Altruism Can Be Assessed Correctly Based on Impression

Detection of genuine altruists could be a solution to the problem of subtle cheating. Brown et al. (Evol Psychol 1:42–69, 2003) found that humans could detect altruists using nonverbal cues. However, their experiments can be improved upon in several ways, and further investigation is needed to determine whether altruist-detection abilities are human universals. In our experiment, we used video clips of natural conversations as the stimulus. We asked a sample of Japanese undergraduates to rate their own level of altruism and then to estimate the videotaped targets’ altruism using the same scale. The perceivers were able to estimate the targets’ altruism levels accurately. Perceivers’ altruism score did not affect their ability to discriminate between altruists and non-altruists. Perceivers’ impressions of the altruist and non-altruist targets were also found to be different. Coding of nonverbal behavior of the targets revealed that altruists exhibited more “felt smiles” than non-altruists, which also supports the results of the previous study.     

Is prospective altruist-detection an evolved solution to the adaptive problem of subtle cheating in cooperative ventures? Supportive evidence using the Wason selection task

Reciprocal altruism in humans may be made possible in part by the existence of information processing mechanisms for the detection of overt cheating. However, cheating may not always be readily detectable due to the division of labor. Subtle cheating poses a serious problem for the evolution of altruism. This article argues that subtle cheating may have exerted selective pressures on early hominids to be sensitive to information regarding the genuineness of an altruistic act. In two experiments, subjects were required to complete Wason selection tasks designed to allow for the detection of altruism. Performance on the altruist-detection tasks was compared to performance on control Wason selection tasks (Experiment 1) and to performance on control and cheater detection tasks (Experiment 2). Participants were significantly better at solving cheater-detection and altruist-detection versions compared to control versions of the problems, and there was no significant difference between altruist-detection and cheater-detection. Results are discussed in relation to recent conceptual models for the evolution of altruism. Specifically, it is argued that non-kin altruism may be an evolutionarily stable strategy if altruists can detect one another and form mutually beneficial social support networks.     

Population viscosity and the evolution of altruism

The term population viscosity refers to limited dispersal, which increases the genetic relatedness of neighbors. This effect both supports the evolution of altruism by focusing the altruists' gifts on relatives of the altruist, and also limits the extent to which altruism may emerge by exposing clusters of altruists to stiffer local competition. Previous analyses have emphasized the way in which these two effects can cancel, limiting the viability of altruism. These papers were based on models in which total population density was held fixed. We present here a class of models in which population density is permitted to fluctuate, so that patches of altruists are supported at a higher density than patches of non-altruists. Under these conditions, population viscosity can support the selection of both weak and strong altruism.     

Effect of group selection on the evolution of altruistic behavior

By using a Monte Carlo simulation, we studied the effect of group selection on the altruistic trait that is controlled by a single locus. The altruistic trait is disadvantageous to the bearer but advantageous to the others. Group selection is defined as the differential reproductive rate among demes caused by genotypic difference among demes. We found that the simulation reproduced many results of former studies. Additionally, when the mutation rate and the migration rate are small enough, we observed two new phenomena: (1) When the effect of the group selection is as large as that of the individual selection, the gene frequency is quite unstable. We found two local stable states, the A- and the S-state. When the metapopulation is in the A-state, altruists are nearly fixed. When in the S-state, on the contrary, altruists are almost lost. The metapopulation shifted quickly from one state to another. We call this phenomenon as the S-A transition. (2) When the mutation rate and migration rate are small enough we found an extremely strong mechanism to stop the non-altruists from expanding no matter how strong the individual selection coefficient is. This is caused by a phenomenon, which we call SA splitting, in which most demes are fixed either by altruists or non-altruists; thus, the relatedness of the metapopulation becomes nearly equal to one. We show SA splitting plays an important role in S-A transition. We define a parameter d to see the degree of SA splitting. We found that d is roughly proportional to mutation rate and deme size.     

Kin recognition and the evolution of altruism

In 1964, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Since then, numerous examples from a diverse array of taxa have shown that seemingly altruistic actions towards close relatives are a common phenomenon. Although many species use kin recognition to direct altruistic behaviours preferentially towards relatives, this important aspect of social biology is less well understood theoretically. I extend Hamilton's classic work by defining the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism when recognizers are permitted to make acceptance (type I) and rejection (type II) errors in the identification of social partners with respect to kinship. The effect of errors in recognition on the evolution of kin-directed altruism depends on whether the population initially consists of unconditional altruists or non-altruists (i.e. alternative forms of non-recognizers). Factors affecting the level of these error rates themselves, their evolution and their long-term stability are discussed.     

Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle

Current work on cooperation is focused on the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, reciprocity is just one way of getting a return on an investment in altruism and is difficult to apply to many examples. Reciprocity theory addresses how animals respond dynamically to others so as to cooperate without being exploited. I discuss how introducing differences in individual generosity together with partner choice into models of reciprocity can lead to an escalation in altruistic behaviour. Individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may become ostracized. I refer to this phenomenon as competitive altruism and propose that it can represent a move away from the dynamic responsiveness of reciprocity. Altruism may be rewarded in kind, but rewards may be indirectly accrued or may not involve the return of altruism at all, for example if altruists tend to be chosen as mates. This variety makes the idea of competitive altruism relevant to behaviours which cannot be explained by reciprocity. I consider whether altruism might act as a signal of quality, as proposed by the handicap principle. I suggest that altruistic acts could make particularly effective signals because of the inherent benefits to receivers. I consider how reciprocity and competitive altruism are related and how they may be distinguished.     

Altruism, cheating, and anticheater adaptations in cellular slime molds

Cellular slime molds (CSMs) possess a remarkable life cycle that encompasses an extreme act of altruism. CSM cells live as individual amoebae until starved, then aggregate and ultimately transform themselves into a multicellular fruiting body. This fruiting body consists of stalk cells (altruists that eventually die) and spores (the beneficiaries of this sacrifice). Altruistic systems such as this are vulnerable to cheaters, which are individuals unrelated to the altruists that obtain the benefits provided by them without reciprocating. Here, we investigate two forces that can maintain CSM altruism despite cheating: kin selection and anticheater adaptations. First, we present new kinship-based models based on CSM developmental biology to evaluate the efficacy of kin selection. These models show that stalk-making genotypes can still be maintained when aggregations are initiated by multiple "founder" spores, provided that spores of stalkless fruiting bodies have low rates of dispersal and dispersal success is a concave function of stalk height. Second, we review proposals that several features of CSM development, such as the chemical suppression of the redifferentiation of prestalk cells into prespores, act as anticheater adaptations.     

Biased face recognition in the Faith Game

Several studies have indicated that people are able to memorize the face of a cheater more accurately than that of a noncheater, but some contradictory findings have also been reported. Because most previous studies focused on memory for the faces of cheaters who break social contracts, the consequence for the subjects of their cheating was unclear. In our study, participants were asked to decide whether they trusted persons depicted in photographs to give them money using two sessions of the Faith Game. The participants tended to not increase their trust in the individuals, depicted in photographs, who had altruistically given money to them previously. However, participants recognized nonaltruists who had not shared money and, during the second session, rescinded the trust that they had previously placed in them. This suggests that bias in face recognition is not restricted to the recognition level, as previous studies have suggested, but also operates at the behavioral level and functions to facilitate the avoidance of persons who have caused some disadvantage in a previous interaction, rather than to facilitate new relationships with altruists by enhancing recognition of their faces.     

The financial cost of status signaling: Expansive postural displays are associated with a reduction in the receipt of altruistic donations

Models of human altruism suggest that decisions to help are influenced by assessments of both potential recipients' need state and their competence, as high need increases the value of gifts received, and competent recipients can most effectively use and repay gifts. Need and competence are often inversely related, however, raising the question of how altruists weigh these competing sources of information. We examined the impact of a nonverbal display (expansive posture) that, by signaling high status, simultaneously cues both low need and high competence, on actual altruistic behaviors: donations of financial aid to needy individuals. Across three studies using ecologically valid data drawn from a micro-lending charity website, men who displayed expansive posture while requesting aid faced a substantial reduction in the amount of aid they received; this effect held controlling for a range of relevant covariates. These findings demonstrate that: (a) altruists bias their giving toward those in greater need rather those who may be more competent, and (b) subtle nonverbal cues of status influence altruistic decision-making.     

