QALYs, age and fairness

... We can therefore conclude that either we should go for equality; and in that case QALYs are unfair because they haven't got enough of an ageist bias. Or we should accept consequentialism; and in that case QALYs have just the right sort of ageist bias. No plausible case can, however, be made for the claim that QALYs have an unfair bias against old people. Other things being equal we ought when distributing resources essential for survival favour the young. This ethical claim can be supported both by reference to equality (the life-time-view) and by reference to consequentialism (and the premises that resources generally will be more useful when given to young people).     

Protecting elderly people: flaws in ageist arguments.

Some form of rationing is necessary in medicine, and to use age as a criterion for rationing seems initially appealing. Many of the criteria currently being used for deciding the distribution of funds depend on subjective judgments. Age, however, is objective and therefore negates the need for value judgments. Justice and fairness, it is sometimes suggested, require that finite resources should be directed at young people, who have not had a chance to live their lives, rather than at elderly people, who have already lived most of theirs. The adoption of ageist policies, however, may not result in the implied savings unless care is also withdrawn. Furthermore, ageist policies, which deny elderly people treatment on the sole grounds of their age, are both unfair and discriminatory and should therefore be resisted.     

Economic and social structure for an ageing population.

The driving force behind the improvement in the quality of life, the rising standard of living, improving health, and increasing longevity, is a process called ''technophysio evolution'', which began about 300 years ago, accelerated during the twentieth century, and is still in progress. Increased spending on health care and on pensions is an appropriate concomitant of technophysio evolution, and should be welcomed. Only wasteful medical services should be restricted. The resources available now and in the future can provide increasingly long and healthy lives of relative luxury for all. However, methods of financing health care and retirement need to be modernized. In the future, luxury will be defined increasingly in terms of spiritual rather than material resources. The test of well-being in the future for both young and old will be measured increasingly in terms of the quality of health and the opportunity for self-realization.     

Health care as a right, fairness and medical resources

Our intention in the following is to use the WHO declaration as a basis for considering the allocation of resources in health care. We shall first argue that most of the criteria suggested as grounds for fair allocation of scarce medical resources have their difficulties if one tries to apply them one by one to medical practices. We shall then go on to claim that, if we take the right of all human beings to health or health care even moderately seriously, increasing the resources would in most cases be more ethical than attempting to allocate them 'fairly'.     

Fair regression for health care spending

The distribution of health care payments to insurance plans has substantial consequences for social policy. Risk adjustment formulas predict spending in health insurance markets in order to provide fair benefits and health care coverage for all enrollees, regardless of their health status. Unfortunately, current risk adjustment formulas are known to underpredict spending for specific groups of enrollees leading to undercompensated payments to health insurers. This incentivizes insurers to design their plans such that individuals in undercompensated groups will be less likely to enroll, impacting access to health care for these groups. To improve risk adjustment formulas for undercompensated groups, we expand on concepts from the statistics, computer science, and health economics literature to develop new fair regression methods for continuous outcomes by building fairness considerations directly into the objective function. We additionally propose a novel measure of fairness while asserting that a suite of metrics is necessary in order to evaluate risk adjustment formulas more fully. Our data application using the IBM MarketScan Research Databases and simulation studies demonstrates that these new fair regression methods may lead to massive improvements in group fairness (eg, 98%) with only small reductions in overall fit (eg, 4%).     

Fiscal implications of population ageing.

In all developed countries the fiscal ties of the tax and benefit system serve to complement, and sometimes substitute for, traditional family bonds between young and old. Older people are major recipients of public pensions and public health care systems. Since these public transfers and services are financed primarily from the taxes paid by people of working age, the welfare system in effect transfers resources from young to old. But rather than see the fiscal interdependency between young and old as being analogous to the ties that bind children, parents and grandparents together in familial networks, it is often interpreted as an oppressive burden that the old place on the young. This paper examines arguments that population ageing will exacerbate this burden, and may lead to the collapse of public welfare systems. It shows that the financial problems currently associated with public pensions are a function of system design rather than demographic change, and that wholesale privatization of pension systems will do little to solve the major dilemma--of persuading people to transfer a larger part of their lifetime income to their later years in order to sustain a reasonable standard of living throughout an ever lengthening period of retirement.     

