Leaders are more attractive: birds with bigger yellow breast patches are followed by more group-mates in foraging groups

Social network theory provides a perfect tool to better understand the population-level consequences of how individuals interact and make their decisions; however, this approach is generally overlooked among evolutionary biologists interested in social relationships. Here, we used social network analysis to examine the patterns of leader-follower interactions in relation to individual characteristics in foraging groups of free-living rock sparrows (Petronia petronia). We found that yellow feather ornamentation, a carotenoid-based trait, was the best predictor of leadership: birds with bigger ornaments exerted greater influence in the foraging groups and were followed by more group-mates than less elaborate individuals. An individual's tendency for eliciting followings was not influenced by sex, condition or the level of parental investment. None of the above individual characteristics had significant effect on the tendency of individuals to follow others. Our results indicate that a sexually selected trait can also play a significant role in group coordination and social organization of a species.     

The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.     

How growers make decisions impacts plant disease control

While the spread of plant disease depends strongly on biological factors driving transmission, it also has a human dimension. Disease control depends on decisions made by individual growers, who are in turn influenced by a broad range of factors. Despite this, human behaviour has rarely been included in plant epidemic models. Considering Cassava Brown Streak Disease, we model how the perceived increase in profit due to disease management influences participation in clean seed systems (CSS). Our models are rooted in game theory, with growers making strategic decisions based on the expected profitability of different control strategies. We find that both the information used by growers to assess profitability and the perception of economic and epidemiological parameters influence long-term participation in the CSS. Over-estimation of infection risk leads to lower participation in the CSS, as growers perceive that paying for the CSS will be futile. Additionally, even though good disease management can be achieved through the implementation of CSS, and a scenario where all controllers use the CSS is achievable when growers base their decision on the average of their entire strategy, CBSD is rarely eliminated from the system. These results are robust to stochastic and spatial effects. Our work highlights the importance of including human behaviour in plant disease models, but also the significance of how that behaviour is included.     

The evolution of respect for property

Although possession is ‘nine‐tenths of the law’, respect for ownership is widespread in the animal kingdom even without third‐party enforcement. Thus, the first individuals to find objects are frequently left unchallenged by potential competitors and tend to win contests when disputes arise. Game theory has shown that respect for ownership (‘Bourgeois’ behaviour) can arise as an arbitrary convention to avoid costly disputes. However, the same theory predicts that a paradoxical respect for lack of ownership (‘anti‐Bourgeois’ behaviour) can evolve under the same conditions and in some cases is the only stable outcome. Despite these predictions, anti‐Bourgeois behaviour is rare in nature, whereas respect for ownership is frequently not absolute. Here, we review extensions of the classic models involving repeated interactions, confusion over roles, strategic coordination of behaviour (‘secret handshakes’), owner–intruder asymmetries and continuous control of fighting investment. Confusion over roles and owner–intruder asymmetries in fighting ability may explain why respect for ownership is often partial. Moreover, although most model extensions facilitate the evolution of Bourgeois‐like behaviour, secret handshakes and continuous control of fighting investment render the alternative anti‐Bourgeois convention unstable. We develop these insights to highlight several key areas for future investigation.     

Dynamic choices are most accurate in small groups

According to the classic results of Galton and Condorcet, as well as in modern decision-making models, accuracy in groups increases with group size. However, these studies do not consider the naturally occurring situation in which individuals dynamically re-evaluate their decision with a possible change of opinion. The dynamics of re-evaluation in groups are very different to individual re-evaluation because individuals influence the group and the group influences the individual. We find that individual accuracy in a group is higher when individuals re-evaluate because all members have more access to social information, while in single decisions, those deciding first have less. This improvement is smaller in large groups as in this case errors can cascade across the members of the group before re-evaluation can correct them. The net result is a maximal accuracy at a small group size. We also analyzed the case in which individuals are influenced only by a small number of the other individuals. In this case, cascading errors affect the interacting subgroups but are very unlikely to reach the whole group. This results in a local optimum at a small group size but also an optimum at a very large size. We thus suggest that re-evaluation dynamics can make small and very large groups optimal. Also, features that may be seen as limitations, like an influence from only a small number of individuals, may turn to be beneficial when considering local animal interactions, here filtering out cascading of errors in the group when reconsideration dynamics takes place.     