The good, the bad and the discriminator--errors in direct and indirect reciprocity

This paper presents, in a series of simple diagrams, concise results about the replicator dynamics of direct and indirect reciprocity. We consider repeated interactions between donors and recipients, and analyse the relationship between three basic strategies for the donor: unconditional cooperation, all-out defection, and conditional cooperation. In other words, we investigate the competition of discriminating and indiscriminating altruists with defectors. Discriminators and defectors form a bistable community, and hence a population of discriminators cannot be invaded by defectors. But unconditional altruists can invade a discriminating population and 'soften it up' for a subsequent invasion by defectors. The resulting dynamics exhibits various forms of rock-paper-scissors cycles and depends in subtle ways on noise, in the form of errors in implementation. The probability for another round (in the case of direct reciprocity), and information about the co-player (in the case of indirect reciprocity), add further elements to the ecology of reciprocation.     

Spotting altruistic dictator game players and mingling with them: the elective assortation of classmates

Altruism can evolve through assortation if the selfish advantage of egoistic individuals is outcompeted by the benefits of mutual cooperation between altruists. This selection process is possible if (a) individuals can distinguish altruists from egoists and (b) altruists cooperate electively with other altruists, leaving egoists no chance but to mingle with each other. This study investigates whether these two conditions are fulfilled in a natural setting. One hundred twenty-two students of six secondary school classes (age 10 to 19 years) played an anonymous dictator game, which functioned as a measure of altruism. Afterwards and unannounced, the students had to estimate their classmates' decisions and did so better than chance. Sociometry revealed that the accuracy of predictions depended on social closeness. Friends and disliked classmates were judged more accurately than liked classmates or those met with indifference. Moreover, altruists were friends with more altruistic persons than were egoists. The results confirm the existence of the two prerequisites for the evolution of altruism through assortation: the predictability of altruistic behavior and the association of altruists.     

Selection for altruism through random drift in variable size populations

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Altruistic behavior is defined as helping others at a cost to oneself and a lowered fitness. The lower fitness implies that altruists should be selected against, which is in contradiction with their widespread presence is nature. Present models of selection for altruism (kin or multilevel) show that altruistic behaviors can have 'hidden' advantages if the 'common good' produced by altruists is restricted to some related or unrelated groups. These models are mostly deterministic, or assume a frequency dependent fitness. RESULTS: Evolutionary dynamics is a competition between deterministic selection pressure and stochastic events due to random sampling from one generation to the next. We show here that an altruistic allele extending the carrying capacity of the habitat can win by increasing the random drift of "selfish" alleles. In other terms, the fixation probability of altruistic genes can be higher than those of a selfish ones, even though altruists have a smaller fitness. Moreover when populations are geographically structured, the altruists advantage can be highly amplified and the fixation probability of selfish genes can tend toward zero. The above results are obtained both by numerical and analytical calculations. Analytical results are obtained in the limit of large populations. CONCLUSIONS: The theory we present does not involve kin or multilevel selection, but is based on the existence of random drift in variable size populations. The model is a generalization of the original Fisher-Wright and Moran models where the carrying capacity depends on the number of altruists.     

Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village

Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT’s free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents’ contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results.     

WHEN HAWKS GIVE RISE TO DOVES: THE EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

The question of how altruism can evolve despite its local disadvantage to selfishness has produced a wealth of theoretical and empirical research capturing the attention of scientists across disciplines for decades. One feature that has remained consistent through this outpouring of knowledge has been that researchers have looked to the altruists themselves for mechanisms by which altruism can curtail selfishness. An alternative perspective may be that just as altruists want to limit selfishness in the population, so may the selfish individuals themselves. These alternative perspectives have been most evident in the fairly recent development of enforcement strategies. Punishment can effectively limit selfishness in the population, but it is not free. Thus, when punishment evolves among altruists, the double costs of exploitation from cheaters and punishment make the evolution of punishment problematic. Here we show that punishment can more readily invade selfish populations when associated with selfishness, whereas altruistic punishers cannot. Thereafter, the establishment of altruism because of enforcement by selfish punishers provides the ideal invasion conditions for altruistic punishment, effectively creating a transition of punishment from selfishness to altruistic. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little hypocrisy may go a long way in the evolution and maintenance of altruism.     

