The Rise of Modern Humans

Human beings are distinguished most strikingly by their unique “symbolic” way of processing information about the world. Although based on a long evolutionary history, the modern human cognitive style is not predicted by that history. It is not the product of a process of incremental refinement but is instead “emergent,” representing an entirely distinct level of complexity. Physically, Homo sapiens is very distinctive, its peculiarities clearly resulting from a significant developmental reorganization with numerous skeletal ramifications and quite plausibly others as well. It seems reasonable to suppose that the structural underpinnings of symbolic thought were acquired in this reorganization. Still, the fossil and archaeological records indicate that the first anatomically recognizable members of the species predated the first humans who behaved in a demonstrably symbolic manner. So while the biological potential for symbolic thinking most likely arose in the morphogenetic event that gave rise to H. sapiens as a distinctive anatomical entity, this new capacity was evidently exaptive, in the sense that it had to await its “discovery” and expression, clearly through a cultural stimulus that was plausibly the invention of language. One manifestation of symbolic reasoning is the adoption of technological change in response to environmental challenges, in contrast to earlier responses that typically used existing technologies in new ways. As climates changed at the end of the last Ice Age, this new technophile proclivity was expressed in a shift toward agriculture and sedentary lifestyles, precipitating a fundamentally new (and potentially self-destructive) relationship with Nature. Both of the two most radical and fateful evolutionary innovations in the history of life (symbolic thinking and sedentary lifestyles) were thus very recent occurrences, well within the short tenure of H. sapiens.     

Spinopelvic pathways to bipedality: why no hominids ever relied on a bent-hip–bent-knee gait

Until recently, the last common ancestor of African apes and humans was presumed to resemble living chimpanzees and bonobos. This was frequently extended to their locomotor pattern leading to the presumption that knuckle-walking was a likely ancestral pattern, requiring bipedality to have emerged as a modification of their bent-hip-bent-knee gait used during erect walking. Research on the development and anatomy of the vertebral column, coupled with new revelations from the fossil record (in particular, Ardipithecus ramidus), now demonstrate that these presumptions have been in error. Reassessment of the potential pathway to early hominid bipedality now reveals an entirely novel sequence of likely morphological events leading to the emergence of upright walking.     

The dual origin of modern humanity

Living Homo sapiens can define itself using both behavioral and anatomical uniquenesses. But is this possible when looking backward? Using a strict morphological definition, Homo sapiens can probably be traced back in the fossil record to about 150 kyr ago, which fits well with molecular estimates for the ancestor of all living human populations. However, activities reliably indicating established symbolic cognition can be recognized in the archaeological record only back to under 100 kyr ago. Since it is probable that the potential for symbolic cognition was born in the genetic/structural alterations that also gave rise to the distinctive morphological entity Homo sapiens, it appears that the expression of the human symbolic cognitive potential had to await, for many millennia, the >discovery< of that potential through a cultural rather than a biological stimulus. Most plausibly, this stimulus was the invention of language. Modern human symbolic cognition is not an extrapolation of pre-existing evolutionary trends, suggesting that Homo sapiens is not biologically >fine-tuned< for any specific behavior patterns.     

Becoming Modern Homo sapiens

Human beings are unusual in many ways but perhaps most strikingly in their unique symbolic form of processing information about the world around them. Although based on a long and essential evolutionary history, the modern human cognitive style is not predicted by that history: it is emergent rather than the product of an incremental process of refinement. Homo sapiens is physically very distinctive and is clearly the result of a significant developmental reorganization with ramifications throughout the skeleton and presumably beyond. It is reasonable to suppose that the neural underpinnings of symbolic thought were acquired in this reorganization. However, the fossil and archeological records indicate that the first anatomically recognizable members of the species substantially predated its first members who behaved in a demonstrably symbolic manner. Thus, while the biological potential for symbolic thinking most likely arose in the morphogenetic event that gave rise to H. sapiens as a distinctive anatomical entity, this new capacity was evidently exaptive, in the sense that it had to await its “discovery” and release through a cultural stimulus. Plausibly, this stimulus was the invention of language. One expression of symbolic reasoning is the adoption of technological change in response to environmental challenges, contrasting with earlier responses that typically involved using existing technologies in new ways. As climates changed at the end of the last Ice Age, the new technophile proclivity was expressed in a shift toward agriculture and sedentary lifestyles: a shift that precipitated a fundamentally new (and potentially self-destructive) relationship with nature. Thus, both of what are arguably the two most radical (and certainly the most fateful) evolutionary innovations in the history of life (symbolic thinking and sedentary lifestyles) were both very recent occurrences, well within the (so far rather short) tenure of H. sapiens.     

