The future‐like‐ours argument,animalism, and mereological universalism

Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.     

The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)

In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio‐style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow‐up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I then raise objections to three claims involved in the substance view's defense: the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its potentiality; the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its essential properties; and the claim that it is the possession of the basic potential for rational moral agency that best accounts for the wrongness of killing the standard human fetus, among others.     

The parenthood argument

Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory (FLO), according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case. In the wake of Brown's conclusion, Marquis presents a new argument—the parenthood argument (PA)—which he believes shows that abortion is seriously morally wrong. Here I argue that the PA fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong for the same reasons FLO fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong.     

The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro‐choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.     

Abortion is incommensurable with fetal alcohol syndrome

A recent article argued for the immorality of abortion regardless of personhood status by comparing the impairment caused by fetal alcohol syndrome to the impairment caused by abortion. I argue that two of the premises in this argument fail and that, as such, one cannot reasonably attribute moral harms to abortion on the basis of the moral harms caused by fetal alcohol syndrome. The impairment argument relies on an inconsistent instantiation, which undermines the claim that personhood is irrelevant, and it does not fulfill its own ceteris paribus clause, which demands that no additional benefit be gained from abortion that would not be gained from causing fetal alcohol syndrome.     

Pro‐Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not Convincing

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article ‘After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro‐life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book ‘Ethics of Abortion’. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken and cannot show Giubilini and Minerva's view to be flawed. I claim that if one wants to reject the permissibility of infanticide, one must find better arguments for doing so.     

Violinists,demandingness, and the impairment argument against abortion

The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more severe impairment (death), and so, ceteris paribus, is also wrong. Notably, Hendricks thinks that this argument does not require the claim that the foetus is a person. Here, I respond to Hendricks by arguing that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment principle is not met in ordinary cases of pregnancy. Carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking for nine months. This provides a pro tanto justification for obtaining an abortion that does not apply to causing FAS. If the foetus is not a person, it seems fairly clear to me that this justification is strong enough to render abortion permissible. Hendricks is therefore incorrect in claiming that the impairment argument can go without claims concerning foetal personhood. If the foetus is a person, then whether burdensomeness justifies abortion depends on certain questions relating to Thomson’s famous violinist argument. I will not attempt to answer those. But anyone who is otherwise sympathetic to Thomson’s argument should not be moved by the impairment argument.     

Even if the fetus is not a person,abortion is immoral: The impairment argument

Much of the debate about the ethics of abortion has centered on whether the fetus is a person. In an attempt to sidestep this complex issue, I argue that, even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral. To arrive at this conclusion, I argue that giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and that if this is so, then killing the fetus is immoral. Roughly, this is because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome. Since abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus, this means that abortion (in most cases) is immoral. I defend the premises of this argument against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.     

Ethnic exclusionism in the periphery: The case of Oriental Jews in Israel's development towns

Students of Israeli politics have stressed cultural factors in explaining the success of right‐wing parties among Oriental Jewish voters. My argument is that closer attention must be paid to labour market relations in trying to explain both the anti‐Arab sentiments of Oriental Jews and their proclivity for right‐wing politics.

Oriental Jews compete with both citizen and non‐citizen Palestinians for jobs at the lowest end of the occupational ladder. This competition, I argue, can explain a great deal of their political attitudes. The data to support the argument are derived from an attitude survey conducted in 1988 in eight ‘development towns’ ‐ small working‐class communities populated mainly with Orientals and characterized by high unemployment rates and pervasive social and economic ills. These towns, and the sociologically similar slum neighbourhoods of major cities, provided Rabbi Meir Kahane, Israel's most vociferously racist politician, with the bulk of his electoral support when he was elected to the Knesset in 1984. In 1988 I found support for Kahane in development towns was almost three times as high as it was in 1984. (Kahane was barred from running for the Knesset in 1988 for being a racist.) Analysis of the data showed that this support was disproportionately concentrated among respondents who suffered most from the effects of labour market friction with Palestinian workers.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

