Four Ways Life Extension will Change Our Relationship with Death

Discussions of life extension ethics have focused mainly on whether an extended life would be desirable to have, and on the social consequences of widely available life extension. I want to explore a different range of issues: four ways in which the advent of life extension will change our relationship with death, not only for those who live extended lives, but also for those who cannot or choose not to. Although I believe that, on balance, the reasons in favor of developing life extension outweigh the reasons against doing so (something I won't argue for here), most of these changes probably count as reasons against doing so. First, the advent of life extension will alter the human condition for those who live extended lives, and not merely by postponing death. Second, it will make death worse for those who lack access to life extension, even if those people live just as long as they do now. Third, for those who have access to life extension but prefer to live a normal lifespan because they think that has advantages, the advent of life extension will somewhat reduce some of those advantages, even if they never use life extension. Fourth, refusing life extension turns out to be a form of suicide, and this will force those who have access to life extension but turn it down to choose between an extended life they don't want and a form of suicide they may (probably mistakenly) consider immoral.     

Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children

Eugenic selection of embryos is now possible by employing in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). While PGD is currently being employed for the purposes of detecting chromosomal abnormalities or inherited genetic abnormalities, it could in principle be used to test any genetic trait such as hair colour or eye colour.
Genetic research is rapidly progressing into the genetic basis of complex traits like intelligence and a gene has been identified for criminal behaviour in one family. Once the decision to have IVF is made, PGD has few 'costs' to couples, and people would be more inclined to use it to select less serious medical traits, such as a lower risk of developing Alzheimer Disease, or even for non-medical traits. PGD has already been used to select embryos of a desired gender in the absence of any history of sex-linked genetic disease.
I will argue that: (1) some non-disease genes affect the likelihood of us leading the best life; (2) we have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should select embryos or fetuses which are most likely to have the best life, based on available genetic information, including information about non-disease genes. I will also argue that we should allow selection for non-disease genes even if this maintains or increases social inequality. I will focus on genes for intelligence and sex selection.
I will defend a principle which I call Procreative Beneficence: couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.     

Why Eberl is wrong. Reflections on the beginning of personhood

In a paper published in Bioethics, Jason Eberl has argued that early embryos are not persons and should not be granted the status possessed by them. Eberl bases this position upon the following claims: (1) The early embryo has a passive potentiality for development into a person. (2) The early embryo has not established both 'unique genetic identity' and 'ongoing ontological identity', which are necessary conditions for ensoulment. (3) The early embryo has a low probability of developing into a more developed embryo. This paper examines these claims. I argue against (1) that a plausible view is that the early embryo has an active potentiality to grow into a more developed embryo. Against (2), I argue that neither 'unique genetic identity' nor 'ongoing ontological identity' are necessary conditions for ensoulment, and that 'ongoing ontological identity' is established between early embryos and more developed embryos. Against (3), I argue that the fact that the early embryo has a low probability of developing into a more developed embryo, if true, does not warrant the conclusion that the early embryo is not a person. If Eberl is right that the human soul is that which organises the activities of a human being and that ensouled humans are persons, embryos are persons from conception.     

Ectogenesis,abortion and a right to the death of the fetus

Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro‐life and pro‐choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, by arguing against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent, their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however, is not a woman's right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together.     

Orphaned at conception: the uncanny offspring of embryos

A number of advances in assisted reproduction have been greeted by the accusation that they would produce children 'without parents'. In this paper I will argue that while to date these accusations have been false, there is a limited but important sense in which they would be true of children born of a reproductive technology that is now on the horizon. If our genetic parents are those individuals from whom we have inherited 50% of our genes, then, unlike in any other reproductive scenario, children who were conceived from gametes derived from stem cell lines derived from discarded IVF embryos would have no genetic parents! This paper defends this claim and investigates its ethical implications. I argue that there are reasons to think that the creation of such embryos might be morally superior to the existing alternatives in an important set of circumstances.     

