Why the embryo rescue case is a bad argument against embryonic personhood

The embryo rescue case (ERC) is a thought experiment that is used to argue against the view that embryos have a right to life (i.e., are persons). I will argue that cognitive science undermines the intuition elicited by the ERC. I will show that whether or not embryos have a right to life, our mental tools will make it very difficult to believe that they do have the said right. This suggests that the intuition elicited by the ERC is not truth‐indicative. The upshot of this is that we have an undercutting defeater for our intuition that embryos do not have a right to life. Thus, the ERC is a bad argument against embryonic personhood.     

Access to essential medicines: a Hobbesian social contract approach

Medicines that are vital for the saving and preserving of life in conditions of public health emergency or endemic serious disease are known as essential medicines. In many developing world settings such medicines may be unavailable, or unaffordably expensive for the majority of those in need of them. Furthermore, for many serious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) these essential medicines are protected by patents that permit the patent-holder to operate a monopoly on their manufacture and supply, and to price these medicines well above marginal cost. Recent international legal doctrine has placed great stress on the need to globalise intellectual property rights protections, and on the rights of intellectual property rights holders to have their property rights enforced. Although international intellectual property rights law does permit compulsory licensing of protected inventions in the interests of public health, the use of this right by sovereign states has proved highly controversial. In this paper I give an argument in support of states' sovereign right to expropriate private intellectual property in conditions of public health emergency. This argument turns on a social contract argument for the legitimacy of states. The argument shows, further, that under some circumstances states are not merely permitted compulsory to license inventions, but are actually obliged to do so, on pain of failure of their legitimacy as sovereign states. The argument draws freely on a loose interpretation of Thomas Hobbes's arguments in his Leviathan, and on an analogy between his state of War and the situation of public health disasters.     

A case study in explanatory power: John Snow's conclusions about the pathology and transmission of cholera

In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or ‘exciting cause’ of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera’s cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera’s origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,—data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues—, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or if, it was passed on. The question then arises as to how Snow arrived at conclusions so systematically different from those of his opponents. In this paper, I want to look at Snow’s reasoning in some detail, and show that there were certain principles, explanatory power in particular, that were epistemologically important to Snow in their own right. I will show that Snow himself takes explanatory power to be an epistemic property, and makes explicit links between explanatory power and confirmation. Systematically juxtaposing Snow’s claims and his opponents’, I will show that Snow was right to tout the explanatory power of his theory, and that his conclusions about the epistemic superiority of his theory over that of the miasmatists’ were justified.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Was Darwin a creationist?

Throughout the Origin of Species, Darwin contrasts his theory of natural selection with the theory that God independently created each species. This makes it seem as though the Origin offers a scientific alternative to a theological worldview. A few months after the Origin appeared, however, the eminent anatomist Richard Owen published a review that pointed out the theological assumptions of Darwin's theory. Owen worked in the tradition of rational morphology, within which one might suggest that evolution occurs by processes that are continuous with those by which life arises from matter; in contrast, Darwin rested his account of life's origins on the notion that God created one or a few life forms upon which natural selection could act. Owen argued that Darwin's reliance on God to explain the origins of life makes his version of evolution no less supernatural than the special creationist that Darwin criticizes: although Darwin limits God to one or a few acts of creation, he still relies upon God to explain life's existence.     

Substance,rights, value,and abortion

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio‐style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg‐Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus’s right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti‐abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn’t care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti‐abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.     

Where the eye looks, the hand follows; limb-dependent magnetic misreaching in optic ataxia

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is thought to play an important role in the sensorimotor transformations associated with reaching movements. In humans, damage to the PPC, particularly bilateral lesions, leads to impairments of visually guided reaching movements (optic ataxia). Recent accounts of optic ataxia based upon electrophysiological recordings in monkeys have proposed that this disorder arises because of a breakdown in the tuning fields of parietal neurons responsible for integrating spatially congruent retinal, eye, and hand position signals to produce coordinated eye and hand movements . We present neurological evidence that forces a reconceptualization of this view. We report a detailed case study of a patient with a limb-dependent form of optic ataxia who can accurately reach with either hand to objects that he can foveate (thereby demonstrating coordinated eye-hand movements) but who cannot effectively decouple reach direction from gaze direction for movements executed using his right arm. The demonstration that our patient's misreaching is confined to movements executed using his right limb, and only for movements that are directed to nonfoveal targets, rules out explanations based upon simple perceptual or motor deficits but indicates an impairment in the ability to dissociate the eye and limb visuomotor systems when appropriate.     

