SOCIAL LEARNERS REQUIRE PROCESS INFORMATION TO OUTPERFORM INDIVIDUAL LEARNERS

Humans exhibit a rich and complex material culture with no equivalent in animals. Also, social learning, a crucial requirement for culture, is particularly developed in humans and provides a means to accumulate knowledge over time and to develop advanced technologies. However, the type of social learning required for the evolution of this complex material culture is still debated. Here, using a complex and opaque virtual task, the efficiency of individual learning and two types of social learning (product‐copying and process‐copying) were compared. We found that (1) individuals from process‐copying groups outperformed individuals from product‐copying groups or individual learners, whereas access to product information was not a sufficient condition for providing an advantage to social learners compared to individual learners; (2) social learning did not seem to affect the exploration of the fitness landscape; (3) social learning led to strong within‐group convergence and also to between‐group convergence, and (4) individuals used widely variable social learning strategies. The implications of these results for cumulative culture evolution are discussed.     

Rapid evolution of social learning

Culture is widely thought to be beneficial when social learning is less costly than individual learning and thus may explain the enormous ecological success of humans. Rogers (1988. Does biology constrain culture. Am. Anthropol.  90 : 819–831) contradicted this common view by showing that the evolution of social learning does not necessarily increase the net benefits of learned behaviours in a variable environment. Using simulation experiments, we re‐analysed extensions of Rogers’ model after relaxing the assumption that genetic evolution is much slower than cultural evolution. Our results show that this assumption is crucial for Rogers’ finding. For many parameter settings, genetic and cultural evolution occur on the same time scale, and feedback effects between genetic and cultural dynamics increase the net benefits. Thus, by avoiding the costs of individual learning, social learning can increase ecological success. Furthermore, we found that rapid evolution can limit the evolution of complex social learning strategies, which have been proposed to be widespread in animals.     

Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions

Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay auctions”, the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological second price all-pay auctions”, the cost for everyone other than the winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both auctions. In both cases, the average bid is a declining function of the number of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction the smaller is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided.     

Evolutionarily stable learning schedules and cumulative culture in discrete generation models

Individual learning (e.g., trial-and-error) and social learning (e.g., imitation) are alternative ways of acquiring and expressing the appropriate phenotype in an environment. The optimal choice between using individual learning and/or social learning may be dictated by the life-stage or age of an organism. Of special interest is a learning schedule in which social learning precedes individual learning, because such a schedule is apparently a necessary condition for cumulative culture. Assuming two obligatory learning stages per discrete generation, we obtain the evolutionarily stable learning schedules for the three situations where the environment is constant, fluctuates between generations, or fluctuates within generations. During each learning stage, we assume that an organism may target the optimal phenotype in the current environment by individual learning, and/or the mature phenotype of the previous generation by oblique social learning. In the absence of exogenous costs to learning, the evolutionarily stable learning schedules are predicted to be either pure social learning followed by pure individual learning (“bang-bang” control) or pure individual learning at both stages (“flat” control). Moreover, we find for each situation that the evolutionarily stable learning schedule is also the one that optimizes the learned phenotype at equilibrium.     

The evolution of conformist social learning can cause population collapse in realistically variable environments

Why do societies collapse? We use an individual-based evolutionary model to show that, in environmental conditions dominated by low-frequency variation (“red noise”), extirpation may be an outcome of the evolution of cultural capacity. Previous analytical models predicted an equilibrium between individual learners and social learners, or a contingent strategy in which individuals learn socially or individually depending on the circumstances. However, in red noise environments, whose main signature is that variation is concentrated in relatively large, relatively rare excursions, individual learning may be selected from the population. If the social learning system comes to lack sufficient individual learning or cognitively costly adaptive biases, behavior ceases tracking environmental variation. Then, when the environment does change, fitness declines and the population may collapse or even be extirpated. The modeled scenario broadly fits some human population collapses and might also explain nonhuman extirpations. Varying model parameters showed that the fixation of social learning is less likely when individual learning is less costly, when the environment is less red or more variable, with larger population sizes, and when learning is not conformist or is from parents rather than from the general population. Once social learning is fixed, extirpation is likely except when social learning is biased towards successful models. Thus, the risk of population collapse may be reduced by promoting individual learning and innovation over cultural conformity, or by preferential selection of relatively fit individuals as models for social learning.     