Mind the Gaps: Intersex and (Re-productive) Spaces in Disability Studies and Bioethics

With a few notable exceptions disability studies has not taken account of intersexuality, and it is principally through the lenses of feminist and queer-theory oriented ethical discussions but not through ‘straight’ bioethics that modes valuing intersex difference have been proposed. Meanwhile, the medical presupposition that intersex characteristics are inherently disabling to social viability remains the taken-for-granted truth from which clinical practice proceeds. In this paper I argue against bioethical perspectives that justify extensive and invasive pre- and post-natal medical interference to eradicate intersex. I argue instead that to constitute the necessary conditions for the recognition of the intersexed child as a person, a life valid in its own right, clinicians must refrain from aggressive interference. Clinical specialists presuppose that intersexed children will be socially disabled and unrecognizable as persons; frustrated by the general failure of traditional interventions to assign a sex, clinicians are now pursuing prenatal technologies, including selective termination, to erase intersex.     

Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do)

The aim of this article is to identify the strongest evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) against moral realism and to assess on which empirical assumptions it relies. In the recent metaethical literature, several authors have de-emphasized the evolutionary component of EDAs against moral realism: presumably, the success or failure of these arguments is largely orthogonal to empirical issues. I argue that this claim is mistaken. First, I point out that Sharon Street’s and Michael Ruse’s EDAs both involve substantive claims about the evolution of our moral judgments. Next, I argue that combining their respective evolutionary claims can help debunkers to make the best empirical case against moral realism. Some realists have argued that the very attempt to explain the contents of our endorsed moral judgments in evolutionary terms is misguided, and have sought to escape EDAs by denying their evolutionary premise. But realists who pursue this reply can still be challenged on empirical grounds: debunkers may argue that the best, scientifically informed historical explanations of our moral endorsements do not involve an appeal to mind-independent truths. I conclude, therefore, that the empirical considerations relevant for the strongest empirically driven argument against moral realism go beyond the strictly evolutionary realm; debunkers are best advised to draw upon other sources of genealogical knowledge as well.     

Against the inalienable right to withdraw from research

In this paper I argue, against the current consensus, that the right to withdraw from research is sometimes alienable. In other words, research subjects are sometimes morally permitted to waive their right to withdraw. The argument proceeds in three major steps. In the first step, I argue that rights typically should be presumed alienable, both because that is not illegitimately coercive and because the general paternalistic motivation for keeping them inalienable is untenable. In the second step of the argument, I consider three special characteristics of the right to withdraw, first that its waiver might be exploitative, second that research involves intimate bodily access, and third that it is irreversible. I argue that none of these characteristics justify an inalienable right to withdraw. In the third step, I examine four considerations often taken to justify various other allegedly inalienable rights: concerns about treating yourself merely as a means as might be the case in suicide, concerns about revoking all your future freedoms in slavery contracts, the resolution of coordination problems, and public interest. I argue that the motivations involved in these four types of situations do not apply to the right to withdraw from research.     

Constitution and common law in bioethics

The use of rights based arguments to justify claims that donor offspring should have access to information identifying their gamete donor has become increasingly widespread. In this paper, I do not intend to revisit the debate about the validity of such rights. Rather, the purpose is to examine the way that such alleged rights have been implemented by those legislatures that have allowed access to identifying information. I will argue that serious inconsistencies exist between the claim that donor offspring have a right to know the identity of their gamete donor and the way such a right is currently met in practice. I hope to show that in systems where non-anonymous donation is practised, an understanding of the proclaimed right of donor offspring to know their genetic identity is one composed of two different rights – the right to know the circumstances of their conception and the right to information identifying the gamete donor – can provide important insights into this important area of public policy.     

