Conjugal transfer of R68.45 and FP5 between Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains in a freshwater environment

Recent concern over the release of genetically engineered organisms has resulted in a need for information about the potential for gene transfer in the environment. In this study, the conjugal transfer in Pseudomonas aeruginosa of the plasmids R68.45 and FP5 was demonstrated in the freshwater environment of Fort Loudoun Resevoir, Knoxville, Tenn. When genetically well defined plasmid donor and recipient strains were introduced into test chambers suspended in Fort Loudoun Lake, transfer of both plasmids was observed. Conjugation occurred in both the presence and absence of the natural microbial community. The number of transconjugants recovered was lower when the natural community was present. Transfer of the broad-host-range plasmid R68.45 to organisms other than the introduced recipient was not observed in these chambers but was observed in laboratory simulations when an organism isolated from lakewater was used as the recipient strain. Although the plasmids transferred in laboratory studies were genetically and physically stable, a significant number of transconjugants recovered from the field trials contained deletions and other genetic rearrangements, suggesting that factors which increase gene instability are operating in the environment. The potential for conjugal transfer of genetic material must be considered in evaluating the release of any genetically engineered microorganism into a freshwater environment.     

Conjugal transfer of R68.45 and FP5 between Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains in a freshwater environment.

Recent concern over the release of genetically engineered organisms has resulted in a need for information about the potential for gene transfer in the environment. In this study, the conjugal transfer in Pseudomonas aeruginosa of the plasmids R68.45 and FP5 was demonstrated in the freshwater environment of Fort Loudoun Resevoir, Knoxville, Tenn. When genetically well defined plasmid donor and recipient strains were introduced into test chambers suspended in Fort Loudoun Lake, transfer of both plasmids was observed. Conjugation occurred in both the presence and absence of the natural microbial community. The number of transconjugants recovered was lower when the natural community was present. Transfer of the broad-host-range plasmid R68.45 to organisms other than the introduced recipient was not observed in these chambers but was observed in laboratory simulations when an organism isolated from lakewater was used as the recipient strain. Although the plasmids transferred in laboratory studies were genetically and physically stable, a significant number of transconjugants recovered from the field trials contained deletions and other genetic rearrangements, suggesting that factors which increase gene instability are operating in the environment. The potential for conjugal transfer of genetic material must be considered in evaluating the release of any genetically engineered microorganism into a freshwater environment.     

Intergeneric natural plasmid transformation between E. coli and a marine Vibrio species

Natural transformation is the mechanism of procaryotic gene transfer that involves the uptake and expression of genetic information encoded in extracellular DNA. This process has been regarded as a mechanism to transfer genes (primarily chromosomal markers) between closely related strains or species. Here we demonstrate the cell-contact-dependent transfer of a non-conjugative plasmid from a laboratory E. coli strain to a marine Vibrio species, the first report of intergeneric natural plasmid transformation involving a marine bacterium. The nucleic acid synthesis inhibitors nalidixic acid and rifampicin inhibited the ability of the E. coli to function as a donor. However, dead cells also served as efficient donors. There was an obligate requirement for cell contact. No transfer occurred in the presence of DNase I, when donors and recipients were separated by a 0.2-micron filter, or when spent medium alone was used as a source of transforming DNA. These results indicate that contact-mediated intergeneric plasmid exchange can occur in the absence of detectable viable donor cells and that small non-conjugative plasmids can be spread through heterogeneous microbial communities by a process previously not recognized, natural plasmid transformation. These findings are important in the assessment of genetic risk to the environment, particularly from wastewater treatment systems and the use of genetically engineered organisms in the environment.     

