Introduction to “Moral (and Other) Laboratories”

“Moral (and other) laboratories” is a special issue that draws on Cheryl Mattingly’s notion of the “moral laboratory” to explore the uncanny interface between laboratory ethnography and moral anthropology, and to examine the relationship between experience and experiment. We ask whether laboratory work may provoke new insights about experimental practices in other social spaces such as homes, clinics, and neighborhoods, and conversely, whether the study of morality may provoke new insights about laboratory practices as they unfold in the day-to-day interactions between test tubes, animals, apparatuses, scientists, and technicians. The papers in this collection examine issues unique to authors’ individual projects, but as a whole, they share a common theme: moral experimentation—the work of finding different ways of relating—occurs in relation to the suffering of something or someone, or in response to some kind of moral predicament that tests cultural and historically shaped “human values.” The collection as a whole intends to push for the theoretical status of not merely experience itself, but also of possibility, in exploring uncertain border zones of various kinds—between the human and the animal, between codified ethical rules and ordinary ethics, and between “real” and metaphorical laboratories.     

The Moral Lives of Laboratory Monkeys: Television and the Ethics of Care

Why do lab monkeys watch TV? This essay examines the preponderance of televisions in primate housing units based in academic research laboratories. Within such labs, television and related visual media are glossed as part-and-parcel of welfare or species-specific enrichment practices intended for research monkeys, a logic that is simultaneously historically- and ontologically-based. In many research centers, television figures prominently in the two inseparable domains of a lab monkey’s life: as a research tool employed during experiments, and in housing units where captive monkeys are said to enjoy watching TV during “down time.” My purpose is not to determine whether monkeys do indeed enjoy, or need, television; rather, I employ visual media as a means to uncover, and decipher, the moral logic of an ethics of care directed specifically at highly sentient creatures who serve as human proxies in a range of experimental contexts. I suggest that this specialized ethics of animal care materializes Mattingly’s notion of “moral laboratories” (Mattingly in Moral laboratories: family peril and the struggle for a good life, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2014), where television mediates the troublesome boundary of species difference among the simian and human subjects who cohabit laboratory worlds.     

The Tipping of the Big Stone—And Life itself. Obesity,Moral Work and Responsive Selves Over Time

Why is “everything I know is the right thing to do a million miles removed from what I do in reality?” This question posed by Rita, my main interlocutor and friend in a fieldwork that started in 2001–2003 and was taken up again in 2014–2015, opens up an exploration of moral work and moral selves in the context of the obesity epidemic and weight loss processes. I address these questions through the notion of “moral laboratories” taking up Mattingly’s argument that moral cultivation over time cannot be disconnected from a notion of self. Mattingly has consistently argued for a biographical and narrative self, which is processual and created in community. Along these lines, and by recourse to the German philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenology, I will propose the notion of a responsive self. The responsive self highlights the eventness of ongoing experimentation against the odds and captures equally pathic and agentive dimensions of a self that both persists and is transformed over time.     

A strategy to end parole dependency

This article explores the moral, political, economic and philosophical reasons for the expansion of the prisoner re-entry industry in the United States over the last several years. Tracing the influence of the military-industrial-prison complex and its mindset of “crackpot-cynical” realism rooted in a fear-based model of human nature, it argues that the very system and policies set up to control the “problem” of crime has led to an exacerbation of it, creating an ever-expanding, permanent “industry” that has traumatized both ‘ruler and ruled’ in a never-ending cycle of pain, mistrust, moral numbness and dysfunctional dependency. The article attempts to unite political and spiritual progressives and begin the mobilization necessary for radical structural and moral changes harkening back to the dissensus politics and ‘spiritual toughness’ of the civil rights and welfare rights tradition of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.     

Choosing between the Emotional Dog and the Rational Pal: A Moral Dilemma with a Tail

ABSTRACT

Neuroscientific studies indicate moral cognition involves a cognitive struggle between two systems in the brain: the emotional “hot” system and the rational “cold” system. Past research has shown that when presented with personal dilemmas, individuals showed greater brain activity in the hot system areas. However, when further probed about their decisions, moral dumbfounding often occurs. Family selection may help explain moral judgments. Oftentimes, people consider their pets as part of their family. Based on the past research on moral decision-making, the current study presented a novel approach to exploring moral decision-making by forcing participants to choose to save the life between biological family and psychological-kin. Participants (n = 573) were given moral dilemmas and forced to decide whether to save humans or pets from imminent death. The level of relationship between the human shifted six times (foreign tourist, hometown stranger, distant cousin, best friend, grandparent, and sibling), while relationship to the pet had two levels (your pet, someone else's pet). Willingness to save a pet over a human consistently decreased as level of relationship between the participant and the human in the scenario increased. Participants were also more likely to save their own pet over a human life than someone else's pet over a human life. The results suggest that pets are often viewed as psychological-kin. Females were found to be more likely to save their pets over non-immediate family members than males (all ps < 0.05), suggesting that males and females may differ in the structure of their moral reasoning.     

