Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Inbreeding depresses altruism in a cooperative society

In some animal species, individuals regularly breed with relatives, including siblings and parents. Given the high fitness costs of inbreeding, evolutionary biologists have found it challenging to understand the persistence of these inbred societies in nature. One appealing but untested explanation is that early life care may create a benign environment that offsets inbreeding depression, allowing inbred societies to evolve. We test this possibility using 21 years of data from a wild cooperatively breeding mammal, the banded mongoose, a species where almost one in ten young result from close inbreeding. We show that care provided by parents and alloparents mitigates inbreeding depression for early survival. However, as adults, inbred individuals provide less care, reducing the amount of help available to the next generation. Our results suggest that inbred cooperative societies are rare in nature partly because the protective care that enables elevated levels of inbreeding can be reduced by inbreeding depression.     

The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension

Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesized that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed ‘parochial altruism’, is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against the out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of ‘parochial altruism’. After a brief synopsis of the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future.     

Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games

Explaining unconditional cooperation, such as donations to charities or contributions to public goods, continues to present a problem. One possibility is that cooperation can pay through developing a reputation that makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (CA) or reputation-based partner choice. Here, we show, to our knowledge, for the first time, that investing in a cooperative reputation can bring net benefits through access to more cooperative partners. Participants played a public goods game (PGG) followed by an opportunity to select a partner for a second cooperative game. We found that those who gave more in the PGG were more often selected as desired partners and received more in the paired cooperative game. Reputational competition was even stronger when it was possible for participants to receive a higher payoff from partner choice. The benefits of being selected by a more cooperative partner outweighed the costs of cooperation in the reputation building phase. CA therefore provides an alternative to indirect reciprocity as an explanation for reputation-building behaviour. Furthermore, while indirect reciprocity depends upon individuals giving preference to those of good standing, CA can explain unconditional cooperation.     

A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism

We present a simple framework that highlights the most fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism: assortment between individuals carrying the cooperative genotype and the helping behaviours of others with which these individuals interact. We partition the fitness effects on individuals into those due to self and those due to the 'interaction environment', and show that it is the latter that is most fundamental to understanding the evolution of altruism. We illustrate that while kinship or genetic similarity among those interacting may generate a favourable structure of interaction environments, it is not a fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism, and even suicidal aid can theoretically evolve without help ever being exchanged among genetically similar individuals. Using our simple framework, we also clarify a common confusion made in the literature between alternative fitness accounting methods (which may equally apply to the same biological circumstances) and unique causal mechanisms for creating the assortment necessary for altruism to be favoured by natural selection.     

The evolution of extreme altruism and inequality in insect societies

In eusocial organisms, some individuals specialize in reproduction and others in altruistic helping. The evolution of eusociality is, therefore, also the evolution of remarkable inequality. For example, a colony of honeybees (Apis mellifera) may contain 50 000 females all of whom can lay eggs. But 100 per cent of the females and 99.9 per cent of the males are offspring of the queen. How did such extremes evolve? Phylogenetic analyses show that high relatedness was almost certainly necessary for the origin of eusociality. However, even the highest family levels of kinship are insufficient to cause the extreme inequality seen in e.g. honeybees via ‘voluntary altruism’. ‘Enforced altruism’ is needed, i.e. social pressures that deter individuals from attempting to reproduce. Coercion acts at two stages in an individual''s life cycle. Queens are typically larger so larvae can be coerced into developing into workers by being given less food. Workers are coerced into working by ‘policing’, in which workers or the queen eat worker-laid eggs or aggress fertile workers. In some cases, individuals rebel, such as when stingless bee larvae develop into dwarf queens. The incentive to rebel is strong as an individual is the most closely related to its own offspring. However, because individuals gain inclusive fitness by rearing relatives, there is also a strong incentive to ‘acquiesce’ to social coercion. In a queenright honeybee colony, the policing of worker-laid eggs is very effective, which results in most workers working instead of attempting to reproduce. Thus, extreme altruism is due to both kinship and coercion. Altruism is frequently seen as a Darwinian puzzle but was not a puzzle that troubled Darwin. Darwin saw his difficulty in explaining how individuals that did not reproduce could evolve, given that natural selection was based on the accumulation of small heritable changes. The recognition that altruism is an evolutionary puzzle, and the solution was to wait another 100 years for William Hamilton.     

Selfish altruism,fierce cooperation and the predator*

This paper suggests a new way to think about a famous question: what explains cooperation in nature and in particular in humans? I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two ‘teammates’ in the presence of a predator (passing and shooting in two-on-one situations) is one of the fundamental conceptual building-blocks for understanding these phenomena because in such a situation the fact that life is packaged in many distinct enclosures (and not in one big monolithic blob) can unfold its comparative advantage. I show how, in the presence of a predator, cooperative equilibria emerge among entirely selfish teammates if we infinitesimally bias the lead player in the selfish direction or assign a computational burden on the predator due to the presence of a teammate. I argue that ‘predators’ are common in the biological jungle but also in everyday human settings. Intuitively, this paper builds on the simple idea – a familiar one to a biologist observing the natural world but perhaps less so to social scientists – that everybody has enemies.     

