Critical bioethics: beyond the social science critique of applied ethics

This article attempts to show a way in which social science research can contribute in a meaningful and equitable way to philosophical bioethics. It builds on the social science critique of bioethics present in the work of authors such as Renee Fox, Barry Hoffmaster and Charles Bosk, proposing the characteristics of a critical bioethics that would take social science seriously. The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics gives a dominant role to idealised, rational thought, and tends to exclude social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies. Another problem is they way in which bioethics assumes social reality divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories. Critical bioethics requires bioethicists to root their enquiries in empirical research, to challenge theories using evidence, to be reflexive and to be sceptical about the claims of other bioethicists, scientists and clinicians. The aim is to produce a rigorous normative analysis of lived moral experience.     

John W. Burgess,the racial state and the making of the American science of politics

This article examines the place of racial ideas in the constitution of political science as an academic discipline in the USA. For the Gilded Age generation that built the first PhD-granting departments in political science in the country, ‘race’ was the source of sovereignty, the basis of democratic legitimacy and a tool for delineating democracy's borders. It was also an important element of that cohort's aspiration to a ‘science’ of politics, distinct from what they viewed as the ‘abstract and formal’ theorizing of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, while the brand of racialism that characterized this founding moment came to seem outmoded within a few decades, in the 1920s political scientists seeking once again to claim an empirical, scientific basis for their discipline – and for American democracy – turned to new accounts and sciences of race.     

Robert Chambers and Thomas Henry Huxley, Science Correspondents: The Popularization and Dissemination of Nineteenth Century Natural Science

Robert Chambers and Thomas Henry Huxley helped popularize science by writing for general interest publications when science was becoming increasingly professionalized. A non-professional, Chambers used his family-owned Chambers' Edinburgh Journal to report on scientific discoveries, giving his audience access to ideas that were only available to scientists who regularly attended professional meetings or read published transactions of such forums. He had no formal training in the sciences and little interest in advancing the professional status of scientists; his course of action was determined by his disability and interest in scientific phenomena. His skillful reporting enabled readers to learn how the ideas that flowed from scientific innovation affected their lives, and his series of article in the Journal presenting his rudimentary ideas on evolution, served as a prelude to his important popular work, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation. Huxley, an example of the new professional class of scientists, defended science and evolution from attacks by religious spokesmen and other opponents of evolution, informing the British public about science through his lectures and articles in such publications as Nineteenth Century. He understood that by popularizing scientific information, he could effectively challenge the old Tory establishment -- with its orthodox religious and political views -- and promote the ideas of the new class of professional scientists. In attempting to transform British society, he frequently came in conflict with theologians and others on issues in which science and religion seemed to contradict each other but refused to discuss matters of science with non-professionals like Chambers, whose popular writing struck a more resonant chord with working class readers. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On the role of hypotheses in science

Scientific research progresses by the dialectic dialogue between hypothesis building and the experimental testing of these hypotheses. Microbiologists as biologists in general can rely on an increasing set of sophisticated experimental methods for hypothesis testing such that many scientists maintain that progress in biology essentially comes with new experimental tools. While this is certainly true, the importance of hypothesis building in science should not be neglected. Some scientists rely on intuition for hypothesis building. However, there is also a large body of philosophical thinking on hypothesis building whose knowledge may be of use to young scientists. The present essay presents a primer into philosophical thoughts on hypothesis building and illustrates it with two hypotheses that played a major role in the history of science (the parallel axiom and the fifth element hypothesis). It continues with philosophical concepts on hypotheses as a calculus that fits observations (Copernicus), the need for plausibility (Descartes and Gilbert) and for explicatory power imposing a strong selection on theories (Darwin, James and Dewey). Galilei introduced and James and Poincaré later justified the reductionist principle in hypothesis building. Waddington stressed the feed-forward aspect of fruitful hypothesis building, while Poincaré called for a dialogue between experiment and hypothesis and distinguished false, true, fruitful and dangerous hypotheses. Theoretical biology plays a much lesser role than theoretical physics because physical thinking strives for unification principle across the universe while biology is confronted with a breathtaking diversity of life forms and its historical development on a single planet. Knowledge of the philosophical foundations on hypothesis building in science might stimulate more hypothesis-driven experimentation that simple observation-oriented “fishing expeditions” in biological research.     

We're Going on a Fossil Hunt!

Scientists understand that scientific ideas are subject to change and improvement. Fourth- through eighth- graders develop this understanding about the nature of science as they gather and examine fossil evidence from the Paleozoic era, record their findings, and read and write about science for authentic purposes as scientists do. Students recognize the tentative nature of science and experience differences in interpretation of evidence. Students also learn that scientists use writing and sketching as tools of inquiry.     

