Animal Consciousness: Some Philosophical, Methodological, and Evolutionary Problems

No consensus exists concerning the mechanisms, distribution,or adaptive significance of consciousness. Agreement on anyone of these issues would aid in resolving others. Given a reliablebehavioral or neuroanatomical test for consciousness, we couldmap its distribution and describe its evolution. Conversely,if we knew its distribution, we could assess its adaptive valueand look for similarly distributed neuroanatomies to help usget at its mechanisms. Morgan's Canon—the rule that we should avoid attributinghumanlike mental states to other animals whenever possible—impedesthe use of the comparative method in unraveling this knot. Ifinterpreted in this context as a parsimony criterion, Morgan'sCanon is logically equivalent to epiphenomenalism. It is parsimoniousif and only if conscious mental events play no causal role inhuman behavior and human consciousness has no adaptive significance.Rejecting this conclusion entails rejecting the parsimony interpretationof Morgan's Canon.     

Blushing and the philosophy of mind

The introduction, an imaginary dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist, is followed by a brief discussion of the interactions between science, philosophy, and religion. Next comes an analysis of the three most popular philosophies of mind: classical mind-body dualism, computerism, and psychoneural monism. It is argued that the latter, held by medical psychologists since Hippocrates, and formulated explicitly by Cajal and Hebb, is the philosophy of mind that underlies contemporary cognitive and affective neuroscience. The standard objections to psychoneural monism (or materialism) are examined. Evolutionary psychology, though promissory, is judged to be more fancy than fact at its present stage. The conclusion is that the philosophy of mind is still in a poor shape, but that it can advance if it learns more from the science of mind. It would also help if scientific psychologists were to replace such tacitly dualistic expressions as "organ N instantiates (or subserves) mental function M" with "organ N performs mental function M", just as we say "the legs walk" instead of "walking is subserved by legs," and "the lungs breathe" instead of "the lungs instantiate breathing."     

The Forgotten Promise of Thiamin: Merck, Caltech Biologists, and Plant Hormones in a 1930s Biotechnology Project

The physiology of plant hormones was one of the most dynamic fields in experimental biology in the 1930s, and an important part of T. H. Morgan's influential life science division at the California Institute of Technology. I describe one episode of plant physiology research at the institution in which faculty member James Bonner discovered that the B vitamin thiamin is a plant growth regulator, and then worked in close collaboration with the Merck pharmaceutical firm to develop it as a growth-boosting agrichemical. This episode allows one to draw continuities between certain fields of life science in the United States circa 1940 and the biotechnology industry today, and also foregrounds a number of similarities between plant physiology of the late 1930s and the molecular biology of the period. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Building a Science of Animal Minds: Lloyd Morgan,Experimentation, and Morgan’s Canon

Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan’s work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan’s thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes’ reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan’s evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift – in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan’s experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan’s Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan’s own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology.     

Models and Myths of Science: Views of the Elephant

I discuss selected philosophies of science in terms of the roleof rationalism in science and the reality status of the productsof scientific reasoning. A model is then presented in whichI argue that creativity in science involves the mental manipulationof images which are later compared to the shared empirical experienceof the scientific community. The assimilation of a scientificconcept involves a re-creation of the concept through a similarmanipulation of images and empirical experience. The processof recreation can distort the original concept. The result ofthis process of creation and recreation is neither an objectivediscovery of truth nor a subjective invention of truth but aninteractive reality composed of the inquiring human mind andan objectively unknowable nature. Since the model or myth ofscience we accept influences many aspects of the science-societyinteraction, the model I present here as well as models presentedby others ought to be carefully evaluated through the studyof the history of science.     

Inferring mental states from neuroimaging data: from reverse inference to large-scale decoding

A common goal of neuroimaging research is to use imaging data to identify the mental processes that are engaged when a subject performs a mental task. The use of reasoning from activation to mental functions, known as "reverse inference," has been previously criticized on the basis that it does not take into account how selectively the area is activated by the mental process in question. In this Perspective, I outline the critique of informal reverse inference and describe a number of new developments that provide the ability to more formally test the predictive power of neuroimaging data.     