Women’s empowerment and rural revolution: rethinking “failed development”

One of the most frequently advanced explanations of the Maoists’ popularity in rural Nepal links dissatisfaction with the State to forms of consciousness and changes in expectations that are products and processes of development. Such theories often attribute popular support for the insurrection to frustrated desires stemming from “failed” or “incomplete” development. Against this, others suggest that it was the very “success” of empowerment programs which aimed to raise participants’ consciousness of oppression and its roots that inspired villagers to embrace revolutionary action. This paper argues that, despite their differences, both hypotheses reflect assumptions about gendered selfhood and political action that limit their recognition of what motivates Maoist sympathies. Extended research with women in Gorkha—a district where female support for the rebels is said to be especially strong—reveals that Gorkhali women’s support for the rebels is not inspired primarily by the desire for greater autonomy, choice or absolute liberation from social constraints, all of which ideals valorize a culturally specific vision of individual agency. Rather, women there report a sense of self that defines itself through social relations and commitments and which values the common good over individual self-interest, which they associate with an unjust state. The disjuncture between Gorkhali women’s own understandings of self and society and prevailing theories of what motivates people to rebel highlights the modernist assumptions that underlie—and potentially distort—otherwise diverse scholarly perspectives. Likewise, it implies that rebellions may be less about consciousness and more about morality than either “failed” or “successful” theories presume.     

The Play is Now Reality: Affective Turns, Narrative Struggles, and Theorizing Emotion as Practical Experience

Discursive approaches to subjectivity have been critiqued most recently for its dismissal of a living body that moves and senses. While identity as performative has proven invaluable to contemporary cultural theory for its dynamic conceptualization of power in everyday practice, the emergence of what some scholars have named an “affective turn” has prompted calls for configuring the body as more than a complex set of significations, but also a vibrant energy field in perpetual emergence. Centered on an enacted story created by two clinical therapists and two South Asian immigrant domestic violence survivors during a therapeutic support group session, this paper brings the affective turn into dialog with narrative theory. I juxtapose two different readings of this clinical “performance.” One interpretation recognizes affect theory’s value for highlighting sensation and the virtual in moments of transformation. Nonetheless I argue it overlooks a lived history. Thus, using a specifically dramatistic approach to narrative, the second analysis stresses the importance of personal experience and meaning-making in strengthening the link between affect and subjectivity. In doing so, the case study also argues for emotion’s critical link to practical and moral experience.     

Engaging with Dementia: Moral Experiments in Art and Friendship

The box-office as well as critical success of the 2014 major motion picture Still Alice, starring Julianne Moore in the title role and based on the bestselling novel of the same name by the Harvard-trained neuroscientist Lisa Genova (Still Alice. Simon & Schuster, New York, 2009), marked an important moment in public cultural representations of people with dementia. Still Alice tells the story of Alice Howland, an eminent scientist whose increasing memory lapses are eventually diagnosed as early-onset Alzheimer’s, and chronicles the transformations in her family relationships as her husband and three children respond to her decline in different ways. Alice’s husband, her son, and her older daughter all respond by turning toward science, while her younger daughter Lydia seeks to engage her mother as she is now, and turns toward art and relationships. Taking Still Alice and the figure of Lydia as an entry point, I discuss arts-focused efforts to improve the lives of people with dementia, and draw upon ongoing interview-based research on the topic of dementia and friendship, to offer an account of some of the ways that people I have spoken with are actively experimenting with art and with relationships in the face of dementia. I argue that these efforts can be understood as “moral experiements,” in the sense articulated by Cheryl Mattingly (Moral Laboratories: Family Peril and the Struggle for a Good Life. University of California Press, Berkeley, 2014). Although Lydia is a fictional character, her response to Alice’s dementia points toward the kinds of moral experimentation that are in fact possible, and quietly being practiced, by ordinary people every day.     

