ALTERNATIVES TO NATIONAL AVERAGE INCOME DATA AS ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIES: A SOCIAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE

Current strategies to address global inequities in access to life‐saving vaccines use averaged national income data to determine eligibility. While largely successful in the lowest income countries, we argue that this approach could lead to significant inefficiencies from the standpoint of justice if applied to middle‐income countries, where income inequalities are large and lead to national averages that obscure truly needy populations. Instead, we suggest alternative indicators more sensitive to social justice concerns that merit consideration by policy‐makers developing new initiatives to redress health inequities in middle‐income countries.     

PALLIATIVE CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND JUSTICE: SETTING PRIORITIES IN RESOURCE POOR COUNTRIES

Many countries have not considered palliative care a public health problem. With limited resources, disease-oriented therapies and prevention measures take priority. In this paper, I intend to describe the moral framework for considering palliative care as a public health priority in resource-poor countries. A distributive theory of justice for health care should consider integrative palliative care as morally required as it contributes to improving normal functioning and preserving opportunities for the individual. For patients requiring terminal care , we are guided less by principles of justice and more by the duty to relieve suffering and society's commitment to protecting the professional's obligation to uphold principles of beneficence, compassion and non-abandonment. A fair deliberation process is necessary to allow these strong moral commitments to serve as reasons when setting priorities in resource poor countries.     

Off‐Shoring Clinical Research: Exploitation and the Reciprocity Constraint

The last 20 years have seen a staggering growth in the practice of off‐shoring clinical research to low‐and middle‐income countries (LICs and MICs), a growth that has been matched by the neoliberal policies adopted by host countries towards attracting trials to their shores. A recurring concern in this context is the charge of exploitation, linked to various aspects of off‐shoring. In this paper, I examine Alan Wertheimer's approach and offer an alternative view of understanding exploitation in this context. I will suggest that the justification for the enterprise of research is largely dependent on its integration within a health system from which participants regularly benefit and I argue that an attention to a principle of reciprocity will enable us to better recognize and address exploitation in international research.     

Expanded FDA regulation of health and wellness apps

This paper argues that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) policy for health and wellness apps is ethically problematic. Currently, the FDA does not regulate health and wellness apps that are not intended for medical use. As a result of this hands-off policy, preventing harm to consumers is left primarily to developers and app marketplaces. We argue that the FDA’s duties to prevent harm and maintain accountability to the American public require that they play a much stronger role. We also discuss concerns about efficiency and fostering innovation, and argue that while they should help shape FDA regulation of health and wellness apps, they do not justify complete absence of FDA involvement.     

GLOBAL HEALTH IMPACT: A BASIS FOR LABELING AND LICENSING CAMPAIGNS?

Most of the world's health problems afflict poor countries and their poorest inhabitants. There are many reasons why so many people die of poverty‐related causes. One reason is that the poor cannot access many of the existing drugs and technologies they need. Another, is that little of the research and development (R&D) done on new drugs and technologies benefits the poor. There are several proposals on the table that might incentivize pharmaceutical companies to extend access to essential drugs and technologies to the global poor. 1 Still, the problem remains – the poor are suffering and dying from lack of access to essential medicines. So, it is worth considering a new alternative. This paper suggests rating pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies based on how some of their policies impact poor people's health. It argues that it might be possible to leverage a rating system to encourage companies to extend access to essential drugs and technologies to the poor.     

Global sharing of COVID-19 vaccines: A duty of justice,not charity

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures.     

Standard of Care,Institutional Obligations,and Distributive Justice

The problem of standard of care in clinical research concerns the level of treatment that investigators must provide to subjects in clinical trials. Commentators often formulate answers to this problem by appealing to two distinct types of obligations: professional obligations and natural duties. In this article, I investigate whether investigators also possess institutional obligations that are directly relevant to the problem of standard of care, that is, those obligations a person has because she occupies a particular institutional role. I examine two types of institutional contexts: (1) public research agencies – agencies or departments of states that fund or conduct clinical research in the public interest; and (2) private‐for‐profit corporations. I argue that investigators who are employed or have their research sponsored by the former have a distinctive institutional obligation to conduct their research in a way that is consistent with the state's duty of distributive justice to provide its citizens with access to basic health care, and its duty to aid citizens of lower income countries. By contrast, I argue that investigators who are employed or have their research sponsored by private‐for‐profit corporations do not possess this obligation nor any other institutional obligation that is directly relevant to the ethics of RCTs. My account of the institutional obligations of investigators aims to contribute to the development of a reasonable, distributive justice‐based account of standard of care.     