On being a (modern) scientist: risks of public engagement in the UK interspecies embryo debate

In 2006, a small group of UK academic scientists made headlines when they proposed the creation of interspecies embryos – mixing human and animal genetic material. A public campaign was fought to mobilize support for the research. Drawing on interviews with the key scientists involved, this paper argues that engaging the public through communicating their ideas via the media can result in tensions between the necessity of, and inherent dangers in, scientists campaigning on controversial issues. Some scientists believed that communicating science had damaged their professional standing in the eyes of their peers, who, in turn, policed the boundaries around what they believed constituted a “good” scientist. Tensions between promoting “science” versus promotion of the “scientist”; engaging the public versus publishing peer-reviewed articles and winning grants; and building expectations versus overhyping the science reveal the difficult choices scientists in the modern world have to make over the potential gains and risks of communicating science. We conclude that although scientists' participation in public debates is often encouraged, the rewards of such engagement remain. Moreover, this participation can detrimentally affect scientists' careers.     

Science and the Concept of Evolution: From the Big Bang to the Origin and Evolution of Life

The common thread of evolution runs through all science disciplines, and the concept of evolution enables students to better understand the nature of the universe and our origins. “Science and the Concept of Evolution” is one of two interdisciplinary science Core courses taken by Dowling College undergraduates as part of their General Education requirements. The course examines basic principles and methods of science by following the concept of evolution from the big bang to the origin and evolution of life. Case studies of leading scientists illustrate how their ideas developed and contributed to the evolution of our understanding of the world. Evidences for physical, chemical, and biological evolution are explored, and students learn to view the evolution of matter and of ideas as a natural process of change over space and time.     

Do we need theory to study disease? Lessons from cancer research and their implications for mental illness

This article applies general ideas from contemporary philosophy of science--chief among them that much good science proceeds without theories and laws--to the science of medicine. I claim that traditional philosophical debates over the nature of disease make demands on medicine that are mistaken. I demonstrate this philosophical error by applying the perspective of the philosophy of science to understanding the nature of disease in two concrete cases, cancer and depression. I first argue that cancer research produces various kinds of piecemeal causal explanation and does so without any well-developed theory of normal and malignant functioning, despite the rhetoric of some leading cancer researchers. I then defuse doubts about the scientific status of psychiatry, by demonstrating that it is not necessary to have a theory of normal functioning in order to understand and treat depression.     

Bridging Restoration Science and Practice: Results and Analysis of a Survey from the 2009 Society for Ecological Restoration International Meeting

Developing and strengthening a more mutualistic relationship between the science of restoration ecology and the practice of ecological restoration has been a central but elusive goal of SERI since its inaugural meeting in 1989. We surveyed the delegates to the 2009 SERI World Conference to learn more about their perceptions of and ideas for improving restoration science, practice, and scientist/practitioner relationships. The respondents' assessments of restoration practice were less optimistic than their assessments of restoration science. Only 26% believed that scientist/practitioner relationships were “generally mutually beneficial and supportive of each other,” and the “science–practice gap” was the second and third most frequently cited category of factors limiting the science and practice of restoration, respectively (“insufficient funding” was first in both cases). Although few faulted practitioners for ignoring available science, many criticized scientists for ignoring the pressing needs of practitioners and/or failing to effectively communicate their work to nonscientists. Most of the suggestions for bridging the gap between restoration science and practice focused on (1) developing the necessary political support for more funding of restoration science, practice, and outreach; and (2) creating alternative research paradigms to both facilitate on‐the‐ground projects and promote more mutualistic exchanges between scientists and practitioners. We suggest that one way to implement these recommendations is to create a “Restoration Extension Service” modeled after the United States Department of Agriculture's Cooperative Extension Service. We also recommend more events that bring together a fuller spectrum of restoration scientists, practitioners, and relevant stakeholders.     

The model of development of science by the example of limnology

Limnology--the science about lakes is the young and relatively closed area of studies; its existence is owing to several hundreds of scientists. The International Society of Limnologists holds its meetings since 1922. We used materials of these meetings to find out the main stages of development of this science; among these stages there were both fast and relatively calm periods. Based on analysis of these data, we constructed a model of development of the science, the same data being used for tuning and verification of the model. We have suggested that the main regularities and of development of limnology can be extrapolated to other sciences. The main "acting person" in the model is population of scientists. Each scientist, with some probability, can propose new ideas as well as use in his elaborations some particular complex of the already accumulated knowledge and ideas. The model also takes into consideration how the scientific information is spreading, specifically some individual peculiarities of model scientists, such as age, experience, communicability. After the model parameters had been chosen in such a way that is described adequately the development of limnology, we performed a series of experiments by changing some of the characteristics and obtained rather unexpected results published preliminary in the short work (Levchenko V. F and Menshutkin V. V. Int. J. Comp. Anticip. Syst., 2008, vol. 22, p. 63-75) and discussed here in the greater detail. It is revealed, that the development of science is passing irregularly and sharply decelerated at low level of scientists communication and absence of scientific schools, and that the age of "scientific youth" of scientist begins usually only after 40 years.     

