共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Zoltán Barta John M. McNamara Dóra B. Huszár Michael Taborsky 《Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society》2011,278(1707):843-848
For decades, attempts to understand cooperation between non-kin have generated substantial theoretical and empirical interest in the evolutionary mechanisms of reciprocal altruism. There is growing evidence that the cognitive limitations of animals can hinder direct and indirect reciprocity because the necessary mental capacity is costly. Here, we show that cooperation can evolve by generalized reciprocity (help anyone, if helped by someone) even in large groups, if individuals base their decision to cooperate on a state variable updated by the outcome of the last interaction with an anonymous partner. We demonstrate that this alternative mechanism emerges through small evolutionary steps under a wide range of conditions. Since this state-based generalized reciprocity works without advanced cognitive abilities it may help to understand the evolution of complex social behaviour in a wide range of organisms. 相似文献
2.
The evolution of cooperation among nonrelatives has been explained by direct, indirect, and strong reciprocity. Animals should base the decision to help others on expected future help, which they may judge from past behavior of their partner. Although many examples of cooperative behavior exist in nature where reciprocity may be involved, experimental evidence for strategies predicted by direct reciprocity models remains controversial; and indirect and strong reciprocity have been found only in humans so far. Here we show experimentally that cooperative behavior of female rats is influenced by prior receipt of help, irrespective of the identity of the partner. Rats that were trained in an instrumental cooperative task (pulling a stick in order to produce food for a partner) pulled more often for an unknown partner after they were helped than if they had not received help before. This alternative mechanism, called generalized reciprocity, requires no specific knowledge about the partner and may promote the evolution of cooperation among unfamiliar nonrelatives. 相似文献
3.
Karine Larose Frédérique Dubois 《Ethology : formerly Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie》2011,117(2):115-123
Reciprocity is apparently uncommon in animal societies because it requires, to evolve, specialized cognitive abilities that most species would not possess. In particular, memory would be important because cooperation can emerge and be maintained only if the same opponents interact repeatedly and adjust their decisions to their opponent’s previous move. To investigate how these constraints influence reciprocity, we first conducted a preliminary foraging experiment with zebra finches (Taeniapygia guttata) to insure that corticosterone elevations impaired the birds’ event memory capabilities. Then, we performed a reciprocity experiment with established pairs that were tested in a two‐choice apparatus under two different conditions: once with an empty implant and once with an implant of corticosterone. We found that the birds were capable of sustained cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment but only when they had an empty implant. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that limitations in event memory constraint the frequency of reciprocity and hence would make this form of cooperation difficult for non‐human animals. In addition, as levels of stress hormones can differ greatly among individuals, our findings might also contribute explaining individual variation in the propensity to cooperate. 相似文献
4.
Gilbert Roberts 《PloS one》2015,10(6)
Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation based on helping those who help others. However, the use of ‘image scores’ to summarize individuals’ past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Explaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all previous treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors. Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group, or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of helping those who help others can work. 相似文献
5.
Fishman MA 《Journal of theoretical biology》2003,225(3):285-292
Reciprocal cooperation occurs when the overall benefits of receiving help exceed the costs of donating help (Q. Rev. Biol. 46 (197) 35). That is, individuals in good condition--for whom the pertinent costs are relatively small; donate help in order to secure reciprocity in their hour of need--when the benefits of receiving a donation are large. Consequently, reciprocity occurs among individuals who occasionally need help. In particular, such individuals will be unable to help others, no matter how deserving, when in need of help themselves--involuntary defection. This paper deals with the effects of involuntary defection in the context of a specific model of indirect reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal altruism that is directed toward all the cooperative members of the community) due to Nowak and Sigmund (J. Theor. Biol.194 (1998b) 561: Sections 2-4). In that model, the authors formulate the decision rules for conditional cooperation in the context of indirect reciprocity, and demonstrate that these decision rules can account for a long-term persistence of cooperation. Here we show that addition of involuntary defection to the decision rules formulated by Nowak and Sigmund results in indirect reciprocity that is evolutionary stable under appropriate conditions. Moreover, for a wide range of parameter values, evolutionary stability of cooperation requires a mixture of conditional- and unconditional-altruist behaviors. To recollect, unconditional altruist strategy can be viewed as conditional altruist strategy sans the ability to decide when the help-soliciting individual should be refused help. That is, given involuntary defection, stability of cooperation requires an occasional forgiveness, if only by default, of a failure to donate help. Thus, we see that evolutionary stable indirect reciprocity does not require perfection in either the ability to assess the merits of the help-soliciting individuals, or the ability to donate help when it is merited. On the contrary, we are forced to conclude that reciprocity, at least in the current case, is stable only among imperfect individuals. 相似文献
6.
