Let the right one in: a microeconomic approach to partner choice in mutualisms

One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we propose a general mechanism of partner choice, "screening," that is similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological symbioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid, ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-products, partner fidelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply, therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont misbehavior.     

Group-size diversity in public goods games

Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that the group size is constant. In this article, I remove this assumption and explore the effects of having random group sizes on the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games. By a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality, I show that the outcome of general nonlinear public goods games depends not only on the average group size but also on the variance of the group-size distribution. This general result is illustrated with two nonlinear public goods games (the public goods game with discounting or synergy and the N-person volunteer's dilemma) and three different group-size distributions (Poisson, geometric, and Waring). The results suggest that failing to acknowledge the natural variation of group sizes can lead to an underestimation of the actual level of cooperation exhibited in evolving populations.     

A general model for the evolution of mutualisms

The evolution of mutualisms presents a puzzle. Why does selection favour cooperation among species rather than cheaters that accept benefits but provide nothing in return? Here we present a general model that predicts three key factors will be important in mutualism evolution: (i) high benefit to cost ratio, (ii) high within‐species relatedness and (iii) high between‐species fidelity. These factors operate by moderating three types of feedback benefit from mutualism: cooperator association, partner‐fidelity feedback and partner choice. In defining the relationship between these processes, our model also allows an assessment of their relative importance. Importantly, the model suggests that phenotypic feedbacks (partner‐fidelity feedback, partner choice) are a more important explanation for between‐species cooperation than the development of genetic correlations among species (cooperator association). We explain the relationship of our model to existing theories and discuss the empirical evidence for our predictions.     

Efficiency of partner choice and sanctions in Lotus is not altered by nitrogen fertilization

Eukaryotic hosts must exhibit control mechanisms to select against ineffective bacterial symbionts. Hosts can minimize infection by less-effective symbionts (partner choice) and can divest of uncooperative bacteria after infection (sanctions). Yet, such host-control traits are predicted to be context dependent, especially if they are costly for hosts to express or maintain. Legumes form symbiosis with rhizobia that vary in symbiotic effectiveness (nitrogen fixation) and can enforce partner choice as well as sanctions. In nature, legumes acquire fixed nitrogen from both rhizobia and soils, and nitrogen deposition is rapidly enriching soils globally. If soil nitrogen is abundant, we predict host control to be downregulated, potentially allowing invasion of ineffective symbionts. We experimentally manipulated soil nitrogen to examine context dependence in host control. We co-inoculated Lotus strigosus from nitrogen depauperate soils with pairs of Bradyrhizobium strains that vary in symbiotic effectiveness and fertilized plants with either zero nitrogen or growth maximizing nitrogen. We found efficient partner choice and sanctions regardless of nitrogen fertilization, symbiotic partner combination or growth season. Strikingly, host control was efficient even when L. strigosus gained no significant benefit from rhizobial infection, suggesting that these traits are resilient to short-term changes in extrinsic nitrogen, whether natural or anthropogenic.     

Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games

The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.     

"Ménage à trois": the presence/absence of thyme shapes the mutualistic interaction between the host plant Medicago truncatula (Fabaceae) and its symbiotic bacterium Sinorhizobium meliloti

The long-term maintenance of specialized mutualisms remains an evolutionary puzzle. Recent focus has been on factors governing the stability of these mutualisms, including sanctions by the host, partner choice, and coevolutionary constraint, that is, the genetic correlation (r(G)) between fitness of both partners. So far these studies have been typically carried out in a single environment. Here, we ask if the genetic correlation between fitness of the host plant Medicago truncatula (Fabaceae) and its bacterial symbiont Sinorhizobium meliloti is affected by the presence/absence of a monoterpene (carvacrol) leached into the soil by Thymus vulgaris-a common plant of the Mediterranean vegetation, often co-occuring with Medicago. We show that the presence of carvacrol in the soil dramatically affects fitness of the rhizobial partner and increases the magnitude of r(G) between plant and rhizobia fitness (r(G) = 0.02 ± 0.05 vs. r(G) = 0.57 ± 0.02). This finding emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity in the biotic environment for understanding the evolution of species interactions.     

Cooperation as a volunteer’s dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public goods games

Conflict and cooperation for the exploitation of public goods are usually modelled as an N‐person prisoner’s dilemma. Many social dilemmas, however, would be described more properly as a volunteer’s dilemma, in which a certain number of individuals are necessary to produce a public good. If volunteering is costly, but so is failure to produce the public good, cheaters can invade and form a stable mixed equilibrium with cooperators. The dilemma is that the benefit for the group decreases with group size because the larger the group is, the less likely it is that someone volunteers. This problem persists even in the presence of a high degree of relatedness between group members. This model provides precise, testable predictions for the stability of cooperation. It also suggests a counterintuitive but practical solution for this kind of social dilemmas: increasing the damage resulting from the failure to produce the public good increases the probability that the public good is actually produced. Adopting a strategy that entails a deliberate risk (brinkmanship), therefore, can lead to a benefit for the society without being detrimental for the individual.     