Dynamics to Equilibrium in Network Games: Individual Behavior and Global Response

Various social contexts can be depicted as games of strategic interactions on networks, where an individual’s welfare depends on both her and her partners’ actions. Whereas much attention has been devoted to Bayes-Nash equilibria in such games, here we look at strategic interactions from an evolutionary perspective. To this end, we present the results of a numerical simulations program for these games, which allows us to find out whether Nash equilibria are accessible by adaptation of player strategies, and in general to identify the attractors of the evolution. Simulations allow us to go beyond a global characterization of the cooperativeness at equilibrium and probe into individual behavior. We find that when players imitate each other, evolution does not reach Nash equilibria and, worse, leads to very unfavorable states in terms of welfare. On the contrary, when players update their behavior rationally, they self-organize into a rich variety of Nash equilibria, where individual behavior and payoffs are shaped by the nature of the game, the social network’s structure and the players’ position within the network. Our results allow to assess the validity of mean-field approaches we use to describe the dynamics of these games. Interestingly, our dynamically-found equilibria generally do not coincide with (but show qualitatively the same features of) those resulting from theoretical predictions in the context of one-shot games under incomplete information.     

Scaling from optimal behavior to population dynamics and ecosystem function

While behavioral responses of individual organisms can be predicted with optimal foraging theory, the theory of how individual behavior feeds back to population and ecosystem dynamics has not been fully explored. Ecological models of trophic interactions incorporating behavior of entire populations commonly assume either that populations act as one when making decisions, that behavior is slowly varying or that non-linear effects are negligible in behavioral choices at the population scale. Here, we scale from individual optimal behavior to ecosystem structure in a classic tri-trophic chain where both prey and predators adapt their behavior in response to food availability and predation risk. Behavior is modeled as playing the field, with both consumers and predators behaving optimally at every instant basing their choices on the average population behavior. We establish uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and find it numerically. By modeling the interactions as playing the field, we can perform instantaneous optimization at the individual level while taking the entire population into account. We find that optimal behavior essentially removes the effect of top-down forcing at the population level, while drastically changing the behavior. Bottom-up forcing is found to increase populations at all trophic levels. These phenomena both appear to be driven by an emerging constant consumption rate, corresponding to a partial satiation. In addition, we find that a Type III functional response arises from a Type II response for both predators and consumers when their behavior follows the Nash equilibrium, showing that this is a general phenomenon. Our approach is general and computationally efficient and can be used to account for behavior in population dynamics with fast behavioral responses.     

Motion-guided attention promotes adaptive communications during social navigation

Animals are capable of enhanced decision making through cooperation, whereby accurate decisions can occur quickly through decentralized consensus. These interactions often depend upon reliable social cues, which can result in highly coordinated activities in uncertain environments. Yet information within a crowd may be lost in translation, generating confusion and enhancing individual risk. As quantitative data detailing animal social interactions accumulate, the mechanisms enabling individuals to rapidly and accurately process competing social cues remain unresolved. Here, we model how motion-guided attention influences the exchange of visual information during social navigation. We also compare the performance of this mechanism to the hypothesis that robust social coordination requires individuals to numerically limit their attention to a set of n-nearest neighbours. While we find that such numerically limited attention does not generate robust social navigation across ecological contexts, several notable qualities arise from selective attention to motion cues. First, individuals can instantly become a local information hub when startled into action, without requiring changes in neighbour attention level. Second, individuals can circumvent speed–accuracy trade-offs by tuning their motion thresholds. In turn, these properties enable groups to collectively dampen or amplify social information. Lastly, the minority required to sway a group''s short-term directional decisions can change substantially with social context. Our findings suggest that motion-guided attention is a fundamental and efficient mechanism underlying collaborative decision making during social navigation.     

Collective decision‐making and fission–fusion dynamics: a conceptual framework

Sociality exists in an extraordinary range of ecological settings. For individuals to accrue the benefits associated with social interactions, they are required to maintain a degree of spatial and temporal coordination in their activities, and make collective decisions. Such coordination and decision‐making has been the focus of much recent research. However, efforts largely have been directed toward understanding patterns of collective behaviour in relatively stable and cohesive groups. Less well understood is how fission–fusion dynamics mediate the process and outcome of collective decisions making. Here, we aim to apply established concepts and knowledge to highlight the implications of fission–fusion dynamics for collective decisions, presenting a conceptual framework based on the outcome of a small‐group discussion INCORE meeting (funded by the European Community's Sixth Framework Programme). First, we discuss how the degree of uncertainty in the environment shapes social flexibility and therefore the types of decisions individuals make in different social settings. Second, we propose that the quality of social relationships and the energetic needs of each individual influence fission decisions. Third, we explore how these factors affect the probability of individuals to fuse. Fourth, we discuss how group size and fission–fusion dynamics may affect communication processes between individuals at a local or global scale to reach a consensus or to fission. Finally, we offer a number of suggestions for future research, capturing emerging ideas and concepts on the interaction between collective decisions and fission–fusion dynamics.     