Nina Gerber Manon K. Schweinfurth Michael Taborsky 《Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society》2020,287(1939)
Reciprocity can explain cooperative behaviour among non-kin, where individuals help others depending on their experience in previous interactions. Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) cooperate reciprocally according to direct and generalized reciprocity. In a sequence of four consecutive experiments, we show that odour cues from a cooperating conspecific are sufficient to induce the altruistic help of rats in a food-exchange task. When rats were enabled to help a non-cooperative partner while receiving olfactory information from a rat helping a conspecific in a different room, they helped their non-cooperative partner as if it was a cooperative one. We further show that the cues inducing altruistic behaviour are released during the act of cooperation and do not depend on the identity of the cue provider. Remarkably, olfactory cues seem to be more important for cooperation decisions than experiencing a cooperative act per se. This suggests that rats may signal their cooperation propensity to social partners, which increases their chances to receive help in return. 相似文献
7.
Gabriele Schino Filippo Aureli 《Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society》2017,92(2):665-672
Reciprocity is probably the most debated of the evolutionary explanations for cooperation. Part of the confusion surrounding this debate stems from a failure to note that two different processes can result in reciprocity: partner control and partner choice. We suggest that the common observation that group‐living animals direct their cooperative behaviours preferentially to those individuals from which they receive most cooperation is to be interpreted as the result of the sum of the two separate processes of partner control and partner choice. We review evidence that partner choice is the prevalent process in primates and propose explanations for this pattern. We make predictions that highlight the need for studies that separate the effects of partner control and partner choice in a broader variety of group‐living taxa. 相似文献
8.
Res Schmid Karin Schneeberger Michael Taborsky 《Ethology : formerly Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie》2017,123(9):640-647
Direct and generalised reciprocity can establish evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation among unrelated individuals, with animals reciprocating help based on whether they have been helped by a social partner before. It has been argued that the actual cooperative act by a social partner may be of minor importance for seemingly reciprocal cooperation and that a mere positive experience might suffice to enhance helpful behaviour towards a conspecific (‘feel good, do good’). However, this effect could easily be exploited by defectors free‐riding on an individual's enhanced propensity to cooperate after an unspecific positive experience, without investing in reciprocity themselves. Here, we use female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) to test if a positive experience that was not provided by a helping partner increases the propensity to subsequently help a social partner. We manipulated the experience of test subjects by providing them with treats, either in the presence or absence of a conspecific. Thereafter, we assessed whether they produce treats and if so, how many, for an unfamiliar social partner compared to a situation in which they had not received treats before. As the treats the test subject received had not been provided by a social partner even if the partner was present, we predicted that the rats should not be more cooperative after they had received treats than if they had not. Indeed, the helping behaviour of rats was apparently not influenced by prior experience made either in a social or non‐social context. Rats have been shown previously to perform both direct and generalised reciprocity in the same variant of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Our results suggest that this behaviour cannot be explained by an unspecific positive experience. The decision to help a social partner seems to be contingent on previously receiving help from a social partner (reciprocity), not on any positive experience (unconditional prosociality). 相似文献
9.
Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies. 相似文献
10.