Aging, disability, and frailty: implications for universal design

Throughout the world all populations are seeing burgeoning numbers of "elders", defined as persons aged 65 year and older. In many countries, including Japan, the United States, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, those aged over 65 are at or approaching 15% of the population. As their numbers have increased, so have their health care expenses, leading to extensive research on the health, well being, and life expectancy of these increasingly older elders. Today this group is further sub-divided: the young-old ages 65-74, the old-old ages 75-84, and the oldest-old ages 85+, for both health care and research purposes. However broad variation still characterizes even these groupings. Rates of frailty and disability increase with increasing age among these elders. For example, inabilities to complete at least one activity of daily living increased from about 5-7% at ages 65-69 years to about 28-36% at ages 85+ in 1987. Death rates continue to decline at all ages past 50 years and rates of disability seem to be doing the same. For the foreseeable future, we may expect increasing numbers of older, frail elders than in previous decades. Thus, people are not only living longer, they generally are healthier at advanced ages than were previous cohorts, thus "old age" disabilities of the 20th century will be put off to even older ages during the 21st century. As yet there is no clear way to assess senescent changes in humans, although activities of daily living, allostatic load, and frailty indices have all been suggested. One future need is greater development and use of universal and accessible design in all aspects of the built environment.     

Public preferences for health care: prioritisation in the United Kingdom

The Government in the UK is encouraging consumerism within health care and is requiring Health Authorities to consult with the public on prioritisation of resources. Public consultation within the National Health Service (NHS) has had limited success in the past. Many of the techniques used are flawed. Despite the limited scope of the public surveys conducted so far, a number of themes have emerged: a willingness to pay for experimental, 'high-tech' life-saving treatments rather than more cost-effective treatments which will improve quality of life, which are more likely to maximise utility from the scarce resources available; preference for treating the young rather than the old; preference for treating patients with dependents (e.g. spouse, children) rather than those who have none; a willingness to discriminate against those patients who were partially responsible for their illness due to choice of 'unhealthy' lifestyle (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking excess alcohol). These public preferences raise ethical problems. For example, is it just to spend more on heroic treatments which are likely to fail? Is there a right to health care irrespective of whether you have had 'a fair innings' or whether a patient is in part responsible for their illness due to an unhealthy lifestyle? If there are ethical concerns about these preferences, should health authorities consult with the public at all? Is human life and suffering incommensurable, and hence is it impossible to prioritise anyway? Some of the ethical consequences of using empirical data on public preferences are discussed.     

Threshold considerations in fair allocation of health resources: justice beyond scarcity

Application of egalitarian and prioritarian accounts of health resource allocation in low-income countries have both been criticized for implying distribution outcomes that allow decreasing/undermining health gains and for tolerating unacceptable standards of health care and health status that result from such allocation schemes. Insufficient health care and severe deprivation of health resources are difficult to accept even when justified by aggregative efficiency or legitimized by fair deliberative process in pursuing equality and priority oriented outcomes. I affirm the sufficientarian argument that, given extreme scarcity of public health resources in low-income countries, neither health status equality between populations nor priority for the worse off is normatively adequate. Nevertheless, the threshold norm alone need not be the sole consideration when a country's total health budget is extremely scarce. Threshold considerations are necessary in developing a theory of fair distribution of health resources that is sensitive to the lexically prior norm of sufficiency. Based on the intuition that shares must not be taken away from those who barely achieve a minimal level of health, I argue that assessments based on standards of minimal physical/mental health must be developed to evaluate the sufficiency of the total resources of health systems in low-income countries prior to pursuing equality, priority, and efficiency based resource allocation. I also begin to examine how threshold sensitive health resource assessment could be used in the Philippines.     

Dental Status in the Elderly: A Review of the Swedish Literature1

1. Elderly persons living in their own homes have over the past 20 years tended to retain an increased number of natural teeth. This tendency is confirmed especially in the ongoing studies by Tor Österberg, nr 12 and 13. These studies indicate a decreasing edentulous part of the 70-year old cohorts from 1971, 1976 and 1981. 2. Elderly persons dependent on institutional care are edentulous in as high degree today as 20 years ago. According to this criterion, therefore, their dental health has not improved. 3. Dentures worn by elderly persons frequently are defective in fit and function. For the general wellbeing and health in later life, mastication of a well-balanced diet and lack of discomfort from denture-bearing mucosal surfaces are important. Information in this respect and measures to improve masticating function are greatly needed among persons in the higher age groups, whether living at home or in institutional care. 4. Caries activity is increasing among elderly persons. 5. Periodontitis (loosening of the teeth) is very frequently found in elderly persons. 6. Oral hygiene requires improvement. 7. Among the elderly, living in their own homes or in institutions, the need for odontologic care is objectively great, but the demands currently made are remarkably low. 8. Of the aged in institutional care, about 75 per cent are suitable for measures of oral care. A change in dental health seems to be slowly taking place among the elderly, in that increasing numbers keep more of their own teeth longer in life. The demands made by the high age groups on the odontologic services, though increasing, are still very low relative to the objective and consequently great accumulated needs. This contrast is especially pronounced among geriatric patients in institutions. An aggressive, searching approach to both restorative and preventive oral care in the higher age groups is of pressing importance if optimum conditions for eating and chewing late in life are to be achieved. For timely counteraction of the tendency to a more passive attitude t o dental care that commonly accompanies rising age, information on these matters should be energetically disseminated among persons due for retirement or new-l y retired.     