Alternative reality and art: the creative world of Walter Inglis Anderson

Both mental illness and creativity run in families. This observation suggests the possibility of genetic predisposition; in light of the known dynamic interrelationships among the environment, the personality, and the brain, however, it does not diminish the possibility of significant environmental influence on personal development. An examination of the biological, psychological, and social forces impacting the life of Walter Inglis Anderson (1903-1965), the South's most important artist, serves as a case in point. Anderson's upbringing, including his mother's determination that her sons become artists and her beliefs about the shamanistic role of artists in society, might have played a large part in establishing an unusual and indelible frame of reference in a family whose history insinuated the possibility of untoward outcomes.Walter Anderson's life as an artist--one who lived at times in an alternative reality--raises questions about how a different set of circumstances might have affected his mental state as well as his talent. This essay discusses some of the important relationships, events, and circumstances in Walter Anderson's life from a biopsychosocial perspective, with emphasis on psychodynamic implications of his illness and its questionable diagnosis as schizophrenia.     

Do Male Mice Prefer or Avoid Each Other's Company? Influence of Hierarchy,Kinship, and Familiarity

In the laboratory, individual housing of male mice who otherwise show aggression is common practice. Because mice are a social species, the question arises whether this procedure is right from the animals' point of view. This study tested the preference of subordinate animals for their dominant cagemate, and vice versa, and the preference of subordinate animals for an unknown subordinate partner. Experiments that allowed male mice with different histories to choose either an inhabited or an empty cage have shown that the mice preferred the proximity of another male over individual housing. No differences in this respect were found between dominant and subordinate males, or between littermates and nonlittermates. The preference was most obvious when mice who were previously housed together were tested. The study concludes that separation and single housing for mice are not attractive solutions for overcoming aggression in group-housed male mice and that alternative approaches, such as improving the housing conditions, should be explored as a way of tempering intermale aggression.     

Do Male Mice Prefer or Avoid Each Other's Company? Influence of Hierarchy, Kinship, and Familiarity

In the laboratory, individual housing of male mice who otherwise show aggression is common practice. Because mice are a social species, the question arises whether this procedure is right from the animals' point of view. This study tested the preference of subordinate animals for their dominant cagemate, and vice versa, and the preference of subordinate animals for an unknown subordinate partner. Experiments that allowed male mice with different histories to choose either an inhabited or an empty cage have shown that the mice preferred the proximity of another male over individual housing. No differences in this respect were found between dominant and subordinate males, or between littermates and nonlittermates. The preference was most obvious when mice who were previously housed together were tested. The study concludes that separation and single housing for mice are not attractive solutions for overcoming aggression in group-housed male mice and that alternative approaches, such as improving the housing conditions, should be explored as a way of tempering intermale aggression.     

REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY, THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM, AND THE NON-PERSON PROBLEM

The Non-Identity Problem is the problem of explaining the apparent wrongness of a decision that does not harm people, especially since some of the people affected by the decision would not exist at all were it not for the decision. One approach to this problem, in the context of reproductive decisions, is to focus on wronging, rather than harming, one's offspring. But a Non-Person Problem emerges for any view that claims (1) that only persons can be wronged and (2) that the person-making properties allow for there to be human non-persons. Consider an individual human organism that is prevented from ever possessing the person-making properties. On person-only accounts of the victims of wronging, this organism cannot be wronged by anyone. Hence even individuals whose decisions prevent it from ever possessing the person-making properties cannot wrong it. But this is counter-intuitive. We can think of examples where a human organism is wronged by precisely those decisions that prevent it from possessing the person-making properties. The best solution to this problem, in the case where the person-making property is rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life, is to adjust the concept of a person so that it refers, not merely to those with the immediate capacity for rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life, but also to those with a higher-order capacity for such self-governance. Any solution to the Non-Identity Problem that focuses on wronging rather than harming should incorporate this sort of solution to the Non-Person Problem.     