ENHANCING EVOLUTION AND ENHANCING EVOLUTION

It has been claimed in several places that the new genetic technologies allow humanity to achieve in a generation or two what might take natural selection hundreds of millennia in respect of the elimination of certain diseases and an increase in traits such as intelligence. More radically, it has been suggested that those same technologies could be used to instil characteristics that we might reasonably expect never to appear due to natural selection alone. John Harris, a proponent of this genomic optimism, claims in his book Enhancing Evolution that we not only have it in our power to enhance evolution, but that we also have a duty to do so. In this paper, I claim that Harris' hand is strong but that he overplays it nevertheless. He is correct to dismiss the arguments of the anti‐enhancement lobby and correct to say that enhancement is permissible; but ‘good’ is different from ‘permissible’ and his argument for the goodness of enhancement is less convincing. Moreover, he is simply wrong to claim that it generates a duty to enhance.     

In vitro digestion enhances anti-adhesion effect of tempe and tofu against Escherichia coli

Aims: Enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli is one of the main pathogenic bacteria causing diarrhoea. Earlier studies have shown that tempe—a fungal fermented soya food—has anti‐adhesive activity against E. coli in vitro. Our aims were to challenge the anti‐adhesive activity under gastro‐intestinal conditions and to assess the activity of the nonfermented soya product tofu. Methods and results: In this study, we compared the anti‐adhesive activity of two major soya bean products, tempe and tofu, and their ileum efflux after transit through a dynamic gastrointestinal system simulating digestion in the human stomach and small intestine. The results showed that both tempe and tofu have an anti‐adhesive activity against E. coli in vitro. Tempe and tofu, after digestion through the stomach and small intestine, have even higher anti‐E. coli adhesive activity. Conclusions: In addition to the proven in‐vivo activity of tempe, this confirms the potential antidiarrhoeal effect of both the soya products tempe and tofu. Significance and Impact of the Study: As tofu has a much greater circle of consumers, this finding is relevant for the health of a large part of the world’s population.     

Social Responsibility and the State's Duty to provide Healthcare: An Islamic Ethico‐Legal Perspective

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights asserts that governments are morally obliged to promote health and to provide access to quality healthcare, essential medicines and adequate nutrition and water to all members of society. According to UNESCO, this obligation is grounded in a moral commitment to promoting fundamental human rights and emerges from the principle of social responsibility. Yet in an era of ethical pluralism and contentions over the universality of human rights conventions, the extent to which the UNESCO Declaration can motivate behaviors and policies rests, at least in part, upon accepting the moral arguments it makes. In this essay I reflect on a state's moral obligation to provide healthcare from the perspective of Islamic moral theology and law. I examine how Islamic ethico‐legal conceptual analogues for human rights and communal responsibility, ?uqūq al‐’ibād and far? al‐kifāyah and other related constructs might be used to advance a moral argument for healthcare provision by the state. Moving from theory to application, I next illustrate how notions of human rights and social responsibility were used by Muslim stakeholders to buttress moral arguments to support American healthcare reform. In this way, the paper advance discourses on a universal bioethics and common morality by bringing into view the concordances and discordances between Islamic ethico‐legal constructs and moral arguments advanced by transnational health policy advocates. It also provides insight into applied Islamic bioethics by demonstrating how Islamic ethico‐legal values might inform the discursive outputs of Muslim organizations.     

The Meta‐Nudge – A Response to the Claim That the Use of Nudges During the Informed Consent Process is Unavoidable

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, in Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, assert that rejecting the use nudges is ‘pointless’ because ‘[i]n many cases, some kind of nudge is inevitable’. Schlomo Cohen makes a similar claim. He asserts that in certain situations surgeons cannot avoid nudging patients either toward or away from consenting to surgical interventions. Cohen concludes that in these situations (assuming surgeons believe that surgery is the best option for their patients), nudging patients toward consenting to surgical interventions is (at the very least) uncriticizable or morally permissible. I call this argument: The Unavoidability Argument. In this essay, I will respond to Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument in support of using nudges during the process of informed consent. Specifically, I argue that many so‐called ‘unavoidable nudges’ are, in fact, avoidable. Although my argument is directed toward Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument, it is applicable to the unavoidability argument more generally.     

