Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

According to some recent arguments, (Joyce in The evolution of morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006; Ruse and Wilson in Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995; Street in Philos Studies 127: 109–166, 2006) if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, (a) the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and (b) the claim (or a certain interpretation of the claim) that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might.     

The role of theology in current evolutionary reasoning

A remarkable but little studied aspect of current evolutionary theory is the use by many biologists and philosophers of theological arguments for evolution. These can be classed under two heads: imperfection arguments, in which some organic design is held to be inconsistent with God's perfection and wisdom, and homology arguments, in which some pattern of similarity is held to be inconsistent with God's freedom as an artificer. Evolutionists have long contended that the organic world falls short of what one might expect from an omnipotent and benevolent creator. Yet many of the same scientists who argue theologically for evolution are committed to the philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism, which maintains that theology has no place in science. Furthermore, the arguments themselves are problematical, employing concepts that cannot perform the work required of them, or resting on unsupported conjectures about suboptimality. Evolutionary theorists should reconsider both the arguments and the influence of Darwinian theological metaphysics on their understanding of evolution.     

Biocontainment design considerations for biopharmaceutical facilities

Summary This article highlights biocontainment design considerations for biopharmaceutical manufacturing facilities. The major focus of this report is on industry's use and interpretation of the regulations with specific design recommendations for a Biosafety Level 2 — Large-Scale physical containment level as described by the National Institutes of Health Guidelines.     

Reproduction and the central project of evolutionary theory

In much of the discourse of evolutionary theory, reproduction is treated as an autonomous function of the individual organism — even in discussions of sexually reproducing organisms. In this paper, I examine some of the functions and consequences of such manifestly peculiar language. In particular, I suggest that it provides crucial support for the central project of evolutionary theory — namely that of locating causal efficacy in intrinsic properties of the individual organism. Furthermore, I argue that the language of individual reproduction is maintained by certain methodological conventions that both obscure many of the problems it generates and serve to actively impede attempts to redress those difficulties that can be identified. Finally, I suggest that inclusion of the complexities introduced by sexual reproduction — in both language and methodology — may radically undermine the individualist focus of evolutionary theory.I am indepted to the Rockefeller Foundation for a Humanities Fellowship that supported this research during the spring of 1986. I am also grateful to Richard Lewontin, Diane Paul, and Lisa Lloyd for many extremely helpful conversations.     

God's magnificent law: The bad influence of theistic metaphysics on Darwin's estimation of natural selection

Conclusion It is natural for us — living after the Darwinian Revolution and the neo-Darwinian synthesis — to consider the adoption of evolution by natural selection as unconditionally rational, because it now seems the best theory or explanation of many phenomena. Nonetheless, if we take historical inquiry seriously, as allowing us to probe into the ground of our knowledge, the roots of even this rational Darwinism might be unearthed. Darwinian doctrine betrays a deceptive desire for unity and simplicity of principle, and belief that the mechanistic aspect of nature is of the highest significance. Such crucial but questionable presuppositions are more easily discerned historically, insofar as they chronologically preceded Darwin's particular theoretical conviction and were even set off as a metaphysics of divine law.We have seen how Darwin's teaching about nature emerged within that theistic metaphysics. It emerged in a prior metaphysical debate in his mind between the contemporary belief in special creations and the belief in a designed hierarchy of physical laws. One can hardly deny that Darwin favored the superior side in this contest; but the contest was a narrow one whose basic premises he never clearly criticized. On the one hand, of course, his conviction about a lawful genesis inspired him to take a broad view of things and to seek out important general phenomena. But, on the other hand, it ensured that his new empirical notions would be easily drawn into the preferred cosmology. Historically, this seems to have occurred in Darwin's adoption of Malthus' principle of population and his extension of it to the whole account of descent: Malthusianism was readily attached to an ultimate scheme of things. Consequently, the key concepts that Darwin developed out of his Malthusian views — perfect adaptation and selection — reflect his cosmological prepossession, his desire to express a total and teleological process of creation. Perhaps our most valuable, and most undervalued, token of Darwin's metaphysical orientation is his reliance on a human technique (selective breeding) to explain Nature's way. In sum, to understand Darwin's faith in his grand view of life, we should not ignore the metaphysics that preceded and structured it, the metaphysics that linked the principles of contemporary science to primordial creation. Nor should we fail to see that such a metaphysics leads natural philosophy into a shadowy realm, where system can come to look like science, and one insight like an absolute.     