Beneath the rhetoric: the role of rights in the practice of non-anonymous gamete donation

The use of rights based arguments to justify claims that donor offspring should have access to information identifying their gamete donor has become increasingly widespread. In this paper, I do not intend to revisit the debate about the validity of such rights. Rather, the purpose is to examine the way that such alleged rights have been implemented by those legislatures that have allowed access to identifying information. I will argue that serious inconsistencies exist between the claim that donor offspring have a right to know the identity of their gamete donor and the way such a right is currently met in practice. I hope to show that in systems where non-anonymous donation is practised, an understanding of the proclaimed right of donor offspring to know their genetic identity is one composed of two different rights – the right to know the circumstances of their conception and the right to information identifying the gamete donor – can provide important insights into this important area of public policy.     

Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

According to some recent arguments, (Joyce in The evolution of morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006; Ruse and Wilson in Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995; Street in Philos Studies 127: 109–166, 2006) if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, (a) the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and (b) the claim (or a certain interpretation of the claim) that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might.     

Frozen embryos, genetic information and reproductive rights

Recent ethical and legal challenges have arisen concerning the rights of individuals over their IVF embryos, leading to questions about how, when the wishes of parents regarding their embryos conflict, such situations ought to be resolved. A notion commonly invoked in relation to frozen embryo disputes is that of reproductive rights: a right to have (or not to have) children. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean a right to have, or not to have, one's own genetic children. But can such rights legitimately be asserted to give rise to claims over embryos? We examine the question of property in genetic material as applied to gametes and embryos, and whether rights over genetic information extend to grant control over IVF embryos. In particular we consider the purported right not to have one's own genetically related children from a property‐based perspective. We argue that even if we concede that such (property) rights do exist, those rights become limited in scope and application upon engaging in reproduction. We want to show that once an IVF embryo is created for the purpose of reproduction, any right not to have genetically‐related children that may be based in property rights over genetic information is ceded. There is thus no right to prevent one's IVF embryos from being brought to birth on the basis of a right to avoid having one's own genetic children. Although there may be reproductive rights over gametes and embryos, these are not grounded in genetic information.     

Rtg2 protein links metabolism and genome stability in yeast longevity

Mitochondrial dysfunction induces a signaling pathway, which culminates in changes in the expression of many nuclear genes. This retrograde response, as it is called, extends yeast replicative life span. It also results in a marked increase in the cellular content of extrachromosomal ribosomal DNA circles (ERCs), which can cause the demise of the cell. We have resolved the conundrum of how these two molecular mechanisms of yeast longevity operate in tandem. About 50% of the life-span extension elicited by the retrograde response involves processes other than those that counteract the deleterious effects of ERCs. Deletion of RTG2, a gene that plays a central role in relaying the retrograde response signal to the nucleus, enhances the generation of ERCs in cells with (grande) or in cells without (petite) fully functional mitochondria, and it curtails the life span of each. In contrast, overexpression of RTG2 diminishes ERC formation in both grandes and petites. The excess Rtg2p did not augment the retrograde response, indicating that it was not engaged in retrograde signaling. FOB1, which is known to be required for ERC formation, and RTG2 were found to be in converging pathways for ERC production. RTG2 did not affect silencing of ribosomal DNA in either grandes or petites, which were similar to each other in the extent of silencing at this locus. Silencing of ribosomal DNA increased with replicative age in either the presence or the absence of Rtg2p, distinguishing silencing and ERC accumulation. Our results indicate that the suppression of ERC production by Rtg2p requires that it not be in the process of transducing the retrograde signal from the mitochondrion. Thus, RTG2 lies at the nexus of cellular metabolism and genome stability, coordinating two pathways that have opposite effects on yeast longevity.     

Two kinds of physician‐assisted death

I argue that the concept ‘physician‐assisted suicide’ covers two procedures that should be distinguished: giving someone access to humane means to end his own life, and taking co‐responsibility for the safe and effective execution of that plan. In the first section I explain the distinction, in the following sections I show why it is important. To begin with I argue that we should expect the laws that permit these two kinds of ‘assistance’ to be different in their justificatory structure. Laws that permit giving access only presuppose that the right to self‐determination implies a right to suicide, but laws that permit doctors to take co‐responsibility may have to appeal to a principle of mercy or beneficence. Actually this difference in justificatory structure can to some extent be found in existing regulatory systems, though far from consistently. Finally I argue that if one recognizes a right to suicide, as Oregon and other American states implicitly do, and as the European Court of Human Rights has recently done explicitly, one is committed to permit the first kind of ‘assistance’ under some conditions.     

