Becoming a face expert.

Young children do not form representations of newly encountered faces as efficiently as do adults. A first step in explaining this difference, like any age-related change, is locating its source. A major source of the improvement is acquisition of knowledge of faces per se, as opposed to age-related changes in general pattern encoding or memorial skills. Two consequences of expertise at individualizing members of classes that share a basic configuration are known: a large inversion effect and a caricature advantage. It is possible that both of these effects reflect increased reliance, with expertise, on configuration distinguishing features. Several phenomena that indicate that inversion interferes with the encoding of configural aspects of faces are reviewed. Finally, developmental data are presented that confirm the suspicion that there are at least two distinct sources of the vulnerability of face encoding to inversion, perhaps reflecting two distinct senses of 'configural encoding' of faces, only one of which is implicated in adult expertise at face encoding.     

The Child on the Threshold of Becoming a Pupil

The functions of a preschooler's imagination that are required for a child to become immersed in the new social situation of development that characterizes the beginning of the early school ages are analyzed. The new social situation of development consists, above all, of new forms of interaction for the child with adults and other children within new primary activity—education. Imagination is viewed as a condition for the development of interaction during the older preschool ages based on a number of important indicators—the degree of development of social-communication skills and communicative competence—that underlie the “social component” of school readiness.     

Becoming Modern Homo sapiens

Human beings are unusual in many ways but perhaps most strikingly in their unique symbolic form of processing information about the world around them. Although based on a long and essential evolutionary history, the modern human cognitive style is not predicted by that history: it is emergent rather than the product of an incremental process of refinement. Homo sapiens is physically very distinctive and is clearly the result of a significant developmental reorganization with ramifications throughout the skeleton and presumably beyond. It is reasonable to suppose that the neural underpinnings of symbolic thought were acquired in this reorganization. However, the fossil and archeological records indicate that the first anatomically recognizable members of the species substantially predated its first members who behaved in a demonstrably symbolic manner. Thus, while the biological potential for symbolic thinking most likely arose in the morphogenetic event that gave rise to H. sapiens as a distinctive anatomical entity, this new capacity was evidently exaptive, in the sense that it had to await its “discovery” and release through a cultural stimulus. Plausibly, this stimulus was the invention of language. One expression of symbolic reasoning is the adoption of technological change in response to environmental challenges, contrasting with earlier responses that typically involved using existing technologies in new ways. As climates changed at the end of the last Ice Age, the new technophile proclivity was expressed in a shift toward agriculture and sedentary lifestyles: a shift that precipitated a fundamentally new (and potentially self-destructive) relationship with nature. Thus, both of what are arguably the two most radical (and certainly the most fateful) evolutionary innovations in the history of life (symbolic thinking and sedentary lifestyles) were both very recent occurrences, well within the (so far rather short) tenure of H. sapiens.