Auditory ERPs to stimulus deviance in an awake chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes): towards hominid cognitive neurosciences

Background

For decades, the chimpanzee, phylogenetically closest to humans, has been analyzed intensively in comparative cognitive studies. Other than the accumulation of behavioral data, the neural basis for cognitive processing in the chimpanzee remains to be clarified. To increase our knowledge on the evolutionary and neural basis of human cognition, comparative neurophysiological studies exploring endogenous neural activities in the awake state are needed. However, to date, such studies have rarely been reported in non-human hominid species, due to the practical difficulties in conducting non-invasive measurements on awake individuals.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We measured auditory event-related potentials (ERPs) of a fully awake chimpanzee, with reference to a well-documented component of human studies, namely mismatch negativity (MMN). In response to infrequent, deviant tones that were delivered in a uniform sound stream, a comparable ERP component could be detected as negative deflections in early latencies.

Conclusions/Significance

The present study reports the MMN-like component in a chimpanzee for the first time. In human studies, various ERP components, including MMN, are well-documented indicators of cognitive and neural processing. The results of the present study validate the use of non-invasive ERP measurements for studies on cognitive and neural processing in chimpanzees, and open the way for future studies comparing endogenous neural activities between humans and chimpanzees. This signifies an essential step in hominid cognitive neurosciences.     

Decision Rules and Group Rationality: Cognitive Gain or Standstill?

Recent research in group cognition points towards the existence of collective cognitive competencies that transcend individual group members’ cognitive competencies. Since rationality is a key cognitive competence for group decision making, and group cognition emerges from the coordination of individual cognition during social interactions, this study tests the extent to which collaborative and consultative decision rules impact the emergence of group rationality. Using a set of decision tasks adapted from the heuristics and biases literature, we evaluate rationality as the extent to which individual choices are aligned with a normative ideal. We further operationalize group rationality as cognitive synergy (the extent to which collective rationality exceeds average or best individual rationality in the group), and we test the effect of collaborative and consultative decision rules in a sample of 176 groups. Our results show that the collaborative decision rule has superior synergic effects as compared to the consultative decision rule. The ninety one groups working in a collaborative fashion made more rational choices (above and beyond the average rationality of their members) than the eighty five groups working in a consultative fashion. Moreover, the groups using a collaborative decision rule were closer to the rationality of their best member than groups using consultative decision rules. Nevertheless, on average groups did not outperformed their best member. Therefore, our results reveal how decision rules prescribing interpersonal interactions impact on the emergence of collective cognitive competencies. They also open potential venues for further research on the emergence of collective rationality in human decision-making groups.     

Acheulean Industries of the Early and Middle Pleistocene,Middle Awash,Ethiopia

The Middle Awash region of Ethiopia contains a rich record of Acheulean occupation spanning from Early Pleistocene times through much of the Middle Pleistocene. Here we will present an overview of some of the major reported features of the Acheulean archaeological record of the Middle Awash (Clark et al., 1994; de Heinzelin et al., 2000) and compare and contrast earlier and later biface technological patterns in this important study area. As an overall pattern, later Acheulean bifaces, here tend to differ from earlier ones in the following characteristics: later biface forms tend to be smaller, more ovate, wider relative to length, thinner (both relative to length and width and in absolute terms), more symmetrical, more heavily flaked, show greater use of soft hammer flaking and Kombewa technique, be straighter-edged or less sinuous, and often exhibit a remarkably high degree of standardization at a given site. These technological changes over perhaps half a million years (between approximately 1.0 and 0.5 million years ago) accompany the transition from Homo erectus to Homo heidelbergensis in this region. The later technological patterns thus correlate with the emergence of larger-brained, more intelligent hominids that exhibit greater technological finesse and also appear to develop and maintain stronger rules and traditions pertaining to their technological behaviors. It is likely that, relative to earlier hominids, these later hominid forms (which would evolve into early anatomically modern humans or Homo sapiens) had richer communicative abilities and cultural complexity, which we believe to be manifested in the technological finesse and standardization of their material culture.     