Media and breastfeeding: Friend or foe?

This short essay examines infant formula marketing and information sources for their representation of "choice" in the infant feeding context, and finds that while providing information about breast and bottle feeding, infant formula manufacturers focus on mothers' feelings and intuition rather than knowledge in making decisions. In addition, the essay considers how "choice" operates in the history of reproductive rights, shifting the discourse from a rights-based set of arguments to one based on a consumerist mentality. Utilizing the work of historian Rickie Solinger and a 2007 paper for the National Bureau of Labor Statistics, I argue that the structure of market work, and not abstract maternal decision making, determine mothers' choices and practices concerning infant feeding. For true freedoms for mothers to be achieved, freedoms that would include greater social provisions for mothers, our culture will have to confront how structural constraints make breastfeeding difficult, as well as how the concept of choice divides mothers into those who make good choices and those who do not.     

Embryos,The Principle of Proportionality,and the Shaky Ground of Moral Respect

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears.     

Effects of mutations in DNA repair genes on formation of ribosomal DNA circles and life span in Saccharomyces cerevisiae

A cause of aging in Saccharomyces cerevisiae is the accumulation of extrachromosomal ribosomal DNA circles (ERCs). Introduction of an ERC into young mother cells shortens life span and accelerates the onset of age-associated sterility. It is important to understand the process by which ERCs are generated. Here, we demonstrate that homologous recombination is necessary for ERC formation. rad52 mutant cells, defective in DNA repair through homologous recombination, do not accumulate ERCs with age, and mutations in other genes of the RAD52 class have varying effects on ERC formation. rad52 mutation leads to a progressive delocalization of Sir3p from telomeres to other nuclear sites with age and, surprisingly, shortens life span. We speculate that spontaneous DNA damage, perhaps double-strand breaks, causes lethality in mutants of the RAD52 class and may be an initial step of aging in wild-type cells.     

Epistemology, necessity, and evolution: a critical review of Michael Ruse��s Philosophy After Darwin

Michael Ruse??s new anthology Philosophy After Darwin provides great history and background in the major impacts Darwinism has had on philosophy, especially in ethics and epistemology. This review focuses on epistemology understood through the lens of evolution by natural selection. I focus on one of Ruse??s own articles in the collection, which responds to two classic articles by Konrad Lorenz and David Hull on the two major forms of evolutionary epistemology. I side with Ruse against Lorenz??s account of the necessity we think our principles of reasoning have, though I disagree with Ruse??s particular example. I also argue that Ruse??s alternative explanation is lacking. Against Hull, I side with Ruse in his doubts that a sociobiological approach to science will prove fruitful, though I point out that it has certain advantages other approaches do not have. Although I side with Ruse on the issue, I conclude that the two views do not really come into direct conflict and so one needs not reject either. Finally, I discuss Ruse??s positive view and raise questions for his conception of evolutionary epistemology. I conclude that his arguments are insufficient to overcome opposing views and his view has at least as many unintuitive conclusions as the alternatives.     