The science of research: The principles underlying the discovery of cognitive and other biological mechanisms

Studies of cognitive function include a wide spectrum of disciplines, with very diverse theoretical and practical frameworks. For example, in Behavioral Neuroscience cognitive mechanisms are mostly inferred from loss of function (lesion) experiments while in Cognitive Neuroscience these mechanisms are commonly deduced from brain activation patterns. Although neuroscientists acknowledge the limitations of deriving conclusions using a limited scope of approaches, there are no systematically studied, objective and explicit criteria for what is required to test a given hypothesis of cognitive function. This problem plagues every discipline in science: scientific research lacks objective, systematic studies that validate the principles underlying even its most elemental practices. For example, scientists decide what experiments are best suited to test key ideas in their field, which hypotheses have sufficient supporting evidence and which require further investigation, which studies are important and which are not, based on intuitions derived from experience, implicit principles learned from mentors and colleagues, traditions in their fields, etc. Philosophers have made numerous attempts to articulate and frame the principles that guide research and innovation, but these speculative ideas have remained untested and have had a minimal impact on the work of scientists. Here, I propose the development of methods for systematically and objectively studying and improving the modus operandi of research and development. This effort (the science of scientific research or S2) will benefit all aspects of science, from education of young scientists to research, publishing and funding, since it will provide explicit and systematically tested frameworks for practices in science. To illustrate its goals, I will introduce a hypothesis (the Convergent Four) derived from experimental practices common in molecular and cellular biology. This S2 hypothesis proposes that there are at least four fundamentally distinct strategies that scientists can use to test the connection between two phenomena of interest (A and B), and that to establish a compelling connection between A and B it is crucial to develop independently confirmed lines of convergent evidence in each of these four categories. The four categories include negative alteration (decrease probability of A or p(A) and determine p(B)), positive alteration (increase p(A) and determine p(B)), non-intervention (examine whether A precedes B) and integration (develop ideas about how to get from A to B and integrate those ideas with other available information about A and B). I will discuss both strategies to test this hypothesis and its implications for studies of cognitive function.     

Biohumanities: rethinking the relationship between biosciences, philosophy and history of science, and society

We argue that philosophical and historical research can constitute a "Biohumanities" that deepens our understanding of biology itself engages in constructive "science criticism," helps formulate new "visions of biology," and facilitates "critical science communication." We illustrate these ideas with two recent "experimental philosophy" studies of the concept of the gene and of the concept of innateness conducted by ourselves and collaborators. We conclude that the complex and often troubled relations between science and society are critical to both parties, and argue that the philosophy and history of science can help to make this relationship work.     

Environmental indices and the politics of the Conservation Reserve Program

Environmental indicators can be used to target public programs to provide a variety of benefits. Social scientists, physical scientists, and politicians have roles in developing indicators that reflect the demands of diverse interest groups. We review the US Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest agricultural conservation program the United States, to determine how a set of environmental indicators were developed and used, and assess results of their application. The use of such indicators has helped the CRP increase and broaden the program’s environmental benefits beyond erosion reduction, which was the primary focus of early program efforts, to meet other demands. This case study provides an example about how integration and assessment for the purpose of managing public resources requires more than natural science disciplines. Social science can help explain how public values influence what information is collected and how it is interpreted. Examples are given to show how the indices used for the CRP integrated science, politics and social values. In the end, the environmental benefits index (EBI) used to target US$ 20 billion of CRP funds reflects compromises made between science and policy considerations. It is our intention that studying this index will yield ideas and understanding from the natural science community that develops ecosystem indices about how to better plug in to programs in the future.     

The Practitioner of Science: Everyone her Own Historian

Carl Becker's classic 1931 address ``Everyman his own historian'holds lessons for historians of science today. Like the professional historians he spoke to, we are content to displaythe Ivory-Tower Syndrome, writing scholarly treatises only forone another, disdaining both the general reader and our naturalreadership, scientists. Following his rhetoric, I argue thatscientists are well aware of their own historicity, and wouldbe interested in lively and balanced histories of science. It isironic that the very professionalism that ought to equip us towrite such histories has imposed on us a powerful taboo that rendersus unable to do so. We who count ourselves sophisticated in describing the effects ofsocial forces upon past scientists have been remarkably unconsciousof the ways our own practices are being shaped by our need (and perhapsmore importantly, the needs of our teachers' teachers) to distinguish ourselves from scientists who write history. Our fear of presentism ingeneral and Whig history in particular is really a taboo, that is, anexcessive avoidance enforced by social pressure. It succeeds at makingour work distinct from histories written by scientists, but at the awful cost of blotting out the great fact of scientific progress.Scientists may be misguided in expecting us to celebrate great men,but they are right to demand from historians an analysis of the processof testing and improvement that is central to science. If progress in general is a problematic term, we could label the process ``emendation.' This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Model of development of science by the example of limnology

