ORPHANS BY DESIGN: THE FUTURE OF GENETIC PARENTHOOD

Establishing the nature of genetic parenthood is an important task. This is, firstly, because many people desire that relationship and it is in their interest to know what that is, and secondly, because there is a view that it may incur certain moral obligations between the genetic parent and their child. Many theorists have made attempts to define exactly what genetic parenthood is. I show that these definitions are deficient if they wish to fully capture all reproductive scenarios in ways that are intuitive and/or meaningful. Through a series of cases involving technologies such as cloning and genome editing, we see that in lieu of the traditional two parents, there are possible beings who have no genetic parents, one genetic parent, or many genetic parents. Establishing these cases complicates our understanding of genetic parenthood. From this, we must reconsider current definitions, as well as the usefulness of defining genetic parenthood in these complex cases. Here I do not aim to establish a new definition, but rather to suggest that this complexity makes it necessary to re‐assess the importance of the connection between genetic parenthood and parental obligations and authorities.     

CLONING, PARENTHOOD, AND GENETIC RELATEDNESS

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents.     

GENETIC TIES: ARE THEY MORALLY BINDING?

Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood. ¹ 1 Bayne, T. & Kolers, A. . Toward A Pluralist Account of Parenthood . Bioethics 2003 ; 17 : 221 – 242 .
Bayne and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’. ² 2 Ibid. p. 241.
This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others.     

A conception of genetic parenthood

We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood—one invoking genetic resemblance and the other genetic inheritance—and presents counter‐examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes’ second conception so as to avoid these and related counter‐examples.     

Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation

According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg's ‘Hazmat Theory’.     

Toward a pluralistic account of parenthood

What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers – call them ‘monists’– claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also ‘necessity’ views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call ‘pluralism’, the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the ‘paternity problem’– necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an ‘intentionalist’ account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralist picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood.     

Mark–recapture cloning: a straightforward and cost‐effective cloning method for population genetics of single‐copy nuclear DNA sequences in diploids

We describe a simple protocol to reduce the number of cloning reactions of nuclear DNA sequences in population genetic studies of diploid organisms. Cloning is a necessary step to obtain correct haplotypes in such organisms, and, while traditional methods are efficient at cloning together many genes of a single individual, population geneticists rather need to clone the same locus in many individuals. Our method consists of marking individual sequences during the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) using 5′‐tailed primers with small polynucleotide tags. PCR products are mixed together before the cloning reaction and clones are sequenced with universal plasmid primers. The individual from which a sequence comes from is identified by the tag sequences upstream of each initial primer. We called our protocol mark–recapture (MR) cloning. We present results from 57 experiments of MR cloning conducted in four distinct laboratories using nuclear loci of various lengths in different invertebrate species. Rate of capture (proportion of individuals for which one or more sequences were retrieved) and multiple capture (proportion of individuals for which two or more sequences were retrieved) empirically obtained are described. We estimated that MR cloning allowed reducing costs by up to 70% when compared to conventional individual‐based cloning. However, we recommend to adjust the mark:recapture ratio in order to obtain multiple sequences from the same individual and circumvent inherent technical artefacts of PCR, cloning and sequencing. We argue that MR cloning is a valid and reliable high‐throughput method, providing the number of sequences exceeds the number of individuals initially amplified.     

Genomic Characterization of Interspecific Hybrids between the Scallops Argopecten purpuratus and A. irradians irradians

The Peruvian scallop (Argopecten purpuratus) has been introduced to China and has successfully been hybridized with the bay scallop (A. irradians irradians). The F1 hybrids of these two scallops exhibited a large increase in production traits and some other interesting new characteristics. To understand the genetic basis of this heterosis, nuclear gene and partial mtDNA sequences, and genomic in situ hybridization (GISH) were employed to analyze the genomic organization of the hybrids. Amplification of the ribosomal DNA internal transcribed spacer (ITS) showed that the parental ITS sequences were present in all the hybrid individuals, illustrating that the hybrid offspring inherited nuclear DNA from both parents. Sequence analyses of the ITS region further confirmed that the hybrids harbored alleles from their parents; some recombinant variants were also detected, which revealed some alterations in the nuclear genetic material of the hybrids. The analysis of mitochondrial 16S rDNA showed that the hybrids possessed sequences that were identical to the 16S rDNA of the female parents, proving a matrilineal inheritance of mitochondrial genes in scallops. In addition, GISH clearly discriminated between the parental chromosomes and indicated a combination of haploid genomes of duplex parents in the hybrids. The genetic analyses in our study illustrated that the F1 hybrids inherited nuclear material from both parents and cytoplasmic genetic material maternally, and some variations occurred in the genome, which might contribute to a further understanding of crossbreeding and heterosis in scallop species.     

