Facilitated personhood

Anthropological models of personhood suggest that the individual is produced through relational ties to others, including humans and nonhumans. American ideas about the individual are deeply ideological, obscuring the human relations that make ‘personhood’ a possible, desirable concept that motivates subjection. Attending to neurological disorders and the technologies that attempt to remedy communication impairments shows that not only is the labour of other humans obscured in producing the individual, but so are the facilitating capacities of technologies and institutions. This article focuses on memoirs of disability and ethnographic and historiographic research on neuroscience to show how personhood is facilitated and produced through engagements with people, technologies, and institutions that attempt to render particular forms of subjection through communicative practices.     

Will cognitive enhancement create post‐persons? The use(lessness) of induction in determining the likelihood of moral status enhancement

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons.     

The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis

‘When did I, a human person, begin to exist?’ In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre‐implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.     

At the Margins of Moral Personhood

In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view that only intrinsic psychological capacities are relevant to moral personhood: that is, that relational properties are generally not relevant. In addition, McMahan depends on an argument that species membership is irrelevant for moral consideration and a contention that privileging species membership is equivalent to a virulent nationalism (these will be discussed below). In consequence, the CSMR are excluded from moral personhood and their deaths are less significant as their killing is less wrong than that of persons. To throw doubt on McMahan’s conclusions about the moral status and wrongness of killing the CSMR I question the exclusive use of intrinsic properties in the metaphysics of personhood, the dismissal of the moral importance of species membership, and the example of virulent nationalism as an apt analogy. I also have a lot to say about McMahan’s empirical assumptions about the CSMR.     

A Moment Dead, a Moment Alive: How a Situational Personhood Emerges in the Vegetative State in an Israeli Hospital Unit

ABSTRACT  Here we address the personhood of patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), who fall outside categories of "alive" or "dead" and "subject" or "object." Drawing on fieldwork in an Israeli hospital, we examine multiple and shifting approaches to PVS patients, which are articulated in the course of caring for and living with them. We argue that, alongside the institutional definition of these patients as being in a PVS, which, as Kaufman showed, evokes irresolvable confusion as to their ontological nature, there appear and disappear other senses of their personhood. Allying with other studies of cognitively impaired patients (e.g., those with dementia and Alzheimer's), we explore this relational person-concept while demonstrating its situational nature. We analyze patients' admission to the hospital, showing how their essentialistic personhood is "emptied" and how and when their fluid, relational personhood appears and disappears, further showing how this personhood is reified by imagined life stories.     

Understanding the Fluid Nature of Personhood – the Ring Theory of Personhood

Familial determination, replete with its frequent usurping of patient autonomy, propagation of collusion, and circumnavigation of direct patient involvement in their own care deliberations, continues to impact clinical practice in many Asian nations. Suggestions that underpinning this practice, in Confucian‐inspired societies, is the adherence of the populace to the familial centric ideas of personhood espoused by Confucian ethics, provide a novel means of understanding and improving patient‐centred care at the end of life. Clinical experience in Confucian‐inspired Singapore, however, suggests that personhood is conceived in broader terms. This diverging view inspired a study of local conceptions of personhood and scrutiny of the influence of the family upon it. From the data gathered, a culturally appropriate, clinically relevant and ethically sensitive concept of personhood was proposed: the Ring Theory of Personhood (Ring Theory) that better captures the nuances of local conceptions of personhood. The Ring Theory highlights the fact that, far from being solely dependent upon familial centric ideals, local conceptions of personhood are dynamic, context dependent, evolving ideas delineated by four dimensions. Using the Ring Theory, the nature of familial influences upon the four dimensions of personhood – the Innate, Individual, Relational and Societal – are examined to reveal that, contrary to perceived knowledge, conceptions of personhood within Confucian societies are not the prime reason for the continued presence of this decision‐making model but remain present within local thinking and practices as a sociocultural residue and primarily because of inertia in updating ideas.     

'From the moment of conception...': the Vatican instruction on artificial procreation techniques

An analysis is presented of Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of Procreation, the official response of the Catholic Church to moral questions raised by the new reproductive technologies which sets down ethical guidelines for the treatment to be accorded human embryos and for procreative techniques from artificial insemination to surrogate motherhood. The document is viewed in the perspective of earlier Church pronouncements, such as The Declaration on Procured Abortion , and its definition of a person as an individual animated by a rational soul is explored in detail for its implications for discussions on the personhood of the human embryo.     