Breeding performance,mate fidelity,and nest site fidelity in a long‐lived seabird: behaving against the current?

There is evidence that breeding failure is associated with divorce and dispersal in many bird species. However, deviations from the general pattern “success‐stay/failure‐leave” seem to be common, suggesting that factors other than breeding performance may importantly influence mate and habitat selection. Moreover, variability in response to performance suggests coexistence of different evolutionary strategies of mate and site selection within a population. In this study, we assessed how individuals conform to the success‐stay/failure‐leave pattern in kittiwakes (Rissa tridactyla), and aimed to identify categories of individuals presenting different behavioural patterns. We considered individual attributes (experience, prior residence at the nest site, performance in multiple breeding attempts), pair attributes (arrival asynchrony, timing of failure, pair duration), and productivity in habitat patches. Timing of failure was an important factor. Pair reunion probability was close to 0.5 in failed pairs, but it was consistently higher in early failed than in late failed pairs. Prior residence better explained variability in probability of reunion in failed pairs than pair duration. However, the positive influence of prior residence on the probability of reunion was perceptible only in early failed pairs. Divorce probability in successful pairs increased with arrival asynchrony, and was higher in first‐time than in experienced breeders. Local productivity positively influenced site fidelity probability in early failed birds, but not in late failed ones. Using memory models, we found that dispersal decisions integrate information on individual breeding performance in a temporal scale longer than one year. This study contributed to the identification of relevant states to be considered when addressing mate and nest site choice. Natural selection may operate on slight fitness differences that cannot be detected without high levels of stratification according to the appropriate individual and habitat attributes.     

Who is coordinating collective movements in black and gold howler monkeys?

Decisions about when and where to travel are likely to have a strong influence on the feeding, ecology, and foraging strategies of individual primates living in a cohesive social group. Specifically, given differences in age, sex, reproductive status, or social dominance, particular group members may benefit from remaining at their present location while others may benefit from traveling to another area of their range to feed or rest. In this study, we present data on movement coordination in two groups of wild black and gold howler monkeys inhabiting Isla Brasilera (27º 20′S and 58º 40′W) in northern Argentina. We examine how factors such as sex, age, reproductive status, and dominance affect patterns of group movement coordination at feeding or resting sites, and in the context of intergroup encounters. Two groups were followed five days a month from sunrise to sunset during June to November 2004. Using focal and scan sampling techniques, we recorded 262 group displacements, the identity of the individual initiating and leading displacement, and the identity of the first individual to arrive at feeding, resting, or intergroup encounter sites. We found that overall age was the only factor that influenced group coordination: adults led more often (94.5 %) than immature individuals (5.5 %) in both groups. We did not find differences among adults. However, we found that males lead more often than females at intergroup encounters, consistent with the male-mate defense hypothesis. The distributed leadership pattern among adults observed in this study may suggest that adult individuals make equally shared consensus decisions. This pattern should be further examined using this individual-level approach in other populations of black and gold howlers, other species of howlers, and in other atelines in which within-group social tolerance is the rule rather than the exception.     

Information aggregation and communication in committees

In this paper, we attempt to explain the underlying strategic incentives confronting individuals when they must make a collective decision over a set of alternatives and each has information that is decision-relevant for others. A significant literature has emerged in formal political theory over the past several years that focuses on such problems, paying particular attention, first, to the extent to which voting can be expected to aggregate committee members'' information and, second, to the role of communication among committee members prior to voting. Inter alia, this literature reveals a surprisingly subtle interaction between the voting rules used to make decisions and the incentives for committee members to share information prior to voting.     

A game-theoretic model of kleptoparasitic behavior in polymorphic populations

Kleptoparasitism, the stealing of food by one animal from another, is a widespread biological phenomenon. In this paper we build upon earlier models to investigate a population of conspecifics involved in foraging and, potentially, kleptoparasitism. We assume that the population is composed of four types of individuals, according to their strategic choices when faced with an opportunity to steal and to resist an attack. The fitness of each type of individual depends upon various natural parameters, for example food density, the handling time of a food item and the probability of mounting a successful attack against resistance, as well as the choices that they make. We find the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for all parameter combinations and show that there are six possible ESSs, four pure and two mixtures of two strategies, that can occur. We show that there is always at least one ESS, and sometimes two or three. We further investigate the influence of the different parameters on when each type of solution occurs.     

