共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices. 相似文献
2.
Scott D. Gelfand 《Bioethics》2001,15(2):135-145
This is a reply to Don Marquis'Why Abortion is Immoral.' Marquis, who asserts that abortion is morally wrong, bases his argument on the following premise: Killing a being is morally wrong if that being is the sort of being who has a valuable future. I argue that this premise is false. I then assert that if I am correct about this premise being false, Marquis is faced with a dilemma. If he does not alter the premise in a way that makes it true, his argument is unsound. However, if he does make such an alteration, he must also alter a second premise in his argument, and this second change opens him to the charge of question begging. In addition, I conclude that such an alteration requires Marquis to adopt a position much like that taken by Judith J. Thompson in 'A Defense of Abortion,' a position he initially states is indefensible. 相似文献
3.
Lane R 《Bioethics》2006,20(3):125-135
Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally obligated to get either the actual consent or the presumed consent of the person to be conceived. In this article, I attempt to explain the appeal of such consent-based arguments as deriving from a mistaken view of personal identity. I then argue that since this view is false, such arguments are unsound. Finally, I argue that even if reproductive cloning is unsafe, it may still be morally permissible in some circumstances. 相似文献
4.
The Meta‐Nudge – A Response to the Claim That the Use of Nudges During the Informed Consent Process is Unavoidable
下载免费PDF全文
![点击此处可从《Bioethics》网站下载免费的PDF全文](/ch/ext_images/free.gif)
Scott D. Gelfand 《Bioethics》2016,30(8):601-608
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, in Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, assert that rejecting the use nudges is ‘pointless’ because ‘[i]n many cases, some kind of nudge is inevitable’. Schlomo Cohen makes a similar claim. He asserts that in certain situations surgeons cannot avoid nudging patients either toward or away from consenting to surgical interventions. Cohen concludes that in these situations (assuming surgeons believe that surgery is the best option for their patients), nudging patients toward consenting to surgical interventions is (at the very least) uncriticizable or morally permissible. I call this argument: The Unavoidability Argument. In this essay, I will respond to Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument in support of using nudges during the process of informed consent. Specifically, I argue that many so‐called ‘unavoidable nudges’ are, in fact, avoidable. Although my argument is directed toward Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument, it is applicable to the unavoidability argument more generally. 相似文献
5.
David B. Resnik 《New genetics and society》2013,32(2):113-125
Advances in genetic medicine may have implications for how we should think about personal responsibility for health, because they may show how it is possible to exert some control over risk factors that were previously thought as beyond the individual's control. Although we cannot control the genes that we are born with, we can often make decisions concerning genetic testing, disease prevention, and treatment. One might argue, therefore, that individuals should be treated as morally responsible for taking effective action in response to genetic risks factors, since genetically based health risks are similar to other health risks. While this argument makes sense as an abstract, philosophical position, it is not a useful guide to public policy. Given these concerns, there is little society can or should do to encourage individuals to address their genetic risk factors, other than praising those who make prudent choices. 相似文献
6.
7.
Parker Crutchfield 《Bioethics》2019,33(1):112-121
Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter of public health, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. I argue that the covert administration of a compulsory moral bioenhancement program better conforms to public health ethics than does an overt compulsory program. In particular, a covert compulsory program promotes values such as liberty, utility, equality, and autonomy better than an overt program does. Thus, a covert compulsory moral bioenhancement program is morally preferable to an overt moral bioenhancement program. 相似文献
8.
Murphy TF 《Bioethics》1991,5(2):123-138
... Both the past and present have seen a number of methods being used to extinguish homoerotic desire and behavior and to inaugurate heteroeroticism in their place, methods I will here call conversion therapies... The typical defense of such therapy holds that even if homoeroticism is not necessarily a disease or evil, neither is it a universal good... Conversion therapy is morally defensible, on such a view, because some people suffer from the perceived consequences of homoerotic orientations despite the freedom and toleration extended to gay men and lesbians in certain areas... Against the view that conversion therapy is morally defensible as a matter of personal preference, I here argue that such therapy is morally suspect and should be resisted for a number of reasons.... 相似文献
9.
Andrea Sauchelli 《Bioethics》2018,32(3):199-204
Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals. 相似文献
10.
Rob Lovering 《Bioethics》2020,34(3):242-251
Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three-premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the “some” are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing. 相似文献
11.
Peterson M 《Bioethics》2008,22(6):321-327
This article discusses some ethical principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine and other indivisible goods. I argue that a number of principles for distributing pandemic influenza vaccine recently adopted by several national governments are morally unacceptable because they put too much emphasis on utilitarian considerations, such as the ability of the individual to contribute to society. Instead, it would be better to distribute vaccine by setting up a lottery. The argument for this view is based on a purely consequentialist account of morality; i.e. an action is right if and only if its outcome is optimal. However, unlike utilitarians I do not believe that alternatives should be ranked strictly according to the amount of happiness or preference satisfaction they bring about. Even a mere chance to get some vaccine matters morally, even if it is never realized. 相似文献
12.
