The evolution of cooperation by negotiation in a noisy world

Cooperative interactions among individuals are ubiquitous despite the possibility of exploitation by selfish free riders. One mechanism that may promote cooperation is ‘negotiation’: individuals altering their behaviour in response to the behaviour of others. Negotiating individuals decide their actions through a recursive process of reciprocal observation, thereby reducing the possibility of free riding. Evolutionary games with response rules have shown that infinitely many forms of the rule can be evolutionarily stable simultaneously, unless there is variation in individual quality. This potentially restricts the conditions under which negotiation could maintain cooperation. Organisms interact with one another in a noisy world in which cooperative effort and the assessment of effort may be subject to error. Here, we show that such noise can make the number of evolutionarily stable rules finite, even without quality variation, and so noise could help maintain cooperative behaviour. We show that the curvature of the benefit function is the key factor determining whether individuals invest more or less as their partner's investment increases, investing less when the benefit to investment has diminishing returns. If the benefits of low investment are very small then behavioural flexibility tends to promote cooperation, because negotiation enables cooperators to reach large benefits. Under some conditions, this leads to a repeating cycle in which cooperative behaviour rises and falls over time, which may explain between‐population differences in cooperative behaviour. In other conditions, negotiation leads to extremely high levels of cooperative behaviour, suggesting that behavioural flexibility could facilitate the evolution of eusociality in the absence of high relatedness.     

Viscous medium promotes cooperation in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa

There has been extensive theoretical debate over whether population viscosity (limited dispersal) can favour cooperation. While limited dispersal increases the probability of interactions occurring between relatives, which can favour cooperation, it can also lead to an increase in competition between relatives and this can reduce or completely negate selection for cooperation. Despite much theoretical attention, there is a lack of empirical research investigating these issues. We cultured Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria in medium with different degrees of viscosity and examined the fitness consequences for a cooperative trait—the production of iron-scavenging siderophore molecules. We found that increasing viscosity of the growth medium (i) significantly limited bacterial dispersal and the diffusion of siderophore molecules and (ii) increased the fitness of individuals that produced siderophores relative to mutants that did not. We propose that viscosity favours siderophore-producing individuals in this system, because the benefits of siderophore production are more likely to accrue to relatives (i.e. greater indirect benefits), and, at the same time, bacteria are more likely to gain direct fitness benefits by taking up siderophore molecules produced by themselves (i.e. the trait becomes less cooperative). Our results suggest that viscosity of the microbial growth environment is a crucial factor determining the dynamics of wild-type bacteria and siderophore-deficient mutants in natural habitats, such as the viscous mucus in cystic fibrosis lung.     

Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation

In cooperative breeding systems, some individuals help to raise offspring that are not their own. While early explanations for such altruistic behaviour were predominantly based on kin selection, recent evidence suggests that direct benefits may be important in the maintenance of cooperation. To date, however, discussions of cooperative breeding have made little reference to more general theories of cooperation between unrelated individuals (while these theories rarely address cooperative breeding). Here, we attempt to integrate the two fields. We identify four key questions that can be used to categorise different mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperative behaviour: (1) whether or not individuals invest in others; (2) whether or not this initial investment elicits a return investment by the beneficiary; (3) whether the interaction is direct, i.e. between two partners, or indirect (involving third parties) and (4) whether only actions that increase the fitness of the partner or also fitness reducing actions (punishment) are involved in the interaction. Asking these questions with regards to concepts in the literature on cooperative breeding, we found that (a) it is often straightforward to relate these concepts to general mechanisms of cooperation, but that (b) a single term (such as 'pay-to-stay', 'group augmentation' or 'prestige') may sometimes subsume two or more distinct mechanisms, and that (c) at least some mechanisms that are thought to be important in cooperative breeding systems have remained largely unexplored in the theoretical literature on the evolution of cooperation. Future theoretical models should incorporate asymmetries in power and pay off structure caused for instance by dominance hierarchies or partner choice, and the use of N-player games. The key challenges for both theoreticians and empiricists will be to integrate the hitherto disparate fields and to disentangle the parallel effects of kin and non-kin based mechanisms of cooperation.     