Fear of selfing in the American cultural imaginary or "you are never alone with a clone"

Recently the New York Times reported that scientists had "cloned" a human embryo. The alarmed response of journalists, bioethicists, and the general public focused a spotlight on the ethics of human embryo research. The popular debate reiterated the critiques of cultural theorists that humans not be figured as (marketable) products. But the debate's attribution of an unproblematic value for individual personhood illustrates the importance of a more powerful engagement by anthropology.     

Rights and responsibilities in rural South Africa: implications for gender,generation, and personhood

In the rural Eastern Cape, South Africa, contests over the meaning and merit of human rights feature prominently in intergenerational and intergendered conflicts. In this article I identify and analyse a tension between amalungelo (a socially embedded and relational form of rights) and irhayti (a Xhosaization of the English ‘[human] right’) as a means of exploring the interpersonal tensions that arise through the production and contestation of the subject positions that human rights set in motion. Using the examples of elders’ complaints of neglect, and of young men's accusations of human rights violations on the part of women, I ground this investigation in men's and elders’ explanations of how human rights enable morally reprehensible actions, and are implicated in what they perceive to be a climate of interpersonal neglect. In analysing these claims, I show that gendered and generational conflict in this region is grounded in uncertainty about the content of gendered and generational subject positions themselves, and speaks to the relative moral value of autonomous versus relational forms of personhood. Moreover, I show that where inequality and interdependence are intrinsic to the ways in which gendered and generational subject positions are constituted and understood, human rights serve both to destabilize the content of these subject positions in ways that render appropriate gendered and generational sociality unclear, and also to bring into question the relative moral value of autonomous versus more relational forms of personhood.     

Understanding the 'conservative' view on abortion

The philosophical literature would have us believe that the conservative view on abortion is based on the claim that the fetus is a person from the time of conception. Given the widespread acceptance of this analysis, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that it conflicts with a number of major arguments offered in support of the conservative view. I argue, in the present paper, that a careful examination of these inconsistencies establishes that the personhood analysis is mistaken: the conservative view is based on the natural process of fetal development, not the personhood of the fetus.     

When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History,Philosophy and Science by Norman M. Ford,Cambridge & New York,Cambridge University Press.

Coughlan reviews Norman M. Ford's When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science (Cambridge University Press; 1988). Ford, master of a Catholic theological college, has written a critique of the view that the life of the human person begins at the fertilization of the ovum. He believes that "when does a human being begin?" is an ontological question, and that attainment of personhood is a fact which calls for appropriate moral and legal attitudes, rather than a product of moral or legal attitudes or conventions. Ford bases his arguments on a detailed analysis of both the biological facts and the significance of early human embryology. Coughlan, while taking issue with some of Ford's reasoning, praises the book for its spirit of honesty, its well-argued transitions, and its instructiveness in human embryology. Ford's response to Coughlan follows the review.     

Abortion is incommensurable with fetal alcohol syndrome

A recent article argued for the immorality of abortion regardless of personhood status by comparing the impairment caused by fetal alcohol syndrome to the impairment caused by abortion. I argue that two of the premises in this argument fail and that, as such, one cannot reasonably attribute moral harms to abortion on the basis of the moral harms caused by fetal alcohol syndrome. The impairment argument relies on an inconsistent instantiation, which undermines the claim that personhood is irrelevant, and it does not fulfill its own ceteris paribus clause, which demands that no additional benefit be gained from abortion that would not be gained from causing fetal alcohol syndrome.     

A Confucian View of Personhood and Bioethics

This paper focuses on Confucian formulations of personhood and the implications they may have for bioethics and medical practice. We discuss how an appreciation of the Confucian concept of personhood can provide insights into the practice of informed consent and, in particular, the role of family members and physicians in medical decision-making in societies influenced by Confucian culture. We suggest that Western notions of informed consent appear ethically misguided when viewed from a Confucian perspective.     