Parents’ posthumous use of daughter’s ovarian tissue: Ethical dimensions

In recent years, progress in cancer treatment has greatly increased the chances of recovery. Yet, treatment may have irreversible effects on patients’ fertility. In order to protect future fertility, preservation of ovarian tissue may be offered today even to very young girls, involving a surgical procedure that may be performed by minimally invasive laparoscopy, under general anesthesia. However, in the tragic event of a girl’s death, questions may arise regarding the possible use of the preserved ovarian tissue by her parents. Should posthumous reproductive use of ovarian tissue without the girl’s prior consent (due to her young age) be considered a violation of her rights? On the other hand, can it be argued that it is in the interest of a child who died young to leave a genetic trace through posthumous reproduction, because genetic continuity is in the interest of every human being? After presenting the relevant clinical facts, we explore the ethical dimensions of this possible practice through an analysis of the interests of the deceased, her parents, and the child that may be born posthumously.     

Nuclear transfer and iPS may work best together

A short meeting, held as an Arthur Sackler Colloquium of the United States National Academy of Sciences, was organized by Douglas Wallace, Susan Bryant, and Peter Donovan under the heading "Therapeutic Cloning: Where Do We Go from Here?" on October 8 and 9, 2007. The individual components required for therapeutic cloning now exist. The question, therefore, is what constraints presently limit or prevent its application to human therapy.     

Sperm,Clinics, and Parenthood

In this article I examine a recent approach to regulating assisted reproduction, whereby use of some kind of medical intervention ‘triggers’ laws governing legal parenthood that are more favourable to intending parents and sperm providers. I argue that although perhaps an improvement on the previous legal framework, these laws are problematic for three important reasons. First, they are prone to violating parental rights and unjustly imposing substantial burdens on individuals. Second, they are discriminatory. Third, even if we take a pragmatic approach to the question of parenthood in these cases, these laws fail to properly consider the welfare interests of children. Finally, I conclude by showing that my argument does not entail adopting a laissez‐fair attitude to conception using third‐party sperm.     

Assisted reproduction technologies and reproductive justice in the production of parenthood and origin: Uses and meanings of the co-produced gestation and the surrogacy in Brazil

This article examines the construction of parenthood, drawing on Brazilian cisgender, heterosexual, and homosexual couples' experiences in using assisted reproduction technologies (ART), particularly the surrogacy. For that purpose, we interviewed: 1) a lesbian woman who had her daughter through her partner's pregnancy, using ART with anonymous donor semen; 2) a gay man who, together with his partner, used a surrogacy service under contract via a specialised offshore agency; 3) a woman who was a surrogate, in Brazil, for her sister-in-law and brother who lived abroad and, from abroad, sent an embryo fertilised for surrogacy; 4) a woman who resorted to her sister-in-law in order to be a mother by surrogacy, with ovules from the woman herself fertilised with semen from her husband; and 5) the sister-in-law mentioned in 4), who acted as surrogate for her brother and his wife. These interviews made it possible to think about the discursive construction of the legitimacy of such parenthoods, as it is produced by access to, and manipulation and circulation of, reproductive technologies and persons. This biomedical management of bodies sets up a material and discursive circuit that, in turn, produces a complex web of personal, normative, legal, professional and market relationships, particularly with a view to construction of a parenthood anchored in a notion of biologically-constituted origin. In this respect, biological, affective and social bonds merge to produce a precise placement of who is the father and/or who is the mother, as well as who are the important others and how they are linked to the child in a broader web of parenthood.     

Genetic processes in intergeneric cell hybrids Atropa + Nicotiana

Summary The genetic constitution of the cell hybrids Atropa belladonna + Nicotiana chinensis, obtained by cloning of individual heteroplasmic protoplast fusion products (Gleba et al. 1982) and cultured in vitro for 12 months, has been studied. The study comprised 11 hybrid cell clones of independent origin and included analysis of a) chromosome number, size, morphology, and relative position in metaphase plates, b) multiple molecular forms of the enzymes esterase and amylase, and c) relative nuclear DNA content. The data obtained permit us to conclude that, after one year of unorganized growth in vitro, the cells of most (8) clones had retained chromosomes of both parents, while species-specific elimination of nearly all Atropa chromosomes had occurred in three clones. About half of the non-segregating clones possess 120–150 chromosomes including 50–70 of Atropa and 50–90 of Nicotiana. Other clones are polyploid and possess 200–250 chromosomes with a predominance of either Atropa or Nicotiana chromosome types. Only a few chromosomal changes (reconstituted chromosomes, ring chromosomes) have been detected. In some metaphase plates, chromosomes of the two parents tend to group separately, indicating non-random arrangement of chromosomes of the two parents within the hybrid nucleus. Cytophotometric studies of the relative nuclear DNA content showed that distribution histograms for cell clones were similar to those of non-hybrid cultured cells. Cell populations were relatively homogenous and do not indicate any genetic instability as a result of hybridization between remote plant species. Biochemical analysis of isoenzyme patterns confirmed that in most cell clones, species-specific multiple molecular forms of esterase and amylase from both parents were present, i.e. genetic material of both parental species was expressed in the cell hybrids.Dedicated to Professor G. Melchers with gratitude     

Researching ethnicity,identity, subjectivity: anything but the four-lettered word

This article gives a frank account of how anthropological research on Cape Verdean migrant experiences of parenthood in Portugal developed from avoiding the use of the analytical concept of ‘race’ to encountering ‘race’ as a category of practice in fieldwork and discusses the implications of this for analysing the data. Although the aim of the research was to look beyond categorizations, in order to explore the emotional dimensions of lived experience, the effects of ‘racial automatisms’ upon migrant subjectivities cannot be ignored. Racist effects are nonetheless distinguished from racist intentions. The ethnography elucidates the political potential of ‘race’ to foment critical reflection upon the relationship between an individual's personal and collective identities.     