The evolution of social learning rules: Payoff-biased and frequency-dependent biased transmission

Humans and other animals do not use social learning indiscriminately, rather, natural selection has favoured the evolution of social learning rules that make selective use of social learning to acquire relevant information in a changing environment. We present a gene-culture coevolutionary analysis of a small selection of such rules (unbiased social learning, payoff-biased social learning and frequency-dependent biased social learning, including conformism and anti-conformism) in a population of asocial learners where the environment is subject to a constant probability of change to a novel state. We define conditions under which each rule evolves to a genetically polymorphic equilibrium. We find that payoff-biased social learning may evolve under high levels of environmental variation if the fitness benefit associated with the acquired behaviour is either high or low but not of intermediate value. In contrast, both conformist and anti-conformist biases can become fixed when environment variation is low, whereupon the mean fitness in the population is higher than for a population of asocial learners. Our examination of the population dynamics reveals stable limit cycles under conformist and anti-conformist biases and some highly complex dynamics including chaos. Anti-conformists can out-compete conformists when conditions favour a low equilibrium frequency of the learned behaviour. We conclude that evolution, punctuated by the repeated successful invasion of different social learning rules, should continuously favour a reduction in the equilibrium frequency of asocial learning, and propose that, among competing social learning rules, the dominant rule will be the one that can persist with the lowest frequency of asocial learning.     

Trickle or clumped infection process? A stochastic model for the infection process of the parasitic roundworm of humans, Ascaris lumbricoides

The importance of the mode of acquisition of infectious stages of directly-transmitted parasitic helminths has been acknowledged in population dynamics models; hosts may acquire eggs/larvae singly in a “trickle” type manner or in “clumps”. Such models have shown that the mode of acquisition influences the distribution and dynamics of parasite loads, the stability of host-parasite systems and the rate of emergence of anthelmintic resistance, yet very few field studies have allowed these questions to be explored with empirical data. We have analysed individual worm weight data for the parasitic roundworm of humans, Ascaris lumbricoides, collected from a three-round chemo-expulsion study in Dhaka, Bangladesh, with the aim of discerning whether a trickle or a clumped infection process predominates. We found that hosts tend to harbour female worms of a similar weight, indicative of a clumped infection process, but acknowledged that unmeasured host heterogeneities (random effects) could not be completely excluded as a cause. Here, we complement our previous statistical analyses using a stochastic infection model to simulate sizes of individual A. lumbricoides infecting a population of humans. We use the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) as a quantitative measure of similarity among simulated worm sizes and explore the behaviour of this statistic under assumptions corresponding to trickle or clumped infections and unmeasured host heterogeneities. We confirm that both mechanisms are capable of generating aggregates of similar-sized worms, but that the particular pattern of ICCs described pre- and post-anthelmintic treatment in the data is more consistent with aggregation generated by clumped infections than by host heterogeneities alone. This provides support to the notion that worms may be acquired in clumps. We discuss our results in terms of the population biology of A. lumbricoides and highlight the significance of our modelling approach for the study of the population dynamics of helminth parasites.     

Coevolution of adaptive technology,maladaptive culture and population size in a producer–scrounger game

Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a ‘producer–scrounger’ game, which can also usefully be interpreted as an ‘individual–social’ learner interaction. Producers (individual learners) are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural transmission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism, where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.     

Evolution of social versus individual learning in an infinite island model

We model the evolution of learning in a population composed of infinitely many, finite-sized islands connected by migration. We assume that there are two discrete strategies, social and individual learning, and that the environment is spatially homogeneous but varies temporally in a periodic or stochastic manner. Using a population-genetic approximation technique, we derive a mathematical condition for the two strategies to coexist stably and the equilibrium frequency of social learners under stable coexistence. Analytical and numerical results both reveal that social learners are favored when island size is large or migration rate between islands is high, suggesting that spatial subdivision disfavors social learners. We also show that the average fecundity of the population under stable coexistence of the two strategies is in general lower than that in the absence of social learners and is minimized at an intermediate migration rate.     

Position chronologique des sites de l’Homme moderne en Chine d’après la datation U-Th

The origin and evolution of modern Homo sapiens has been the subject of an intensive debate between exponents of two competing hypotheses, multiregional origins and “recent out of Africa”. This paper presents a synthesis of the chronological studies on seven hominid sites in China based on the U-series dating, five of them of intercalated speleothem calcites and other two of fossil materials. The results show that modern humans were present in China about 100 ka ago, much earlier than previously estimated, and that the so-called “temporal gap” of human presence in China between 40 and 100 ka is most probably nothing but an artifact caused by systematic errors of the dating methods. Further multidisciplinary studies on hominid sites in China may provide important evidence for resolving the hotly debated issues concerning the origin of modern humans.     