An inclusive fitness analysis of altruism on a cyclical network

A recent model studies the evolution of cooperation on a network, and concludes with a result connecting the benefits and costs of interactions and the number of neighbours. Here, an inclusive fitness analysis is conducted of the only case solved analytically, of a cycle, and the identical result is obtained. This brings the result within a biologically familiar framework. It is notable that the benefits and costs in the inclusive fitness framework need to be derived, and are not the benefits and costs that are the parameters in the original model. The relatedness is a quadratic function of position in a cycle of size N: an individual is related by 1 to itself, by (N - 5)/(N + 1) to an immediate neighbour, and by very close to -1/2 to the most distant individuals. The inclusive fitness analysis explains hitherto puzzling features of the results.     

Sex-linked altruism: A stepping-stone in the evolution of social behavior?

A verbal model is presented for a mechanism that enhances the probability of the evolution of altruism in diploids if the gene for altruism arises on the X chromosome. If the altruism takes place between sibs of the homogametic sex, the condition for spread of a sex-linked gene for altruism is less stringent than for an autosomal gene. Then, with altruistic behavior present, selection for increased efficiency (benefit/cost ratio) may raise the efficiency above the autosomal threshold before autosomal modifiers are widespread enough to eliminate the behavior. The results of computer simulations confirms that, if the initial benefit/cost ratio is lower than 2, sex-linkage can make the evolution of altruism more likely.     

Grooming and agonistic support: a meta-analysis of primate reciprocal altruism

Grooming and agonistic support are 2 common primate behaviorsthat have been hypothesized to constitute examples of reciprocalaltruism. In particular, because primates often direct theirgrooming up the dominance hierarchy, it has been suggested thatthey may exchange grooming for agonistic support. Empiricaltests of this hypothesis have resulted in highly inconsistentfindings. I synthesized the published literature on the relationbetween grooming and agonistic support in primates using modernmeta-analytical techniques. A meta-analysis of 36 studies carriedout on 14 different species showed that a significant positiverelation exists between grooming and agonistic support (weightedaverage r = 0.154, corrected for publication bias). These findingssuggest that grooming and agonistic support may have evolvedas part of a system of low-cost reciprocal altruism. They alsohighlight the potential of meta-analysis in tackling the studyof behavioral phenomena characterized by low overall frequencyand small effect sizes.     

Testing kin altruism in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) in a food-sharing experiment

Social grooming and coalition formation have been main foci in studies concerning altruism in monkeys. Results have been inconclusive because the altruistic nature of these behaviors remains unclear. I investigated altruism in a more transparent context via an apparatus in which captive long-tailed macaque females had the choice to exploit a food source themselves or to yield the food to a test partner. I hypothesized that if potential donors behaved altruistically toward kin, they would yield the food sources longer to kin than to nonkin. Of 11 tested potential donors, 8 did not discriminate between daughters or sisters and nonkin. Thus, the experiments do not support the kin altruism hypothesis. Three females let their youngest offspring have more food than matched juvenile nonrelatives. Behavioral observations strongly suggested,however, that it was primarily spiteful behavior toward juvenile nonrelatives that caused the differences between kin and nonkin in these three cases.     

A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism

The study of reciprocal altruism, or the exchange of goods and services between individuals, requires attention to both evolutionary explanations and proximate mechanisms. Evolutionary explanations have been debated at length, but far less is known about the proximate mechanisms of reciprocity. Our own research has focused on the immediate causes and contingencies underlying services such as food sharing, grooming, and cooperation in brown capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Employing both observational and experimental techniques, we have come to distinguish three types of reciprocity. Symmetry-based reciprocity is cognitively the least complex form, based on symmetries inherent in dyadic relationships (e.g., mutual association, kinship). Attitudinal reciprocity, which is more cognitively complex, is based on the mirroring of social attitudes between partners and is exhibited by both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Finally, calculated reciprocity, the most cognitively advanced form, is based on mental scorekeeping and is found only in humans and possibly chimpanzees. Sarah F. Brosnan is a graduate student in the Population Biology, Ecology, and Evolution Program at Emory University. Her interests include proximate mechanisms of cooperation and reciprocity in primates, and social learning in primates and other species. Frans B. M. de Waal is the C. H. Candler Professor of Psychology and the director of the Living Links Center at Emory University. His interests include social behavior and cognition of monkeys and apes, and their relevance for questions on the evolution of human politics, economy, morality, and culture.     

