Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.     

A case reopened: teleology and its consequences for the units of selection discussion.

Darwinian explanations for teleology are often imprecise, and justify the occurrence of teleological features by referring to natural selection in a vague and unspecified sense. In this paper, the Darwinian account for teleology is further analyzed. It is argued that in theory only a specific form of teleology--teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preservation of the genetic program--can be explained in a naturalistic way by employing Darwin's theory of natural selection. This observation links teleology with the units of selection discussion, as for both discussions the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior is of elementary importance. According to Dawkins' analysis, the unit of selection is an active germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the teleological point of view, the unit of selection should additionally incorporate the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. It is shown that within sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. Dawkins' concept of genic selectionism cannot be maintained without violating the naturalistic claims on teleology, and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed by Dawkins and those developed in the light of teleology.     

The function of function

Contemporary analyses of biological function almost invariably advocate a naturalistic analysis, grounding biological functions in some feature of the mind-independent world. Many recent accounts suggest that no single analysis will be appropriate for all cases of use and that biological teleology should be split into several distinct categories. This paper argues that such accounts have paid too little attention to the way in which functional language is used, concentrating instead on the types of situation in which it is used. An example of the role of teleology in science is examined and, on the basis of conclusions drawn from this, an alternative unifying analysis is proposed. It is suggested that, contrary to naturalistic accounts, teleology in biology carries no ontological commitment whatsoever to any class of mind-independent entities or properties. Instead, it is best regarded as a methodological device which is used to focus interest, formulate research perspectives and facilitate the structuring of certain questions or types of question that are pertinent in a given context of interest.     

Darwin was a teleologist

It is often claimed that one of Darwin's chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin's closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin's version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin's attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin's teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin's explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.I would like to thank John Beatty, David Hull and one of this journal's readers for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Teleology in biology: Is it a cause for concern?

Evolutionary biology is distinctively forward looking or 'teleological' in its way of thought. In this, it distinguishes itself from the physical sciences. One can ask for the purpose or function of the stegoseaur's fins. One would never ask for the function of a planet. Many, including biologists, worry that such teleology is an unhappy legacy of a Christian past. Although teleology does have its roots in pre-evolutionary thought, there are good reasons why it has persisted, and there are equally good reasons why it should be cherished.     

Ethics in Darwin's melancholy vision

Darwinian natural selection draws on Malthus' harsh vision of human society to explain how organisms come to be adapted to their environments. Natural selection produces the appearance of teleology, but requires only efficient causal processes: undirected, heritable variation combined with effects of the variations on survival and reproduction. This paper draws a sharp distinction between the resulting form of backwards-directed teleology and the future-directed teleology we ascribe to intentional human activity. Rather than dismiss teleology as mere illusion, the paper concludes with an account of how future-directed teleology came to be a justifiable part of how we understand ourselves.     

Teleology and its constitutive role for biology as the science of organized systems in nature

'Nothing in biology makes sense, except in the light of teleology'. This could be the first sentence in a textbook about the methodology of biology. The fundamental concepts in biology, e.g. 'organism' and 'ecosystem', are only intelligible given a teleological framework. Since early modern times, teleology has often been considered methodologically unscientific. With the acceptance of evolutionary theory, one popular strategy for accommodating teleological reasoning was to explain it by reference to selection in the past: functions were reconstructed as 'selected effects'. But the theory of evolution obviously presupposes the existence of organisms as organized and regulated, i.e. functional systems. Therefore, evolutionary theory cannot provide the foundation for teleology. The underlying reason for the central methodological role of teleology in biology is not its potential to offer particular forms of (evolutionary) explanations for the presence of parts, but rather an ontological one: organisms and other basic biological entities do not exist as physical bodies do, as amounts of matter with a definite form. Rather, they are dynamic systems in stable equilibrium; despite changes of their matter and form (in metabolism and metamorphosis) they maintain their identity. What remains constant in these kinds of systems is their 'organization', i.e. the causal pattern of interdependence of parts with certain effects of each part being relevant for the working of the system. Teleological analysis consists in the identification of these system-relevant effects and at the same time of the system as a whole. Therefore, the identity of biological systems cannot be specified without teleological reasoning.     