Alternative sources of pluripotent stem cells: altered nuclear transfer

Abstract. Altered nuclear transfer (ANT) is one of several methods that have been suggested for obtaining pluripotent stem cells without destroying human embryos. ANT proposes to alter the nucleus of a somatic cell and/or the cytoplasm of an enucleated oocyte such that when the two are combined, they do not produce a zygote, but rather they form a cell capable of producing pluripotent stem cells without being an embryo. The ANT proposal raises the serious question of whether it is possible to know with confidence that this procedure generates a non-embryo, rather than merely an embryo with a deficiency. Here I address the question of how embryos can be distinguished from non-embryos using scientific criteria and apply these criteria to the two forms of ANT proposed thus far: ANT combined with oocyte-assisted reprogramming (ANT-OAR) or with gene deletion (ANT-GD). I propose that the first globally coordinated event in human development, the formation of trophoblast and inner cell mass (ICM) lineages via Cdx2-Oct3/4 mutual cross-repression, is the earliest act of the embryo qua embryo; it is an operation intrinsic to an embryo as such, and entities lacking the power ( potentia ) for such an act cannot be considered embryos. Thus, I will argue that formation of trophoblast-ICM lineages is a both necessary and sufficient criterion for determining whether ANT produces an embryo or a non-embryonic entity.     

