Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology

How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many-if any-ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change-called an intervention-that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to manipulate or control their effects. I apply the account to ecological generalizations to show that invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory relevance provides interesting interpretations for the explanatory status of many ecological generalizations. Thus, I argue that there could be causal explanations in ecology by generalizations that are not, in a strict sense, laws. I also address the issue of mechanistic explanations in ecology by arguing that invariance and modularity constitute such explanations.     

Hypothesis test for causal explanations in human pathology: evaluation of pulmonary edema in 181 autopsied patients with leukemia

Symbolic logic, as used in the formal theory of scientific explanation proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim, has been suggested as the basis for automated medical diagnosis. In human autopsy pathology the determination of cause-and-effect relationships is a major area subject to logical analysis. We propose a modification of the Hempel-Oppenheim schema in which the logical relationships must only be satisfied “much” of the time, as determined by binomial significance tests. The analysis employs “certainty levels” logic with a more limited consistency requirement than classical logic. The analysis is applied to a series of 181 autopsied patients with leukemia in an attempt to determine a possible role of chemotherapeutic agents in the etiology of pulmonary edema. Among 51 patients who had received cytosine arabinoside (Ara-C) within 30 days of death, there was significantly more unexplained moderate or massive pulmonary edema than among patients with no or remote therapy (p<0.001). The results suggest that a symbolic logical analysis combined with a binomial significance test can elucidate cause-and-effect relationships observed at autopsy, especially when there are multiple possible explanations for the same effect.     

Constraining the adaptationism debate

This contribution to the adaptationism debate elaborates the nature of constraints and their importance in evolutionary explanation and argues that the adaptationism debate should be limited to the issue of how to privilege causes in evolutionary explanation. I argue that adaptationist explanations are deeply conceptually dependent on developmental constraints, and explanations that appeal to constraints are dependant on the results of natural selection. I suggest these explanations should be integrated into the framework of historical causal explanation. Each strategy explicitly appeals to some aspect of the evolutionary process, while implicitly appealing to others. Thus, adaptationists and anti-adaptationists can offer complementary causal explanations of the same explanandum. This eliminates much of the adaptationism debate and explains why its adversaries regularly agree with each other more than they would like. The adaptationism issue that remains is a species of the general issue of how to privilege causes in explanation. I show how a proposed solution to this general problem might be brought to bear on evolutionary explanations, and investigate some difficulties that might arise due to the nature of the evolutionary process.     

Conjecture and explanation: A reply to Reydon

Reydon (2012) comments on my account of how-possibly explanation (Forber, 2010). I distinguish between three types of explanation (global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how actually) and argue that these distinctions track various roles explanations play in evolutionary biology. While Reydon accepts the distinctions, he questions whether the two different types of how-possibly explanation count as genuine explanations. He summarizes his analysis with a slogan: “global how-possibly explanations are explanations but not how-possibly; local explanations are how-possibly but not explanations.” Reydon’s commentary raises a number of insightful points, and I will not be able to address them all. Instead, after clarifying certain points in my original paper (4 1), I will respond to Reydon’s slogan by addressing whether global how-possibly explanations should count as explaining how possible (4 2), and what (so-called) local how-possibly explanations are, if not explanations (4 3).     

Families of stationary patterns producing illusory movement: insights into the visual system.

A computational explanation of the illusory movement experienced upon extended viewing of Enigma, a static figure painted by Leviant, is presented. The explanation relies on a model for the interpretation of three-dimensional motion information contained in retinal motion measurements. This model shows that the Enigma figure is a special case of a larger class of figures exhibiting the same illusory movement and these figures are introduced here. Our explanation suggests that eye movements and/or accommodation changes cause weak retinal motion signals, which are interpreted by higher-level processes in a way that gives rise to these illusions, and proposes a number of new experiments to unravel the functional structure of the motion pathway.     

Induction and deduction in morphology

Professor de Wilde's scientific contributions can be divided into two separate areas based on the applied methods: induction and deduction. The first method is used in the investigation of the finger ridge pattern and the second in that of the branching of bloodvessels. It is shown that with induction alternative classifications and explanations remain always possible and that the ultimate choice of the classification depends on supposed biological meanings or practical applicability. In the case of the finger ridge patterns the latter criterion is decisive. With the deductive method a sufficient logical explanation within the boundary conditions can be reached. Alternatives can be presented if the boundary conditions are changed or the functional parameters have to be chosen differently, which is necessary when direct observation (induction) "shows" that other functions are involved. A number of advantages and problematic points in both methods are analysed and their relationship and function in morphology are demonstrated in the mentioned research topics.     

