into question three of these arguments. The first argument contends that biodiversity is a Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC). I respond that there is no plausible homeostatic mechanism that would make biodiversity an HPC natural kind. The second argument proposes that biodiversity is a multiply-realizable functional kind. I respond that there is no shared function to ground this account. The final, and strongest, argument, is that biodiversity is an ineliminable explanans and explanandum in various subdisciplines of biology. I argue that once we look at the details of the relevant research, not only does biodiversity in a broad sense not function in explanatory roles, but we must eliminate biodiversity in favor of more specific concepts in order to make sense of the leading explanations in contemporary ecology and conservation science.     

‘Alive by default’: An exploration of Velleman’s unfair burdens argument against state sanctioned euthanasia

In this article we critically evaluate an argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia made by David Velleman in his 1992 paper ‘Against the right to die’. In that article, Velleman argues that legalizing euthanasia is morally problematic as it will deprive eligible patients of the opportunity of staying ‘alive by default’. That is to say, those patients who are rendered eligible for euthanasia as a result of legislative reform will face the burden of having to justify their continued existence to their epistemic peers if they are to be perceived as ‘reasonable’. We discuss potential criticisms that could be made of the argument, and consider how a defender of the view might respond. Velleman’s argument is particularly interesting as it is a consequentialist argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia, challenging the many consequentialist arguments that have been made in favour of legalizing the procedure. We conclude by suggesting that further research on the question of unfair burdens is important to adequately evaluating the potential harms of legalizing euthanasia for patients at the end of life.     

Safety, identity and consent: a limited defense of reproductive human cloning

Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally obligated to get either the actual consent or the presumed consent of the person to be conceived. In this article, I attempt to explain the appeal of such consent-based arguments as deriving from a mistaken view of personal identity. I then argue that since this view is false, such arguments are unsound. Finally, I argue that even if reproductive cloning is unsafe, it may still be morally permissible in some circumstances.     

Species,essence and explanation

Michael Devitt, 2008, Devitt, 2010 has argued that species have intrinsic essences. This paper rebuts Devitt’s arguments, but in so doing it shores up the anti-essentialist consensus in two ways that have more general interest. First, species membership can be explanatory even when species have no essences; that is, Tamsin’s membership of the tiger species can explain her stripyness, without this committing us to any further claim about essential properties of tigers. Second, even the views of species that appear most congenial to essentialism—namely phenetic and genotypic cluster accounts—do not entail strong forms of intrinsic essentialism.     

Ethical dimensions of therapeutic human cloning

Therapeutic human cloning has the potential significantly to reduce human suffering and enhance human happiness. This is the main ethical argument in its favour. The main ethical arguments against it centre on questions to do with the moral status of the human embryo. A subsidiary set of arguments arises from the connections between therapeutic human cloning and reproductive cloning. Most of the ethical questions concerning the status of the human embryo have long been examined in the context of abortion, though they are being re-examined in the context of genetic screening and embryo research. A consensus on such matters seems extremely unlikely to result in the near future. The current role of ethicists may not, therefore, be so much to attempt to produce a definitive answer to the question of the status of the human embryo at the very early developmental stages at which therapeutic human cloning would take place, but more to help clarify arguments and indicate the implications of particular approaches. That is what this paper seeks to do.     

Sustainability,Health, and the Human Population

A sustainable human population (e.g., range, density, and total numbers) is essential to health and in management. The notion of sustainability applies to all species and ecosystems and to the biosphere. Sustainability involves the health not only of individual humans, but also of ecosystems and other species. Thus, sustainability of the human population is important because of the wealth of factors involved: both the elements of systems it affects and those that contribute to its size. In this article, I address the sustainability of the human population on the basis of the argument that other species serve as examples of sustainability at the species level—an example of an application of systemic management that simultaneously accounts for complexity and achieves measurable health for individuals, species, and ecosystems. I conclude that the human population is two to four orders of magnitude larger than is optimally sustainable when compared with the populations of other mammalian species of similar body size and that this is a significant contributor to health problems for our species, other species, and ecosystems—a systemic pathology.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

The Question of a Dermohyal in Brachiopterygian Fishes

Since the turn of this century it has been suggested between whiles that brachiopterygians (i.e. the species of Polypterus and Calamoichthys) are actinopterygians. One of the arguments used recently by advocates of this widespread contention is the dermohyal, an exoskeletal branchial-arch element which they assert occurs in both groups. However, this argument has to be rejected: the dermohyal does not exist in brachiopterygian fishes. The writer proposes to maintain the view that brachiopterygians are not actinopterygians until better arguments to the contrary are forthcoming.     