Group level effects of social versus individual learning

We study the effects of learning by imitating others within the framework of an iterated game in which the members of two complementary populations interact via random pairing at each round. This allows us to compare both the fitness of different strategies within a population and the performance of populations in which members have access to different types of strategies. Previous studies reveal some emergent dynamics at the population level, when players learn individually. We here investigate a different mechanism in which players can choose between two different learning strategies, individual or social. Imitating behavior can spread within a mixed population, with the frequency of imitators varying over generation time. When compared to a pure population with solely individual learners, a mixed population with both individual and social learners can do better, independently of the precise learning scheme employed. We can then search for the best imitating strategy. Imitating the neighbor with the highest payoff turns out to be consistently superior. This is in agreement with findings in experimental and model studies that have been carried out in different settings.     

Evolution of social learning: a mathematical analysis

Social learning is an important ability seen in a wide range of animals including humans. It has been argued that individual learning, social learning, and innate determination of behavior are favored by natural selection when environmental changes occur at short, intermediate, and long intervals, respectively. Only recently, however, has the hypothesis been examined by means of mathematical models. In this paper, we construct a simple model in which each organism uses one of three genetically determined strategies--it is an individual learner, a social learner or an "innate"--and the three types of organisms are in direct competition with each other. A reduced model, involving only the individual learners and innates, is effectively linear, and we show that by solving the eigenvalue problem of this reduced system we arrive at a good approximation to the global dynamics of the full model. We also study the effect of stochastic environmental changes and reversible mutations among the three strategies. Our results are consistent with the predictions of previous studies. In addition, we identify a critical level of environmental constancy below which only individual and social learners are present.     

Expected utility violations evolve under status-based selection mechanisms

The expected utility theory of decision making under uncertainty, a cornerstone of modern economics, assumes that humans linearly weight “utilities” for different possible outcomes by the probabilities with which these outcomes occur. Despite the theory's intuitive appeal, both from normative and from evolutionary perspectives, many experiments demonstrate systematic, though poorly understood, patterns of deviation from EU predictions. This paper offers a novel theoretical account of such patterns of deviation by demonstrating that EU violations can emerge from evolutionary selection when individual “status” affects inclusive fitness. In humans, battles for resources and social standing involve high-stakes decision making, and assortative mating ensures that status matters for fitness outcomes. The paper therefore proposes grounding the study of decision making under uncertainty in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework.     

Imitation or innovation? Unselective mixed strategies can provide a better solution

Current theory about the evolution of social learning in a changing environment predicts the emergence of mixed strategies that rely on some selective combination of social and asocial learning. However, the results of a recent tournament of social learning strategies [Rendell et al. Science 328(5975):208?C213, 2010] suggest that the success relies almost entirely on copying to learn behavior. Those authors conclude that mixed strategies are vulnerable to invasion by individuals using social learning strategies alone. Here we perform a competition using unselective strategies that differ only in the degree of social versus asocial learning. We show that, under the same conditions of the aforementioned tournament, a pure social learning strategy can be invaded by an unselectively mixed strategy and attain an equilibrium where the latter is majority. Although existing theory suggests that copying other individuals unselectively is not adaptive, we show that, at this equilibrium, the average individual fitness of the population is higher than for a population of pure asocial learners, overcoming Rogers?? paradox in finite populations.     

Cumulative cultural dynamics and the coevolution of cultural innovation and transmission: an ESS model for panmictic and structured populations

When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady‐state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.     

An experimental comparison of human social learning strategies: payoff-biased social learning is adaptive but underused

Analytical models have identified a set of social learning strategies that are predicted to be adaptive relative to individual (asocial) learning. In the present study, human participants engaged in an ecologically valid artifact-design task with the opportunity to engage in a range of social learning strategies: payoff bias, conformity, averaging and random copying. The artifact (an arrowhead) was composed of multiple continuous and discrete attributes which jointly generated a complex multimodal adaptive landscape that likely reflects actual cultural fitness environments. Participants exhibited a mix of individual learning and payoff-biased social learning, with negligible frequencies of the other social learning strategies. This preference for payoff-biased social learning was evident from the initial trials, suggesting that participants came into the study with an intrinsic preference for this strategy. There was also a small but significant increase in the frequency of payoff-biased social learning over sessions, suggesting that strategy choice may itself be subject to learning. Frequency of payoff-biased social learning predicted both absolute and relative success in the task, especially in a multimodal (rather than unimodal) fitness environment. This effect was driven by a minority of hardcore social learners who copied the best group member on more than half of trials. These hardcore social learners were also above-average individual learners, suggesting a link between individual and social learning ability. The lower-than-expected frequency of social learning may reflect the existence of information producer–scrounger dynamics in human populations.     

How does competition affect the transmission of information?