Putting placebo‐controlled trials in developing countries to the interpersonal justifiability test

This paper considers the ethics of placebo‐controlled trials in developing countries, where a treatment already exists but is not available due to the low local standard of care. Such trials would not be permitted in more developed nations where a higher standard of care is available. I argue that there are moral intuitions against such trials, but a further intuition that if the trials were aimed at producing treatment options for the developing world, that would be more permissible than if the trials were designed with the benefit of rich world people in mind. An approach based upon GA Cohen's work on interpersonal justifiability is suggested to allow us to explain these intuitions. Cohen's framework shows that these trials are ethically problematic because the inequality in healthcare provision between developing and developed nations that allows them to take place is at least partly the pharmaceutical corporations’ fault. Following Cohen's argument, this means the trials are non‐comprehensively justified. This allows for a more complete explanation of our intuitions than to consider such trials as cases of exploitation, because intuitions on the ethicacy of research can vary even when the exploitation relation remains the same. It is then established that there is good empirical evidence to believe that pharmaceutical corporations do fail the interpersonal justifiability test. The policy implications of this judgement are then considered, and it is suggested that the framework might be equally applicable to examining the permissibility of research conducted on vulnerable people within more developed nations.     

The Social Value of Knowledge and International Clinical Research

In light of the growth in the conduct of international clinical research in developing populations, this paper seeks to explore what is owed to developing world communities who host international clinical research. Although existing paradigms for assigning and assessing benefits to host communities offer valuable insight, I criticize their failure to distinguish between those benefits which can justify the conduct of research in a developing world setting and those which cannot. I argue that the justification for human subjects research is fundamentally grounded in the social value of knowledge, and that this value is context‐dependent in a manner which should inform our ethical evaluation of the conduct of research in specific settings. I propose a new framework for the assessment of research benefits assigned to developing world host communities, a natural implication of which is to limit the types of research projects which may permissibly be conducted in developing world settings.     

Because we can: clashes of perspective over researcher obligation in the failed PrEP trials

This article examines the relationship between bioethics and the therapeutic standards in HIV prevention research in the developing world, focusing on the closure of the pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) trials in the early 2000s. I situate the PrEP trials in the historical context of the vertical transmission debates of the 1990s, where there was protracted debate over the use of placebos despite the existence of a proven intervention. I then discuss the dramatic improvement in the clinical management of HIV and the treatment access movement, and consider how these contexts have influenced research practice. I argue that as HIV prevention trials oblige researchers to observe the rate at which vulnerable people under their care acquire HIV, there is an obligation to provide antiretroviral treatment to seroconverters and other health care benefits that fall within the scope of researchers' entrustment, both to avoid exploitation and to enact reciprocal justice. I argue against propositions that the obligations to provide specific benefits are vague, fall only upon researchers and sponsors, and create injustices by privileging the few over the many. Finally, I contend that the realisation of a broader standard of care in HIV prevention research broadens the role of research from being a simple tool to produce knowledge to a complex intervention that can play a part in the reduction of health disparities.     

Clinical trials and SCID row: the ethics of phase 1 trials in the developing world

Relatively little has been written about the ethics of conducting early phase clinical trials involving subjects from the developing world. Below, I analyze ethical issues surrounding one of gene transfer's most widely praised studies conducted to date: in this study, Italian investigators recruited two subjects from the developing world who were ineligible for standard of care because of economic considerations. Though the study seems to have rendered a cure in these two subjects, it does not appear to have complied with various international guidelines that require that clinical trials conducted in the developing world be responsive to their populations' health needs. Nevertheless, policies devised to address large scale, late stage trials, such as the AZT short-course placebo trials, map somewhat awkwardly to early phase studies. I argue that interest in conducting translational research in the developing world, particularly in the context of hemophilia trials, should motivate more rigorous ethical thinking around clinical trials involving economically disadvantaged populations.     

On beginning with justice: Bioethics,advocacy and the rights of asylum seekers

The situation around the seeking of refuge, both in Australia and abroad, has become a core human rights issue of our time, engendering protest and activism from the public, researchers, healthcare professionals and academics. The question remains: do bioethicists have duties to advocate on behalf of such populations, and if so, why? I argue that if our work is founded upon the principle of justice, then we do have such duties, and that our research, in itself, can become a form of advocacy.     

Intergenerational healthcare inequities in developing countries

Concern about the rapid ageing of all societies reaches alarming proportions as healthcare inequities are steeply rising, prompting the elderly to live longer but subject to insufficient social protection and healthcare in the wake of dwindling public resources. The aged population of developing nations are facing additional hardships due to the growing gap between needs and the financial reductions of public institutions, retirement funds, and the trend towards privatization of essential services turned into commodities. Current approaches to allocation of insufficient resources without ageist discrimination are briefly discussed: individual self‐care aimed at successful, active and healthy ageing based on resourcefulness of the privileged elderly; utilitarian approaches founded on QALY and fair innings, and human rights focused on the plights of the elderly. These approaches cannot apply to resources poor nations, who need to engage in context‐bound bioethics dealing with the realities of their exposed ageing population. A developing world bioethics is needed to face the plights of the elderly in countries with low and middle‐income and insufficient social capital. Suggested are: 1) a phenomenological approach based on the interaction of bioethics and ethnology, furthering grass‐roots input from the elderly; 2) Create small communities –campus‐like boroughs– to simplify accessibility to social services and healthcare facilities, as an alternative to the high‐cost WHO proposal of age‐friendly large cities.     