B for bureaucracy

Despite the scientific community''s overwhelming support for the European Research Council, many grant recipients are irked about red tapeThere is one thing that most European researchers agree on: B stands for Brussels and bureaucracy. Research funding from the European Commission (EC), which distributes EU money, is accompanied by strict accountability and auditing rules in order to ensure that European taxpayers'' money is not wasted. All disbursements are treated the same, whether subsidies to farmers or grants to university researchers. However, the creation of the European Research Council (ERC) in 2007 as a new EU funding agency for basic research created high hopes among scientists for a reduced bureaucratic burden.… many researchers who have received ERC funding have been angered with accounting rules inherited from the EC''s Framework Programmes…ERC has, indeed, been a breath of fresh air to European-level research funding as it distributes substantial grants based only on the excellence of the proposal and has been overwhelmingly supported by the scientific community. Nevertheless, many researchers who have received ERC funding have been angered with accounting rules inherited from the EC''s Framework Programmes, and which seem impossible to change. In particular, a requirement to fill out time sheets to demonstrate that scientists spend an appropriate amount of time working on the project for which they received their ERC grant has triggered protests over the paperwork (Jacobs, 2009).Luis Serrano, Coordinator of the Systems Biology Programme at the Centre for Genomic Regulation in Barcelona, Spain, and recipient of a €2 million ERC Advanced Investigator Grant for five years, said the requirement of keeping time sheets is at best a waste of time and worst an insult to the high-level researchers. “Time sheets do not make much sense, to be honest. If you want to cheat, you can always cheat,” he said. He said other grants he receives from the Spanish government and the Human Frontier Science Programme do not require time sheets.Complaints by academic researchers about the creeping bureaucratization of research are not confined to the old continent (see Opinion by Paul van Helden, page 648). As most research, as well as universities and research institutes, is now funded by public agencies using taxpayers'' money, governments and regulators feel to be under pressure to make sure that the funds are not wasted or misappropriated. Yet, the USA and the EU have taken different approaches to making sure that scientists use public money correctly. In the USA, misappropriation of public money is considered a criminal offence that can be penalized by a ban on receiving public funds, fines and even jail time; in fact, a few scientists in the USA have gone to prison.By contrast, the EU puts the onus on controlling how public money is spent upfront. Research funding under the EU''s Framework Programmes requires clearly spelt out deliverables and milestones, and requires researchers to adhere to strict accountability and auditing rules. Not surprisingly, this comes with an administrative burden that has raised the ire of many scientists who feel that their time is better spent doing research. Serrano said in a major research centre such as the CRG, the administration could minimize the paper burden. “My administration prepares them for me and I go one, two, three, four, five and I do all of them. You can even have a machine sign for you,” he commented. “But I can imagine researchers who don''t have the administrative help, this can take up a significant amount of time.” For ERC grants, which by definition are for ‘blue-skies'' research and thus do not have milestones or deliverables, such paperwork is clearly not needed.Complaints by academic researchers about the creeping bureaucratization of research are not confined to the old continentNot everyone is as critical as Serrano though. Vincent Savolainen at the Division of Biology at Imperial College London, UK, and recipient of a €2.5 million, five-year ERC Advanced Investigator Grant, said, “Everything from the European Commission always comes with time sheets, and ERC is part of the European Commission.” Still, he felt it was very confusing to track time spent on individual grants for Principal Investigators such as him. “It is a little bit ridiculous but I guess there are places where people may abuse the system. So I can also see the side of the European Commission,” he said. “It''s not too bad. I can live with doing time sheets every month,” he added. “Still, it would be better if they got rid of it.”Juleen Zierath, an integrative physiologist in the Department of Molecular Medicine at Karolinska Institutet (Stockholm, Sweden), who received a €2.5 million, five-year ERC grant, takes the time sheets in her stride. “If I worked in a company, I would have to fill out a time sheet,” she said. “I''m delighted to have the funding. It''s a real merit. It''s a real honour. It really helps my work. If I have to fill out a time sheet for the privilege of having that amount of funding for five years, it''s not a big issue.”Zierath, a native of Milwaukee (WI, USA) who came to Karolinska for graduate work in 1989, said the ERC''s requirements are certainly “bureaucracy light” compared with the accounting and reporting requirements for more traditional EU funding instruments, such as the ‘Integrated Projects''. “ERC allows you to focus more on the science,” she said. “I don''t take time sheets as a signal that the European Union doesn''t count on us to be doing our work on the project. They have to be able to account for where they''re spending the money somehow and I think it''s okay. I can understand where some people would be really upset about that.”…governments and regulators feel to be under pressure to make sure that the funds are not wasted or misappropriated…The complaints about time sheets and other bureaucratic red tape have caught the attention of high-level scientists and research managers throughout Europe. In March 2009, the EC appointed an outside panel, headed by Vaira Vike-Freiberga, former President of Latvia, to review the ERC''s structures and mechanisms. The panel reported in July last year that the objective of building a world-class institution is not properly served by “undue cumbersome regulations, checks and controls.” Although fraud and mismanagement should be prevented, excessively bureaucratic procedures detract from the mission, and might be counter-productive.Helga Nowotny, President of the ERC, said the agency has to operate within the rules of the EC''s Framework Programme 7, which includes the ERC. She explained that if researchers hold several grants, the EC wants recipients to account for their time. “The Commission and the Rules of Participation of course argue that many of these researchers have more than one grant or they may have other contracts. In order to be accountable, the researchers must tell us how much time they spend on the project. But instead of simply asking if they spent a percentage of time on it, the Commission auditors insist on time sheets. I realize that filling them out has a high symbolic value for a researcher. So, why not leave it to the administration of the host institution?”Particle physicist Ian Halliday, President of the European Science Foundation and a major supporter of the ERC, said that financial irregularities that affected the EU over many years prompted the Commission to tighten its monitoring of cash outlays. “There have been endless scandals over the agricultural subsidies. Wine leaks. Nonexistent olive trees. You name it,” he said. “The Commission''s financial system is designed to cope with that kind of pressure as opposed to trusting the University of Cambridge, for example, which has been there for 800 years or so and has a well-earned reputation by now. That kind of system is applied in every corner of the European Commission. And that is basically what is causing the trouble. But these rules are not appropriate for research.”