Darwin was a teleologist

It is often claimed that one of Darwin's chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin's closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin's version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin's attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin's teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin's explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.I would like to thank John Beatty, David Hull and one of this journal's readers for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

THE FITNESS CONSEQUENCES OF MULTIPLE-LOCUS HETEROZYGOSITY UNDER THE MULTIPLICATIVE OVERDOMINANCE AND INBREEDING DEPRESSION MODELS

There is a growing body of literature suggesting that the fitness of an individual increases with the observed number of heterozygous loci. Broad theoretical considerations indicate that under various sorts of balancing selection, this is what one should generally expect in a population of multiple-locus genotypes. To date, however, it has not been possible to distinguish between two potential explanations of the phenomenon. The first explanation is that the loci examined are themselves responsible for the fitness differences observed (or, equivalents, are very closely linked to those that do). The genetic variation in question is thought to be maintained in polymorphic equilibrium by some form of balancing selection. The second explanation assumes that the observed loci are themselves selectively irrelevant but that their heterozygosity reflects that of the total genome. Genomic heterozygosity is thought to be predictive of fitness, being an obverse measure of generalized inbreeding depression. We provide a formal derivation of an explicit relationship between fitness and multiple-locus genotype for a simple form of the first explanation, the multiplicative overdominance model. The inbreeding depression model is a degenerate special case of this more general formulation. A formal estimation and testing framework is constructed that should facilitate evaluation of the two models with empiric data on heterozygosity and fitness.     

How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber

Recently, Forber introduced a distinction between two kinds of how-possibly explanation, global and local how-possibly explanation, and argued that both play genuinely explanatory roles in evolutionary biology. In this paper I examine the nature of these two kinds of how-possibly explanations, focusing on the question whether they indeed constitute genuine explanations. I will conclude that one of Forber's kinds of how-possibly explanation may be thought of as a kind of genuine explanation but not as a kind of how-possibly explanation, while the other kind plays a heuristic role and should not be conceived of as a kind of explanation at all.     

Sex chromosomes and speciation in Drosophila

Two empirical rules suggest that sex chromosomes play a special role in speciation. The first is Haldane's rule - the preferential sterility and inviability of species hybrids of the heterogametic (XY) sex. The second is the disproportionately large effect of the X chromosome in genetic analyses of hybrid sterility. Whereas the causes of Haldane's rule are well established, the causes of the 'large X-effect' have remained controversial. New genetic analyses in Drosophila confirm that the X is a hotspot for hybrid male sterility factors, providing a proximate explanation for the large X-effect. Several other new findings -- on faster X evolution, X chromosome meiotic drive and the regulation of the X chromosome in the male-germline -- provide plausible evolutionary explanations for the large X-effect.     

Explaining events in the environment to primary school students

This paper is part of an investigation into 11-year-old students' interpretations of events in the environment. In particular, we analyse the use of a scale model constructed and manipulated by students when simulating a forest fire.We consider that their explanations involve the interrelation of three levels of organisation: the level at which the phenomenon is observed, a lower level at which causal mechanisms are identified, and a higher level in which environmental constraints are identified. The data consisted of recordings of conversations in class and the students' explanations themselves.These were analysed under three headings: 1. The organisational level of the explanation; 2. The source of the evidence (original observations, the scale model, previous experiences or authorities); and 3.Who promotes the explanation (teacher, student or in interaction). The results show a spiral process of explanation construction. The use of the scale model encourages the inclusion of constraints in the explanations, while mechanisms are mostly introduced when resorting to previous experiences and observations. Scientific language is used mostly regarding mechanisms, and the integration of levels is encouraged by questions posed by the teacher.     

Developmental plasticity and evolutionary explanations

Developmental plasticity looks like a promising bridge between ecological and developmental perspectives on evolution. Yet, there is no consensus on whether plasticity is part of the explanation for adaptive evolution or an optional “add‐on” to genes and natural selection. Here, we suggest that these differences in opinion are caused by differences in the simplifying assumptions, and particular idealizations, that enable evolutionary explanation. We outline why idealizations designed to explain evolution through natural selection prevent an understanding of the role of development, and vice versa. We show that representing plasticity as a reaction norm conforms with the idealizations of selective explanations, which can give the false impression that plasticity has no explanatory power for adaptive evolution. Finally, we use examples to illustrate why evolutionary explanations that include developmental plasticity may in fact be more satisfactory than explanations that solely refer to genes and natural selection.     

Viability explanation

This article deals with a type of functional explanation, viability explanation, that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of science. Viability explanations relate traits of organisms and their environments in terms of what an individual needs to survive and reproduce. I show that viability explanations are neither causal nor historical and that, therefore, they should be accounted for as a distinct type of explanation.The investigations for this paper were supported by the Foundation for Philosophical Research (SWON), which is subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). I am grateful to Theo Kuipers and Ton Derksen for their useful comments on early versions, to Josje Lodder for improving my logic, and to Jaap van Brakel for his help in structuring this article.     