Stephanoscyphus planulophorus n. spec., ein neuer Scyphopolyp mit einem neuen Entwicklungsmodus

A new solitary species ofStephanoscyphus (order Coronatae) is described. It has been collected in submarine caves of the rocky shore near Marseille, Mediterranean Sea, where it lives attached to colonies of corals at a depth of 10 to 20 m. The essential characteristics of the peridermal tube and the soft body are outlined. They are not sufficient to distinguish significantly the new species from others of the same genus. Identification was possible by the observation of a unique way of development which is characterized by the complete reduction of the free swimming medusa generation. First, the strobilation phase undergoes normal development whereby a chain of numerous ephyra-like stages is originated in the tube of the polyp. Simultaneously, its head is transformed into an opercular apparatus in the normal way whereby the aperture of the tube is closed completely. The strobilation stages must be considered as true young ephyrae because of their flat shape, the regularly formed marginal lappets and contraction movements. Contrary to the normal development, the ephyrae metamorphozise directly to ciliated free swimming planulae. After a long period of incubation, the planulae hatch from the tube and begin a planctonic way of life for a period of about 14 to 50 days. They attach then to the substratum in the normal way and develop into young polyps with a basic disk and small peridermal tube. Thus, the life cycle is completed. Because of the existence of a strobilation phase and the production of ephyrae the mode of development must be considered as a reduced metagenesis. The problem of the existence and special realization of the sexual phase remains unsolved. The diagnosis of the new species is given, and the systematical, evolutionary and ecological aspects of the new mode of development are discussed.     

Les premiers comportements funéraires auraient-ils pris place à Atapuerca, il y a 350 000 ans ?

A lithic tool has appeared for the first time at Sima de los Huesos (Atapuerca, Spain). It is a finely flaked quartzite handaxe, which is associated with the hominid assemblage of a MNI of 27 Homo heidelbergensis, dated more than 350,000 years ago. The particular nature of the deposit involving its taphonomy, paleontology, and technology points to a symbolic meaning both of the tool and the human accumulation.     

Brain endocast asymmetry in pongids and hominids: Some preliminary findings on the paleontology of cerebral dominance

Observations on petalial asymmetry for 190 hominoid endocasts are reported, and their statistical differences assessed. While all taxa of hominoids show asymmetries to various degrees, the patterns or combinations of petalial asymmetries are very different, with fossil hominids and modern Homo sapiens showing an identical pattern of left-occipital, right-frontal petalias, which contrasts with those found normally in pongids. Of the pongids, Gorilla shows the greater degree of asymmetry in left-occipital petalias. Only modern Homo and hominids (Australopithecus, Homo erectus, Neandertals) show a distinct left-occipital, right-frontal petalial pattern. Analysis by x² statistics shows the differences to be highly significant. Due to small sample size and incompleteness of endocasts, small-brained hominids, i.e., Australopithecus, are problematical. To the degree that gross petalial patterns are correlated with cognitive task specialization, we speculate that human cognitive patterns evolved early in hominid evolution and were related to selection pressures operating on both symbolic and spatiovisual integration, and that these faculties are corroborated in the archaeological record.     