Assessment of ecological risks in weed biocontrol: Input from retrospective ecological analyses

Prediction of the outcomes of natural enemy introductions remains the most fundamental challenge in biological control. Quantitative retrospective analyses of ongoing biocontrol projects provide a systematic strategy to evaluate and further develop ecological risk assessment. In this review, we highlight a crucial assumption underlying a continued reliance on the host specificity paradigm as a quantitative prediction of ecological risk, summarize the status of our retrospective analyses of nontarget effects of two weevils used against exotic thistles in North America, and discuss our prospective assessment of risk to a federally listed, threatened species (Cirsium pitcheri) based on those studies. Our analyses quantify the fact that host range and preference from host specificity tests are not sufficient to predict ecological impact if the introduced natural enemy is not strictly monophagous. The implicit assumption when such use is made of the host specificity data in risk assessment is that population impacts are proportional to relative preference and performance, the key components of host specificity. However, in concert with shifting awareness in the field, our studies demonstrate that the environment influences and can alter host use and population growth, leading to higher than expected direct impacts on the less preferred native host species at several spatial scales. Further, we have found that straightforward, easily anticipated indirect effects, on intraguild foragers as well as on the less preferred native host plant species, can be both widespread and significant. We conclude that intensive retrospective ecological studies provide some guidance for the quantitative prospective studies needed to assess candidate biological control agent dynamics and impacts and, so, contribute to improved rigor in the evaluation of total ecological risk to native species.     

Quantification of the presence and activity of specific microorganisms in nature

Traditional techniques for assessment of microbial numbers and activity generally lack the specificity required for risk assessment following environmental release of genetically engineered microbial inocula. Immunological and molecular-based techniques, such as DNA probing and genetic tagging, were initially used to determine the presence or absence of microorganisms in environmental samples. Increasingly they are being developed for quantification of populations of specific organisms, either indigenous or introduced, in the environment. In addition, they are being used to quantify the activity of particular organisms or groups of organisms, greatly extending the range of techniques available to the microbial ecologist. This article reviews the use of traditional techniques for the quantification of microbial population size and activity and the application of molecular techniques, including DNA probing, genetic marking, use of fluorescent probes, and quantitative PCR, in combination with advanced cell detection techniques such as confocal laser scanning microscopy and flow cytometry.     

Assessment of ecological risks in weed biocontrol: Input from retrospective ecological analyses

Prediction of the outcomes of natural enemy introductions remains the most fundamental challenge in biological control. Quantitative retrospective analyses of ongoing biocontrol projects provide a systematic strategy to evaluate and further develop ecological risk assessment. In this review, we highlight a crucial assumption underlying a continued reliance on the host specificity paradigm as a quantitative prediction of ecological risk, summarize the status of our retrospective analyses of nontarget effects of two weevils used against exotic thistles in North America, and discuss our prospective assessment of risk to a federally listed, threatened species (Cirsium pitcheri) based on those studies. Our analyses quantify the fact that host range and preference from host specificity tests are not sufficient to predict ecological impact if the introduced natural enemy is not strictly monophagous. The implicit assumption when such use is made of the host specificity data in risk assessment is that population impacts are proportional to relative preference and performance, the key components of host specificity. However, in concert with shifting awareness in the field, our studies demonstrate that the environment influences and can alter host use and population growth, leading to higher than expected direct impacts on the less preferred native host species at several spatial scales. Further, we have found that straightforward, easily anticipated indirect effects, on intraguild foragers as well as on the less preferred native host plant species, can be both widespread and significant. We conclude that intensive retrospective ecological studies provide some guidance for the quantitative prospective studies needed to assess candidate biological control agent dynamics and impacts and, so, contribute to improved rigor in the evaluation of total ecological risk to native species.     

Diversity in CRISPR‐based immunity protects susceptible genotypes by restricting phage spread and evolution

Diversity in host resistance often associates with reduced pathogen spread. This may result from ecological and evolutionary processes, likely with feedback between them. Theory and experiments on bacteria–phage interactions have shown that genetic diversity of the bacterial adaptive immune system can limit phage evolution to overcome resistance. Using the CRISPR–Cas bacterial immune system and lytic phage, we engineered a host–pathogen system where each bacterial host genotype could be infected by only one phage genotype. With this model system, we explored how CRISPR diversity impacts the spread of phage when they can overcome a resistance allele, how immune diversity affects the evolution of the phage to increase its host range and if there was feedback between these processes. We show that increasing CRISPR diversity benefits susceptible bacteria via a dilution effect, which limits the spread of the phage. We suggest that this ecological effect impacts the evolution of novel phage genotypes, which then feeds back into phage population dynamics.     