The social context of cannibalism in migratory bands of the Mormon cricket

Cannibalism has been shown to be important to the collective motion of mass migratory bands of insects, such as locusts and Mormon crickets. These mobile groups consist of millions of individuals and are highly destructive to vegetation. Individuals move in response to attacks from approaching conspecifics and bite those ahead, resulting in further movement and encounters with others. Despite the importance of cannibalism, the way in which individuals make attack decisions and how the social context affects these cannibalistic interactions is unknown. This can be understood by examining the decisions made by individuals in response to others. We performed a field investigation which shows that adult Mormon crickets were more likely to approach and attack a stationary cricket that was side-on to the flow than either head- or abdomen-on, suggesting that individuals could reduce their risk of an attack by aligning with neighbours. We found strong social effects on cannibalistic behaviour: encounters lasted longer, were more likely to result in an attack, and attacks were more likely to be successful if other individuals were present around a stationary individual. This local aggregation appears to be driven by positive feedback whereby the presence of individuals attracts others, which can lead to further crowding. This work improves our understanding of the local social dynamics driving migratory band formation, maintenance and movement at the population level.     

Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating behaviour

There exists an interplay between vaccine coverage, disease prevalence and the vaccinating behaviour of individuals. Moreover, because of herd immunity, there is also a strategic interaction between individuals when they are deciding whether or not to vaccinate, because the probability that an individual becomes infected depends upon how many other individuals are vaccinated. To understand this potentially complex interplay, a game dynamic model is developed in which individuals adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamic (a learning process), and base vaccination decisions on disease prevalence and perceived risks of vaccines and disease. The model predicts that oscillations in vaccine uptake are more likely in populations where individuals imitate others more readily or where vaccinating behaviour is more sensitive to changes in disease prevalence. Oscillations are also more likely when the perceived risk of vaccines is high. The model reproduces salient features of the time evolution of vaccine uptake and disease prevalence during the whole-cell pertussis vaccine scare in England and Wales during the 1970s. This suggests that using game theoretical models to predict, and even manage, the population dynamics of vaccinating behaviour may be feasible.     

Wood warblers copy settlement decisions of poor quality conspecifics: support for the tradeoff between the benefit of social information use and competition avoidance

Social information use in songbird habitat selection commonly involves a conspecific attraction strategy. Individuals copy the breeding‐site choices of conspecifics, that is, bias their own settlement decisions towards sites (tracts of spatially limited habitat with similar structure) already occupied by others. In order to be adaptive, social information use has to be discriminative. Especially the decisions of good quality individuals, i.e. measuring high at observable fitness correlates, should be copied more frequently than those of poor quality individuals. It is unknown, however, whether songbirds discriminatively use conspecific presence by evaluating the quality of information providers in habitat selection. We experimentally tested whether wood warblers Phylloscopus sibilatrix selectively copied settlement decisions of conspecifics in relation to the quality of observed individuals. We also tested whether the use of social cues was influenced by the population density at a particular site in the preceding year. We found that wood warblers selectively used intraspecific social information, but in a pattern opposite to that expected based on existing hypotheses. Wood warblers copied breeding‐site choices of poor quality conspecifics and despite temporary attraction to sites where the presence of good quality individuals was simulated, they did not ultimately settle near these individuals. Population density in the preceding year did not influence settlement patterns. We argue that when making settlement decisions, wood warblers assessed the expected level of local intraspecific competition and selectively copied breeding‐site choices of conspecifics or refused to settle, depending on competitive abilities of observed individuals. This adds a novel aspect to the patterns and processes of social information use proposed thus far, and provides support for the predicted negative effect of intraspecific competition on benefit of information. Moreover, it seems that habitat selection in wood warblers is a complex decision‐making process, in which initial decisions are adjusted after acquiring more accurate information. Synthesis Social information use in songbird habitat selection commonly involves copying the breeding‐site choices of conspecifics (so‐called conspecific attraction). To be adaptive, this strategy has to be discriminative, but almost no empirical studies have tested this assertion. Our study shows that birds may selectively use social information by copying settlement decisions of poor quality conspecifics, but avoid settling near good quality individuals, likely because of their high competitive abilities. This decision‐making pattern supports the predicted, yet not experimentally tested, tradeoff between information value and cost of competition in social information use. Our study highlights also that the use of social cues in settlement decisions may be both positively and negatively biased.     