The biological and chronological maturation of early hominids

Recent studies on the rate and pattern of dental development indicate that the growth and maturation of early hominids were more similar to the extant apes than to modern humans. This contrasts with the previously held opinion derived from combined dental development, pattern and attrition studies claiming that early hominids were more hominine in their development (Mann, 1975). This paper explores the origin of this difference of opinion and reviews immature hominid dentitions with the benefit of improved radiographs and new data on the pattern and rate of pongid dental development. Paranthropus and Australopithecus specimens are shown to possess an ape-like development pattern but incisor development is specialized in the former and superficially human-like in pattern. The present and recent studies on dental development rate and pattern justify the position that early hominids were more ape-like in their growth and development. Therefore, ages at death calculated from pongid dental development schedules are provided for most immature early hominids. More detailed studies of early hominid developmental biology are now possible. It is suggested that divergent heterochronic processes characterize changes in brain/body proportions during hominid evolution. Relative rates of bone remodeling processes can now be identified on early hominid skeletons. The paleodemographic analysis of early hominids is little changed by the developmental model one chooses.     

The power of possibility: causal learning, counterfactual reasoning, and pretend play

We argue for a theoretical link between the development of an extended period of immaturity in human evolution and the emergence of powerful and wide-ranging causal learning mechanisms, specifically the use of causal models and Bayesian learning. We suggest that exploratory childhood learning, childhood play in particular, and causal cognition are closely connected. We report an empirical study demonstrating one such connection--a link between pretend play and counterfactual causal reasoning. Preschool children given new information about a causal system made very similar inferences both when they considered counterfactuals about the system and when they engaged in pretend play about it. Counterfactual cognition and causally coherent pretence were also significantly correlated even when age, general cognitive development and executive function were controlled for. These findings link a distinctive human form of childhood play and an equally distinctive human form of causal inference. We speculate that, during human evolution, computations that were initially reserved for solving particularly important ecological problems came to be used much more widely and extensively during the long period of protected immaturity.     

Will cognitive enhancement create post‐persons? The use(lessness) of induction in determining the likelihood of moral status enhancement

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons.     

Replicating the first known sea travel by humans: the lower pleistocene crossing of Lombok Strait

The first successful experimental crossing of the Wallace Line by means of a primitive raft without steering or sail is reported. Forming part of a long-term project of exploring the technology and use of the most archaic sea-going vessels, this experiment seeks to examine the minimum requirements of succeeding in crossing Lombok Strait, Indonesia. The first effective maritime colonization in human history is thought to have taken place there, leading to the subsequent hominid occupation of Flores about 850,000 years ago. The rationale and methodology of this replication experiment, which took place in January 2000, are discussed, and the implications of the principal findings are briefly considered. They are significant for the understanding of the technological, cultural and cognitive development of Pleistocene hominids.     

Human Distributed Cognition from an Organism-in-Its-Environment Perspective

The organism-in-its-environment is recognized as the basic unit of analysis when dealing with living beings. This paper seeks to define the fundamental implications of the concept of the organism-in-its-environment in terms of the biosemiotic concept of human distributed cognition. Human distributed cognition in a biosemiotic context is defined as the ability of a self-referencing organism-in-its-environment to interact with its environment to satisfy its physiological (internal and external) and social needs to survive and sustain itself. The ontogenetic development of the organism-in-its-environment serves as the backdrop to discover the implications of distributed cognition that have general applicability in organisms, but in this paper, are made relevant to human beings.     

The capacity of animals to acquire language: do species differences have anything to say to us?

Following the Gardners' discovery that an ape named Washoe could learn to produce and combine a number of hand movements similar to those used by deaf human beings, a variety of 'ape-language projects' sprang up. Some projects used different symbol systems, others used different training techniques, and others used different species of apes. While debate still rages regarding the appropriate way to interpret the symbolic productions of apes, three species of great apes (gorilla, orangutan, and chimpanzee) have now been credited with this capacity while no lesser apes or monkeys have been reported, at present, to have acquired such communicative skills. Among all of the claims made for the various animal species, the philosophers have entered the fray attempting to define the essence of what it is about language that makes it 'human'. This paper will compare and contrast the above positions to arrive at behavioural definitions of symbolic usage that can be applied across species. It will then present new data on a fourth ape species Pan paniscus which is proving to be the first non-human species to acquire symbolic skills in a spontaneous manner.     