The use of social information is a prerequisite to the evolution of culture. In humans, social learning allows individuals to aggregate adaptive information and increase the complexity of technology at a level unparalleled in the animal kingdom. However, the potential to use social information is related to the availability of this type of information. Although most cultural evolution experiments assume that social learners are free to use social information, there are many examples of information withholding, particularly in ethnographic studies. In this experiment, we used a computer-based cultural game in which players were faced with a complex task and had the possibility to trade a specific part of their knowledge within their groups. The dynamics of information transmission were studied when competition was within- or exclusively between-groups. Our results show that between-group competition improved the transmission of information, increasing the amount and the quality of information. Further, informational access costs did not prevent social learners from performing better than individual learners, even when between-group competition was absent. Interestingly, between-group competition did not entirely eliminate access costs and did not improve the performance of players as compared with within-group competition. These results suggest that the field of cultural evolution would benefit from a better understanding of the factors that underlie the production and the sharing of information.     

Social Network Analysis Shows Direct Evidence for Social Transmission of Tool Use in Wild Chimpanzees

Social network analysis methods have made it possible to test whether novel behaviors in animals spread through individual or social learning. To date, however, social network analysis of wild populations has been limited to static models that cannot precisely reflect the dynamics of learning, for instance, the impact of multiple observations across time. Here, we present a novel dynamic version of network analysis that is capable of capturing temporal aspects of acquisition—that is, how successive observations by an individual influence its acquisition of the novel behavior. We apply this model to studying the spread of two novel tool-use variants, “moss-sponging” and “leaf-sponge re-use,” in the Sonso chimpanzee community of Budongo Forest, Uganda. Chimpanzees are widely considered the most “cultural” of all animal species, with 39 behaviors suspected as socially acquired, most of them in the domain of tool-use. The cultural hypothesis is supported by experimental data from captive chimpanzees and a range of observational data. However, for wild groups, there is still no direct experimental evidence for social learning, nor has there been any direct observation of social diffusion of behavioral innovations. Here, we tested both a static and a dynamic network model and found strong evidence that diffusion patterns of moss-sponging, but not leaf-sponge re-use, were significantly better explained by social than individual learning. The most conservative estimate of social transmission accounted for 85% of observed events, with an estimated 15-fold increase in learning rate for each time a novice observed an informed individual moss-sponging. We conclude that group-specific behavioral variants in wild chimpanzees can be socially learned, adding to the evidence that this prerequisite for culture originated in a common ancestor of great apes and humans, long before the advent of modern humans.     

Late Pleistocene human population bottlenecks, volcanic winter, and differentiation of modern humans

The “Weak Garden of Eden” model for the origin and dispersal of modern humans (Harpendinget al., 1993) posits that modern humans spread into separate regions from a restricted source, around 100 ka (thousand years ago), then passed through population bottlenecks. Around 50 ka, dramatic growth occurred within dispersed populations that were genetically isolated from each other. Population growth began earliest in Africa and later in Eurasia and is hypothesized to have been caused by the invention and spread of a more efficient Later Stone Age/Upper Paleolithic technology, which developed in equatorial Africa.Climatic and geological evidence suggest an alternative hypothesis for Late Pleistocene population bottlenecks and releases. The last glacial period was preceded by one thousand years of the coldest temperatures of the Later Pleistocene (∼71–70 ka), apparently caused by the eruption of Toba, Sumatra. Toba was the largest known explosive eruption of the Quaternary. Toba's volcanic winter could have decimated most modern human populations, especially outside of isolated tropical refugia. Release from the bottleneck could have occurred either at the end of this hypercold phase, or 10,000 years later, at the transition from cold oxygen isotope stage 4 to warmer stage 3. The largest populations surviving through the bottleneck should have been found in the largest tropical refugia, and thus in equatorial Africa. High genetic diversity in modern Africans may thus reflect a less severe bottleneck rather than earlier population growth.Volcanic winter may have reduced populations to levels low enough for founder effects, genetic drift and local adaptations to produce rapid population differentiation. If Toba caused the bottlenecks, then modern human races may have differentiated abruptly, only 70 thousand years ago.     

Effects of a disease affecting a predator on the dynamics of a predator-prey system

We study the effects of a disease affecting a predator on the dynamics of a predator-prey system. We couple an SIRS model applied to the predator population, to a Lotka-Volterra model. The SIRS model describes the spread of the disease in a predator population subdivided into susceptible, infected and removed individuals. The Lotka-Volterra model describes the predator-prey interactions. We consider two time scales, a fast one for the disease and a comparatively slow one for predator-prey interactions and for predator mortality. We use the classical “aggregation method” in order to obtain a reduced equivalent model. We show that there are two possible asymptotic behaviors: either the predator population dies out and the prey tends to its carrying capacity, or the predator and prey coexist. In this latter case, the predator population tends either to a “disease-free” or to a “disease-endemic” state. Moreover, the total predator density in the disease-endemic state is greater than the predator density in the “disease-free” equilibrium (DFE).