Evolution of heterogeneous perceptual limits and indifference in competitive foraging

The collective behaviour of animal and human groups emerges from the individual decisions and actions of their constituent members. Recent research has revealed many ways in which the behaviour of groups can be influenced by differences amongst their constituent individuals. The existence of individual differences that have implications for collective behaviour raises important questions. How are these differences generated and maintained? Are individual differences driven by exogenous factors, or are they a response to the social dilemmas these groups face? Here I consider the classic case of patch selection by foraging agents under conditions of social competition. I introduce a multilevel model wherein the perceptual sensitivities of agents evolve in response to their foraging success or failure over repeated patch selections. This model reveals a bifurcation in the population, creating a class of agents with no perceptual sensitivity. These agents exploit the social environment to avoid the costs of accurate perception, relying on other agents to make fitness rewards insensitive to the choice of foraging patch. This provides a individual-based evolutionary basis for models incorporating perceptual limits that have been proposed to explain observed deviations from the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD) in empirical studies, while showing that the common assumption in such models that agents share identical sensory limits is likely false. Further analysis of the model shows how agents develop perceptual strategic niches in response to environmental variability. The emergence of agents insensitive to reward differences also has implications for societal resource allocation problems, including the use of financial and prediction markets as mechanisms for aggregating collective wisdom.     

Group decision making in fission-fusion societies: evidence from two-field experiments in Bechstein's bats

Group decisions are required when group coordination is beneficial, but individuals can choose between alternatives. Despite the increased interest in animal group decision making, there is a lack of experimental field studies that investigate how animals with conflicting information make group decisions. In particular, no field studies have considered the influence of fission-fusion behaviour (temporary splitting into subgroups) on group decisions. We studied group decision making in two wild Bechstein's bat colonies, which are fission-fusion societies of stable individual composition. Since they frequently switch communal roosts, colony members must regularly make group decisions over where to roost. In the two-field experiments, we provided marked individuals with conflicting information about the suitability of potential roosts. We investigated whether conflicting information led to group decisions that followed a 'unanimous' or a 'majority' rule, or increased colony fission. Individual behaviour suggests that bats considered both their own information and the behaviour of others when deciding where to roost. Group decisions about communal roosts reflected the information available to a majority of the bats roosting together, but conflicting information led to an increased fission in one colony. Our results suggest that fission-fusion societies allow individuals to avoid majority decisions that are not in their favour.     

Sujet politique,sujet psychique. En marge d’un séminaire de psychopathologie historique

A sociologist who cares to know how a society’s political organisation influences the anthropogenesis of individuals will find that the evolution of psychopathological individuals provide a prime vantage point. That evolution shows how pervasive and deeply rooted in society is the psychology of the individual: individuals are unable to escape the social history enveloping their external environments. In this paper, the author underlines that becoming a person in post-modern society, in which socialisation works through extreme individualisation, is a problem: individuals are no longer able to look at themselves from the point of view of the political whole in which they could then find a place. The author argues that new disorders (depression-related fatigue, antisocial violence, aggressive fear of abandonment, hyperkinesis, and others) are signs of failure in personal authonomy. In every case, there is a bipolarity of extreme independence and dependent behaviour. Arguably, these as yet ‘unidentified clinical objects’ can be related to borderline personality disorders, although the latter concept must be re-examined.     

Impact of Imitation Processes on the Effectiveness of?Ring Vaccination

Ring vaccination can be a highly effective control strategy for an emerging disease or in the final phase of disease eradication, as witnessed in the eradication of smallpox. However, the impact of behavioural dynamics on the effectiveness of ring vaccination has not been explored in mathematical models. Here, we analyze a series of stochastic models of voluntary ring vaccination. Contacts of an index case base vaccinating decisions on their own individual payoffs to vaccinate or not vaccinate, and they can also imitate the behaviour of other contacts of the index case. We find that including imitation changes the probability of containment through ring vaccination considerably. Imitation can cause a strong majority of contacts to choose vaccination in some cases, or to choose non-vaccination in other cases-even when the equivalent solution under perfectly rational (non-imitative) behaviour yields mixed choices. Moreover, imitation processes can result in very different outcomes in different stochastic realizations sampled from the same parameter distributions, by magnifying moderate tendencies toward one behaviour or the other: in some realizations, imitation causes a strong majority of contacts not to vaccinate, while in others, imitation promotes vaccination and reduces the number of secondary infections. Hence, the effectiveness of ring vaccination can depend significantly and unpredictably on imitation processes. Therefore, our results suggest that risk communication efforts should be initiated early in an outbreak when ring vaccination is to be applied, especially among subpopulations that are heavily influenced by peer opinions.