Brief communication: Reaction to fire by savanna chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) at Fongoli,Senegal: Conceptualization of “fire behavior” and the case for a chimpanzee model

The use and control of fire are uniquely human traits thought to have come about fairly late in the evolution of our lineage, and they are hypothesized to correlate with an increase in intellectual complexity. Given the relatively sophisticated cognitive abilities yet small brain size of living apes compared to humans and even early hominins, observations of wild chimpanzees' reactions to naturally occurring fire can help inform hypotheses about the likely responses of early hominins to fire. We use data on the behavior of savanna chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) at Fongoli, Senegal during two encounters with wildfires to illuminate the similarities between great apes and humans regarding their reaction to fire. Chimpanzees' close relatedness to our lineage makes them phylogenetically relevant to the study of hominid evolution, and the open, hot and dry environment at Fongoli, similar to the savanna mosaic thought to characterize much of hominid evolution, makes these apes ecologically important as a living primate model as well. Chimpanzees at Fongoli calmly monitor wildfires and change their behavior in anticipation of the fire's movement. The ability to conceptualize the “behavior” of fire may be a synapomorphic trait characterizing the human‐chimpanzee clade. If the cognitive underpinnings of fire conceptualization are a primitive hominid trait, hypotheses concerning the origins of the control and use of fire may need revision. We argue that our findings exemplify the importance of using living chimpanzees as models for better understanding human evolution despite recently published suggestions to the contrary. Am J Phys Anthropol, 2010. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture and cognition

Although many species display behavioural traditions, human culture is unique in the complexity of its technological, symbolic and social contents. Is this extraordinary complexity a product of cognitive evolution, cultural evolution or some interaction of the two? Answering this question will require a much better understanding of patterns of increasing cultural diversity, complexity and rates of change in human evolution. Palaeolithic stone tools provide a relatively abundant and continuous record of such change, but a systematic method for describing the complexity and diversity of these early technologies has yet to be developed. Here, an initial attempt at such a system is presented. Results suggest that rates of Palaeolithic culture change may have been underestimated and that there is a direct relationship between increasing technological complexity and diversity. Cognitive evolution and the greater latitude for cultural variation afforded by increasingly complex technologies may play complementary roles in explaining this pattern.     

Functional imaging of numerical processing in adults and 4-y-old children

Adult humans, infants, pre-school children, and non-human animals appear to share a system of approximate numerical processing for non-symbolic stimuli such as arrays of dots or sequences of tones. Behavioral studies of adult humans implicate a link between these non-symbolic numerical abilities and symbolic numerical processing (e.g., similar distance effects in accuracy and reaction-time for arrays of dots and Arabic numerals). However, neuroimaging studies have remained inconclusive on the neural basis of this link. The intraparietal sulcus (IPS) is known to respond selectively to symbolic numerical stimuli such as Arabic numerals. Recent studies, however, have arrived at conflicting conclusions regarding the role of the IPS in processing non-symbolic, numerosity arrays in adulthood, and very little is known about the brain basis of numerical processing early in development. Addressing the question of whether there is an early-developing neural basis for abstract numerical processing is essential for understanding the cognitive origins of our uniquely human capacity for math and science. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) at 4-Tesla and an event-related fMRI adaptation paradigm, we found that adults showed a greater IPS response to visual arrays that deviated from standard stimuli in their number of elements, than to stimuli that deviated in local element shape. These results support previous claims that there is a neurophysiological link between non-symbolic and symbolic numerical processing in adulthood. In parallel, we tested 4-y-old children with the same fMRI adaptation paradigm as adults to determine whether the neural locus of non-symbolic numerical activity in adults shows continuity in function over development. We found that the IPS responded to numerical deviants similarly in 4-y-old children and adults. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that the neural locus of adult numerical cognition takes form early in development, prior to sophisticated symbolic numerical experience. More broadly, this is also, to our knowledge, the first cognitive fMRI study to test healthy children as young as 4 y, providing new insights into the neurophysiology of human cognitive development.