The Tragedy of a priori Selectionism: Dennett and Gould on Adaptationism

In his recent book on Darwinism, Daniel Dennett has offered up a species of a priori selectionism that he calls algorithmic. He used this view to challenge a number of positions advocated by Stephen J. Gould. I examine his algorithmic conception, review his unqualified enthusiasm for the a priori selectionist position, challenge Dennett's main metaphors (cranes vs. skyhooks and a design space), examine ways in which his position has lead him to misunderstand or misrepresent Gould (spandrels, exaptation, punctuated equilibrium, contingency and disparity), and discuss recent results in developmental biology that suggest that an a priori position does not fill the demands of an evolutionary biology. I conclude by insisting that evolutionary biology is many leveled, complicated, and is carried on an ever shifting and expanding empirical base that when disregarded results in caricature.     

On the Relationship Between Memes and Genes: A Critique of Dennett

Dennett (1995) argues that memes or cultural replicators are largely autonomous of genes, and that they are fairly efficacious in determining who we are and what we do. I argue that Dennett's arguments are wrong in several aspects, which we can see by analyzing processes at appropriate levels. Specifically, I argue that it is not true that we as persons are created largely by memes, that our memes are not largely independent of our genes, and that we can use the universality of memes to make inferences about genetic predispositions. Finally, by suggesting an innate psychological mechanism for morality, I argue that morality may be largely the effect of genetic predispositions rather than autonomous.     

Agents and acacias: replies to Dennett,Sterelny, and Queller

The commentaries by Dennett, Sterelny, and Queller on Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection (DPNS) are so constructive that they make it possible to extend and improve the book’s framework in several ways. My replies will focus on points of disagreement, and I will pick a small number of themes and develop them in detail. The three replies below are mostly self-contained, except that all my comments about genes, discussed by all three critics, are in the reply to Queller. Agential views of evolution, discussed by Queller and Dennett, are addressed in my reply to Dennett.     

Evolution and belief: the missing question

In this paper, I address the question of what an evolutionary account of intentional states should look like. I suggest that many accounts rest on the (usually implicit) assumption that, so far as intentionality is concerned, differences between animal species should be understood solely in terms of comparative sophistication. I argue that this assumption is misguided. Such accounts ignore an important biological distinction between functional and anatomical characterisations and seek to explain comparative differences that are symptomatic of functional divergence by appealing solely to a cognitive analogue of anatomical complexity. This results in accounts that are fundamentally incomplete or beside the point.     

Fixing Content and Function in Neurobiological Systems: The Neuroethology of Electroreception

Are attributions of content and function determinate, or is there no fact of the matter to be fixed? Daniel Dennett has argued in favor of indeterminacy and concludes that, in practice, content and function cannot be fixed. The discovery of an electrical modality in vertebrates offers one concrete instance where attributions of function and content are supported by a strong scientific consensus. A century ago, electroreception was unimagined, whereas today it is widely believed that many species of bony fish, amphibians, sharks, skates, and rays possess this non-human sensory modality. A look at the history of science related to this discovery reveals a highly interdisciplinary endeavor, encompassing ethology, behavioral analysis, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. While each area provides important evidence, none is sufficient on its own to fix content and function. Instead, I argue that an interdisciplinary, neuroethological approach is required to carry out such determinations. Further, a detailed consideration of biological research suggests that while content and function claims are empirically underdetermined and uncertain, there is insufficient reason to believe in an additional problem of indeterminism. In particular, Dennett's indeterminism arises from a research methodology -- logical adaptationism -- that generates evidence from only one of the areas of neuroethology. However, logical adaptationism does not reflect adaptationism as it is practiced in contemporary biology. I conclude that Dennett is faced with a dilemma: On the one hand, he can hold to logical adaptationism and the indeterminism that results from it, while giving up the relevance of his arguments to biological practice. On the other, he can embrace a more accurate version of adaptationism -- one which plays a role in a larger neuroethological framework -- but from which no strong indeterminacy claims follow.     

A lost cause? Fundamental problems for causal theories of parenthood

In this paper, I offer a critique of (actual and possible) causal theories of parenthood. I do not offer a competing account of who incurs parental obligations and why; rather, I aim to show that there are fundamental problems for any account of who acquires parental obligations and why by appeal to causal responsibility for a child’s existence. I outline and justify three criteria that any plausible causal account of parental obligation must meet, and demonstrate that attempting to fulfil all three criteria simultaneously will give rise to one or both of two potentially insurmountable dilemmas.     

Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science

One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as aProcess (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the``demic structure' of science. I conclude that the social account cando significant explanatory work independently of the selectionistaccount. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demicstructure of science points us toward an important set of issues insocial epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process iscorrect, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solelyon his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promisingaspects of his theory.     

Hustedt's study of the diatom species Tetracyclus ellipticus: why history is not just a chronicle of events

In 1914 Hustedt presented a monographic revision of the genus Tetracyclus Ralfs. His paper was a detailed account of his investigations made for the illustrations of the genus in Schmidt's Atlas. Hustedt made a particularly detailed study of the species T. ellipticus and outlined his ideas of the interrelationships between the subspecific taxa he understood to be organised around the nominate type. The monograph was unusual (and unique) in that Hustedt included a schematic diagram which represented his views on the interrelationships of symmetry characters observed between the various subspecific taxa he recognised. I show that Hustedt's diagram can be related to a particular understanding of both species definitions and taxonomic practice and that others who have followed Hustedt (by implication) move further away from, rather than closer to, the data they are attempting to explain in a systematic framework.     

Kant on epigenesis, monogenesis and human nature: the biological premises of anthropology

The aim of this paper is to show that for Kant, a combination of epigenesis and monogenesis is the condition of possibility of anthropology as he conceives of it and that moreover, this has crucial implications for the biological dimension of his account of human nature. More precisely, I begin by arguing that Kant's conception of mankind as a natural species is based on two premises: firstly the biological unity of the human species (monogenesis of the human races); and secondly the existence of 'seeds' which may or may not develop depending on the environment (epigenesis of human natural predispositions). I then turn to Kant's account of man's natural predispositions and show that far from being limited to the issue of races, it encompasses unexpected human features such as gender, temperaments and nations. These predispositions, I argue, are means to the realisation of Nature's overall purpose for the human species. This allows me to conclude that man's biological determinism leads to the species' preservation, cultivation and civilisation.     

Data Processing Techniques May Influence Numerical Results and Interpretation of Single Leg Stance Test

Purposeto evaluate how different data sampling and different analysis methods may effect numerical results and interpretation of single leg stance test using parameters derived from CoP trajectories.MethodsThirty healthy active subjects were recruited for this study on voluntary. Each participant was asked to stand as still as possible for 20 s on the dominant limb, with the supporting foot placed on the force platform. Balancing task in two conditions, with eyes open (EO) and closed (EC). Three trials were collected for each condition.Medial-lateral and anterior-posterior CoP force platform data were obtained and downsampling techniques was applied to get data at original (500 Hz), 100 Hz and 20 Hz of sampling frequencies.Time series data were then analysed to get CoP variables including medial-lateral total path, anterior-posterior total path, total path, maximal excursion for the ML plane and maximal excursion for the AP plane. Sway area was evaluated as 95% confidence ellipse area (CEA) and as 95% prediction ellipse area (PEA)Main findingsSignificant different results were obtained for the same variable evaluated at different sampling frequency. In addition, at all sampling frequencies variables were significantly different (p.<0.05) between EO and EC conditions. High correlation (>0.9) between the same CoP variable calculated at different sampling frequencies was found for all CoP variables. Regarding sway area calculation, both methods were able to distinguish between EO and EC conditions and high correlation was found between CEA and PEA methods.ConclusionOverall results of this study demonstrated the importance of reporting data processing techniques, which includes sampling frequency and variable calculation methods, as they shown to influence one leg stance CoP results, thus data analysed in different manner cannot be directly compared. However, for the variables included in the study, researchers can choose preferred data collection and data analysis methods as they all return same data analysis interpretation as long as they keep consistency in the method.     

Adaptationism and Engineering

The rights and wrongs of adaptationism areoften discussed by appeal to what I call theartefact model. Anti-adaptationistscomplain that the use of optimality modelling,reverse engineering and other techniques areindicative of a mistaken and outmoded beliefthat organisms are like well-designedartefacts. Adaptationists (e.g. Dennett 1995)respond with the assertion that viewingorganisms as though they were well designed isa fruitful, perhaps necessary research strategyin evolutionary biology. Anti-adaptationistsare right when they say that techniques likereverse engineering are liable to mislead. This fact does not undermine the artefact modelprecisely because the same techniques misleadus for the same reasons when they are appliedunreflectively to artefacts. Thoseadaptationists who hold only that it isworthwhile to investigate organisms as thoughthey were artefacts and thoseanti-adaptationists who criticise simplisticdesign models have far more in common than thelabels attached to their positions mightsuggest.     