Diving down: ritual healing in the tale of The Blind Man and the Loon

Some stories enjoy a very widespread distribution in the North. Anthropologists and folklorists have long collected and analyzed these stories, and scrutinized their regional variants. Craig Mishler taps into this longstanding scholarly tradition as he looks at the widespread story of “The Blind Man and the Loon.” However, he goes beyond analyzing the form of this tale to explore what gives it healing properties. He wants to know why this story has become part of virtually every Native storyteller’s repertoire throughout the Arctic and Subarctic. One answer is that the main character and events of the story evoke the undeserved suffering that shapes the human condition everywhere. Much of the story’s power stems from its depiction of a ritual for healing the handicapped, thereby becoming a medicinal oral text. Additional power comes from the wide range of local and regional forms that adapt it to local sensibilities.     

Intersexual Births: The Epistemology of Sex and Ethics of Sex Assignment

This article aims to analyse a possible manner of approaching the birth of intersexual children. We start out by summing up what intersexuality is and how it is faced in the dominant clinical practice (the “treatment paradigm”). We then argue against this paradigm, in favour of a postponement of genital surgery. In the second part of this paper, we take into consideration the general question of whether only two existing sexes are to be recognized, arguing in favour of an expansion of sex categories. In the third part, we illustrate the reasons supporting provisional sex attribution: the child’s best interest and respect for their developing moral autonomy. This position aims to increase the child’s well-being and self-determination, limiting parents’ freedom to take decisions on behalf of others, in particular, those decisions concerning basic aspects of their children’s personal identity.     

The Issues of Freedom and Happiness in Moral Bioenhancement: Continuing the Debate With a Reply to Harris Wiseman

During the previous years, Harris Wiseman has devoted substantial attention to my stance on voluntary moral bioenhancement. He argued that he has been influenced by that position, but nonetheless criticized it. I haven’t replied to his criticisms yet and wish to do so now. One of the reasons is to avoid my position being misrepresented. By replying to Wiseman’s criticisms, I also wish to clarify those issues in my standpoint that might have given rise to some of the misinterpretations. With the same purpose in mind, I will demarcate my concept of voluntary moral bioenhancement from related standpoints, in particular from Persson and Savulescu’s notion of compulsory moral bioenhancement that, as I argued, diminishes our freedom (of the will). Furthermore, I will consider the possibility of adding another essential element to my position—one that I have not discussed in my earlier publications. It is designed to propose a novel explanation of why humans would be motivated to opt for voluntary moral bioenhancement if its outcome is not a lowering of the likelihood of “Ultimate Harm” (as defined by Persson and Savulescu) or a milder form of self-destruction of humanity. This explanation will be based on the conception that an increase in happiness, rather than Ultimate Harm prevention, might be the grounding rationale for moral bioenhancement.     

Parental Moral Distress and Moral Schism in the Neonatal ICU

Ethical dilemmas in critical care may cause healthcare practitioners to experience moral distress: incoherence between what one believes to be best and what occurs. Given that paediatric decision-making typically involves parents, we propose that parents can also experience moral distress when faced with making value-laden decisions in the neonatal intensive care unit. We propose a new concept—that parents may experience “moral schism”—a genuine uncertainty regarding a value-based decision that is accompanied by emotional distress. Schism, unlike moral distress, is not caused by barriers to making and executing a decision that is deemed to be best by the decision-makers but rather an encounter of significant internal struggle. We explore factors that appear to contribute to both moral distress and “moral schism” for parents: the degree of available support, a sense of coherence of the situation, and a sense of responsibility. We propose that moral schism is an underappreciated concept that needs to be explicated and may be more prevalent than moral distress when exploring decision-making experiences for parents. We also suggest actions of healthcare providers that may help minimize parental “moral schism” and moral distress.     

Autism Crises: Music Therapeutic Practice & Research at the Social Care Centre Tloskov,Czech Republic. A Short Report

CSS Tloskov is a social pediatric care center and a leading institution in the Czech Republic. Sixty-five percent of its clients are diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and receive usually music therapy as a main constituent of individually designed pedagogical and therapeutic programs. In contrast to numerous music therapeutic concepts that are based on musical improvisation, the Tloskov model advocates a complex approach involving favorite songs, instrumental improvisation, and body-oriented modalities such as muscle relaxation and breathing techniques.