Public Preferences for Health Care: Prioritisation in the United Kingdom

The Government in the UK is encouraging consumerism within health care and is requiring Health Authorities to consult with the public on prioritisation of resources. Public consultation within the National Health Service (NHS) has had limited success in the past. Many of the techniques used are flawed. Despite the limited scope of the public surveys conducted so far, a number of themes have emerged:
— a willingness to pay for experimental, 'high-tech' life-saving treatments rather than more cost-effective treatments which will improve quality of life, which are more likely to maximise utility from the scarce resources available;
— preference for treating the young rather than the old;
— preference for treating patients with dependants (e.g. spouse, children) rather than those who have none;
— a willingness to discriminate against those patients who were partially responsible for their illness due to choice of `unhealthy' lifestyle (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking excess alcohol).
These public preferences raise ethical problems. For example, is it just to spend more on heroic treatments which are likely to fail? Is there a right to health care irrespective of whether you have had 'a fair innings' or whether a patient is in part responsible for their illness due to an unhealthy lifestyle? If there are ethical concerns about these preferences, should health authorities consult with the public at all? Is human life and suffering incommensurable, and hence is it impossible to prioritise anyway? Some of the ethical consequences of using empirical data on public preferences are discussed.     

The health status and health care use of elderly living in sheltered residences. A comparison with independently living elderly

A sheltered residence for older persons is a living arrangement in between independent living and a residential institution. There is little knowledge about the health of elderly living in these residences. We studied the physical, functional and psychosocial health of 401 persons living in a sheltered residence for elderly in Zwolle through a standardised interview. We compared the health of these elderly to the health of independently living elderly in the same region studied in the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam and adjusted for sex, age and married state. We found an impaired functional health and more chronic illnesses among elderly living in a sheltered residence. In addition, more medication was used (OR = 2.4). The studied elderly felt more often depressed (OR = 1.9) or lonely (OR = 1.7). Their mental state was more frequently impaired (OR = 1.7), they visited health professionals more often and received more help for personal care (OR = 2.0) and housekeeping (OR = 1.6). We conclude that people living in sheltered residences form a distinct group of elderly, characterised by impaired physical, functional and psychosocial health. Planners of future care must be aware of this vulnerable group.     

Access and Use of Medical Care among Obese Persons

The prevalence of obesity and severe obesity is growing rapidly, along with obesity‐related comorbidities and mortality. Given the increased health risks associated with obesity, it is vital that obese persons have adequate access to, and make consistent use of, medical care services. Assuming obese persons have access to medical care that is comparable to non‐obese persons, one would expect to observe greater use of medical services among obese persons. In this article we briefly review empirical evidence of the access to and use of medical care among obese persons. Although certain subgroups that tend to have disproportionately high prevalences of obesity (i.e., low socioeconomic status, minority groups) have reduced access to care, no studies have specifically examined whether or not obese persons have the same access to health care as do their lean counterparts. With respect to use of health care services, however, obesity has been consistently linked with greater rates of utilization and increased health care expenditures. Both the increased use and cost appear to be largely a function of treating obesity‐associated comorbidities such as diabetes and hypertension. We conclude that, although it is clear that obesity is associated with both greater use and cost of medical care, the relationship between obesity and access to medical care has not been determined.     

Hastening death and respect for dignity: Kantianism at the end of life

Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self‐interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician‐assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting rightly in ending his life. One basis for such doubt is the notion that persons have dignity in a Kantian sense. This paper probes responses that David Velleman and Frances Kamm have suggested to the question of whether participating in PAS or VAE to benefit oneself, as the young man might, respects the dignity of persons, specified in an orthodox Kantian way. Velleman claims that it does not, while Kamm insists that, in certain circumstances, it does. I argue against Kamm's position. I go on to contend that while orthodox Kantianism might provide a basis for moral concern regarding the case of the young quadriplegic, it suffers from two serious shortcomings. First, it implies that terminally ill patients are wrong to request VAE or engage in PAS to avoid intense suffering, at least when this suffering has not yet overwhelmed their reason. Second, orthodox Kantianism implies that it is wrong for physicians to withdraw such patients from life‐sustaining treatments, even if they request it. To remedy these shortcomings, I sketch an unorthodox Kantian account of respect for the dignity of persons. This account promises to capture the idea that it would be morally problematic for doctors to help the young quadriplegic to die, but to avoid the shortcomings of an orthodox Kantian account.     