Flix Geoffroy Nicolas Baumard Jean‐Baptiste Andr 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2019,32(10):1069-1081
A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency. 相似文献
11.
Michael Taborsky Joachim G. Frommen Christina Riehl 《Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences》2016,371(1687)
The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as ‘help anyone if helped by someone’ should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus. 相似文献
12.
The error management model of altruism in one-shot interactions provides an influential explanation for one of the most controversial behaviors in evolutionary social science. The model posits that one-shot altruism arises from a domain-specific cognitive bias that avoids the error of mistaking a long-term relationship for a one-shot interaction. One-shot altruism is thus, in an intriguingly paradoxical way, a form of reciprocity. We examine the logic behind this idea in detail. In its most general form the error management model is exceedingly flexible, and restrictions about the psychology of agents are necessary for selection to be well-defined. Once these restrictions are in place, selection is well defined, but it leads to behavior that is perfectly consistent with an unbiased rational benchmark. Thus, the evolution of one-shot reciprocity does not require an evoked cognitive bias based on repeated interactions and reputation. Moreover, in spite of its flexibility in terms of psychology, the error management model assumes that behavior is exceedingly rigid when individuals face a new interaction partner. Reciprocity can only take the form of tit-for-tat, and individuals cannot adjust their behavior in response to new information about the duration of a relationship. Zefferman (2014) showed that one-shot reciprocity does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the first restriction, and we show that the behavior does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the second restriction. Altogether, these theoretical results on one-shot reciprocity do not square well with experiments showing increased altruism in the presence of payoff-irrelevant stimuli that suggest others are watching. 相似文献
13.
A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers. 相似文献
14.
Pairs of individuals frequently face situations in which they could do well if they cooperated, but each risks being exploited. The Prisoner's Dilemma is widely used for investigating such scenarios, but it is framed in terms of cooperating and defecting, whereas in reality cooperation is rarely "all or nothing". Recent models allowing for variable investment in cooperation indicated the success of a strategy of "raising-the-stakes" (RTS), which invests minimally at first and then increases its investment if its partner matches it. We tested whether this strategy was adopted by subjects participating in an experiment in which they could choose how much money to give to a partner, reciprocity being encouraged by doubling donations. Subjects did increase their donations over successive rounds, both when playing against a stooge who reciprocated with the same investment, and when playing with a partner who was free to choose their investment. Subjects showed a strong tendency to match variations in their partner's investments. Cooperation was therefore achieved through a combination of initial escalation (RTS strategy) and quantitative responsiveness ("give-as-good-as-you-get" strategy). Although initial offers were higher than predicted, our results were broadly consistent with theoretical expectations. 相似文献
15.
Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner's dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner's behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one-shot games, cooperative solutions based on reciprocity can emerge in iterated games. Among the most prominent theoretical solutions are the so-called bookkeeping strategies, such as tit-for-tat, where individuals copy their partner's behaviour in the previous round. However, the lack of empirical data conforming to predicted strategies has prompted the suggestion that the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is neither a useful nor realistic basis for investigating cooperation. Here, we discuss several recent studies where authors have used the IPD framework to interpret their data. We evaluate the validity of their approach and highlight the diversity of proposed solutions. Strategies based on precise accounting are relatively uncommon, perhaps because the full set of assumptions of the IPD model are rarely satisfied. Instead, animals use a diverse array of strategies that apparently promote cooperation, despite the temptation to cheat. These include both positive and negative reciprocity, as well as long-term mutual investments based on 'friendships'. Although there are various gaps in these studies that remain to be filled, we argue that in most cases, individuals could theoretically benefit from cheating and that cooperation cannot therefore be explained with the concept of positive pseudo-reciprocity. We suggest that by incorporating empirical data into the theoretical framework, we may gain fundamental new insights into the evolution of mutual reciprocal investment in nature. 相似文献
16.
Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient. 相似文献
17.