Nano-intentionality: a defense of intrinsic intentionality

I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell’s ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things provides a necessary building block for cognition and high-order intentionality, because the neurons that make up vertebrate brains, like most cells in our body, embody such capacities. I provisionally dub the capacities in question “nano-intentionality”: a microscopic form of “aboutness”. The form of intrinsic intentionality I propose is thoroughly materialistic, fully compatible with known biological facts, and derived non-mysteriously through evolution. Crucially, these capacities are not shared by any existing computers or computer components, and thus provide a clear, empirically-based distinction between brains and currently existing artificial information processing systems. I suggest that an appreciation of this aspect of living matter provides a potential route out of what may otherwise appear to be a hopeless philosophical quagmire confronting information-processing models of the mind.

Howard Pattee's theoretical biology--a radical epistemological stance to approach life, evolution and complexity

This paper offers a short review of Pattee's main contributions to science and philosophy. With no intention of being exhaustive, an account of Pattee's work is presented which discusses some of his ideas and their reception. This is done through an analysis centered in what is thought to be his main contribution: the elaboration of an internal epistemic stance to better understand life, evolution and complexity. Having introduced this core idea as a sort of a posteriori cohesive element of a complex but highly coherent and complete system of thinking, further specific elements are also reviewed.     

Intentionality,social play,and definition

Social play is naturally characterized in intentional terms. An evolutionary account of social play could help scientists to understand the evolution of cognition and intentionality. Alexander Rosenberg (1990) has argued that if play is characterized intentionally or functionally, it is not a behavioral phenotype suitable for evolutionary explanation. If he is right, his arguments would threaten many projects in cognitive ethology. We argue that Rosenberg's arguments are unsound and that intentionally and functionally characterized phenotypes are a proper domain for ethological investigation.     

The species concept in diatoms: Evidence for morphologically distinct,sympatric gamodemes in four epipelic species

Reproductive isolation is demonstrated between morphologically distinct, sympatric demes of four epipelic diatom species inhabiting a small pond. The six demes ofSellaphora pupula, four of them allogamous, one probably autogamous, and one apparently asexual, differ morphologically with respect to size, shape, stria density and pattern. In the pond,Caloneis silicula, Cymatopleura solea, andNeidium ampliatum each contain two allogamous demes, differing principally in size. There are intrinsic barriers to hybridization between the demes, which operate at the earliest stages of sexual reproduction. Such gamodemes are perhaps best treated taxonomically as separate species.Dedicated to Prof. DrLothar Geitler on the occasion of his 90th birthday. I gratefully acknowledge the debt I owe Prof.Geitler for the insights and inspiration I have gained from his papers. I account myself fortunate to have visited him briefly in 1983, at Lunz, and to have seen the rivers where his work on diatom species began in 1922.     

Discursive Formation,Ethnographic Encounter,Photographic Evidence: The Centenary of Durkheim's Basic Forms of Religious Life and the Anthropological Study of Australian Aboriginal Religion in His Time

Historical research on the work of Émile Durkheim has often been confined to textual analysis aiming to reconstruct his research in the context of anthropological discourses at the turn of the 20th century. As radical changes in the visual culture of the late 19th century shaped the formation of anthropology as an academic discipline, the ambition of this article is to elaborate the ways Durkheim's use of ethnographic data and visual material formed the foundation of the theoretical and methodological design of his approach to religion. By tracing features in his Basic Forms that emphasize visual material and prioritize religious practice, I submit that the photographic evidence given in Spencer and Gillen's account of Aboriginal religion allowed Durkheim to theorize religion primarily through ritual. Photography, as a visual means of representation, enhanced the study of religion by focusing on ritual without necessarily demanding consideration of its mythical narratives and cosmological accounts. Based on a thorough analysis of his Basic Forms, this article argues that Durkheim used the photographs of the Aborigines of Central Australia systematically and that this use of photographs consequently guided his ethnographic depiction and his selection of theoretical concepts and methodological procedures.     