What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game

This study investigates strategies in reasoning about mental states of others, a process that requires theory of mind. It is a first step in studying the cognitive basis of such reasoning, as strategies affect tradeoffs between cognitive resources. Participants were presented with a two-player game that required reasoning about the mental states of the opponent. Game theory literature discerns two candidate strategies that participants could use in this game: either forward reasoning or backward reasoning. Forward reasoning proceeds from the first decision point to the last, whereas backward reasoning proceeds in the opposite direction. Backward reasoning is the only optimal strategy, because the optimal outcome is known at each decision point. Nevertheless, we argue that participants prefer forward reasoning because it is similar to causal reasoning. Causal reasoning, in turn, is prevalent in human reasoning. Eye movements were measured to discern between forward and backward progressions of fixations. The observed fixation sequences corresponded best with forward reasoning. Early in games, the probability of observing a forward progression of fixations is higher than the probability of observing a backward progression. Later in games, the probabilities of forward and backward progressions are similar, which seems to imply that participants were either applying backward reasoning or jumping back to previous decision points while applying forward reasoning. Thus, the game-theoretical favorite strategy, backward reasoning, does seem to exist in human reasoning. However, participants preferred the more familiar, practiced, and prevalent strategy: forward reasoning.     

Repeatability Using Automatic Tracing with Canon OCT- HS100 and Zeiss Cirrus HD-OCT 5000

Background

Optical coherence tomography (OCT), can be used in clinical practice to provide high resolution cross-sectional images of the retina, optic disc and macula structure. These measurements can be useful for early detection, diagnosis, monitoring and treatment guidance for retinal diseases. Therefore, repeatability of measurements in OCT is of great importance.

Methods

Macula and optic disc parameters from the right eye of 30 healthy subjects were obtained twice with the Canon OCT-HS100 and Zeiss Cirrus HD-OCT 5000. Repeatability was evaluated by use of the coefficient of repeatability (CR) and the coefficient of repeatability as a percentage of the mean (CR%), and the obtained measurements were compared between the instruments.

Results

CR% of optic disc parameters ranged between 0.90 and 22.22% and 0.00 and 16.00% with the Canon and Zeiss OCT respectively. For macular parameters CR% ranged between 0.62 and 2.81% and 0.99 and 1.81% with the Canon and Zeiss OCT respectively. No statistical difference could be found when comparing the CR of all macular and disc measurements between the instruments. Compared to our previously published data repeatability has significantly improved with the inclusion of automatic tracking systems with both the Canon and Zeiss OCT.

Conclusion

Automatic tracking function improves repeatability in both Canon OCT-HS100 and Zeiss Cirrus HD-OCT 5000. However, measurements generated by the two instruments are still not interchangeable.     

Kind-Making, objectivity, and political neutrality; the case of Solastalgia

Politics and science, it is customarily and broadly assumed, should not mix. I investigate a purported "new mental illness" arising from psychological stress associated with environmental damage. Previous assessments have concluded that the diagnosis of "solastalgia", which is clearly intended to advance a political agenda, may thereby lack scientific validity. Building on work by Ian Hacking and Nelson Goodman, and drawing comparisons with the history of "political medicine"--in particular, the scientific study of Child Abuse and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome--I argue that the political consequences of such a diagnosis may plausibly help to justify it as a distinct objective scientific kind, by demarcating it from alternative classifications. That science should be objective, then, does not require that it be politically neutral.     

Towards reasoning and coordinating action in the mental space

Unlike a purely reactive system where the motor output is exclusively controlled by the actual sensory input, a cognitive system must be capable of running mental processes which virtually simulate action sequences aimed at achieving a goal. The mental process either attempts to find a feasible course of action compatible with a number of constraints (Internal, Environmental, Task Specific etc) or selects it from a repertoire of previously learned actions, according to the parameters of the task. If neither reasoning process succeeds, a typical backup strategy is to look for a tool that might allow the operator to match all the task constraints. This further necessitates having the capability to alter ones own goal structures to generate sub-goals which must be successfully accomplished in order to achieve the primary goal. In this paper, we introduce a forward/inverse motor control architecture (FMC/IMC) that relaxes an internal model of the overall kinematic chain to a virtual force field applied to the end effector, in the intended direction of movement. This is analogous to the mechanism of coordinating the motion of a wooden marionette by means of attached strings. The relaxation of the FMC/IMC pair provides a general solution for mentally simulating an action of reaching a target position taking into consideration a range of geometric constraints (range of motion in the joint space, internal and external constraints in the workspace) as well as effort-related constraints (range of torque of the actuators, etc.). In case, the forward simulation is successful, the movement is executed; otherwise the residual "error" or measure of inconsistency is taken as a starting point for breaking the action plan into a sequence of sub actions. This process is achieved using a recurrent neural network (RNN) which coordinates the overall reasoning process of framing and issuing goals to the forward inverse models, searching for alternatives tools in solution space and formation of sub-goals based on past context knowledge and present inputs. The RNN + FMC/IMC system is able to successfully reason and coordinate a diverse range of reaching and grasping sequences with/without tools. Using a simple robotic platform (5 DOF Scorbot arm + Stereo vision) we present results of reasoning and coordination of arm/tool movements (real and mental simulation) specifically directed towards solving the classical 2-stick paradigm from animal reasoning at a non linguistic level.     