Strategies for cooperation in biological markets,especially for humans

When organisms can choose whom to interact with, it can create a biological market where individuals need to outbid their rivals for access to cooperative relationships. Each individual's market value is determined by the benefits it can confer (and is willing to confer) upon others, which selects for tendencies to actively confer benefits on others. In this article, I introduce the basics of biological markets and how they relate to traditional models of cooperation, and then elucidate their impact on human cooperation, especially in the tasks of choosing partners, competing over partners, and keeping partners. Since “generosity” is necessarily rated relative to one's rivals, this can result in tendencies to compete over relative generosity, commit to partners, help when help is unnecessary, give strategically, and attack or suppress others' helpfulness. Biological markets explain and make novel predictions about why we desire to associate with particular individuals and how we attract them, and are therefore a useful incorporation into models of cooperation.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

How is human cooperation different?

Although cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature, human cooperation exceeds that of all other species with regard to the scale and range of cooperative activities. Here we review and discuss differences between humans and non-humans in the strategies employed to maintain cooperation and control free-riders. We distinguish forms of cooperative behaviour based on their influence on the immediate payoffs of actor and recipient. If the actor has immediate costs and only the recipient obtains immediate benefits, we term this investment. If the behaviour has immediate positive effects for both actor and recipient, we call this a self-serving mutually beneficial behaviour or mutual cooperation. We argue that humans, in contrast to all other species, employ a wider range of enforcement mechanisms, which allow higher levels of cooperation to evolve and stabilize among unrelated individuals and in large groups. We also discuss proximate mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour and focus on our experimental work with humans and our closest primate relatives. Differences in the proximate mechanisms also seem to contribute to explaining humans'' greater ability to cooperate and enforce cooperation.     

Evolving the neuroendocrine physiology of human and primate cooperation and collective action

While many hormones play vital roles in facilitating or reinforcing cooperative behaviour, the neurohormones underlying competitive and cooperative behaviours are largely conserved across all mammals. This raises the question of how endocrine mechanisms have been shaped by selection to produce different levels of cooperation in different species. Multiple components of endocrine physiology—from baseline hormone concentrations, to binding proteins, to the receptor sensitivity and specificity—can evolve independently and be impacted by current socio-ecological conditions or individual status, thus potentially generating a wide range of variation within and between species. Here, we highlight several neurohormones and variation in hormone receptor genes associated with cooperation, focusing on the role of oxytocin and testosterone in contexts ranging from parenting and pair-bonding to reciprocity and territorial defence. While the studies reviewed herein describe the current state of the literature with regard to hormonal modulators of cooperation and collective action, there is still a paucity of research on hormonal mechanisms that help facilitate large-scale collective action. We end by discussing several potential areas for future research.     

Social eavesdropping and the evolution of conditional cooperation and cheating strategies

The response of bystanders to information available in their social environment can have a potent influence on the evolution of cooperation and signalling systems. In the presence of bystanders, individuals might be able to increase their payoff by exaggerating signals beyond their means (cheating) or investing to help others despite considerable costs. In doing so, animals can accrue immediate benefits by manipulating (or helping) individuals with whom they are currently interacting and delayed benefits by convincing bystanders that they are more fit or cooperative than perhaps is warranted. In this paper, I provide some illustrative examples of how bystanders could apply added positive selection pressure on both cooperative behaviour and dishonest signalling during courtship or conflict. I also discuss how the presence of bystanders might select for greater flexibility in behavioural strategies (e.g. conditional or condition dependence), which could maintain dishonesty at evolutionarily stable frequencies under some ecological conditions. By recognizing bystanders as a significant selection pressure, we might gain a more realistic approximation of what drives signalling and/or interaction dynamics in social animals.     

Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.     