Natural selection and the conditions for existence: representational vs. conditional teleology in biological explanation

Human intentional action, including the design and use of artifacts, involves the prior mental representation of the goal (end) and the means to achieve that goal. This representation is part of the efficient cause of the action, and thus can be used to explain both the action and the achievement of the end. This is intentional teleological explanation. More generally, teleological explanation that depends on the real existence of a representation of the goal (and the means to achieve it) can be called representational teleological explanation. Such explanations in biology can involve both external representations (e.g., ideas in the mind of God) and internal representations (souls, vital powers, entelechies, developmental programs, etc.). However, another type of explanation of intentional action (or any other process) is possible. Given that an action achieving a result occurs, the action can be explained as fulfilling the necessary conditions (means) for that result (end), and, reciprocally, the result explained by the occurrence of those necessary conditions. This is conditional teleological explanation. For organisms, natural selection is often understood metaphorically as the designer, intentionally constructing them for certain ends. Unfortunately, this metaphor is often taken rather too literally, because it has been difficult to conceive of another way to relate natural selection to the process of evolution. I argue that combining a conditional teleological explanation of organisms and of evolution provides such an alternative. This conditional teleology can be grounded in existence or survival. Given that an organism exists, we can explain its existence by the occurrence of the necessary conditions for that existence. This principle of the 'conditions for existence' was introduced by Georges Cuvier in 1800, and provides a valid, conditional teleological method for explaining organismal structure and behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, the conditions for existence are the range of boundary conditions within which the evolutionary process must occur. Moreover, evolutionary change itself can be subjected to conditional teleological explanation, because natural selection theory is primarily a theory about the relation between the conditions for the existence of organisms and the conditions for the existence of traits in populations. I show that failure to distinguish representational from conditional teleological explanation has confused previous attempts to clarify the relation of teleology to biology.     

Darwin teleologist? Design in the Orchids

Focusing on the Orchids, this article aims at disentangling the concepts of teleology, design and natural theology. It refers to several contemporary critics of Darwin (Kölliker, Argyll, Royer, Candolle, Delpino) to challenge Huxley's interpretation that Darwin's system was “a deathblow” to teleology. The Orchids seem rather to be a “flank-movement” (Gray): it departs from the Romantic theories of transmutation and the “imaginary examples” of the Origin; it focuses on empirical data and on teleological structures. Although Darwin refers to natural selection, his readers mock him for his fascination for delicate morphological contrivances and co-adaptations – a sign that he was inescapably lured to finality. Some even suggested that his system was a “theodicy”. In the history of Darwinism, the Orchids reveal “another” quite unexpected and heterodox Darwin: freed from the hypothetical fancies of the Origin, and even suggesting a new kind of physico-theology.     

The problem of teleology in biology as a problem of biology-teacher education

The paper sketches the ways ‘the problem of teleology’ appears in pupil-texts, teacher-guides, and college-level texts. Excerpts from the literature in the field of philosophy and history of science are then quoted, which illustrate that ‘the problem of teleology’ cannot be handled dogmatically, as if the issues were indisputable. It is pointed out, that teacher-education does not enable the prospective teacher to analyse the teacher and pupil texts objectively and critically as to their philosophical implications. Suggestions are made which might alter this situation.     

Preliminary studies of Eutorna phaulocosma (Lepidoptera: Oecophoridae) in New Zealand

Abstract

In 1978 George C. Williams predicted that the last two decades of this century would be a fabulous age, and that evolutionary biology would provide critical insights into the processes of change in the biological world. He suggested that these might come to be described as the “good old days”. I am not so sure that this is likely, but I am very sure that it will be a turbulent time. I think also that those biologists who attended the recent SYSTANZ meeting on evolution must by now be equally convinced. The conference was punctuated by heated debates on major topics such as Darwinian and neo-Darwinian theory, vicariance biogeography, and teleology, to mention but a few.     

Phylogenetic inertia and Darwin's higher law

The concept of 'phylogenetic inertia' is routinely deployed in evolutionary biology as an alternative to natural selection for explaining the persistence of characteristics that appear sub-optimal from an adaptationist perspective. However, in many of these contexts the precise meaning of 'phylogenetic inertia' and its relationship to selection are far from clear. After tracing the history of the concept of 'inertia' in evolutionary biology, I argue that treating phylogenetic inertia and natural selection as alternative explanations is mistaken because phylogenetic inertia is, from a Darwinian point of view, simply an expected effect of selection. Although Darwin did not discuss 'phylogenetic inertia,' he did assert the explanatory priority of selection over descent. An analysis of 'phylogenetic inertia' provides a perspective from which to assess Darwin's view.     