How theories became knowledge: Morgan's chromosome theory of heredity in America and Britain

T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller and C. B. Bridges published their comprehensive treatise The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity in 1915. By 1920 Morgan's ``Chromosome Theory of Heredity' was generally accepted by geneticists in the United States, and by British geneticists by 1925. By 1930 it had been incorporated into most general biology, botany, and zoology textbooks as established knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons why it was accepted as part of a series of comparative studies of theory-acceptance in the sciences. In this context it is of interest to look at the persuasiveness of confirmed novel predictions, a factor often regarded by philosophers of science as the most important way to justify a theory. Here it turns out to play a role in the decision of some geneticists to accept the theory, but is generally less important than the CTH's ability to explain Mendelian inheritance, sex-linked inheritance, non-disjunction, and the connection between linkage groups and the number of chromosome pairs; in other words, to establish a firm connection between genetics and cytology. It is remarkable that geneticists were willing to accept the CTH as applicable to all organisms at a time when it had been confirmed only for Drosophila. The construction of maps showing the location on the chromosomes of genes for specific characters was especially convincing for non-geneticists.     

On mechanistic reasoning in unexpected places: the case of population genetics

A strong case has been made for the role and value of mechanistic reasoning in process-oriented sciences, such as molecular biology and neuroscience. This paper shifts focus to assess the role of mechanistic reasoning in an area where it is neither obvious nor expected: population genetics. Population geneticists abstract away from the causal-mechanical details of individual organisms and, instead, use mathematics to describe population-level, statistical phenomena. This paper, first, develops a framework for the identification of mechanistic reasoning where it is not obvious: mathematical and mechanistic styles of scientific reasoning. Second, it applies this framework to demonstrate that both styles are integrated in modern investigations of evolutionary biology. Characteristic of the former, applied population genetic techniques provide statistical evidence for associations between genotype, phenotype, and fitness. Characteristic of the latter, experimental interventions provide causal-mechanical evidence for associations between the very same relationships, often in the same model organisms. The upshot is a richer perspective of how evolutionary biologists build evidence for hypotheses regarding adaptive evolution and a general framework for assessing the scope of mechanistic reasoning across the sciences.     

Logical, epistemological and statistical aspects of nature-nurture data interpretation

In this paper the nature of the reasoning processes applied to the nature-nurture question is discussed in general and with particular reference to mental and behavioral traits. The nature of data analysis and analysis of variance is discussed. Necessarily, the nature of causation is considered. The notion that mere data analysis can establish "real" causation is attacked. Logic of quantitative genetic theory is reviewed briefly. The idea that heritability is meaningful in the human mental and behavioral arena is attacked. The conclusion is that the heredity-IQ controversy has been a "tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". To suppose that one can establish effects of an intervention process when it does not occur in the data is plainly ludicrous. Mere observational studies can easily lead to stupidities, and it is suggested that this has happened in the heredity-IQ arena. The idea that there are racial-genetic differences in mental abilities and behavioral traits of humans is, at best, no more than idle speculation.     

Counterfactual Reasoning Deficits in Schizophrenia Patients

Background

Counterfactual thinking is a specific type of conditional reasoning that enables the generation of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Although it has been broadly studied in the general population, research on schizophrenia is still scarce. The aim of the current study was to further examine counterfactual reasoning in this illness.

Methods

Forty schizophrenia patients and 40 controls completed a series of tests that assessed the influence of the “causal order effect” on counterfactual thinking, and the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually derive inferences from a hypothetical situation. Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics, as well as neurocognitive variables, were also examined.

Results

Compared to controls, the schizophrenia patients generated fewer counterfactual thoughts when faced with a simulated scenario. The pattern of response when assessing the causality effect of the order was also different between the groups, with the patients being more frequently unable to attribute any ordering of events than the control subjects. Additionally, the schizophrenia patients showed more difficulties when deriving normative counterfactual inferences from hypothetical social situations. None of the counterfactual reasoning measures was associated to any of the cognitive functions or clinical and socio-demographic variables assessed.

Conclusions

A global impairment in counterfactual thinking characterizes schizophrenia patients. Because of the potential impact of such deficits on psychosocial functioning, targeting counterfactual reasoning for improvement might be considered in future treatment approaches.     