There is ongoing debate within the bioethics literature regarding to what extent (if any) it is ethically justifiable for doctors to engage in religious discussion with their patients, in cases where patients cite religious considerations as influencing their medical decision-making. In this paper, we concede that certain forms of religious discussion between doctors and patients are morally permissible (though not necessarily morally obligatory), insofar as patients’ religious beliefs may comprise an important part of their overall wellbeing and can influence their medical decisions. However, we argue that it is not morally permissible for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with their patients, beyond simply inquiring about the patient's values (which may include their religious values) or referring patients to a chaplain or religious figure for further discussion. In support of this claim, we put forward two key arguments which have remained relatively unaddressed in the current debate. First, we argue that it is not practical for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with patients, and hence it cannot be morally obligatory for them to do so. Second, we argue that, while doctors might have a professional duty to ensure that their patient's religious interests (if any) are addressed, this does not entail that doctors themselves are the ones who should directly address these interests. Along the way, we anticipate and respond to some possible objections to these two key arguments. 相似文献
13.
Jansen and Wall suggest a new way of defending hard paternalism in clinical research. They argue that non‐therapeutic research exposing people to more than minimal risk should be banned on egalitarian grounds: in preventing poor decision‐makers from making bad decisions, we will promote equality of welfare. We argue that their proposal is flawed for four reasons. First, the idea of poor decision‐makers is much more problematic than Jansen and Wall allow. Second, pace Jansen and Wall, it may be practicable for regulators to uncover the values that a potential research participant holds when agreeing to enter a research project, so their claim that we must ban such research projects for all if we are to ban them for poor decision‐makers looks to be unmotivated. Third, there seem to be cases where the liberty to enter the sort of research project Jansen and Wall discuss is morally weighty, and arguably should outweigh concerns of egalitarian distribution. Fourth, banning certain types of research, which seem on the face of it to offer an unfavourable risk‐benefit ratio, would have unwelcome consequences for all clinical research, which Jansen and Wall do not recognize. 相似文献
14.
M. Matthen 《Human Evolution》1990,5(2):167-176
Though there are good reasons for thinking that sociobiology is capable of contributing to the solution of one of the central
problems of philosophical ethics, the problem of other-benefitting behaviour, philosophers have not welcomed the new discipline
with open arms. This has been so for three reasons: it is said that sociobiology studies behaviour, and not its proximal causes,
that sociobiology tells us about the evolutionary history of behaviour and not about its justification, and that sociobiology
prescribes morally unacceptable ways of acting. I argue that the first of the objections is simply mistaken, and that when
we realize this, the second loses some of its force. I also argue in favour of atwo-factor model of motivation with reason and the emotions engaged in a dialogue with each other concerning the morally relevant features
of a given situation. This two-factor model helps us overcome the third objection above, namely to the morally unacceptable
dictates of sociobiology, and also to weaken claims that sociobiology is committed to a lack of freedom of the will in human
action. Broadly speaking, my argument suggest that the ethical framework most suited to accommodating sociobiological insights
into human motivation is an Aristotelian structure. 相似文献
15.
CARLA SAENZ 《Bioethics》2010,24(9):499-506
In ‘Parental Virtues: A New Way of Thinking about the Morality of Reproductive Actions’ Rosalind McDougall proposes a virtue‐based framework to assess the morality of child selection. Applying the virtue‐based account to the selection of children with impairments does not lead, according to McDougall, to an unequivocal answer to the morality of selecting impaired children. In ‘Impairment, Flourishing, and the Moral Nature of Parenthood,’ she also applies the virtue‐based account to the discussion of child selection, and claims that couples with an impairment are morally justified in selecting a child with the same impairment. This claim, she maintains, reveals that the flourishing of a child should be understood as requiring environment‐specific characteristics. I argue that McDougall's argument begs the question. More importantly, it does not do justice to virtue ethics. I also question to what extent a virtue ethics framework can be successfully applied to discussions about the moral permissibility of reproductive actions. 相似文献
16.
Petersen TS 《Bioethics》2002,16(4):353-375
In this article several justifications of what I call 'the claim from adoption' are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children.
Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe's utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe's argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.
n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption. 相似文献
Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe's utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe's argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.
n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption. 相似文献
17.
Perry Hendricks 《Bioethics》2019,33(6):669-673
The embryo rescue case (ERC) is a thought experiment that is used to argue against the view that embryos have a right to life (i.e., are persons). I will argue that cognitive science undermines the intuition elicited by the ERC. I will show that whether or not embryos have a right to life, our mental tools will make it very difficult to believe that they do have the said right. This suggests that the intuition elicited by the ERC is not truth‐indicative. The upshot of this is that we have an undercutting defeater for our intuition that embryos do not have a right to life. Thus, the ERC is a bad argument against embryonic personhood. 相似文献
18.
19.
William Simkulet 《Bioethics》2018,32(1):10-15
Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory (FLO), according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case. In the wake of Brown's conclusion, Marquis presents a new argument—the parenthood argument (PA)—which he believes shows that abortion is seriously morally wrong. Here I argue that the PA fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong for the same reasons FLO fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong. 相似文献
20.
Abstract We disagree with the assertion that recent human‐caused invasions differ substantially from historic natural invasions in their magnitudes and impacts on ecological processes. The position that exotic species are inherently ‘bad’ and should be eradicated is an ethical judgement, usually based on the naturalist fallacy or xenophobic prejudice; it is not a scientific judgement. The role of scientists in studying invasive species should be to gather, interpret and communicate information as accurately and objectively as possible. 相似文献