Evolution: like any other science it is predictable

Evolutionary biology rejoices in the diversity of life, but this comes at a cost: other than working in the common framework of neo-Darwinian evolution, specialists in, for example, diatoms and mammals have little to say to each other. Accordingly, their research tends to track the particularities and peculiarities of a given group and seldom enquires whether there are any wider or deeper sets of explanations. Here, I present evidence in support of the heterodox idea that evolution might look to a general theory that does more than serve as a tautology (‘evolution explains evolution’). Specifically, I argue that far from its myriad of products being fortuitous and accidental, evolution is remarkably predictable. Thus, I urge a move away from the continuing obsession with Darwinian mechanisms, which are entirely uncontroversial. Rather, I emphasize why we should seek explanations for ubiquitous evolutionary convergence, as well as the emergence of complex integrated systems. At present, evolutionary theory seems to be akin to nineteenth-century physics, blissfully unaware of the imminent arrival of quantum mechanics and general relativity. Physics had its Newton, biology its Darwin: evolutionary biology now awaits its Einstein.     

Extinction

A significant proportion of conservationists' work is directed towards efforts to save disappearing species. This relies upon the belief that species extinction is undesirable. When justifications are offered for this belief, they very often rest upon the assumption that extinction brought about by humans is different in kind from other forms of extinction. This paper examines this assumption and reveals that there is indeed good reason to suppose current anthropogenic extinctions to be different in kind from extinctions brought about at other times or by other factors. Having considered – and rejected – quantity and rate of extinction as useful distinguishing factors, four alternative arguments are offered, each identifying a way in which anthropogenic extinction is significantly different from other forms of extinction, even mass extinction: (1) Humans are a different kind of natural cause from other causes of extinction; (2) Extinctions brought about by humans are uniquely persistent; (3) Anthropogenic extinctions are effectively random whereas past mass extinctions are rule-bound; (4) The impact of the current anthropogenic extinction event differs from the impact of other extinction events of the past, such that future recovery may not follow past patterns. Together, these four arguments suggest that the present-day extinction event brought about by humans may be unprecedented and that we cannot clearly extrapolate from past to present recovery from extinctions. Although insufficient as justification for the claim that present-day extinctions are undesirable, the arguments provide some ammunition for conservationists' conviction that species extinction – in which humans play an accelerating role – ought to be prevented.     

Geographical distribution and the origin of life: The development of early nineteenth-century British explanations

Conclusions By the 1840s and 1850s biogeographical theory had polarized into two opposing views — both of which had their origins in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. At issue in this polarization was the question of God's involvement with His creation. At one end of the spectrum were Sclater, Agassiz, Kirby, and others who saw a neatly designed world in which geographical distributions were planned and executed by the hand of God at creation. For most of these naturalists, organisms were created en masse within the regions they now occupy. Disjunct distributions were proof to them that God had indeed created species in situ as many individuals. These naturalists hoped to reveal God's biogeographical plan by discovering His regions of creation. They had hoped to demonstrate a neatly devised set of regions of creation which might be applicable to all creatures, but in attempting to do so, they arrived at conflicting sets of delineations — thus helping to undermine their conceptions of nature in which design (both idealist and utilitarian) played an important part.⁹³ At the other end of the biogeographical spectrum were the theoretical ideas of Prichard and Lyell, who viewed a more remote God — one who allowed His creation to be shaped and modified by secondary laws. Lyell in particular wished to leave considerations of design aside, hoping to demonstrate that the shape of the present creation is due to natural laws. Prichard and Lyell saw God's role in the creation of species (and distributions) as being extremely limited. In fact, the regions of creation seen today are in actuality only natural artifacts produced by migrations and barriers. They saw distributions being in constant flux, as was the rest of nature.Those supporting the views of Prichard and Lyell spent a great deal of effort in attempting to remove a major obstacle in their paths — disjunct distributions. If disjunct distributions were indeed the products of separate creative acts, as Sclater and others claimed, then the arguments of Prichard and Lyell would be negated. For if the creation of a species was shown to be the product of multiple creations, then what was the need of migrations and dispersal mechanisms? Also at stake, of course, was the concept of species based upon generation. Darwin was well aware that if the supernatural implications of disjunct distributions could not be refuted, then his evolutionary system — founded upon a species concept based on descent — would be in peril.⁹⁴ A further barrier to the acceptance of the Prichard/Lyell view was the fact that those sympathetic to a nonsupernatural explanation of disjunct distributions could not agree upon a natural explanation for those anomalies, and an internal debate between naturalists within this group raged for decades.⁹⁵ By 1859 a biogeographical stalemate had occurred. Sclater and others, supporting their static view of nature, continued to look for regions of creation, pointing to disjunct distributions in support of their arguments, while those favorable to the views of Prichard and Lyell continued to search for natural explanations for such biogeographical anomalies.The key needed to resolve the biogeographical debate was a credible theory for species origins. By 1858 there were essentially three options for British naturalists: supernatural creation, Lamarckian transmutation, or natural creation. A few British naturalists grasped at these straws, but most workers preferred the option of remaining silent until a more viable explanation for the origin and distribution of species could be advanced.⁹⁶ And not until the publication of Darwin's theory did that explanation become available.     