Explaining unconditional cooperation, such as donations to charities or contributions to public goods, continues to present a problem. One possibility is that cooperation can pay through developing a reputation that makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (CA) or reputation-based partner choice. Here, we show, to our knowledge, for the first time, that investing in a cooperative reputation can bring net benefits through access to more cooperative partners. Participants played a public goods game (PGG) followed by an opportunity to select a partner for a second cooperative game. We found that those who gave more in the PGG were more often selected as desired partners and received more in the paired cooperative game. Reputational competition was even stronger when it was possible for participants to receive a higher payoff from partner choice. The benefits of being selected by a more cooperative partner outweighed the costs of cooperation in the reputation building phase. CA therefore provides an alternative to indirect reciprocity as an explanation for reputation-building behaviour. Furthermore, while indirect reciprocity depends upon individuals giving preference to those of good standing, CA can explain unconditional cooperation. 相似文献
18.
Jon Grinnell 《Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)》2002,13(1):85-104
Cooperation during territorial defense allows social groups of African lions to defend access to resources necessary for individual reproductive success. Some forms of cooperation will be dependent upon cognition: reciprocity places greater cognitive demands on participants than does kinship or mutualism. Lions have well-developed cognitive abilities that enable individuals to recognize and interact with others in ways that seem to enhance their inclusive fitness. Male lions appear to cooperate unconditionally, consistently responding to roaring intruders regardless of their male companions’ kinship or behavior. Female lions, however, do keep track of the past behavior of their female companions, apparently using the reliability of a companion as one means of assessing the risks posed by approaching intruders. Some “laggard” females may exploit the cooperative tendencies of “leaders” during territorial encounters. Although leader females clearly recognize laggards as such, the costs of tolerating laggards may be less than the benefits leaders gain through territorial defense behavior. Thus, although lions clearly have the cognitive ability to base cooperation on reciprocity, territorial defense cooperation appears instead to be based primarily on mutual benefits to participants for both male and female lions. 相似文献
19.
Alexander Bor 《Evolution and human behavior》2017,38(4):468-473
Successful cooperation requires a partner both willing and capable of contributing to a joint endeavour. Accordingly, partner choice psychology should include mechanisms to distinguish between people with good and bad intentions, and between people who are competent and incompetent. While it is well established that intentions influence partner choice, the literature offers mixed evidence concerning people's ability to gauge competence in social interactions. Theoretical accounts in leadership-followership psychology and food-sharing imply that partner competence can influence the estimated future benefits from cooperation. The available empirical evidence, however, is limited to leadership evaluations in the political science literature. This paper thus investigates if people have dedicated cognitive mechanisms, which have evolved to categorize potential social partners on competence. It looks at competence both in regular social partnerships and leader-follower relations. In a series of four experiments relying on the memory confusion protocol, it demonstrates that people spontaneously distinguish between competent and incompetent social partners. This mental categorization is present equally in partner and leader evaluations. These results have interesting implications for partner choice literature and evolutionary leadership theories. 相似文献
20.
Generalized reciprocity (help anyone, if helped by someone) is a minimal strategy capable of supporting cooperation between unrelated individuals. Its simplicity makes it an attractive model to explain the evolution of reciprocal altruism in animals that lack the information or cognitive skills needed for other types of reciprocity. Yet, generalized reciprocity is anonymous and thus defenseless against exploitation by defectors. Recognizing that animals hardly ever interact randomly, we investigate whether social network structure can mitigate this vulnerability. Our results show that heterogeneous interaction patterns strongly support the evolution of generalized reciprocity. The future probability of being rewarded for an altruistic act is inversely proportional to the average connectivity of the social network when cooperators are rare. Accordingly, sparse networks are conducive to the invasion of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is enhanced by a modular network structure. Communities of reciprocal altruists are protected against exploitation, because modularity increases the mean access time, that is, the average number of steps that it takes for a random walk on the network to reach a defector. Sparseness and community structure are characteristic properties of vertebrate social interaction patterns, as illustrated by network data from natural populations ranging from fish to primates. 相似文献