Evolutionary routes to non-kin cooperative breeding in birds

Cooperatively breeding animals live in social groups in which some individuals help to raise the offspring of others, often at the expense of their own reproduction. Kin selection—when individuals increase their inclusive fitness by aiding genetic relatives—is a powerful explanation for the evolution of cooperative breeding, particularly because most groups consist of family members. However, recent molecular studies have revealed that many cooperative groups also contain unrelated immigrants, and the processes responsible for the formation and maintenance of non-kin coalitions are receiving increasing attention. Here, I provide the first systematic review of group structure for all 213 species of cooperatively breeding birds for which data are available. Although the majority of species (55%) nest in nuclear family groups, cooperative breeding by unrelated individuals is more common than previously recognized: 30% nest in mixed groups of relatives and non-relatives, and 15% nest primarily with non-relatives. Obligate cooperative breeders are far more likely to breed with non-kin than are facultative cooperators, indicating that when constraints on independent breeding are sufficiently severe, the direct benefits of group membership can substitute for potential kin-selected benefits. I review three patterns of dispersal that give rise to social groups with low genetic relatedness, and I discuss the selective pressures that favour the formation of such groups. Although kin selection has undoubtedly been crucial to the origin of most avian social systems, direct benefits have subsequently come to play a predominant role in some societies, allowing cooperation to persist despite low genetic relatedness.     

Individual contributions to territory defence in a cooperative breeder: weighing up the benefits and costs

While investment in territory defence is expected to be influenced by its benefits, the additional role that costs may play is rarely considered. Here, we quantify both benefits and costs of repelling prospecting males in cooperative meerkats, and demonstrate that both are required to explain the substantial variation in individual contributions to the defence observed. Males benefit more from repelling prospectors than females, as males may lose dominance and be expelled during intrusions. Accordingly, males invest the most in repelling prospectors. We also show that males experience an associated cost in the form of reduced weight gain and, as such, heavier males contribute more to chasing prospectors. Finally, we show evidence of a cost not restricted to individuals engaged in chasing: both males and females reduce their contributions to feeding dependent pups when prospectors are present, resulting in a reduction in pup weight gain in this context. Males appear to adjust their contributions to chasing in light of this cost, chasing at lower rates when their group contains dependent young. Our findings support the view that investment in cooperative behaviours can be attributed to benefits and costs, and highlight the additional importance of considering trade-offs in investment between cooperative behaviours.     

Variation in contributions to teaching by meerkats

Recent evidence from cooperative insect, bird and mammal societies has challenged the assumption that teaching is restricted to humans. However, little is known about the factors affecting the degree to which individuals in such societies contribute to teaching. Here, I examine variation in contributions to teaching in meerkats, where older group members teach pups to handle difficult prey. I show that investment in teaching varies with characteristics of pups, helpers, groups and ecological conditions. Although prior experience in caring for pups did not significantly influence teaching behaviour, younger helpers, which were still investing in growth, contributed less to teaching than older individuals. This suggests that, in common with other cooperative activities, contributions to teaching vary with the costs experienced by individual group members. However, in contrast to other forms of helping in meerkats, I detected no effects of nutritional state on teaching, suggesting that it carries relatively low costs. In species where individuals can potentially gain direct or indirect fitness benefits from facilitating learning in others, low costs divided among multiple group members may help tip the balance towards selection for teaching.     

Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits

The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs and benefits with a continuum of strategies from non-cooperation to total cooperation. This cost-benefit game allows the cooperator to share in the benefit of a cooperative act, and the recipient to be burdened with a share of the cooperator's cost. The cost-benefit game encompasses the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift game and Partial Altruism. The models produce ESS solutions of total cooperation, partial cooperation, non-cooperation and coexistence between cooperation and non-cooperation. Cooperation emerges from an interplay between the nonlinearities in the cost and benefit functions. If benefits increase at a decelerating rate and costs increase at an accelerating rate with the degree of cooperation, then the ESS has an intermediate level of cooperation. The game also exhibits non-ESS points such as unstable minima, convergent-stable minima and unstable maxima. The emergence of cooperative behaviour in this game represents enlightened self-interest, whereas non-cooperative solutions illustrate the Tragedy of the Commons. Games having either a stable maximum or a stable minimum have the property that small changes in the incentive structure (model parameter values) or culture (starting frequencies of strategies) result in correspondingly small changes in the degree of cooperation. Conversely, with unstable maxima or unstable minima, small changes in the incentive structure or culture can result in a switch from non-cooperation to total cooperation (and vice versa). These solutions identify when human or animal societies have the potential for cooperation and whether cooperation is robust or fragile.     