Scientific principles for ecologically based risk assessment of transgenic organisms

It is critical to base scientific risk assessment of genetically engineered organisms (GEOs) on appropriate scientific concepts. A variety of 'generic safety' models has now largely been recognized to have been based on outdated scientific thinking. One broad safety argument that is still used is that genetic engineering categorically is nothing but an extension of selective breeding. It is explained here, though, that the mechanisms and potentials of the two can be profoundly different. This does not mean that every GEO is ecologically dangerous; but some types of GEOs may be considerably more risky than what could be produced with selective breeding, especially when an ecologically competent host is supplemented with novel features that may increase its competitiveness. In addition, genetic 'side effects' raise food-safety issues; and the possibility that they may sometimes increase ecological competitiveness cannot be ruled out, though this would be quite rare. Field plots have a proper use: to gather particular data that could be used in analysing the risks of commercial releases. But it is not scientific to call a small, confined, field population, isolated from potential competitors, a 'test or release' and then conclude that because 'nothing happened' the GEO will be safe when commercialized, or indeed that all GEOs will be safe.     

Microcosm for assessing survival of genetically engineered microorganisms in aquatic environments

Laboratory-contained microcosms are important for studying the fate and survival of genetically engineered microorganisms. In this study, we describe a simple aquatic microcosm that utilizes survival chambers in a flowthrough or static renewal system. The model was used to study the survival of genetically engineered and wild-type strains of Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas putida in the lake water environment. Temperature-dependent studies indicated that the genetically engineered microorganisms survived better or at least as well as their wild-type counterparts at 15, 25, and 30 degrees C. The genetic determinants of the genetically engineered microorganisms also remained fairly stable within the host cell under the tested conditions. In the presence of organisms indigenous to lake water, E. coli was eliminated after 20 days, whereas P. putida showed an initial decline but was able to stabilize its population after 5 days. A herbicide, Hydrothol-191, caused a significant decline in numbers of P. putida, but no significant difference was observed between the genetically engineered microorganisms and the wild-type strain. The microcosm described is simple, can be easily adapted to study a variety of environmental variables, and has the advantage that the organisms tested are constantly exposed to test waters that are continuously renewed.     

Microcosm for assessing survival of genetically engineered microorganisms in aquatic environments.

Laboratory-contained microcosms are important for studying the fate and survival of genetically engineered microorganisms. In this study, we describe a simple aquatic microcosm that utilizes survival chambers in a flowthrough or static renewal system. The model was used to study the survival of genetically engineered and wild-type strains of Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas putida in the lake water environment. Temperature-dependent studies indicated that the genetically engineered microorganisms survived better or at least as well as their wild-type counterparts at 15, 25, and 30 degrees C. The genetic determinants of the genetically engineered microorganisms also remained fairly stable within the host cell under the tested conditions. In the presence of organisms indigenous to lake water, E. coli was eliminated after 20 days, whereas P. putida showed an initial decline but was able to stabilize its population after 5 days. A herbicide, Hydrothol-191, caused a significant decline in numbers of P. putida, but no significant difference was observed between the genetically engineered microorganisms and the wild-type strain. The microcosm described is simple, can be easily adapted to study a variety of environmental variables, and has the advantage that the organisms tested are constantly exposed to test waters that are continuously renewed.     

Survival of Pseudomonas putida UWC1 containing cloned catabolic genes in a model activated-sludge unit.

The possibility of the accidental or deliberate release of genetically engineered microorganisms into the environment has accentuated the need to study their survival in, and effect on, natural habitats. In this study, Pseudomonas putida UWC1 harboring a non-self-transmissible plasmid, pD10, encoding the breakdown of 3-chlorobenzoate was shown to survive in a fully functioning laboratory-scale activated-sludge unit (ASU) for more than 8 weeks. The ASU maintained a healthy, diverse protozoal population throughout the experiment, and the introduced strain did not adversely affect the functioning of the unit. Although plasmid pD10 was stably maintained in the host bacterium, the introduced strain did not enhance the degradation of 3-chlorobenzoate in the ASU. When reisolated from the ASU, derivatives of strain UWC1 (pD10) were identified which were able to transfer plasmid pD10 to a recipient strain, P. putida PaW340, indicating the in situ transfer of mobilizing plasmids from the indigenous population to the introduced strain. Results from plate filter matings showed that bacteria present in the activated-sludge population could act as recipients for plasmid pD10 and actively expressed genes carried on the plasmid. Some of these activated-sludge transconjugants gave higher rates of 3-chlorobenzoate breakdown than did strain UWC1(pD10) in batch culture.     