How strategy environment and wealth shape altruistic behaviour: cooperation rules affecting wealth distribution in dynamic networks

Societies rely on individual contributions to sustain public goods that benefit the entire community. Several mechanisms, that specify how individuals change their decisions based on past experiences, have been proposed to explain how altruists are not outcompeted by selfish counterparts. A key aspect of such strategy updates involves a comparison of an individual''s latest payoff with that of a random neighbour. In reality, both the economic and social milieu often shapes cooperative behaviour. We propose a new decision heuristic, where the propensity of an individual to cooperate depends on the local strategy environment in which she is embedded as well as her wealth relative to that of her neighbours. Our decision-making model allows cooperation to be sustained and also explains the results of recent experiments on social dilemmas in dynamic networks. Final cooperation levels depend only on the extent to which the strategy environment influences altruistic behaviour but are largely unaffected by network restructuring. However, the extent of wealth inequality in the community is affected by a subtle interplay between the environmental influence on a person''s decision to contribute and the likelihood of reshaping social ties, with wealth-inequality levels rising with increasing likelihood of network restructuring in some situations.     

Male cleaner wrasses adjust punishment of female partners according to the stakes

Punishment is an important deterrent against cheating in cooperative interactions. In humans, the severity of cheating affects the strength of punishment which, in turn, affects the punished individual's future behaviour. Here, we show such flexible adjustments for the first time in a non-human species, the cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus), where males are known to punish female partners. We exposed pairs of cleaners to a model client offering two types of food, preferred 'prawn' items and less-preferred 'flake' items. Analogous to interactions with real clients, eating a preferred prawn item ('cheating') led to model client removal. We varied the extent to which female cheating caused pay-off reduction to the male and measured the corresponding severity of male punishment. Males punished females more severely when females cheated during interactions with high value, rather than low value, model clients; and when females were similar in size to the male. This pattern may arise because, in this protogynous hermaphrodite, cheating by similar-sized females may reduce size differences to the extent that females change sex and become reproductive competitors. In response to more severe punishment from males, females behaved more cooperatively. Our results show that punishment can be adjusted to circumstances and that such subtleties can have an important bearing on the outcome of cooperative interactions.     

Size and asymmetry: are there costs to winning the royalty race?

Body size and morphology are key fitness-determining traits that can vary genotypically. They are likely to be important in social insect queens, which mate in swarms and found colonies independently, but genetic influences on queen morphology have been little investigated. Here, we show that the body size and morphology of queens are influenced by their genotype in the leaf-cutting ant Acromyrmex echinatior, a species in which certain lineages (patrilines) bias their development towards reproductive queens rather than sterile workers. We found no relationship between the queen-worker skew of patrilines and the size or morphology of queens, but there was a significant relationship with fluctuating asymmetry, which was greater in more queen-biased patrilines. Our results suggest that queen-biased patrilines do not incur a fitness cost in terms of body size, but may face more subtle costs in developmental stability. Such costs may constrain the evolution of royal cheating in social insects.     

A mechanistic molecular test of the plant-sanction hypothesis in legume–rhizobia mutualism

The origin and persistence of mutualism is difficult to explain because of the widespread occurrence of exploitative, ‘cheating’ partners. As a policing strategy stabilising intraspecific cooperation, host sanctions against non-N₂ fixing, cheating symbionts have been proposed to stabilise mutualism in legume-rhizobium symbiosis. Mechanism of penalisations would include decreased nodular rhizobial viability and/or early nodule senescence. We tested these potential mechanisms of penalisations in split-root experiments using two soybean varieties and two rhizobial strains, a cooperative, normal N₂-fixing strain and an isogenic non-fixing derivative. We found no differences in the number of viable rhizobia recovered from nodules and no differential expression of a nodular senescence molecular marker. Thus, our results do not support the hypothesis of plant sanctions acting against cheating rhizobia in our experimental conditions.     

The spatial spread of altruism versus the evolutionary response of egoists

Several recent models have shown that altruism can spread in viscous populations, i.e. in spatially structured populations within which individuals interact only with their immediate neighbours and disperse only over short distances. I first confirm this result with an individual-based model of a viscous population, where an individual can vary its level of investment into a behaviour that is beneficial to its neighbours but costly to itself. Two distinct classes of individuals emerge: egoists with no or very little investment into altruism, and altruists with a high level of investment; intermediate levels of altruism are not maintained. I then extend the model to investigate the consequences of letting interaction and dispersal distances evolve along with altruism. Altruists maintain short distances, while the egoists respond to the spread of altruism by increasing their interaction and dispersal distances. This allows the egoistic individuals to be maintained in the population at a high frequency. Furthermore, the coevolution of investment into altruism and interaction distance can lead to a stable spatial pattern, where stripes of altruists (with local interactions) alternate with stripes of egoists (with far-reaching interactions). Perhaps most importantly, this approach shows that the ease with which altruism spreads in viscous populations is maintained despite countermeasures evolved by egoists.