Complexity,adaptive complexity and the Creative View of natural selection

In this paper, I respond to arguments proposed by Brunnander in this journal issue concerning my position regarding the Creative View of natural selection (Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Brunnander argues that (i) the Creative View we defend does not serve to answer William Paley’s question because (ii) Paley’s question is “why there are complex things rather than simple ones” and (iii) natural selection cannot answer this question. Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) defend a Non-creative View of natural selection (sensu Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Here I claim that Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) are mistaken and I also argue that even accepting (iii) we do not have to accept (i), given that statement (ii) is historically and conceptually flawed. Thus here I analyze Paley’s question from a historical point of view and from a contemporary perspective in a quest for the potential conceptual relevance of Paley’s question today. In this vein I argue that from a contemporary point of view statement (iii) may be correct but for different reasons than those adduced by Brunnander.     

Selective high-performance liquid chromatographic assays for hydralazine and its metabolites in plasma of man

Selective high-performance liquid chromatographic assays for hydralazine (I), hydralazine pyruvic acid hydrazone (II) and the acetylation metabolites, namely s-triazolo[3,4-a]-phthalazine (V) and 3-hydroxymethyl (VI) and 3-methyl-s-triazolo[3,4-a]phthalazine (VII) in human plasma were developed. Utilizing the fluorescence of these compounds or their derivatives the limits of detection could be extended down to 5 nmole/l (1 ng/ml) for I, 1 nmole/l (0.2 ng/ml) for II and 0.5 nmole/l (0.1 ng/ml) for V–VII. The intra-assay coefficients of variation for the assays ranged from 2 to 7% over the concentration range 5.0 to 0.05 μmole/l and the inter-assay variability in the slope of the standard curves ranged from 4 to 8%. An improved method for measuring the sum of I plus all its hydrazones (apparent I) was also developed. On addition of I to fresh plasma at 37°, half the added I was converted to II within 15 min and there was no detectable level of I, 2 h after the addition. The plasma level—time course of I, and its metabolites in a healthy volunteer (slow acetylator) following separate oral and intravenous administrations of I indicated that I contributed only a small fraction (4.3 and 4.7% respectively) to the area under the plasma level—time curve of apparent hydralazine.     

Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller

In this paper I argue that any adequate evolutionary ethical theory needs to account for moral belief as well as for dispositions to behave altruistically. It also needs to be clear whether it is offering us an account of the motivating reasons behind human behaviour or whether it is giving justifying reasons for a particular set of behaviours or, if both, to distinguish them clearly. I also argue that, unless there are some objective moral truths, the evolutionary ethicist cannot offer justifying reasons for a set of behaviours. I use these points to refute Waller's claims that the illusion of objectivity plays a dispensable role in Ruse's theory, that my critique of Ruse's Darwinian metaethics is built on a false dilemma, that there is nothing to be distressed about if morality is not objective, and that ethical beliefs are subject to a kind of causal explanation that undermines their objectivity in a way that scientific beliefs are not.     

Evolution,altruism, and the prisoner's dilemma

I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting Singer's and Kavka's claim about the selective advantage of altruism proper, it is doubtful whether that type of claim can be used in a particular sort of sociobiological argument against psychological egoism.     

There May be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, after All

This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, so there cannot be strict laws in biology. I argue that both types of arguments fail. Part 3 considers some examples of biological laws in recent biological research and argues that they exemplify strict laws in biology. Part 4 considers the objection that the examples in part 3 may be strict laws but they are not distinctively biological laws. I argue that given a plausible account of what distinctively biological means, such laws are distinctively biological.     