Le principe de l’anonymat du donneur de gamètes à l’épreuve de son contexte. Analyse des conceptions juridiques de l’identité

This study clarifies the lively debate surrounding the anonymity of gamete donors. This principle, which has not been challenged since 1994, is currently criticized by a number of people, who were conceived through medically assisted procreation technologies with donor and who now have reached adulthood. Their testimony has a very significant impact on French public opinion. Several official reports have already suggested that the anonymity of gamete donors may well be removed under certain circumstances. To understand why public opinion has evolved so dramatically, we must revisit the legal position of gamete donors in the specific context of less visible changes in the law. Indeed, the legal concepts of parenthood and identity have been reshuffled over time, and such changes have deeply affected the legal issues relating to the anonymity of gamete donors. Formerly, the law governing the identification of individuals was shaped by political and social objectives. Now it is more concerned with the sense of identity and personal fulfilment of people. This change, based on modern western notions of egalitarianism and individuality, has dramatically affected the outcome of parenthood trials. Moreover, biological tests have made the truth available like never before. The possibility of finding out the truth has shocked the practice of many areas of family law and has created a new set of challenges, especially when the secrecy of the genetic parents has been legally established. In France, women have traditionally been able to deliver their children anonymously. A deadlock has resulted, which may now be overcome by introducing a new concept of personal origins. Now the law is evolving to permit the children to demand their biological mothers’ identity under certain circumstances, but without affecting anyone’s rights. The concept of personal origins has been quite successful on the European scene and has also charged the debate. It is now recognized under French and European laws that individuals must have privileged access to their personal origins. Can the principle of anonymity of gamete donors remain immune from such a (r)evolution ?     

Mothers,Fathers, Families,and Circumstances: Factors Affecting Children's Adjustment

The burgeoning empirical literature exploring the factors accounting for individual differences in psychological adjustment is reviewed. Many studies have shown that adjustment is largely affected by differences in the quality of parenting and parent–child relationships, the quality of the relationships between the parents, and the richness of the economic and social resources available to the family; more recent research signals the importance of congenital differences as well. Dimensions of family structure—including such factors as divorce, single parenthood, and the parents' sexual orientation—and biological relatedness between parents and children are of little or no predictive importance once the process variables are taken into account, because the same factors explain child adjustment regardless of family structure. These findings have important social and legal implications, especially in relation to decisions regarding foster care and adoption, as well as those concerning children's well-being following family dissolution.     

Rethinking parenthood within assisted reproductive technology: The need for regulation in Nigeria

In Nigeria, reproduction is highly valued, with many people desiring to produce a child ‘in their own image and likeness’. Previously, aspiring parents often resorted to adoption. Today, the availability of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has provided options other than adoption for those desiring to procreate. Through ARTs, aspirations for a family may be attained through an exchange of reproductive goods and services, and not necessarily through traditional heterosexual relationships. ARTs have altered the perception of parenthood as it exists in Nigeria, and courts face a difficult task in defining parenthood within Nigerian jurisprudence, as they can only adjudicate based on extant law. Although ARTs provide greater individual choices for fulfilling the desire to procreate, they raise a number of ethical and legal issues that evolving legal systems, such as that in Nigeria, are ill-equipped to manage. This paper describes the traditional assignment of parenthood under indigenous laws and other sources of law within the Nigerian jurisprudence. We carried out an in-depth study of the Nigerian legislative framework and found that there are no laws directly regulating parenthood, procreation and ARTs in Nigeria. We also found that the extant laws are only tangentially related and do not answer the relevant questions sufficiently well, especially concerning succession, nationality and assignment of responsibility in collaborative reproduction. We conclude by highlighting the need for and recommending a regulatory framework on ARTs with a particular focus on providing a definition for parenthood achieved through ARTs in Nigeria.     

A lost cause? Fundamental problems for causal theories of parenthood

In this paper, I offer a critique of (actual and possible) causal theories of parenthood. I do not offer a competing account of who incurs parental obligations and why; rather, I aim to show that there are fundamental problems for any account of who acquires parental obligations and why by appeal to causal responsibility for a child’s existence. I outline and justify three criteria that any plausible causal account of parental obligation must meet, and demonstrate that attempting to fulfil all three criteria simultaneously will give rise to one or both of two potentially insurmountable dilemmas.     

Parentalité et Individualité

The concept of parenthood needs to be redefined in relation to the new uses of sexuality and reproduction. Exclusively from the view of point of personal freedom, a “parent” is any person who has chosen to define himself/herself in this way with reference to the existence of another individual, whoipso facto benefits from this same freedom, limiting his/her own freedom. This redefinition is derived from an unlimited right to parenthood for any individual who chooses parenthood, an unlimited right to abortion for any unwanted pregnancy, and absolute prohibition of abortion for congenital malformations.