Clinical analyses allow us to distinguish typical psychiatric exacerbations in our ASD-clients. These “autistic crises” comprise an “onset phase,” a “gradation phase,” a “culmination phase,” and a “subsiding phase,” which can be partly controlled by music therapeutic interventions. On the basis of Grounded Theory we used qualitative methods to examine system compatibility between clinical data and the 4-phase autism crisis theory and to generate hypotheses about mechanisms of successful music therapy.

Outcomes involve five main principles: identification and avoidance of specific stimuli and cues that trigger autism crises; direct musical “sedation”; acquisition of music-behavioral skills to “auto-regulate” pathological developments; and a sort of music therapeutic emotional re-balancing and consolidation of an inner equilibrium. The “right moment” of intervention and adjustment of musical experiences within a narrow range of the client’s aesthetic-emotional intensity tolerance are critical to therapeutic outcomes. Possible music therapeutic contra-indications have to be taken into consideration.     

Curing “Moral Disability”: Brain Trauma and Self-Control in Victorian Science and Fiction

While, historically, the disabled body has appeared in literature as “monstrous,” burgeoning psychological theories of the Victorian period predicated an unusual shift. In a culture of sexual anxiety and fears of devolution and moral decay, the physically disabled and “weak” are portrayed as strangely free from moral corruption. Unlike the cultural link between deviance and disability witnessed in the medical literature and eugenic approach to generation, authors of narrative fiction—particularly Charles Dickens, but Wilkie Collins, Charlotte Yonge, and others as well—portray disabled characters as “purified,” and trauma itself as potentially sanitizing. This present paper argues that such constructions were made possible by developments in the treatment of insanity. “Curing ‘Moral Disability’: Brain Trauma and Self-Control in Victorian Fiction,” examines the concept of trauma-as-cure. Throughout the Victorian period, case studies on brain trauma appeared in widely circulated journals like the Lancet, concurrently with burgeoning theories about psychological disturbance and “moral insanity.” While not widely practiced until the early twentieth century, attempts at surgical “cures” aroused curiosity and speculation—the traumatic event that could free sufferers from deviance. This work provides a unique perspective on representations of disability as cure in the nineteenth century as a means of giving voice to the marginalized, disabled, and disempowered.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Beyond V40.31</Emphasis>: Narrative Phenomenology of Wandering in Autism and Dementia

Research on autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and on Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and other types of dementia describes a behaviour called ‘wandering’, a term that denotes movement through space lacking intention or exact destination, as when a person is disoriented or not self-aware. In the U.S., ‘wandering’ in both ASD and AD has been examined mostly from a management and prevention perspective. It prioritizes safety while primarily overlooking personal experiences of those who ‘wander’ and their families, thus limiting the range of potentially effective strategies to address this issue. Communicative challenges faced by many people diagnosed with ASD and AD further obscure the experiential, existential aspects of ‘wandering’. This article reflects an increasing concern of social science scholars interested in whether and how the conceptual and practical strategies to address ‘wandering’ are informed by the situated experiences of people with cognitive and developmental disabilities and their families. We examine ‘wandering’ at the intersections of personal experience, family life, clinical practice, public health policy, and legislation, as a conceptually rich site where notions of personhood, subjectivity, intentionality, and quality of life powerfully and consequentially converge to impact the lives of many people with ASD and AD, and their families. We draw upon critical autism studies describing how attributions of personhood, subjectivity, intentionality, rational agency, and moral autonomy of people with ASD have been contingent upon the norms and conventions governing movement of the human body through space (Hilton, Afr Am Rev 50(2):221–235, 2017). When this movement is deemed aberrant, the person may be construed as irrational, a danger to self because of a lack of self-awareness, and a danger to others because of a lack of empathy. These attributions put the person at risk of being excluded from the considerations and, more importantly, the obligations of the ‘moral community’ to ensure that he or she has a ‘good human life’ (Barnbaum, The Ethics of Autism: Among Them but not of Them. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2008; Silvers and Francis, Metaphilosophy 40(3/4):475–498, 2009). Using ethnographic, narrative phenomenological (Mattingly, The Paradox of Hope: Journeys through a Clinical Borderland. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), and medical humanities (Charon, JAMA 286:1897–1902, 2001; Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) approaches, we examine multiple perspectives on ‘wandering’ in ASD and AD across narrative discourse genres, institutional contexts, and media of representation. We argue for an extension of the prevention and management view to focus not only on safety but also on what phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1962) called “having a world” (p. 146). The analysis is intended to inform clinical practice, policy and public health efforts to enhance understanding of first and second person perspectives on ‘wandering’ in order to improve the participation and quality of life of people with ASD and AD who ‘wander’, and their families.     