Why Darwin rejected intelligent design

As a Cambridge University undergraduate Charles Darwin was fascinated and convinced by the argument for intelligent design, as set forth in William Paley’s 1802 classic, Natural Theology. Subsequently, during his five-year voyage on HMS Beagle (1831–1836), Darwin interpreted his biological findings through a creationist lens, including the thought-provoking evidence he encountered during his historic visit to the Galápagos Islands in September and October 1835. After his return to England in 1836 and his subsequent conversion to the idea of organic evolution in March 1837, Darwin searched for a theory that would explain both the fact of evolution and the widespread appearance of intelligent design. His insight into the process of natural selection, which occurred in September 1838, provided this alternative explanation. Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) exemplifies his skillful deployment of the hypothetico-deductive method in testing and refuting the arguments for intelligent design that he had once so ardently admired.     

“A Great Complication of Circumstances” – Darwin and the Economy of Nature

In 1749, Linnaeus presided over the dissertation “Oeconomia Naturae,” which argued that each creature plays an important and particular role in nature’s economy. This phrase should be familiar to readers of Darwin, for he claims in the Origin that “all organic beings are striving, it may be said, to seize on each place in the economy of nature.” Many scholars have discussed the influence of political economy on Darwin’s ideas. In this paper, I take a different tack, showing that Darwin’s idea of an economy of nature stemmed from the views of earlier naturalists like Linnaeus and Lyell. I argue, in the first section of the paper, that Linnaeus’ idea of oeconomia naturae is derived from the idea of the animal economy, and that his idea of politia naturae is an extension of the idea of a politia civitatis. In the second part, I explore the use of the concept of stations in the work of De Candolle and Lyell – the precursor to Darwin’s concept of places. I show in the third part of the paper that the idea of places in an economy of nature is employed by Darwin at many key points in his thinking: his discussion of the Galapagos birds, his reading of Malthus, etc. Finally, in the last section, I demonstrate that the idea of a place in nature’s economy is essential to Darwin’s account of divergence. To tell his famous story of divergence and adaptation, Darwin needed the economy of nature.     

Flexible Designs for Genomewide Association Studies

Summary .  Genomewide association studies attempting to unravel the genetic etiology of complex traits have recently gained attention. Frequently, these studies employ a sequential genotyping strategy: A large panel of markers is examined in a subsample of subjects, and the most promising markers are genotyped in the remaining subjects. In this article, we introduce a novel method for such designs enabling investigators to, for example, modify marker densities and sample proportions while strongly controlling the family-wise type I error rate. Loss of efficiency is avoided by redistributing conditional type I error rates of discarded markers. Our approach can be combined with cost optimal designs and entails a greater flexibility than all previously suggested designs. Among other features, it allows for marker selections based upon biological criteria instead of statistical criteria alone, or the option to modify the sample size at any time during the course of the project. For practical applicability, we develop a new algorithm, subsequently evaluate it by simulations, and illustrate it using a real data set.     

Agential autonomy and biological individuality

What is a biological individual? How are biological individuals individuated? How can we tell how many individuals there are in a given assemblage of biological entities? The individuation and differentiation of biological individuals are central to the scientific understanding of living beings. I propose a novel criterion of biological individuality according to which biological individuals are autonomous agents. First, I articulate an ecological–dynamical account of natural agency according to which, agency is the gross dynamical capacity of a goal-directed system to bias its repertoire to respond to its conditions as affordances. Then, I argue that agents or agential dynamical systems can be agentially dependent on, or agentially autonomous from, other agents and that this agential dependence/autonomy can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, strong or weak. Biological individuals, I propose, are all and only those agential dynamical systems that are strongly agentially autonomous. So, to determine how many individuals there are in a given multiagent aggregate, such as multicellular organism, a colony, symbiosis, or a swarm, we first have to identify how many agential dynamical systems there are, and then what their relations of agential dependence/autonomy are. I argue that this criterion is adequate to the extent that it vindicates the paradigmatic cases, and explains why the paradigmatic cases are paradigmatic, and why the problematic cases are problematic. Finally, I argue for the importance of distinguishing between agential and causal dependence and show the relevance of agential autonomy for understanding the explanatory structure of evolutionary developmental biology.