‘The Mind of Christ’: Financial Success,Born-again Personhood,and the Anthropology of Christianity

In this article, I contribute to the emerging project of the anthropology of Christianity by exploring the subject of born-again personhood. As a nascent field of inquiry, the anthropology of Christianity must delimit what theoretical opportunities exist for comparative research. I argue that a focus on personhood offers a promising series of questions toward this end. To illustrate this claim, I use the case study of one Evangelical Sunday school teacher – Rick Betcher – and his life as a ‘Christian businessman.’ Anthropologists and other scholars have shown great interest in how matters of money figure in the culture of Protestantism. Using Rick's self-designed Sunday school class, The Mind of Christ, I argue that conceptions of personal financial success among born-again Christians are structured by the prevailing model of born-again personhood – the New Mind.     

Humanity at the Edge: The Moral Laboratory of Feeding Precarious Lives

At the heart of anthropology and the social sciences lies a notion of human existence according to which humans and animals share the basic need for food, but only humans have the capacity for morality. Based on fieldwork in a pig laboratory, a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), and a dementia nursing home, we follow practices of feeding precarious lives lacking most markers of human personhood, including the exercise of moral judgment. Despite the absence of such markers, laboratory researchers and caregivers in these three sites do not abstain from engaging in questions about the moral status of the piglets, infants, and people with dementia in their care. They continually negotiate how their charges belong to the human collectivity and thereby challenge the notion of ‘the human’ that is foundational to anthropology. Combining analytical approaches that do not operate with a fixed boundary between human and animal value and agency with approaches that focus on human experience and virtue ethics, we argue that ‘the human’ at stake in the moral laboratory of feeding precarious lives puts ‘the human’ in anthropology at disposal for moral experimentation.     

The core of affects: namer and named in Bahia (Brazil)

This article is a study of personal naming using drawings made by secondary school students from two small towns in coastal Bahia (Brazil) of the persons who gave them their names. The article explores the relation between namer and named as one of continued identity created by imaginative processes of surrogation akin to pretend‐play. In early ontogeny, the person is constituted through a series of mutualities of being that come to constitute a core of affects. The article aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the processes of constitution of personhood in the context of human relatedness.     

Enveloping Mothers,Enveloped Sons: Positions in Chinese Family Therapy

The increasing acceptance and use of psychotherapy in contemporary China powerfully attests to the “psychologization” of Chinese society. Yet attending therapy is only one aspect of psychologization. Analyzing the practice of therapy through case examples illuminates the broader sociocultural context of China’s “psycho-boom.” This includes insight into what I term an expansive-I notion of personhood. This non-singular notion of personhood is a major challenge for Chinese therapists. Therapists’ attempts to resolve clients’ problems by reorienting them according to psychological ideals highlight the multiple, at times contradictory relationships between psychotherapy, the state and families.     

Sacrifice and the problem of beginning: meditations from Sakalava mythopraxis

This article addresses the general problem of beginning in human thought and action. It argues for complementing the emphasis on transition in the analysis of ritual with attention to beginning and for supplementing the relative passivity of liminality with the resoluteness of initiating action, while also attending to both the transitive and intransitive aspects of beginning itself. Drawing from representations of the foundation of a Sakalava monarchy in Madagascar, the article presents sacrifice as an exemplary form of beginning. Describing sacrifice in this manner obviates the need for any theory of sacrifice while offering new insights on the gift, ethical personhood, and the temporality of tradition.     

A critique of the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’, grounded in African thought

I give an account how the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ dominates the field of bioethics, and how it came to triumph over its competitors, ‘respect for persons’ and ‘respect for free power of choice’. I argue that ‘respect for autonomy’ is unsatisfactory as a basic principle of bioethics because it is grounded in too individualistic a worldview, citing concerns of African theorists and other communitarians who claim that the principle fails to acknowledge the fundamental importance of understanding persons within the nexus of their communal relationships. I defend the claim that ‘respect for persons’ is a more appropriate principle, as it is able to acknowledge both individual decision making and the essential relationality of persons. I acknowledge that my preference for ‘respect for persons’ is problematic because of the important debate around the definition of ‘personhood’ in bioethics discourse. Relying on Thaddeus Metz's conception of moral status, I propose a relational definition of personhood that distinguishes between persons with agency and persons without agency, arguing that we have different moral obligations to these distinct categories of persons. I claim that this conception of personhood is better able to accommodate our moral intuitions than conventional approaches, and that it is able to do so without being speciesist or question‐begging.