Ethnographic Note on Nation: Narratives and Symbols of the Early Post-socialist Nationalism in Lithuania

In the late 1980s and early 1990s Lithuania experienced the nationalist upheaval, which epitomized in the break up from the Soviet Union in 1990. Narratives and symbols were constitutive of the nationalist movement. “Nation” — the master symbol of that time — was reproduced in relation to the symbols of “the West,” and “the East,” as well as through the different values implied in “the West” and “the East” symbolism. Nationalist narratives reconstructed history and memory, reevaluated the present of the “reborn” nation, and drew the paths for the transition. Symbols and narratives were significant in mobilizing popular opinion, creating models for identity and action, and expressing moral and legitimate stances. They were a primary mechanism by which ideologies and cultural stances were shaped and maintained during the nationalist upheaval. In early 1990s the “nation” was redefined in the context of the Western tradition which was essential in communicating with the European countries and distancing from the former Soviet Union.     

“Pensando Mucho” (“Thinking Too Much”): Embodied Distress Among Grandmothers in Nicaraguan Transnational Families

In this paper, I describe an embodied form of emotional distress expressed by Nicaraguan grandmothers caring for children of migrant mothers, “pensando mucho” (“thinking too much”). I draw on ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured exploratory interviews about pensando mucho conducted with grandmother heads-of-household to show the cultural significance of this complaint within the context of women’s social roles as caregivers in transnational families. Adopting an interpretive and meaning-centered approach, I analyze the cultural significance of pensando mucho as expressed through women’s narratives about the impacts of mother outmigration on their personal and family lives. I show how women use pensando mucho to express the moral ambivalence of economic remittances and the uncertainty surrounding migration, particularly given cultural values for “unity” and “solidarity” in Nicaraguan family life. I also discuss the relationship between pensando mucho and dolor de cerebro (“brainache”) as a way of documenting the relationship between body/mind, emotional distress, and somatic suffering. The findings presented here suggest that further research on “thinking too much” is needed to assess whether this idiom is used by women of the grandmother generation in other cultural contexts to express embodied distress in relation to broader social transformations.     

Morgan’s Canon, meet Hume’s Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons

How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities to an exaggerated sense of typical human performance. I dub this error “anthropofabulation”, since it combines anthropocentrism with confabulation about our own prowess. Anthropofabulation has long distorted the debate about animal minds, but it is a bias that has been little discussed and against which the Canon provides no protection. Luckily, there is a venerable corrective against anthropofabulation: a principle offered long ago by David Hume, which I call “Hume’s Dictum”. In this paper, I argue that Hume’s Dictum deserves a privileged place next to Morgan’s Canon in the methodology of comparative psychology, illustrating my point through a discussion of the debate over Theory of Mind in nonhuman animals.     

Carnivores,Colonization, and Conflict: A Qualitative Case Study on the Intersectional Persecution of Predators and People in Namibia

Nonhuman carnivores have historically been demonized, lethally controlled, and extirpated throughout many parts of the world—indeed, they bear the brunt of this in some places still today. To understand why this is still occurring, it is important to appreciate the historical events that have shaped and led to this situation. We use a qualitative case study in Namibia that draws on an archival review and eight months of ethnography to describe the widespread control of nonhuman carnivores in the country, from the 1800s to the present day. Calling upon Val Plumwood’s eco-feminist typology of domination of the “Other,” and integrating it with current advances in inter- sectional theory, we explain the apparent parallels in this process of domi- nation of Namibian nonhuman predators alongside its Indigenous peoples by European settlers. We discuss the process of colonization of predators and people, highlighting how perceived power differentials provided an ideal situation to dominate these presumed “Others.” We conclude with a number of recommendations that could begin to reconcile conflicts between people and predators, and between different groups of people.     

Big men and the conversational marketplace of Tanna (Vanuatu)

“Big men” in different parts of Melanesia achieve political status by various means. However, all big men possess a reputation—a “big name.” Reputations grow or decline as people talk. Big men acquire renown by meeting the costs of the “conversational marketplace,” to use Randall Collins’ term. Some of these costs are systemic, given by the local mode of communication; others are discursive, related to cultural rules for producing authentic talk. This paper describes the conversational costs of acquiring renown on Tanna, Vanuatu. It traces how Nampas, who emerged as a leader of the John Frum movement, made his name by investing in the island's conversational marketplace.