Distinctions among reciprocal altruism,kin selection,and cooperation and a model for the initial evolution of beneficent behavior

Reciprocal altruism is usually regarded as distinct from kin selection. However, because reciprocators are likely to establish long-term relations and to deliver most of their aid to other individuals genetically predisposed to reciprocation, most acts of reciprocal altruism should involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness, at least as regards alleles for reciprocation. Thus, as usually defined, reciprocal altruism is not clearly distinct from kin selection because both involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness. We propose a new definition for reciprocal altruism that makes the phenomenon distinct from kin selection and allows for reciprocation between nonrelatives in which current costs exceed future benefits returned to the reciprocal altruist. Cooperation and reciprocal altruism are often considered synonymous or different only in the timing of donating and receiving aid. We show, however, that there are other critical differences between reciprocal altruism and other forms of cooperation, most importantly, the latter often involve no clearly identifiable aid. We propose a four-category system to encompass the range of cooperative and beneficent behaviors that occur in nature (reciprocal altruism, pseudoreciprocity, simultaneous cooperation and by-product beneficence). Reciprocal altruism must involve aid that is returned to an original donor as a result of behavior that has a net cost to an original recipient. Our simplest category of cooperative/beneficent behavior, “by-product beneficence,” occurs when a selfish act also benefits another individual and requires no prior or subsequent interactions between the individuals involved. By-product beneficence may be the primitive state from which more complicated types of cooperative/beneficent behavior evolved. We show via simple models that by-product beneficence can allow for the initial increase of helping behavior in a completely unstructured population although the individuals showing such behavior pay all the costs while sharing the benefits with other individuals. Previous models that attempted to explain the initial increase of cooperative/beneficent behavior were much more complex and were based on the prisoner's dilemma, which does not accurately reflect most forms of cooperation and beneficence that occur in nature.     

Modes of cooperation during territorial defense by African lions

Cooperation during territorial defense allows social groups of African lions to defend access to resources necessary for individual reproductive success. Some forms of cooperation will be dependent upon cognition: reciprocity places greater cognitive demands on participants than does kinship or mutualism. Lions have well-developed cognitive abilities that enable individuals to recognize and interact with others in ways that seem to enhance their inclusive fitness. Male lions appear to cooperate unconditionally, consistently responding to roaring intruders regardless of their male companions’ kinship or behavior. Female lions, however, do keep track of the past behavior of their female companions, apparently using the reliability of a companion as one means of assessing the risks posed by approaching intruders. Some “laggard” females may exploit the cooperative tendencies of “leaders” during territorial encounters. Although leader females clearly recognize laggards as such, the costs of tolerating laggards may be less than the benefits leaders gain through territorial defense behavior. Thus, although lions clearly have the cognitive ability to base cooperation on reciprocity, territorial defense cooperation appears instead to be based primarily on mutual benefits to participants for both male and female lions.     

Cooperating in the face of uncertainty: a consistent framework for understanding the evolution of cooperation

The evolution of cooperative behaviour, whereby individuals enhance the fitness of others at an apparent cost to themselves, represents one of the greatest paradoxes of evolution. Individuals that engage in such cooperative behaviour can, however, be favoured by natural selection if cooperative actions confer higher fitness than alternative actions. To understand the evolution of cooperative behaviour, the direct and indirect genetic benefits that individuals accrue in the present and future must be summed - this can be accomplished without any reference to the colorful vocabulary typically associated with studies of cooperation. When benefits are accrued indirectly through relatives or directly in the future individuals must be able to assess and enhance their probability of accruing those benefits and behave accordingly. We suggest that, in the same way that studies of kin recognition systems improved our understanding of how individuals assess and enhance their probability of accruing indirect benefits, studies of various forms of inheritance and reciprocation recognition systems will improve our understanding of how individuals assess and enhance their probability of accruing future benefits. Recognizing the parallel between studies of indirect fitness and future fitness, at multiple levels of analysis, will move us toward a simpler and more consistent framework for understanding the evolution of cooperative behaviour.     