Thermodynamics and the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory

Thermodynamics and evolutionary theory have spent most of their shared history in adversarial relationship to one another. The point of this paper is to consider some qualitative ways in which thermodynamics can enrich both the theory and epistemology of evolution. The "autonomy of biology" posture in evolutionary theory hangs on the supposed uniqueness of why-questions in biology. With this posture, and with the general obstruction of constructive dialogue between evolution and the physical sciences it fosters, come the perennial accusations that Darwinism deals in adaptational teleology but not mechanisms. Thermodynamics provides for a two-tiered hierarchy of causation in nature in which the why-question is rendered not only legitimate materialistically, but essential to understanding the evolutionary process in its totality--from the emergence of life to the branching of lineages in speciation.     

Report on the round-table discussion of the subject "idea and experience" in connection with the 1977 annual meeting "process kinetics" of the German Academy of Natural Scientists Leopoldina (Halle/S., October 16, 1977)]

A report is given about a round-table-discussion upon the role and meaning of "idea and experience" in the creative scientific process. Notable representatives of mathematics, theoretical physics and geophysics, chemistry, theoretical and general experimental biology, and of medicine contribute in the discussion guided by C. F. V. WEIZSACKER to this theme from point of view of their disciplines. The components of meaning of "idea and experience" in their connection one to another may be paraphrased by such pairs of terms as "theory and practice", "theoretical or empirical", "law and appearance of a single phenomenon", "unity and diversity", abstract and concrete". It was demonstrated that in each of the mentioned scientific disciplines there is a natural, and that, starting from mathematics and going to biology and medicine, the weight in that relation will shift more and more to "experience". Many of the known methodological problems and difficulties will arise in the mentioned scientific branches if one stresses immoderately only one component of "idea and experience" by leaving the natural, discipline-related range of variation of the relation "idea and experience".     

Darwin's changing views on evolution: from centres of origin and teleology to vicariance and incomplete lineage sorting

It is a strange fact that in many ways the first edition of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species is closer to modern neodarwinism than the sixth and last edition. Sometimes this is attributed to a decline in the quality of the argument, but the opposite interpretation is given here. It is suggested that Darwin's early work on evolution is naïve and based on the two creationist principles of centre of origin and teleology (panselectionism). This fusion later became the 'modern synthesis'. However, after the first edition of the Origin , Darwin developed a non-teleological synthesis that integrated natural selection with what he called 'laws of growth'– phylogenetic/morphogenetic trends or tendencies. Discussion of Darwin's later, more sophisticated model of evolution has been suppressed in the teleological modern synthesis, but similar ideas are re-emerging in current work on molecular phylogenetics and biogeography. This indicates that the ancestor of a group can be diverse in its morphology and its ecology, that this diversity can be inherited, and that groups usually originate over a broad region and not at a single point.     

Biological invasions at the gene level

Despite several recent contributions of population and evolutionary biology to the rapidly developing field of invasion biology, integration is far from perfect. I argue here that invasion and native status are sometimes best discussed at the level of the gene rather than at the level of the species. This, and the need to consider both natural (e.g. postglacial) and human‐induced invasions, suggests that a more integrative view of invasion biology is required.     

Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.     

Interview with Sydney Brenner

The following text is an edited version of a recent interview with Sydney Brenner who has been at the forefront of many developments in molecular biology since the 1950s. It provides a participant’s view on current issues in the history and epistemology of molecular biology. The main issue raised by Brenner regards the relation of molecular biology to the new field of systems biology. Brenner defends the original programme of molecular biology—the molecular explanation of living processes—that in his view has yet to be completed. The programme of systems biology in contrast he views as either trivial or as not achievable since it purports to deal with inverse problems that are impossible to solve in complex living systems. Other issues covered in the conversation concern the impact of the human genome sequencing project, the commercial turn in molecular biology and the contested disciplinary status of the science.     

Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering

Welfare biology is the study of living things and their environment with respect to their welfare (defined as net happiness, or enjoyment minus suffering). Despite difficulties of ascertaining and measuring welfare and relevancy to normative issues, welfare biology is a positive science. Evolutionary economics and population dynamics are used to help answer basic questions in welfare biology: Which species are affective sentients capable of welfare? Do they enjoy positive or negative welfare? Can their welfare be dramatically increased? Under plausible axioms, all conscious species are plastic and all plastic species are conscious (and, with a stronger axiom, capable of welfare). More complex niches favour the evolution of more rational species. Evolutionary economics also supports the common-sense view that individual sentients failing to survive to mate suffer negative welfare. A kind of God-made (or evolution-created) fairness between species is also unexpectedly found. The contrast between growth maximization (as may be favoured by natural selection), average welfare, and total welfare maximization is discussed. It is shown that welfare could be increased without even sacrificing numbers (at equilibrium). Since the long-term reduction in animal suffering depends on scientific advances, strict restrictions on animal experimentation may be counter-productive to animal welfare.