Psychological and Evolutionary Evidence for Altruism

Sober and Wilson have recentlyclaimed that evolutionary theory can do whatneither philosophy nor experimental psychologyhave been able to, namely, ``break the deadlock'in the egoism vs. altruism debate with anargument based on the reliability of altruisticmotivation. I analyze both their reliabilityargument and the experimental evidence ofsocial psychology in favor of altruism in termsof the folk-psychological ``laws' and inferencepatterns underlying them, and conclude thatthey both rely on the same patterns. I exposethe confusions that have led Sober and Wilsonto defend a reliability argument whilerejecting the experimental evidence of socialpsychology.     

The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species'' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour.     

Development of intervention behavior in Japanese macaques: Testing the targeting hypothesis

Matrilineal dominance systems, which characterize several species of cercopithecines, are determined largely by the patterning of third-party aggressive interventions in conflicts. Although the role of interventions in structuring rank relations has received much attention, very few studies have dealt specifically with the development of intervention behavior. In other words,most studies have focused on the interventions received and their effect on the recipients rather than on the interventions performed and the goals of the interveners. We analyzed the intervention behavior of 10 juvenile females in a colony of 40 Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata)housed at the University of Montreal Laboratory of Behavioral Primatology. The analysis of 749 interventions performed by the juveniles over their first 4 years and 2425 interventions received over the same period reveals that (1) juvenile females intervened selectively against females ranking below their mother, (2) they began to intervene at about the same time that they began to challenge the latter females in dyadic contests, (3) they sided with females as well as with males against these females, (4) juvenile interveners incurred little risks in terms of aggressive retaliation from their targets, (5) they derived immediate benefits in terms of conflicts won over stronger targets, (6) interventions often did not take place when the possible recipients needed support, and (7) interveners did not conform to a pattern of mutually preferential support. These results support the view that interventions by juveniles are selfish (vs altruistic) and constitute a low-cost and effective means to target and to outrank prospectively subordinate females.     

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.     

Dynamic connections in neural networks

Massively parallel (neural-like) networks are receiving increasing attention as a mechanism for expressing information processing models. By exploiting powerful primitive units and stability-preserving construction rules, various workers have been able to construct and test quite complex models, particularly in vision research. But all of the detailed technical work was concerned with the structure and behavior offixed networks. The purpose of this paper is to extend the methodology to cover several aspects of change and memory.     

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group''s success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters'' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.     

First- and second-order sociality determine survival and reproduction in cooperative cichlids

Cooperative breeders serve as a model to study the evolution of cooperation, where costs and benefits of helping are typically scrutinized at the level of group membership. However, cooperation is often observed in multi-level social organizations involving interactions among individuals at various levels. Here, we argue that a full understanding of the adaptive value of cooperation and the evolution of complex social organization requires identifying the effect of different levels of social organization on direct and indirect fitness components. Our long-term field data show that in the cooperatively breeding, colonial cichlid fish Neolamprologus pulcher, both large group size and high colony density significantly raised group persistence. Neither group size nor density affected survival at the individual level, but they had interactive effects on reproductive output; large group size raised productivity when local population density was low, whereas in contrast, small groups were more productive at high densities. Fitness estimates of individually marked fish revealed indirect fitness benefits associated with staying in large groups. Inclusive fitness, however, was not significantly affected by group size, because the direct fitness component was not increased in larger groups. Together, our findings highlight that the reproductive output of groups may be affected in opposite directions by different levels of sociality, and that complex forms of sociality and costly cooperation may evolve in the absence of large indirect fitness benefits and the influence of kin selection.     

The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension

Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesized that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed ‘parochial altruism’, is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against the out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of ‘parochial altruism’. After a brief synopsis of the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future.     

Hidden altruism in a real-world setting

Concerns for reputation can promote cooperative behaviour. Individuals that behave cooperatively stand to benefit if they gain in influence, status or are more likely to be chosen as interaction partners by others. Most theoretical and empirical models of cooperation predict that image score will increase with cooperative contributions. Individuals are therefore expected to make higher contributions when observed by others and should opt to make contributions publicly rather than privately, particularly when contributions are higher than average. Here, however, I find the opposite effect. Using data from an online fundraising website, I show that donors are more likely to opt for anonymity when making extremely low and extremely high donations. Mid-range donations, on the other hand, are typically publicized. Recent work has shown that extremely generous individuals may be ostracized or punished by group members. The data presented here suggest that individuals may hide high donations to avoid these repercussions.     