Depending on care: recognition of vulnerability and the social contribution of care provision

People who are paid to provide basic care for others are frequently undervalued, exploited and expected to reach often unrealistic standards of care. I argue that appropriate social recognition, support and fair pay for people who provide care for those who are disabled, frail and aged, or suffering ill health that impedes their capacity to negotiate daily activities without support, depends on a reconsideration of the paradigm of the citizen or and moral agent. I argue that by drawing on the ideas of human vulnerability and dependency as central to our personhood, a more realistic conception of selves, citizens and persons can be developed that better recognises the inevitability of human dependency and the social value of care work. I also indicate the significance of this vulnerability-focussed view for ethical evaluation of the emotional aspects of care relationships.     

Sentient Nonpersons and the Disvalue of Death

Implicit in our everyday attitudes and practices is the assumption that death ordinarily harms a person who dies. A far more contested matter is whether death harms sentient individuals who are not persons, a category that includes many animals and some human beings. On the basis of the deprivation account of the harm of death, I argue that death harms sentient nonpersons (whenever their lives would be worth continuing). I next consider possible bases for the commonsense judgment that death ordinarily harms persons more than it harms sentient nonpersons. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, it is doubtful that the familiar resources of prudential value theory can vindicate this judgment. I show that the approach that at first glance seems most promising for supporting this judgment – namely, invoking an objective account of well‐being – faces substantial challenges, before arguing that McMahan's time‐relative interest account supplies the needed theoretical basis. I then go on to extract a significant practical implication of the first thesis, that death ordinarily harms sentient nonpersons: We should find a way to discontinue the routine killing of animal subjects following their use in experiments.     

Transplants from living donors in the United Kingdom and Ireland: a centre survey.

A survey was carried out to determine for the first time the extent of transplantation from living donors in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland and the views of transplant surgeons regarding future developments. Questionnaires were sent to 32 transplant centres representing 18 health regions and covered their extent of experience of transplantation, sources of donors, ages of donors and recipients, outcome of transplantation, and views on expansion of living donor transplantation services. Replies received from 27 transplant centres representing 17 health regions gave data on more than 1200 transplants from living donors. Transplants from living donors accounted for 0-25% of the total experience of health regions. Two centres had abandoned living donor transplantation. Sixty per cent of transplant surgeons favoured expansion of the living donor programme to meet a shortage of kidneys from cadavers, and the remainder thought that existing programmes were optimal. Living donor transplantation promises to be an important factor in the future planning of health care resources.     

The health of the very aged.

Little information is available on the health status of persons 85 years or over. Recent United States data indicate that 20% of individuals 85 years of age or over reside in nursing and personal care homes and that among these institutional residents 31% are bedfast, 11% are chairfast and 71% manifest evidence of senility. An investigation into the health of persons 85 years of age or over in two Ontario counties revealed that 39% resided in long-stay institutions, and that one of the main differences between old people living independently in the community and those in institutions was the higher proportion of the latter needing help with the activities of daily living and showing mental disorientation. Of those individuals 85 years of age or over in institutions for 1 year, 26% acknowledged often feeling depressed and 18% acknowledged often wishing they were dead, but these tendencies were not more frequent in those 85 years of age or over than in those 65 to 84 years of age. These findings have implications for service and research needs and attitudes towards death.     

Making the case for human life extension: personal arguments

In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all.     

Ageism in cardiology

This article supports the argument that ageism exists in health care, particularly on the equity of access to cardiological services. Rates of use of potentially life saving and life promoting interventions and investigations decline as the patient gets older. Higher rates of cardiological interventions occur among younger people, despite the high incidence of the condition among older individuals. Any ageism in clinical medicine and policy is simply a reflection of the presence of ageist attitudes in wider society, where the youth receives a higher priority over age. Ageism in medicine needs to be addressed to preserve or recapture this trust within an aging population. A wide ranging approach is necessary if equity in the provision of health care services is to be ensured which includes improvement of clinical guidelines and more specific monitoring of health care. Educational efforts to raise awareness that age stereotyping and ageist attitudes are unethical should be initiated. Research initiatives, which cover large numbers of older people, should be developed and older people should be empowered to influence choices and standards of treatments. Finally, legislation may be required to eradicate ageism in society.