Linking physiological mechanisms of coherent cellular behaviour with more general physical approaches towards the coherence of life

Schr?dinger pointed out that one of the most fundamental properties of life is its coherent behaviour. This property has been approached from a physiological point of view by Ling in his 'association-induction hypothesis' and extended by Pollack (gel-sol theory), by Chaplin and by Kaivarainen (detailed studies of cellular water). The question of coherence has also been attacked from general physics in three independent approaches: from non-linear thermodynamics (Fr?hlich), from quantum field theory (Del Giudice and his group) and from quantum mechanics (Davydov). In this paper all these approaches are unified. The emerging picture constitutes a new paradigm of life.     

Dissociations in cognitive memory: the syndrome of developmental amnesia

The dearth of studies on amnesia in children has led to the assumption that when damage to the medial temporal lobe system occurs early in life, the compensatory capacity of the immature brain rescues memory functions. An alternative view is that such damage so interferes with the development of learning and memory that it results not in selective cognitive impairments but in general mental retardation. Data will be presented to counter both of these arguments. Results obtained from a series of 11 amnesic patients with a history of hypoxic ischaemic damage sustained perinatally or during childhood indicate that regardless of age at onset of hippocampal pathology, there is a pronounced dissociation between episodic memory, which is severely impaired, and semantic memory, which is relatively preserved. A second dissociation is characterized by markedly impaired recall and relatively spared recognition leading to a distinction between recollection-based versus familiarity-based judgements. These findings are discussed in terms of the locus and extent of neuropathology associated with hypoxic ischaemic damage, the neural basis of 'remembering' versus 'knowing', and a hierarchical model of cognitive memory.     

Names and naming: Instances from the ORU-IGBO

Conclusion People have many names. But, changing one's name is no small thing. It can signify a major step in life or an embarrassing story, as in the last case.A person has a complex individual identity. His collective identity is clear from the moment he is conceived. He is one with a body of people, his kinsmen, who share one common ancestor and through him access to land and resources. The continuation of this group and its name is perpetuated through paternal descent.Kingroup membership ensures a person's place in life, his right to exist, eat, live and enjoy. But, who is he, apart from being a kinsman? Which kinsman is he? How are people going to interact with him? His individual identity will become clear through time. He is a re-incarnation of ancestor x. The circumstances of his birth were such. He behaves like this. He has these personal traits. This has happened to him. He has achieved that. There is no permanent role attached to an individual. He is neither bound to class nor caste. He is dynamic and changes constantly. His life is one of achievement, constant striving and upward mobility till death — when it all begins again. His name signals his state of being in time and existence.Sabine Jell-Bahlsen is an anthropologist and filmmaker.     

Kant goes fishing: Kant and the right to property in environmental resources

We can observe a connection between some serious environmental problems caused by the overexploitation of environmental resources and the particular conceptions of property rights that are claimed to hold with regard to these resources. In this paper, I investigate whether Kant's conception of property rights might constitute a basis for justifying property regimes that would overcome some of these environmental problems. Kant's argument for the right to property, put forward in his Doctrine of right, is complex. In Section , I attempt an interpretation. Section works out the defining characteristics of the conception of property rights that Kant's argument establishes and investigates their implications for determining property regimes in environmental resources. Kant proposes a minimalist notion of the right to property as a triadic relation between persons with regard to an object, justified only on the condition that it is universalizable in the given circumstances. I argue that this notion offers a promising account for determining property relations with regard to environmental resources. By way of illustration, in Section , I focus on an example of Kantian property rights in one type of environmental resource: the marine fisheries.     

Rho family GTPases as key regulators for neuronal network formation

Rho family GTPases act as transducers of signals from extracellular stimuli to the cytoskeleton and gene expression. Their actions are temporal and spatial determinants for cellular functions. The cellular functions of Rho family GTPases have been studied in fibroblasts and endothelial cells, and recent advances have revealed their roles in the regulation of neuronal network formation, including migration, neurite outgrowth, polarity, axon guidance, dendrite maturation and synapse formation. In addition, a significant number of X-linked mental retardation genes have been shown to encode components directly involved in signal transduction pathways of Rho family GTPases, underscoring the view that Rho family GTPases essentially participate in the neuronal network formation. In this review, we will overview current understanding of the functions of Rho family GTPases in neuronal network formation.     