Survival of Pseudomonas putida UWC1 containing cloned catabolic genes in a model activated-sludge unit

The possibility of the accidental or deliberate release of genetically engineered microorganisms into the environment has accentuated the need to study their survival in, and effect on, natural habitats. In this study, Pseudomonas putida UWC1 harboring a non-self-transmissible plasmid, pD10, encoding the breakdown of 3-chlorobenzoate was shown to survive in a fully functioning laboratory-scale activated-sludge unit (ASU) for more than 8 weeks. The ASU maintained a healthy, diverse protozoal population throughout the experiment, and the introduced strain did not adversely affect the functioning of the unit. Although plasmid pD10 was stably maintained in the host bacterium, the introduced strain did not enhance the degradation of 3-chlorobenzoate in the ASU. When reisolated from the ASU, derivatives of strain UWC1 (pD10) were identified which were able to transfer plasmid pD10 to a recipient strain, P. putida PaW340, indicating the in situ transfer of mobilizing plasmids from the indigenous population to the introduced strain. Results from plate filter matings showed that bacteria present in the activated-sludge population could act as recipients for plasmid pD10 and actively expressed genes carried on the plasmid. Some of these activated-sludge transconjugants gave higher rates of 3-chlorobenzoate breakdown than did strain UWC1(pD10) in batch culture.     

Genetic exchange in the environment

Summary Reports made over the past few years leave little doubt that horizontal gene transfer among bacteria can and does occur in the environment. The significance of these events in the dissemination of recombinant molecules is not clear and more research is required to fully appreciate the impact of genetic exchange on their stability and survival. Based on the available data it is fair to say that horizontal gene transfer may play as important a role in transmission of recombinant sequences as does the survival and persistence of genetically engineered microorganisms.     

Evidence for phage-mediated gene transfer among Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains on the phylloplane.

As the use of genetically engineered microorganisms for agricultural tasks becomes more frequent, the ability of bacteria to exchange genetic material in the agricultural setting must be assessed. Transduction (bacterial virus-mediated horizontal gene transfer) is a potentially important mechanism of gene transfer in natural environments. This study investigated the potential of plant leaves to act as surfaces on which transduction can take place among microorganisms. Pseudomonas aeruginosa and its generalized transducing bacteriophage F116 were used as a model system. The application of P. aeruginosa lysogens of F116 to plant leaves resulted in genetic exchange among donor and recipient organisms resident on the same plant. Transduction was also observed when these bacterial strains were inoculated onto adjacent plants and contact was made possible through high-density planting.     

Deciphering host migrations and origins by means of their microbes

Mitochondrial DNA and microsatellite sequences are powerful genetic markers for inferring the genealogy and the population genetic structure of animals but they have only limited resolution for organisms that display low genetic variability due to recent strong bottlenecks. An alternative source of data for deciphering migrations and origins in genetically uniform hosts can be provided by some of their microbes, if their evolutionary history correlates closely with that of the host. In this review, we first discuss how a variety of viruses, and the bacterium Helicobacter pylori, can be used as genetic tracers for one of the most intensively studied species, Homo sapiens. Then, we review statistical problems and limitations that affect the calculation of particular population genetic parameters for these microbes, such as mutation rates, with particular emphasis on the effects of recombination, selection and mode of transmission. Finally, we extend the discussion to other host-parasite systems and advocate the adoption of an integrative approach to both sampling and analysis.     