Improving the justice-based argument for conducting human gene editing research to cure sickle cell disease

In a recent article, Marilyn Baffoe-Bonnie offers three arguments that conducting CRISPR/Cas9 biotechnology research to cure sickle cell disease (SCD) would help address historical and current injustices in SCD research and care. I will grant that the first argument is sound, but show that the second and third arguments suffer from roughly the same defect, which is that they really argue for something else rather than for conducting CRISPR/Cas9 research to cure SCD. I conclude that a better justice-based argument would use only Baffoe-Bonnie’s first argument.     

Social Responsibility and the State's Duty to provide Healthcare: An Islamic Ethico‐Legal Perspective

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights asserts that governments are morally obliged to promote health and to provide access to quality healthcare, essential medicines and adequate nutrition and water to all members of society. According to UNESCO, this obligation is grounded in a moral commitment to promoting fundamental human rights and emerges from the principle of social responsibility. Yet in an era of ethical pluralism and contentions over the universality of human rights conventions, the extent to which the UNESCO Declaration can motivate behaviors and policies rests, at least in part, upon accepting the moral arguments it makes. In this essay I reflect on a state's moral obligation to provide healthcare from the perspective of Islamic moral theology and law. I examine how Islamic ethico‐legal conceptual analogues for human rights and communal responsibility, ?uqūq al‐’ibād and far? al‐kifāyah and other related constructs might be used to advance a moral argument for healthcare provision by the state. Moving from theory to application, I next illustrate how notions of human rights and social responsibility were used by Muslim stakeholders to buttress moral arguments to support American healthcare reform. In this way, the paper advance discourses on a universal bioethics and common morality by bringing into view the concordances and discordances between Islamic ethico‐legal constructs and moral arguments advanced by transnational health policy advocates. It also provides insight into applied Islamic bioethics by demonstrating how Islamic ethico‐legal values might inform the discursive outputs of Muslim organizations.     

Conservation implications of the link between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning

The relationship between biodiversity and individual ecosystem processes is often asymptotic, saturating at relatively low levels, with some species contributing more strongly than others. This has cast doubt on arguments for conservation based on maintenance of the functioning of ecosystems. However, we argue that the link between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning is an important additional argument for conservation for several reasons. (1) Although species differ in importance to ecosystem processes, we do not believe that this argues for preservation of just a few species for two reasons: first, it is nearly impossible to identify all species important to the numerous systems and processes on which humans depend; second, the important species themselves may depend on an unknown number of other species in their communities. (2) Arguments for conservation based on ecosystem functioning are complementary to other utilitarian, ethical and aesthetic justifications. No single reason will convince all people or protect all species, however the combination produces a strong case for conservation of biodiversity. (3) Even if the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning is asymptotic at local spatial scales and in the short term, effects of biodiversity loss are likely to be important at larger temporal and spatial scales. (4) Initial arguments for the importance of biodiversity for ecosystem functioning were largely based on a precautionary approach (points 1-3). However, we are now moving to a scientific position based on accumulating experimental evidence. The future challenge is the integration of this scientific research with policy.     

Arguing from potential

Buckle's article is one of three discussing the potentiality of the human embryo in this issue of Bioethics devoted to the subject of embryo research. (See also Michael Lockwood's "Warnock v. Powell (and Harradine): when does potentiality count?" and Richard M. Hare's "When does potentiality count? A comment on Lockwood.") In his essay, Buckle analyzes some of the distinct ways of arguing about potential, and the different senses of potential on which these arguments rely. He also examines some of the criticisms of the argument from the potential and replies to them, and shows why the argument's protagonists and critics are often at cross-purposes.     

Killing, letting die and moral perception: a reply to Grant Gillett

A number of philosophers in recent times have employed arguments to show that there is no morally relevant difference between killing a patient and allowing that patient to die in those circumstances where the outcome is virtually identical and where death is preventable, at least for a significant time. From his perspective as both a philosopher and a clinician, Grant Gillett has rejected such general and abstract arguments in the light of the intuitions and moral perceptions available to clinicians and those who care for the terminally ill. I argue that his strategy fails, is massively question-begging, and that his appeal to the notion of 'moral particularism', far from being an alternative to cogent philosophical argument, actually supports the very position he has attempted to discredit.