CLARIFYING APPEALS TO DIGNITY IN MEDICAL ETHICS FROM AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Over the past few decades the concept of (human) dignity has deeply pervaded medical ethics. Appeals to dignity, however, are often unclear. As a result some prefer to eliminate the concept from medical ethics, whereas others try to render it useful in this context. We think that appeals to dignity in medical ethics can be clarified by considering the concept from an historical perspective. Firstly, on the basis of historical texts we propose a framework for defining the concept in medical debates. The framework shows that dignity can occur in a relational, an unconditional, a subjective and a Kantian form. Interestingly, all forms relate to one concept since they have four features in common: dignity refers, in a restricted sense, to the 'special status of human beings'; it is based on essential human characteristics; the subject of dignity should live up to it; and it is a vulnerable concept, it can be lost or violated. We argue that being explicit about the meaning of dignity will prevent dignity from becoming a conversation-stopper in moral debate. Secondly, an historical perspective on dignity shows that it is not yet time to dispose of dignity in medical ethics. At least Kantian and relational dignity can be made useful in medical ethics.     

Justice For All? Children’s Moral Reasoning about the Welfare and Rights of Endangered Species

This study reports children’s developing moral concerns for endangered animals. Three questions were addressed: 1) Do children conceive of not harming an endangered animal as a moral obligation? 2) Do children use biocentric (nature-centered) moral reasoning? and 3) Does a developmental shift in biocentrism occur between the ages of 7and 10-years-old? Fifty-two urban children (gender balanced and evenly divided between two ages groups: 7 and 10-year-olds) from the Pacific Northwest were interviewed regarding their understanding of, and beliefs and values about, endangered animals, their moral obligatory concerns, and their conceptions of animal rights. Many questions focused on a single species—the gray wolf— as it presents a canonical example of a local, familiar, charismatic endangered animal. The semi-structured interview methodology and the coding procedures followed well-established methods in social-cognitive psychology. Results were that the 7 and 10-year-olds valued endangered animals, extended moral obligations to gray wolves, and endorsed animal rights. Quantitative analysis of the content responses revealed a typology of seven rights that children spontaneously offered when asked which rights animals have: food, companionship, reproduction, habitat, play/exercise, welfare, and autonomy. The 10-year-olds were significantly more likely to endorse autonomy rights than the 7-year-olds. The findings reveal the highest rates of biocentrism observed in young children, and the 10-year-olds endorsed biocentrism to a greater degree than the 7-year-olds. Children drew on their understanding of human moral concerns to extend these concerns to the animal. Sentiency and biological needs are salient features that allow children to take the perspective of the animal in ways that build upon and diverge from their own experiences. These findings provide a comparative baseline for extending our understanding of biocentrism across cultures, animal kinds, and in human–wildlife conflict scenarios.