…financial irregularities that affected the EU over many years prompted the Commission to tighten its monitoring of cash outlaysNowotny is sympathetic and sensitive to the researchers'' complaints, saying that requiring time sheets for researchers sends a message of distrust. “It feels like you''re not trusted. It has this sort of pedantic touch to it,” she said. “If you''ve been recognized for doing this kind of top research, researchers feel, ‘Why bother [with time sheets]?''” But the bureaucratic alternative would not work for the ERC either. This would mean spelling out ‘deliverables'' in advance, which is clearly not possible with frontier research.Moreover, as Halliday pointed out, there is inevitably an element of fiction with time sheets in a research environment. In his area of research, for example, he considers it reasonable to track the hours of a technician fabricating parts of a telescope. But he noted that there is a different dynamic for researchers: “Scientists end up doing their science sitting in their bath at midnight. And you mull over problems and so forth. How do you put that on a time sheet?” Halliday added that one of the original arguments in establishing the ERC was to put it at an arm''s length from the Commission and in particular from financial regulations. But to require scientists to specify what proportion of their neurons are dedicated to a particular project at any hour of the day or night is nonsensical. Nowotny agreed. “The time sheet says I''ve been working on this from 11 in the morning until 6 in the evening or until midnight or whatever. This is not the way frontier research works,” she said.Halliday, who served for seven years as chief executive of the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (Swindon, UK), commented that all governments require accountability. In Great Britain, for instance, much more general accountability rules are applied to grantees, thereby offering a measure of trust. “We were given a lot of latitude. Don''t get me wrong that we allowed fraud, but the system was fit for the purpose of science. If a professor says he''s spending half his time on a certain bit of medical research, let''s say, the government will expect half his salary to show up in the grants he gets from the funding agencies. We believe that if the University of Cambridge says that this guy is spending half his time on this research, then that''s probably right and nobody would get excited if it was 55% or 45%. People would get excited if it was 5%. There are checks and balances at that kind of level, but it''s not at a level of time sheets. It will be checked whether the project has done roughly what it said.”Other funding agencies also take a less bureaucratic approach. Candace Hassall, head of Basic Careers at the Wellcome Trust (London, UK), which funds research to improve human and animal health, said Wellcome''s translation awards have milestones that researchers are expected to meet. But “time sheets are something that the Wellcome Trust hasn''t considered at all. I would be astonished if we would ever consider them. We like to work closely with our researchers, but we don''t require that level of reporting detail,” she said. “We think that such detailed, day-by-day monitoring is actually potentially counterproductive overall. It drives people to be afraid to take risks when risks should be taken.”…to require scientists to specify what proportion of their neurons are dedicated to a particular project at any hour of the day or night is nonsensicalOn the other side of the Atlantic, Jack Dixon, vice president and chief scientific officer at the Howard Hughes Medical Institution (Chevy Chase, MD, USA), who directs Hughes'' investigator programme, said he''d never heard of researchers being asked to keep time sheets: “Researchers filling out time sheets is just something that''s never crossed our minds at the Hughes. I find it sort of goofy if you want to know the truth.”In fact, a system based on trust still works better in the academic worldInstead, Hughes trusts researchers to spend the money according to their needs. “We trust them,” Dixon said. “What we ask each of our scientists to do is devote 75% of their time to research and then we give them 25% of their time which they can use to teach, serve on committees. They can do consulting. They can do a variety of things. Researchers are free to explore.”There is already growing support for eliminating the time sheets and other bureaucratic requirements that come with an ERC grant, and which are obviously just a hangover from the old system. Indeed, there have been complaints, such as reviewers of grant applications having to fax in copies of their passports or identity cards, before being allowed sight of the proposals, said Nowotny. The review panel called on the EC to adapt its rules “based on trust and not suspicion and mistrust” so that the ERC can attain the “full realization of the dream shared by so many Europeans in the academic and policy world as well as in political milieus.”In fact, a system based on trust still works better in the academic world. Hassall commented that lump-sum payments encourage the necessary trust and give researchers a sense of freedom, which is already the principle behind ERC funding. “We think that you have to trust the researcher. Their careers are on the line,” she said. Nowotny hopes ERC will be allowed to take a similar approach to that of the Wellcome Trust, with its grants treated more like “a kind of prize money” than as a contract for services.She sees an opportunity to relax the bureaucratic burden with a scheduled revision of the Rules of Participation but issues a word of caution given that, when it comes to EU money, other players are involved. “We don''t know whether we will succeed in this because it''s up to the finance ministers, not even the research ministers,” she explained. “It''s the finance ministers who decide the rules of participation. If finance ministers agree then the time sheets would be gone.”