Revisiting “The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups”: Continuous reciprocity in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma

For many years in evolutionary science, the consensus view has been that while reciprocal altruism can evolve in dyadic interactions, it is unlikely to evolve in sizable groups. This view had been based on studies which have assumed cooperation to be discrete rather than continuous (i.e., individuals can either fully cooperate or else fully defect, but they cannot continuously vary their level of cooperation). In real world cooperation, however, cooperation is often continuous. In this paper, we re-examine the evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups by presenting a model of the n-person prisoner's dilemma that assumes continuous rather than discrete cooperation. This model shows that continuous reciprocity has a dramatically wider basin of attraction than discrete reciprocity, and that this basin's size increases with efficiency of cooperation (marginal per capita return). Further, we find that assortative interaction interacts synergistically with continuous reciprocity to a much greater extent than it does with discrete reciprocity. These results suggest that previous models may have underestimated reciprocity's adaptiveness in groups. However, we also find that the invasion of continuous reciprocators into a population of unconditional defectors becomes realistic only within a narrow parameter space in which the efficiency of cooperation is close to its maximum bound. Therefore our model suggests that continuous reciprocity can evolve in large groups more easily than discrete reciprocity only under unusual circumstances.     

The building-up of social relationships: behavioural types, social networks and cooperative breeding in a cichlid

Consistent individual differences in behavioural types may not only cause variation in life-history decisions, but may also affect the choice of social partners and sociality in general. Here, we tested whether and how behavioural type influences the establishment of social ties using the cooperatively breeding cichlid, Neolamprologus pulcher. In a habitat saturation experiment with individuals pre-tested for behavioural type, we first analysed whether behavioural type affected the likelihood of settlement (i.e. social status), group sizes, and the types of dominant and subordinate individuals accepted as group members. Corrected for effects of body size and sex, the behavioural type did not affect settlement. However, bold dominant males only accepted smaller females, and grouped with bold subordinates, while shy dominant males accepted larger females than themselves, and grouped with shy subordinates. Second, we analysed the relationships between behavioural type and the aggressiveness or affiliation social network. Behavioural type significantly affected the number and quality of connections within the two networks. We show that behavioural types affect group composition, social networks and status achieved, in interaction with body size. Thus, the interactions within groups may depend not only on age, size and sex, but also on the behavioural type of the individuals involved.     

Strength determines coalitional strategies in humans

Coalitions enhance survival and reproductive success in many social species, yet they generate contradictory impulses. Whereas a coalition increases the probability of successfully obtaining rewards for its members, it typically requires a division of rewards among members, thereby diminishing individual benefits. Non-human primate data indicate that coalition formation is more likely when an individual''s probability of success is low when competing alone. No comparable studies exist for humans. Here we show using a computerized competitive game that humans exhibit a systematic, intuitive strategy for coalition formation based on their own and others'' levels of perceived strength, a pattern that resembles coalition formation in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. Despite equal expected pay-offs for all strategies, subjects were more likely to form coalitions as their own level of perceived strength waned. Those chosen as coalition partners tended to be stronger individuals or arbitrarily designated ‘friends’. Results suggest a heuristic for human coalitionary decisions that rests on the perception of relative power rather than on the assessment of pay-offs.     

The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups

The scale and complexity of human cooperation is an important and unresolved evolutionary puzzle. This article uses the finitely repeated n person Prisoners’ Dilemma game to illustrate how sapience can greatly enhance group-selection effects and lead to the evolutionary stability of cooperation in large groups. This affords a simple and direct explanation of the human “exception.”     

Sex-biased dispersal, haplodiploidy and the evolution of helping in social insects

In his famous haplodiploidy hypothesis, W. D. Hamilton proposed that high sister-sister relatedness facilitates the evolution of kin-selected reproductive altruism among Hymenopteran females. Subsequent analyses, however, suggested that haplodiploidy cannot promote altruism unless altruists capitalize on relatedness asymmetries by helping to raise offspring whose sex ratio is more female-biased than the population at large. Here, we show that haplodiploidy is in fact more favourable than is diploidy to the evolution of reproductive altruism on the part of females, provided only that dispersal is male-biased (no sex-ratio bias or active kin discrimination is required). The effect is strong, and applies to the evolution both of sterile female helpers and of helping among breeding females. Moreover, a review of existing data suggests that female philopatry and non-local mating are widespread among nest-building Hymenoptera. We thus conclude that Hamilton was correct in his claim that 'family relationships in the Hymenoptera are potentially very favourable to the evolution of reproductive altruism'.