The role of play objects and object play in human cognitive evolution and innovation

In this contribution, we address a major puzzle in the evolution of human material culture: If maturing individuals just learn their parental generation's material culture, then what is the origin of key innovations as documented in the archeological record? We approach this question by coupling a life‐history model of the costs and benefits of experimentation with a niche‐construction perspective. Niche‐construction theory suggests that the behavior of organisms and their modification of the world around them have important evolutionary ramifications by altering developmental settings and selection pressures. Part of Homo sapiens' niche is the active provisioning of children with play objects — sometimes functional miniatures of adult tools — and the encouragement of object play, such as playful knapping with stones. Our model suggests that salient material culture innovation may occur or be primed in a late childhood or adolescence sweet spot when cognitive and physical abilities are sufficiently mature but before the full onset of the concerns and costs associated with reproduction. We evaluate the model against a series of archeological cases and make suggestions for future research.     

HEALTH,VITAL GOALS,AND CENTRAL HUMAN CAPABILITIES

I argue for a conception of health as a person's ability to achieve or exercise a cluster of basic human activities. These basic activities are in turn specified through free‐standing ethical reasoning about what constitutes a minimal conception of a human life with equal human dignity in the modern world. I arrive at this conception of health by closely following and modifying Lennart Nordenfelt's theory of health which presents health as the ability to achieve vital goals. Despite its strengths I transform Nordenfelt's argument in order to overcome three significant drawbacks. Nordenfelt makes vital goals relative to each community or context and significantly reflective of personal preferences. By doing so, Nordenfelt's conception of health faces problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively defined wellbeing. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not ever explicitly specify a set of vital goals. The theory of health advanced here replaces Nordenfelt's (seemingly) empty set of preferences and society‐relative vital goals with a human species‐wide conception of basic vital goals, or ‘central human capabilities and functionings’. These central human capabilities come out of the capabilities approach (CA) now familiar in political philosophy and economics, and particularly reflect the work of Martha Nussbaum. As a result, the health of an individual should be understood as the ability to achieve a basic cluster of beings and doings—or having the overarching capability, a meta‐capability, to achieve a set of central or vital inter‐related capabilities and functionings.     

The Unabomber’s ethics

In this paper, I present and criticize Ted Kaczynski’s (“The Unabomber”) theory that industrialization has been terrible for humanity, and that we should use any means necessary, including violent means, to induce a return to pre‐industrial ways of living. Although Kaczynski’s manifesto, Industrial society and its future, has become widely known, his ideas have never before been subject to careful philosophical criticism. In this paper I show how Kaczynski’s arguments rely on a number of highly implausible philosophical premises. I further make the case that, although his theory as a whole should be rejected, Kaczynski raises a number of worries about technological development that ought to receive serious attention. Some of these worries have recently come to be shared by prominent defenders of human enhancement, including Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu. In the last section I indicate why I believe it is important that academic philosophers scrutinize ideas that motivate acts of violence.     

The β3‐integrin endothelial adhesome regulates microtubule‐dependent cell migration

Integrin β3 is seen as a key anti‐angiogenic target for cancer treatment due to its expression on neovasculature, but the role it plays in the process is complex; whether it is pro‐ or anti‐angiogenic depends on the context in which it is expressed. To understand precisely β3's role in regulating integrin adhesion complexes in endothelial cells, we characterised, by mass spectrometry, the β3‐dependent adhesome. We show that depletion of β3‐integrin in this cell type leads to changes in microtubule behaviour that control cell migration. β3‐integrin regulates microtubule stability in endothelial cells through Rcc2/Anxa2‐driven control of active Rac1 localisation. Our findings reveal that angiogenic processes, both in vitro and in vivo, are more sensitive to microtubule targeting agents when β3‐integrin levels are reduced.