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL AID

Every year approximately 18 million people die prematurely from treatable medical conditions including infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies. The deaths occur primarily amongst the poorest citizens of poor developing nations. Various groups and individuals have advanced plans for major international medical aid to avert many of these unnecessary deaths. For example, the World Health Organization's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health estimated that eight million premature deaths could be prevented annually by interventions costing roughly US$57 bn per year.
This essay advances an argument that human rights require high-income nations to provide such aid. The essay briefly examines John Rawls' obligations of justice and the reasons that their applicability to cases of international medical aid remains controversial. Regardless, the essay argues that purely humanitarian obligations bind the governments and citizens of high-income liberal democracies at a minimum to provide major medical aid to avert premature deaths in poor nations. In refusing to undertake such medical relief efforts, developed nations fail to adequately protect a fundamental human right to life.     

Ethics and Rationing Access to Dialysis in Resource‐Limited Settings: The Consequences of Refusing a Renal Transplant in the South African State Sector

Resource constraints in developing countries compel policy makers to ration the provision of healthcare services. This article examines one such set of Guidelines: A patient dialysing in the state sector in South Africa may not refuse renal transplantation when a kidney becomes available. Refusal of transplantation can lead to exclusion from the state‐funded dialysis programme. This Guideline is legally acceptable as related to Constitutional stipulations which allow for rationing healthcare resources in South Africa. Evaluating the ethical merit of the Guideline, and exploring the ethical dilemma it poses, proves a more complex task. We examine the actions of healthcare professionals as constrained by the Guideline. From a best interests framework, we argue that in these circumstances directing patient decision making (pressurising a patient to undergo renal transplantation) is not necessarily unethical or unacceptably paternalistic. We then scrutinise the guideline itself through several different ethical ‘lenses’. Here, we argue that bioethics does not provide a definitive answer as to the moral merit of rationing dialysis under these circumstances, however it can be considered just in this context. We conclude by examining a potential pitfall of the Guideline: Unwilling transplant recipients may not comply with immunosuppressive medication, which raises questions for policies based on resource management and rationing.     

Covert moral bioenhancement,public health,and autonomy

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy‐based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.     

Threshold considerations in fair allocation of health resources: justice beyond scarcity

Application of egalitarian and prioritarian accounts of health resource allocation in low-income countries have both been criticized for implying distribution outcomes that allow decreasing/undermining health gains and for tolerating unacceptable standards of health care and health status that result from such allocation schemes. Insufficient health care and severe deprivation of health resources are difficult to accept even when justified by aggregative efficiency or legitimized by fair deliberative process in pursuing equality and priority oriented outcomes. I affirm the sufficientarian argument that, given extreme scarcity of public health resources in low-income countries, neither health status equality between populations nor priority for the worse off is normatively adequate. Nevertheless, the threshold norm alone need not be the sole consideration when a country's total health budget is extremely scarce. Threshold considerations are necessary in developing a theory of fair distribution of health resources that is sensitive to the lexically prior norm of sufficiency. Based on the intuition that shares must not be taken away from those who barely achieve a minimal level of health, I argue that assessments based on standards of minimal physical/mental health must be developed to evaluate the sufficiency of the total resources of health systems in low-income countries prior to pursuing equality, priority, and efficiency based resource allocation. I also begin to examine how threshold sensitive health resource assessment could be used in the Philippines.     

Global Health Care Justice,Delivery Doctors and Assisted Reproduction: Taking a Note From Catholic Social Teachings

This article will examine the Catholic concept of global justice within a health care framework as it relates to women's needs for delivery doctors in the developing world and women's demands for assisted reproduction in the developed world. I will first discuss justice as a theory, situating it within Catholic social teachings. The Catholic perspective on global justice in health care demands that everyone have access to basic needs before elective treatments are offered to the wealthy. After exploring specific discrepancies in global health care justice, I will point to the need for delivery doctors in the developing world to provide basic assistance to women who hazard many pregnancies as a priority before offering assisted reproduction to women in the developed world. The wide disparities between maternal health in the developing world and elective fertility treatments in the developed world are clearly unjust within Catholic social teachings. I conclude this article by offering policy suggestions for moving closer to health care justice via doctor distribution.     

Negative ��GHIs,�� the Right to Health Protection, and Future Generations

The argument has been made that future generations of human beings are being harmed unjustifiably by the actions individuals commit today. This paper addresses what it might mean to harm future generations, whether we might harm them, and what our duties toward future generations might be. After introducing the “Global Health Impact” (GHI) concept as a unit of measurement that evaluates the effects of human actions on the health of all organisms, an incomplete theory of human justice is proposed. Having shown that the negative GHIs of our current generation cause unfair harm to future generations, I argue that each human being must be allocated a fair threshold of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded. By emphasising the need to consider all the GHIs of human actions, the theory of human justice developed here is highly relevant to evaluate human actions that might affect future generations, for example those related to climate change.