Negotiation, sanctions, and context dependency in the legume-Rhizobium mutualism

Two important questions about mutualisms are how the fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legume-rhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia--a phenomenon termed "plant sanctions"--but only when more-cooperative rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has a "choice" between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain's cooperativeness and the outside options it provides, can maintain cooperative rhizobia. Our results show how joint control over the outcome of a mutualism through the proximate mechanism of negotiation can affect the evolutionary dynamics of interspecific cooperation.     

Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games

Explaining unconditional cooperation, such as donations to charities or contributions to public goods, continues to present a problem. One possibility is that cooperation can pay through developing a reputation that makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (CA) or reputation-based partner choice. Here, we show, to our knowledge, for the first time, that investing in a cooperative reputation can bring net benefits through access to more cooperative partners. Participants played a public goods game (PGG) followed by an opportunity to select a partner for a second cooperative game. We found that those who gave more in the PGG were more often selected as desired partners and received more in the paired cooperative game. Reputational competition was even stronger when it was possible for participants to receive a higher payoff from partner choice. The benefits of being selected by a more cooperative partner outweighed the costs of cooperation in the reputation building phase. CA therefore provides an alternative to indirect reciprocity as an explanation for reputation-building behaviour. Furthermore, while indirect reciprocity depends upon individuals giving preference to those of good standing, CA can explain unconditional cooperation.     

Population genetic signatures of diffuse co-evolution between leaf-cutting ants and their cultivar fungi

Switching of symbiotic partners pervades most mutualisms, despite mechanisms that appear to enforce partner fidelity. To investigate the interplay of forces binding and dissolving mutualistic pairings, we investigated partner fidelity at the population level in the attine ant-fungal cultivar mutualism. The ants and their cultivars exhibit both broad-scale co-evolution, as well as cultivar switching, with short-term symbiont fidelity maintained by vertical transmission of maternal garden inoculates via dispersing queens and by the elimination of alien cultivar strains. Using microsatellite markers, we genotyped cultivar fungi associated with five co-occurring Panamanian attine ant species, representing the two most derived genera, leaf-cutters Atta and Acromyrmex. Despite the presence of mechanisms apparently ensuring the cotransmission of symbiont genotypes, different species and genera of ants sometimes shared identical fungus garden genotypes, indicating widespread cultivar exchange. The cultivar population was largely unstructured with respect to host ant species, with only 10% of the structure in genetic variance being attributable to partitioning among ant species and genera. Furthermore, despite significant genetic and ecological dissimilarity between Atta and Acromyrmex, generic difference accounted for little, if any, variance in cultivar population structure, suggesting that cultivar exchange dwarfs selective forces that may act to create co-adaptive ant-cultivar combinations. Thus, binding forces that appear to enforce host fidelity are relatively weak and pairwise associations between cultivar lineages and ant species have little opportunity for evolutionary persistence. This implicates that mechanisms other than partner fidelity feedback play important roles in stabilizing the leafcutter ant-fungus mutualism over evolutionary time.     

Co‐evolutionary patterns and diversification of ant–fungus associations in the asexual fungus‐farming ant Mycocepurus smithii in Panama

Partner fidelity through vertical symbiont transmission is thought to be the primary mechanism stabilizing cooperation in the mutualism between fungus‐farming (attine) ants and their cultivated fungal symbionts. An alternate or additional mechanism could be adaptive partner or symbiont choice mediating horizontal cultivar transmission or de novo domestication of free‐living fungi. Using microsatellite genotyping for the attine ant Mycocepurus smithii and ITS rDNA sequencing for fungal cultivars, we provide the first detailed population genetic analysis of local ant–fungus associations to test for the relative importance of vertical vs. horizontal transmission in a single attine species. M. smithii is the only known asexual attine ant, and it is furthermore exceptional because it cultivates a far greater cultivar diversity than any other attine ant. Cultivar switching could permit the ants to re‐acquire cultivars after garden loss, to purge inferior cultivars that are locally mal‐adapted or that accumulated deleterious mutations under long‐term asexuality. Compared to other attine ants, symbiont choice and local adaptation of ant–fungus combinations may play a more important role than partner‐fidelity feedback in the co‐evolutionary process of M. smithii and its fungal symbionts.     

Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

When group interests clash with individual ones, maintaining cooperation poses a problem. However, cooperation can be facilitated by introducing reputational incentives. Through indirect reciprocity, people who cooperate in a social dilemma are more likely to receive cooperative acts from others. Another mechanism that enhances group cooperation is reputation-based partner choice, or competitive altruism. According to this framework, cooperators benefit via increased access to cooperative partners. Our study compared the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism in re-establishing cooperation after the typical decline found during repeated public goods games. Twenty groups of four participants first played a series of public goods games, which confirmed the expected decline. Subsequently, public goods games were alternated with either indirect reciprocity games (in which participants had an opportunity to give to another individual from whom they would never receive a direct return) or competitive altruism games (in which they could choose partners for directly reciprocal interactions). We found that public goods game contributions increased when interspersed with competitive altruism games; they were also higher than in public goods games interspersed with indirect reciprocity games. Investing in reputation by increasing contributions to public goods was a profitable strategy in that it increased returns in subsequent competitive altruism and indirect reciprocity games. There was also some evidence that these returns were greater under competitive altruism than indirect reciprocity. Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through competitive altruism provides an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity as a means for restoring cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Understanding policing as a mechanism of cheater control in cooperating bacteria

Policing occurs in insect, animal and human societies, where it evolved as a mechanism maintaining cooperation. Recently, it has been suggested that policing might even be relevant in enforcing cooperation in much simpler organisms such as bacteria. Here, we used individual‐based modelling to develop an evolutionary concept for policing in bacteria and identify the conditions under which it can be adaptive. We modelled interactions between cooperators, producing a beneficial public good, cheaters, exploiting the public good without contributing to it, and public good‐producing policers that secrete a toxin to selectively target cheaters. We found that toxin‐mediated policing is favoured when (a) toxins are potent and durable, (b) toxins are cheap to produce, (c) cell and public good diffusion is intermediate, and (d) toxins diffuse farther than the public good. Although our simulations identify the parameter space where toxin‐mediated policing can evolve, we further found that policing decays when the genetic linkage between public good and toxin production breaks. This is because policing is itself a public good, offering protection to toxin‐resistant mutants that still produce public goods, yet no longer invest in toxins. Our work thus highlights that not only specific environmental conditions are required for toxin‐mediated policing to evolve, but also strong genetic linkage between the expression of public goods, toxins and toxin resistance is essential for this mechanism to remain evolutionarily stable in the long run.     

Maintenance of variation in mutualism by screening

Models of partner choice leading to mutualism raise a conceptual problem: directional selection for high‐quality partners should ultimately erode variation in partner quality. How do we explain the persistence of variation in partner quality observed in nature? The problem arises in all models of partner choice, including screening models, in which a host induces potential symbionts of different quality to screen themselves by assigning them different costs and rewards. Using a screening model in which costs and rewards are sometimes assigned incorrectly, I show that a stable polymorphism can arise because rewards are higher when partners vary in quality than when there is only one type of partner. Partner quality, therefore, undergoes negative frequency‐dependent selection even though there is a preference for high‐quality partners. This also shows that partner choice by screening does not need to be totally accurate to be effective—inaccuracies enable both effective screening and the maintenance of variation.     

Cheating can stabilize cooperation in mutualisms

Mutualisms present a challenge for evolutionary theory. How is cooperation maintained in the face of selection for selfishness and cheating? Both theory and data suggest that partner choice, where one species preferentially directs aid to the more cooperative members of the other species, is central to cooperation in many mutualisms. However, the theory has only so far considered the evolutionary effects of partner choice on one of the species in a mutualism in isolation. Here, we investigate the co-evolution of cooperation and choice in a choosy host and its symbiont. Our model reveals that even though choice and cooperation may be initially selected, it will often be unstable. This is because choice reduces variation in the symbiont and, therefore, tends to remove the selective incentive for its own maintenance (a scenario paralleled in the lek paradox in female choice and policing in within-species cooperation). However, we also show that when variability is reintroduced into symbionts each generation, in the form of less cooperative individuals, choice is maintained. This suggests that the presence of cheaters and cheater species in many mutualisms is central to the maintenance of partner choice and, paradoxically, cooperation itself.     

The impact of transmission mode on the evolution of benefits provided by microbial symbionts

While past work has often examined the effects of transmission mode on virulence evolution in parasites, few studies have explored the impact of horizontal transmission on the evolution of benefits conferred by a symbiont to its host. Here, we identify three mechanisms that create a positive covariance between horizontal transmission and symbiont‐provided benefits: pleiotropy within the symbiont genome, partner choice by the host, and consumption of host waste by‐products by symbionts. We modify a susceptible‐infected model to incorporate the details of each mechanism and examine the evolution of symbiont benefits given variation in either the immigration rate of susceptible hosts or the rate of successful vertical transmission. We find conditions for each case under which greater opportunity for horizontal transmission (higher migration rate) favors the evolution of mutualism. Further, we find the surprising result that vertical transmission can inhibit the evolution of benefits provided by symbionts to hosts when horizontal transmission and symbiont‐provided benefits are positively correlated. These predictions may apply to a number of natural systems, and the results may explain why many mutualisms that rely on partner choice often lack a mechanism for vertical transmission.     

Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games

The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.     

Does the female seahorse still prefer her mating partner after a period of separation?

For species showing sexual monogamy, once one male and one female form a mating pair bond, they will be faithful to each other in subsequent breeding events. However, if their pair bond is broken for some reason, do they continue to prefer their partner when they come together again for mating? In other words, can the broken pair bond of sexually monogamous species be repaired? This is an interesting question but not yet well answered. To address this question, in the present study we used the lined seahorse (Hippocampus erectus), a typical sexually monogamous species, to study the partner preference of a female individual who experienced a complete separation followed by a reunion with her partner. Our main findings are as follows: (i) The female seahorse no longer prefers her partner after a separation, whether it is a former partner or a recent partner. No preference for partner-males may indicate that the broken pair bond cannot be repaired. (ii) The female seahorse maintains sexual fidelity to her partner in the absence of separation. However, once the health of her partner decreases, the female will switch mate, and her courtship with the new partner can take place during the pregnancy of her original partner. The first finding may provide insight into whether monogamous species still have an opportunity to reselect a new partner in the future to correct their poor choice once they have mated with a low-quality partner. The answer is that they can still gain an opportunity as long as the pair bonds with their current partners are broken. The second finding may reveal the conditions and timing at which a female seahorse switches her mate. These findings help us better understand the mating system of the seahorse H. erectus.     

Evolutionary Dynamics of Nitrogen Fixation in the Legume–Rhizobia Symbiosis

The stabilization of host–symbiont mutualism against the emergence of parasitic individuals is pivotal to the evolution of cooperation. One of the most famous symbioses occurs between legumes and their colonizing rhizobia, in which rhizobia extract nutrients (or benefits) from legume plants while supplying them with nitrogen resources produced by nitrogen fixation (or costs). Natural environments, however, are widely populated by ineffective rhizobia that extract benefits without paying costs and thus proliferate more efficiently than nitrogen-fixing cooperators. How and why this mutualism becomes stabilized and evolutionarily persists has been extensively discussed. To better understand the evolutionary dynamics of this symbiosis system, we construct a simple model based on the continuous snowdrift game with multiple interacting players. We investigate the model using adaptive dynamics and numerical simulations. We find that symbiotic evolution depends on the cost–benefit balance, and that cheaters widely emerge when the cost and benefit are similar in strength. In this scenario, the persistence of the symbiotic system is compatible with the presence of cheaters. This result suggests that the symbiotic relationship is robust to the emergence of cheaters, and may explain the prevalence of cheating rhizobia in nature. In addition, various stabilizing mechanisms, such as partner fidelity feedback, partner choice, and host sanction, can reinforce the symbiotic relationship by affecting the fitness of symbionts in various ways. This result suggests that the symbiotic relationship is cooperatively stabilized by various mechanisms. In addition, mixed nodule populations are thought to encourage cheater emergence, but our model predicts that, in certain situations, cheaters can disappear from such populations. These findings provide a theoretical basis of the evolutionary dynamics of legume–rhizobia symbioses, which is extendable to other single-host, multiple-colonizer systems.     

Divergent host plant adaptation drives the evolution of sexual isolation in the grasshopper Hesperotettix viridis (Orthoptera: Acrididae) in the absence of reinforcement

Early stages of lineage divergence in insect herbivores are often related to shifts in host plant use and divergence in mating capabilities, which may lead to sexual isolation of populations of herbivorous insects. We examined host preferences, degree of differentiation in mate choice, and divergence in cuticular morphology using near‐infrared spectroscopy in the grasshopper Hesperotettix viridis aiming to understand lineage divergence. In Kansas (USA), H. viridis is an oligophagous species feeding on Gutierrezia and Solidago host species. To identify incipient mechanisms of lineage divergence and isolation, we compared host choice, mate choice, and phenotypic divergence among natural grasshopper populations in zones of contact with populations encountering only one of the host species. A significant host‐based preference from the two host groups was detected in host‐paired feeding preference studies. No‐choice mate selection experiments revealed a preference for individuals collected from the same host species independent of geographic location, and little mating was observed between individuals collected from different host species. Female mate choice tests between males from the two host species resulted in 100% fidelity with respect to host use. Significant differentiation in colour and cuticular composition of individuals from different host plants was observed, which correlated positively with host choice and mate choice. No evidence for reinforcement in the zone of contact was detected, suggesting that divergent selection for host plant use promotes sexual isolation in this species. © 2010 The Linnean Society of London, Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 2010, 100 , 866–878.