Divine powers and exchange with ‘others’ in Melanesia

Marshall Sahlins described divine king forms for a wide range of societies from Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, among others. In this article, I document a divine king form among the Fuyuge people of the Papuan highlands, revising my previous understanding of this powerful figure. At the same time, I argue there is an inextricable connection between Sahlins's theory of divine power and Marilyn Strathern's model of Melanesian gift exchange: both operate according to distinct ideas of otherness. The capacity to engage in transaction derives from cosmological sources while evidence of cosmological power is provided by the ability to engage in transactions with others in effective and powerful ways. More generally, I argue that conventional Melanesian figures of big-men, great men, and chiefs are all versions of the alterity of power in related political forms; each instantiates the mutual relations between cosmological and transactional otherness.     

The relativity of Darwinian populations and the ecology of endosymbiosis

If there is a single discipline of science calling the basic concepts of biology into question, it is without doubt microbiology. Indeed, developments in microbiology have recently forced us to rethink such fundamental concepts as the organism, individual, and genome. In this paper I show how microorganisms are changing our understanding of natural aggregations and develop the concept of a Darwinian population to embrace these discoveries. I start by showing that it is hard to set the boundaries of a Darwinian population, and I suggest thinking of a Darwinian population as a relative property of a Darwinian individual. Then I argue, in contrast to the commonly held view, that Darwinian populations are multispecies units, and that in order to accept the multispecies account of Darwinian populations we have to separate fitness from natural selection. Finally, I show how all these ideas provide a theoretical framework leading to a more precise understanding of the ecology of endosymbiosis than is afforded by poetic metaphors such as ‘slavery’.     

Evolution,reproduction and definition of life

Synthetic theory of evolution is a superior integrative biological theory. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about the fact that multiple attempts of defining life are based on this theory. One of them even has a status of NASA’s working definition. According to this definition, ‘life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution’ Luisi (Orig Life Evol Bios 28:613–622, 1998); Cleland, Chyba (Orig Life Evol Bios 32:387–393, 2002). This definition is often considered as one of the more theoretically mature definitions of life. This Darwinian definition has nonetheless provoked a lot of criticism. One of the major arguments claims that this definition is wrong due to ‘mule’s problem’. Mules (and other infertile hybrids), despite being obviously living organisms, in the light of this definition are considered inanimate objects. It is strongly counterintuitive. The aim of this article was to demonstrate that this reasoning is false. In the later part of the text, I also discuss some other arguments against the Darwinian approach to defining life.     

Attitudes toward homosexuals: An alternative darwinian view

Gallup (1995) argued that there has been selection for parents to counter any social process that would increase the likelihood of one of their children becoming homosexual, and he indicated that contact between adult homosexuals and children was such a process. He therefore predicted (and found) that homophobia would be exaggerated where there was perceived contact with children. In this commentary, I argue that this hypothesis is based on supposing that sexual orientation occurs through a modeling process, when in fact it operates via an imprinting-like process. The specific findings regarding negative attitudes to homosexuals can be explained in terms of a more general evolved response, xenophobia. I argue that Gallup's hypothesis comes from a general willingness to view specific aspects of contemporary human behavior as adaptive when there are a number of reasons—all consistent with modern Darwinian thinking—why many of these are not themselves adaptive.     

Spider heuristics

Simple heuristics may help explain how even a spider, despite its minute brain, can be disturbingly intelligent. Hutchinson and Gigerenzer suggest that the generalist-specialist distinction (or more accurately the predictability-unpredictability distinction) may be related to a species' level of reliance on simple heuristics, and spider behaviour may present some especially instructive opportunities for investigating these ideas. Daniel Dennett's distinction between Darwinian, Skinnerian and Popperian animals might be useful for discerning the different contexts in which optimality considerations and individual decision making are relevant.     

Beyond directed evolution: Darwinian selection as a tool for synthetic biology

Synthetic biology is an engineering approach that seeks to design and construct new biological parts, devices and systems, as well as to re-design existing components. However, rationally designed synthetic circuits may not work as expected due to the context-dependence of biological parts. Darwinian selection, the main mechanism through which evolution works, is a major force in creating biodiversity and may be a powerful tool for synthetic biology. This article reviews selection-based techniques and proposes strict Darwinian selection as an alternative approach for the identification and characterization of parts. Additionally, a strategy for fine-tuning of relatively complex circuits by coupling them to a master standard circuit is discussed.     

In Defense of Some `Cartesian' Assumptions Concerning the Brain and Its Operation

I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control.