When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation?

Altruistic punishment has been shown to invade when rare if individuals are allowed to opt out of cooperative ventures. Individuals that opt out do not contribute to the common enterprise or derive benefits from it. This result is potentially significant because it offers an explanation for the origin of large-scale cooperation in one-shot interactions among unrelated individuals. Here, we show that this result is not a general consequence of optional participation in cooperative activities, but depends on special assumptions about cooperative pay-offs. We extend the pay-off structure of optional participation models to consider the effects of economies and diseconomies of scale in public-goods production, rival and non-rival consumption of goods, and different orderings of the pay-offs of freeriding and opting out. This more general model highlights the kinds of pay-offs for which optional participation favours cooperation, and those in which it does not.     

On the further integration of cooperative breeding and cooperation theory

We present a synopsis about the commentaries to the target article "Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation", in which we attempted to integrate general mechanisms to explain cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals with classic concepts to explain helping behaviour in cooperative breeders that do not invoke kin-based benefits. Here we (1) summarize the positions of the commentators concerning the main issues we raised in the target article and discuss important criticisms and extensions. (2) We relate our target article to some recent reviews on the evolution of cooperation and, (3) clarify how we use terminology with regard to cooperation and cooperative behaviour. (4) We discuss several aspects that were raised with respect to cooperative interactions including by-product mutualism, generalised reciprocity and multi-level selection and, (5) examine the alternatives to our classification scheme as proposed by some commentaries. (6) Finally, we highlight several aspects that might hinder the application of game theoretical mechanisms of cooperation in cooperatively breeding systems. Although there is broad agreement that cooperative breeding theory should be integrated within the more general concepts of cooperation, there is some debate about how this may be achieved. We conclude that the contributions in this special issue provide a fruitful first step and ample suggestions for future directions with regard to a more unified framework of cooperation in cooperative breeders.     

The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models

One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is the origin and persistence of intraspecific cooperation and altruism in humans and other species. Hundreds of theoretical models have been proposed and there is much confusion about the relationship between these models. To clarify the situation, we developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be fulfilled: direct benefits to the focal individual performing a cooperative act; direct or indirect information allowing a better than random guess about whether a given individual will behave cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions; preferential interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be identified. When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or cooperation can evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and cooperative acts is greater than a threshold value. The cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion, punishment and policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the evolution of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing us to classify them into four general categories.     

Keeping the benefits of group cooperation: domain-specific responses to distinct causes of social exclusion

Some people are especially physically adept, others carry dangerous pathogens, some have valuable and rare knowledge, and still others cheat or deceive those around them. Because of these differences, and the costs and benefits they pose, natural selection has crafted mechanisms of partner choice that are selective: some people are chosen as social partners, others are not. When people are not chosen as partners—when they are socially excluded—they lose access to important fitness benefits. Thus, the mind should have adaptations to recapture these benefits by regaining inclusion. Is there one best way to regain inclusion? This is unlikely because there are multiple causes of exclusion; a single response is unlikely to be successful across all possible causes. Instead, distinct causes of exclusion might require adaptively tailored responses. We test whether there are tailored responses to five possible causes of exclusion from a cooperative group: inability to contribute, pathogen infection, free riding, disrupting group coordination, and exit from the group. Our results show that different causes of exclusion lead to distinct profiles of emotions and behavior. Each emotion and behavior profile is adaptively specialized to reverse or mitigate its specific cause of exclusion. Our research shows how taking an evolutionary view of human sociality can help map the psychology of cooperation and exclusion.