Phyletic size change and brain/body allometry: A consideration based on the African pongids and other primates

A problematic aspect of brain/body allometry is the frequency of interspecific series which exhibit allometry coefficients of approximately 0.33. This coefficient is significantly lower than the 0.66 value which is usually taken to be the interspecific norm. A number of explanations have been forwarded to account for this finding. These include (1) intraspecificallometry explanations, (2) nonallometric explanations, and (3) Jerison’s “extraneurons” hypothesis, among others. The African apes, which exhibit a lowered interspecific allometry coefficient, are used here to consider previous explanations. These are found to be inadequate in a number of ways, and an alternative explanation is proposed. This explanation is based on patterns of brain and body size change during ontogeny and phytogeny. It is argued that the interspecific allometry coefficient in African apes parallels the intraspecific one because similar ontogenetic modifications of body growth separate large and small forms along each curve. In both cases, body size differences are produced primarily by growth in later postnatal periods, during which little brain growth occurs. Data on body growth, neonatal scaling, and various lifehistory traits support this explanation. This work extends previous warnings that sizecorrected estimates of relative brain size may not correspond very closely to our understanding of the behavioral capacities of certain species in lineages characterized by rapid change in body size.     

Explanatory unification and natural selection explanations

The debate between the dynamical and the statistical interpretations of natural selection is centred on the question of whether all explanations that employ the concepts of natural selection and drift are reducible to causal explanations. The proponents of the statistical interpretation answer negatively, but insist on the fact that selection/drift arguments are explanatory. However, they remain unclear on where the explanatory power comes from. The proponents of the dynamical interpretation answer positively and try to reduce selection/drift arguments to some of the most prominent accounts of causal explanation. In turn, they face the criticism raised by statisticalists that current accounts of causation have to be violated in some of their core conditions or otherwise used in a very loose manner in order to account for selection/drift explanations. We propose a reconciliation of both interpretations by conveying evolutionary explanations within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Therefore, we argue that the explanatory power in natural selection arguments is a result of successful unification of individual- and population-level facts. A short case study based on research on sympatric speciation will be presented as an example of how population- and individual-level facts are unified to explain the morphological mosaic of bill shape in island scrub jays (Aphelocoma insularis).     

Constructing a query-able radial basis function artificial neural network

Artificial neural networks will be more widely accepted as standard engineering tools if their reasoning process can be made less opaque. This paper describes NetQuery, an explanation mechanism that extracts meaningful explanations from trained Radial Basis Function (RBF) networks. RBF networks are well suited for explanation generation because they contain a set of locally tuned units. Standard RBF networks are modified to identify dependencies between the inputs, to be sparsely connected, and to have an easily interpretable output layer. Given these modifications, the network architecture can be used to extract "Why?" and "Why not?" explanations from the network in terms of excitatory and inhibitory in-puts and their linear relationships, greatly simplified by a run-time pruning algorithm. These query results are validated by creating an expert system based on the explanations. NetQuery is also able to inform a user about a possible change in category for a given pattern by responding to a "How can I...?" query. This kind of query is extremely useful when analyzing the quality of a pattern set.     

Adaptation and novelty: teleological explanations in evolutionary biology

Knives, birds' wings, and mountain slopes are used for certain purposes: cutting, flying, and climbing. A bird's wings have in common with knives that they have been 'designed' for the purpose they serve, which purpose accounts for their existence, whereas mountain slopes have come about by geological processes independently of their uses for climbing. A bird's wings differ from a knife in that they have not been designed or produced by any conscious agent; rather, the wings, like the slopes, are outcomes of natural processes without any intentional causation. Evolutionary biologists use teleological language and teleological explanations. I propose that this use is appropriate, because teleological explanations are hypotheses that can be subject to empirical testing. The distinctiveness of teleological hypotheses is that they account for the existence of a feature in terms of the function it serves; for example, wings have evolved and persist because flying is beneficial to birds by increasing their chances of surviving and reproducing. Features of organisms that are explained with teleological hypotheses include structures, such as wings; processes, such as development from egg to adult; and behaviours, such as nest building. A proximate explanation of these features is the function they serve; an ultimate explanation that they all share is their contribution to the reproductive fitness of the organisms. I distinguish several kinds of teleological explanations, such as natural and artificial, as well as bounded and unbounded, some of which but not others apply to biological explanations.     

HISTORICAL VERSUS SELECTIONIST EXPLANATIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

Abstract— Evolutionary changes require historical explanations, yet these are limited by the evolutionary processes we entertain and investigate. Using phylogenetic analysis, adaptation and natural selection can be tested as historical claims, but this is appropriate only in those special cases where change follows the scheme of one character-one function, singled out in new environmental circumstances. Systematic treatment of the evolutionary origin of characters (in particular, origin through ecological and developmental flexibility) lies outside the scope of selectionist explanations. Structural hypotheses about regularities in the directions of change, also analyzed phylogenetically, expand the scope of historical explanation to include the origin of characters, yet retain the view of organisms as passive and constrained objects of evolutionary change. Historical biology needs to encompass both the active responses of organisms and the construction by organisms of their own environments. For this to be realized will require changes in the concepts and practices of evolutionary biology, including a re-examination of the Lamarckian theme that the active responses of organisms have evolutionary significance—the rarity of individual-to-individual transmission of "acquired" characters does not disprove the possibility of their frequency increasing in a population.     

Inferential explanations in biology

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism.We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic explanations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right.In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.