Morals,suicide, and psychiatry: a view from Japan

In this paper, I argue that within the Japanese social context, the act of suicide is a positive moral act because the values underpinning it are directly related to a socially pervasive moral belief that any act of self–sacrifice is a worthy pursuit. The philosophical basis for this view of the self and its relation to society goes back to the writings of Confucius who advocated a life of propriety in which being dutiful, obedient, and loyal to one's group takes precedence over the desires of the individual selves that make up the group. I argue that this philosophical perspective poses formidable challenges to Japanese psychiatry (which accepts a contrary western perspective) because, as western psychiatry is based on the concept of autonomous individuality, the Japanese conceive of the self as socially embedded. Because suicide in Japan is viewed as a potentially honorable, virtuous, and even beautiful act of self–sacrifice expressing one's duty to one's group, the western perspective is quite foreign to the Japanese self–conceptual framework. Therefore, since Japanese psychiatry and law have embraced the western medical tradition of viewing suicide as a non–rational response to mental illness, which runs counter to the cultural view that suicide is a moral (and rational) act, I argue that western explanations of suicide present significant cross–cultural problems for Japanese psychiatry.     

Triadic conceptual structure of the maximum entropy approach to evolution

Many problems in evolutionary theory are cast in dyadic terms, such as the polar oppositions of organism and environment. We argue that a triadic conceptual structure offers an alternative perspective under which the information generating role of evolution as a physical process can be analyzed, and propose a new diagrammatic approach. Peirce's natural philosophy was deeply influenced by his reception of both Darwin's theory and thermodynamics. Thus, we elaborate on a new synthesis which puts together his theory of signs and modern Maximum Entropy approaches to evolution in a process discourse. Following recent contributions to the naturalization of Peircean semiosis, pointing towards ‘physiosemiosis’ or ‘pansemiosis’, we show that triadic structures involve the conjunction of three different kinds of causality, efficient, formal and final. In this, we accommodate the state-centered thermodynamic framework to a process approach. We apply this on Ulanowicz's analysis of autocatalytic cycles as primordial patterns of life. This paves the way for a semiotic view of thermodynamics which is built on the idea that Peircean interpretants are systems of physical inference devices evolving under natural selection. In this view, the principles of Maximum Entropy, Maximum Power, and Maximum Entropy Production work together to drive the emergence of information carrying structures, which at the same time maximize information capacity as well as the gradients of energy flows, such that ultimately, contrary to Schrödinger's seminal contribution, the evolutionary process is seen to be a physical expression of the Second Law.     

The values of life

In Life's Dominion Dworkin aims at defusing the controversy about abortion and euthanasia by redefining its terms. Basically it is not a dispute about the right to life, but about its value. Liberals should grant that human life has not only a personal, but also an intrinsic value; conservatives should accept the principle of toleration which requires to let people decide for themselves about matters of intrinsic value. Dworkin fails, however, to distinguish between two kinds of personal value: (1) the value of something to a person, when he actually or dispositionally desires it, or finds it pleasant; and (2) the value of something to a person, when it's objectively contributes to his well-being, as defined by reference to his personal point of view, whether or not he ever perceives it as so contributing. He also fails to distinguish between two meanings of the concept of 'intrinsic value': (3) ultimate, i.e. non-instrumental personal value of kind (2); (4) the impersonal value of something which is not good-for-anybody, but simply good, i.e. not a constituent of someone's well-being. Dworkin argues that the human fetus from conception onwards has a value, that it is not a personal value of kind (1), and therefore must be an intrinsic value. But the value of the life of the fetus is not a personal value of kind (2) either and therefore not an intrinsic value of kind (3): it is normally a constituent of the well-being of the pregnant woman, but that doesn't constitute its value, and it is not good 'for' the fetus itself in the relevant sense, because it doesn't have a personal point of view. If, however, the fetus' life is allowed to have an intrinsic value of kind (4), the conservative cannot be refuted by appeal to the principle of toleration, for this only concerns intrinsic value of kind (3). The liberal, indeed, should recognize that the fetus' life has a value, but it is neither a personal value (1) or (2), nor an impersonal value (4), but rather a relational value which gradually develops from some point substantially later than conception.