The adaptive dynamics of altruism in spatially heterogeneous populations

Abstract.— We study the spatial adaptive dynamics of a continuous trait that measures individual investment in altruism. Our study is based on an ecological model of a spatially heterogeneous population from which we derive an appropriate measure of fitness. The analysis of this fitness measure uncovers three different selective processes controlling the evolution of altruism: the direct physiological cost, the indirect genetic benefits of cooperative interactions, and the indirect genetic costs of competition for space. In our model, habitat structure and a continuous life cycle makes the cost of competing for space with relatives negligible. Our study yields a classification of adaptive patterns of altruism according to the shape of the costs of altruism (with decelerating, linear, or accelerating dependence on the investment in altruism). The invasion of altruism occurs readily in species with accelerating costs, but large mutations are critical for altruism to evolve in selfish species with decelerating costs. Strict selfishness is maintained by natural selection only under very restricted conditions. In species with rapidly accelerating costs, adaptation leads to an evolutionarily stable rate of investment in altruism that decreases smoothly with the level of mobility. A rather different adaptive pattern emerges in species with slowly accelerating costs: high altruism evolves at low mobility, whereas a quasi-selfish state is promoted in more mobile species. The high adaptive level of altruism can be predicted solely from habitat connectedness and physiological parameters that characterize the pattern of cost. We also show that environmental changes that cause increased mobility in those highly altruistic species can beget selection-driven self-extinction, which may contribute to the rarity of social species.     

The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species'' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour.     

Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting

We examined the effect of an image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box used to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room. People paid nearly three times as much for their drinks when eyes were displayed rather than a control image. This finding provides the first evidence from a naturalistic setting of the importance of cues of being watched, and hence reputational concerns, on human cooperative behaviour.     

Selfishness and altruism can coexist when help is subject to diminishing returns

Altruism and selfishness are 30-50% heritable in man in both Western and non-Western populations. This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation. In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and satisfies the condition known as Hamilton's rule. This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the ratio of the benefit of receiving help to the cost of giving it exceeds a value that depends on the relatedness of the individuals involved. Standard analyses assume that the benefit provided by each individual is the same but it is plausible in some cases that as more individuals contribute, help is subject to diminishing returns. We analyse this situation using a single-locus two-allele model of selection in a diploid population with the altruistic allele dominant to the selfish allele. The analysis requires calculation of the relationship between the fitnesses of the genotypes and the frequencies of the genes. The fitnesses vary not only with the genotype of the individual but also with the distribution of phenotypes amongst the sibs of the individual and this depends on the genotypes of his parents. These calculations are not possible by direct fitness or ESS methods but are possible using population genetics. Our analysis shows that diminishing returns change the operation of natural selection and the outcome can now be a stable equilibrium between altruistic and selfish alleles rather than the elimination of one allele or the other. We thus provide a plausible genetic model of kin selection that leads to the stable coexistence in the same population of both altruistic and selfish individuals. This may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.     

Altruism in networks: the effect of connections

Why are individuals altruistic to their friends? Theory suggests that individual, relationship and network factors will all influence the levels of altruism; but to date, the effects of social network structure have received relatively little attention. The present study uses a novel correlational design to test the prediction that an individual will be more altruistic to friends who are well-connected to the individual''s other friends. The result shows that, as predicted, even when controlling for a range of individual and relationship factors, the network factor (number of connections) makes a significant contribution to altruism, thus showing that individuals are more likely to be altruistic to better-connected members of their social networks. The implications of incorporating network structure into studies of altruism are discussed.     

Stalk size and altruism investment within and among populations of the social amoeba

Reproductive division of labour is common in many societies, including those of eusocial insects, cooperatively breeding vertebrates, and most forms of multicellularity. However, conflict over what is best for the individual vs. the group can prevent an optimal division of labour from being achieved. In the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, cells aggregate to become multicellular and a fraction behaves altruistically, forming a dead stalk that supports the rest. Theory suggests that intra‐organismal conflict over spore–stalk cell fate can drive rapid evolutionary change in allocation traits, leading to polymorphisms within populations or rapid divergence between them. Here, we assess several proxies for stalk size and spore–stalk allocation as metrics of altruism investment among strains and across geographic regions. We observe geographic divergence in stalk height that can be partly explained by differences in multicellular size, as well as variation among strains in clonal spore–stalk allocation, suggesting within‐population variation in altruism investment. Analyses of chimeras comprised of strains from the same vs. different populations indicated genotype‐by‐genotype epistasis, where the morphology of the chimeras deviated significantly from the average morphology of the strains developed clonally. The significantly negative epistasis observed for allopatric pairings suggests that populations are diverging in their spore–stalk allocation behaviours, generating incompatibilities when they encounter one another. Our results demonstrate divergence in microbial social traits across geographically separated populations and demonstrate how quantification of genotype‐by‐genotype interactions can elucidate the trajectory of social trait evolution in nature.