From philosophy to science (to natural philosophy): evolutionary developmental perspectives

This paper focuses on abstraction as a mode of reasoning that facilitates a productive relationship between philosophy and science. Using examples from evolutionary developmental biology, I argue that there are two areas where abstraction can be relevant to science: reasoning explication and problem clarification. The value of abstraction is characterized in terms of methodology (modeling or data gathering) and epistemology (explanatory evaluation or data interpretation).     

In Search of the Good: Narrative Reasoning in Clinical Practice

Based on ethnographic work among North American occupational therapists, I compare two forms of everyday clinical talk. One, 'chart talk," conforms to normative conceptions of clinical rationality. The second, storytelling, permeates clinical discussions but has no formal status as a vehicle for clinical reasoning. I argue that both modes of discourse provide avenues for reasoning about clinical problems. However, these discourses construct very different clinical objects and different phenomena to reason about. Further, the clinical problems created through storytelling point toward a more radically distinct conception of rationality than the one underlying biomedicine as it is formally conceived. Clinical storytelling is more usefully understood as a mode of Aristotle's "practical rationality" than the technical rationality of modern (enlightenment) conceptions of reasoning, [narrative, practical reasoning, clinical reasoning, ethics]     

Cryptic designs on the peppered moth

In a provocative recent book, Jonathan Wells (2000) decries what he discerns as a systematic pattern in how introductory biology textbooks "blatantly misrepresent" ten routinely cited examples offered as evidence for evolution. Each of these examples, according to Wells, is fraught with interpretive problems and, as such, textbooks that continue to use them should at the very least be accompanied by warning labels. The following essay critiques his reasoning with reference to one of these examples, the phenomenon of industrial melanism. After criticizing Wells's specific argument, the essay draws several conclusions about the nature of science lost in his account.     

Simple minds: a qualified defence of associative learning

Using cooperation in chimpanzees as a case study, this article argues that research on animal minds needs to steer a course between 'association-blindness'-the failure to consider associative learning as a candidate explanation for complex behaviour-and 'simple-mindedness'-the assumption that associative explanations trump more cognitive hypotheses. Association-blindness is challenged by the evidence that associative learning occurs in a wide range of taxa and functional contexts, and is a major force guiding the development of complex human behaviour. Furthermore, contrary to a common view, association-blindness is not entailed by the rejection of behaviourism. Simple-mindedness is founded on Morgan's canon, a methodological principle recommending 'lower' over 'higher' explanations for animal behaviour. Studies in the history and philosophy of science show that Morgan failed to offer an adequate justification for his canon, and subsequent attempts to justify the canon using evolutionary arguments and appeals to simplicity have not been successful. The weaknesses of association-blindness and simple-mindedness imply that there are no short-cuts to finding out about animal minds. To decide between associative and yet more cognitive explanations for animal behaviour, we have to spell them out in sufficient detail to allow differential predictions, and to test these predictions through observation and experiment.     

Breeding ecology of the Clay-coloured Robin Turdus grayi in lowland Panama

The breeding ecology of Clay-coloured Robins Turdus grayi was studied in 1979 in the former Canal Zone of lowland Panama. Two study areas were chosen close together, Summit Gardens (27-3 ha), an ecological island of habitat suitable for Clay-coloured Robin surrounded by forest, and Morgan's Gardens (3–6 ha), a similar island surrounded by deforested areas and settlements. Eighty-three active nests were found and checked. The breeding season lasted from 2 March to 21 June. In Morgan's Gardens the first broods were raised in the dry season and second broods in the rainy season; in Summit Gardens most broods started at the beginning of the rainy season. In comparison to the closely related Blackbird T. merula in Poland, Clay-coloured Robins build nests on isolated trees or bushes, usually in more conspicuous sites (interpreted as an anti-predator adaptation) and on flexible, horizontal branches off the main trunk. Over 45% of broods were destroyed by predators but other factors causing brood loss were negligible. Nests built on palms were considerably safer. In the dry season the predation rate was low (5%) and increased during the course of the rainy season. Unlike Blackbirds, Clay-coloured Robin nestlings were given a lot of fruit; their diet was diversified. Starvation occurred in 60% of nests although usually only the youngest nestling died. Breeding density in Morgan's Gardens at 50 pairs per 10 ha was much higher than in Summit Gardens at 15>8 pairs per 10 ha. Breeding losses were lower, the nestlings were fed more fruit, the average nestling weight was lower and the production of fledglings per breeding pair was twice as high in Morgan's Gardens. It was concluded that a strategy of settling in a rather overpopulated place with hard foraging conditions but lower predation was better than settling in a area with a better food supply but higher predation.