Role of Ecological Modeling in Risk Assessment

Ecological models are useful tools for evaluating the ecological significance of observed or predicted effects of toxic chemicals on individual organisms. Current risk estimation approaches using hazard quotients for individual-level endpoints have limited utility for assessing risks at the population, ecosystem, and landscape levels, which are the most relevant indicators for environmental management. In this paper, we define different types of ecological models, summarize their input and output variables, and present examples of the role of some recommended models in chemical risk assessments. A variety of population and ecosystem models have been applied successfully to evaluate ecological risks, including population viability of endangered species, habitat fragmentation, and toxic chemical issues. In particular, population models are widely available, and their value in predicting dynamics of natural populations has been demonstrated. Although data are often limited on vital rates and doseresponse functions needed for ecological modeling, accurate prediction of ecological effects may not be needed for all assessments. Often, a comparative assessment of risk (e.g., relative to baseline or reference) is of primary interest. Ecological modeling is currently a valuable approach for addressing many chemical risk assessment issues, including screening-level evaluations.     

Transformation of Escherichia coli with DNA from Saccharomyces cerevisiae cell lysates

We developed a system to monitor the transfer of heterologous DNA from a genetically manipulated strain of Saccharomyces cerevisiae to Escherichia coli. This system is based on a yeast strain that carries multiple integrated copies of a pUC-derived plasmid. The bacterial sequences are maintained in the yeast genome by selectable markers for lactose utilization. Lysates of the yeast strain were used to transform E. coli. Transfer of DNA was measured by determining the number of ampicillin-resistant E. coli clones. Our results show that transmission of the Amp(r) gene to E. coli by genetic transformation, caused by DNA released from the yeast, occurs at a very low frequency (about 50 transformants per microg of DNA) under optimal conditions (a highly competent host strain and a highly efficient transformation procedure). These results suggest that under natural conditions, spontaneous transmission of chromosomal genes from genetically modified organisms is likely to be rare.     

转基因微生物生态学及大田释放风险评价研究

向环境中释放转基因微生物可能会带来一系列的安全问题．在大面积释放之前必须对转基因微生物在环境中发生基因转移的潜力、存活能力、扩散能力及对生态系统的潜在影响等进行生态学研究和风险评价,同时还要探索有效的检测方法和风险评价策略．该研究有助于分子生态学的发展和生物技术的安全应用,具有重要的理论和实践意义．     

生态风险研究述评

生态风险(ＥｃｏｌｏｇｉｃａｌＲｉｓｋ,ＥＲ),指一个种群、生态系统或整个景观的正常功能受外界胁迫,从而在目前和将来减小该系统健康、生产力、遗传结构、经济价值和美学价值的一种状况[20]。生态风险评估(ＥｃｏｌｏｇｉｃａｌＲｉｓｋＡｓｓｅｓｓｍｅｎｔ,ＥＲＡ)指受一个或多个胁迫因素影响后,对不利的生态后果出现的可能性进行的评估。美国环保局(ＥＰＡ)把这种尚不为人们所重视的领域叫做生态风险评估[20,48]。随着新技术和新方法的应用,ＥＲＡ的研究领域迅速扩展。早期的生态风险评估主要是针对人类健康而言的,也就是人类健康风险…     

Suicidal genetically engineered microorganisms for bioremediation: need and perspectives

In the past few decades, increased awareness of environmental pollution has led to the exploitation of microbial metabolic potential in the construction of several genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs) for bioremediation purposes. At the same time, environmental concerns and regulatory constraints have limited the in situ application of GEMs, the ultimate objective behind their development. In order to address the anticipated risks due to the uncontrolled survival/dispersal of GEMs or recombinant plasmids into the environment, some attempts have been made to construct systems that would contain the released organisms. This article discusses the designing of safer genetically engineered organisms for environmental release with specific emphasis on the use of bacterial plasmid addiction systems to limit their survival thus minimizing the anticipated risk. We also conceptualize a novel strategy to construct "Suicidal Genetically Engineered Microorganisms (SGEMs)" by exploring/combining the knowledge of different plasmid addiction systems (such as antisense RNA-regulated plasmid addiction, proteic plasmid addiction etc.) and inducible degradative operons of bacteria.