Limnology—the science about lakes—is the young and relatively closed area of studies; its existence is owing to several hundreds of scientists. The International Society of Limnologists holds its meetings since 1922. We used materials of these meetings to find out the main stages of development of this science; among these stages there were both fast and relatively calm periods. Based on analysis of these data, we constructed a model of development of the science, the same data being used for tuning and verification of the model. We have suggested that the main regularities and mechanisms of development of limnology can be extrapolated to other sciences. The main “acting person” in the model is population of scientists. Each scientist, with some probability, can propose new ideas as well as use in his studies some particular complex of the already accumulated knowledge and ideas. The model also takes into consideration how the scientific information is spreading, as well as some individual peculiarities of model scientists, such as age, experience, communicability. After the model parameters had been chosen in such a way that is described adequately development of limnology, we performed a series of experiments by changing some of the characteristics and obtained rather unexpected results published preliminary in the short work (Levchenko, V.F. and Menshutkin, V.V., Int. J. Comput. Anticip. Syst., 2008, vol. 22, pp. 63–75) and discussed here in the greater detail. It is revealed that development of science occurs irregularly and is sharply decelerated at low level of communication between scientists and the absence of scientific schools, while the age of “scientific youth” of scientist usually begins only after 40 years.     

Worthy heir or treacherous patricide? Konrad Lorenz and Jakob v. Uexküll.

The biologist Jakob v. Uexküll is often seen as the preceptor of modern behavioral theory, who lastingly influenced Konrad Lorenz in particular. Nevertheless, Uexküll has been highly inadequately received by the school Lorenz founded. This neglect of Uexküll's works resulted because Lorenz and Uexküll came into contact at a time when the biological sciences were sundered by a deep ideological division. On the one side stood the Darwin-rejecting Neo-Vitalists (for example Uexküll), on the other side were the Neo-Darwinists (for example Lorenz). After Vitalism was overcome as a consequence of the Evolutionary Synthesis, Darwinists who had taken an intermittent interest in Vitalists and their theories could now only distance themselves completely from earlier ideas. This went not only for biologists and behavioral researchers, but also for medical scientists. The emancipation from the starting points of their own science was so complete that, even decades later, when the earlier debates about Mechanism and Vitalism were long since historically outdated, behavioral research never investigated its own history.     

Evolving Scientific Epistemologies and the Artifacts of Empirical Philosophy of Science: A Reply Concerning Mesosomes

In a 1993 paper, I argued that empirical treatments of the epistemologyused by scientists in experimental work are too abstract in practice tocounter relativist efforts to explain the outcome of scientificcontroversies by reference to sociological forces. This was because, atthe rarefied level at which the methodology of scientists is treated byphilosophers, multiple mutually inconsistent instantiations of theprinciples described by philosophers are employed by contestingscientists. These multiple construals change within a scientificcommunity over short time frames, and these different versions ofscientific methodology can determine the outcome of a controversy. Iillustrated with a comparatively detailed analysis of the methodologyused by biologists debating the existence of an entity called thebacterial mesosome between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. This 1993piece has drawn several critiques in the philosophical literature. Inthis present piece I respond to these critiques and argue that they failto address the core argument of the original paper, and I reflectfurther on the methodologies of philosophers of science pursuingempirical or `naturalistic' epistemology.     

The Scientific Discovery of ‘Natural Capital’: The Production of Catalytic Antibodies

Modern science has undoubtedly become one the principal engines of economic growth, even though the epistemological status of scientific knowledge has been continuously contested. Leaving the philosophical problem of knowledge aside, this paper examines how scientific discovery contributes to the production of wealth. The analysis focuses on a recent achievement at the crossroads of chemistry, immunology and biotechnology: antibody catalysis. For this purpose, we develop a model of entrepreneurial work to explain how the discovery of natural products and processes generates new economic opportunities. The proposed model is based on the assumption that scientists believe that the natural environment is a repository of ‘natural capital’. Natural capital includes goods that are not made by humans but can be used to produce other goods and services. The belief in natural capital induces scientists to search for and identify a natural property that, in the specific cultural context of their work, is recognized as a valuable resource. The selection of such a property forms the initial phase of the discovery process. Certain research methods are then deployed to create novel empirical conditions within which the selected property is transformed into a specific good. The discovery of natural capital thus comprises a historically accountable entrepreneurial endeavour.