The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Applying the Ashford Framework to Technological Risk

The precautionary principle reflects an old adage — an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Its four central components include: taking preventative action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof to proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision processes. Scholars in a range of fields have identified U.S. environmental laws, regulations, and decisions exhibiting precaution de facto. This study moves beyond the traditional treatments of the subject, the morass of definitions systematizing precaution into its basic elements. It poses a further question, within the current legal system and existing laws, how might the precautionary principle be implemented by modifying aspects of a statute? By applying a conceptual legal precautionary framework to a specific example of technological risk management, Washington State's energy facility siting statute, we reveal deficiencies in four areas: compensation issues; burden of proof; Type I or II error preferences; and systematic comparisons. Supplying these would, in all likelihood, ensure a more effective statute and process as well as an outcome consistent with legislative goals. However, were an explicit statement of the precautionary principle introduced, parties dissatisfied with an outcome would seek judicial review, and extensive litigation could counter the legislative mandate of abundant energy at a reasonable cost.     

Is There a Role for Risk Assessment within Precautionary Legislation?

Posing the question of whether the precautionary principle has a role in risk assessment effectively constrains any debate of the issue within a framework predicated on the assumption that application of risk assessment is inevitable in the formulation of regulatory decisions. The question can equally validly be expressed in terms of whether there is a role for risk assessment in the formulation of precautionary legislation. This allows the debate then to turn on consideration of two questions: Firstly, does the precautionary principle have a role in policy development? and secondly, is this role consistent and compatible with a risk based approach to regulation? When recast in these terms, a more holistic comparison of the aims and objectives of both approaches and of their relative power in the formulation of regulation becomes possible. This leads to the conclusion that the precautionary principle is, when defined and applied correctly, scientifically more robust than risk assessment. Precautionary approaches utilize scientific information and conform robustly to a scientific process but also explicitly incorporate indeterminacies into the decision making framework. Moreover, the precautionary principle when applied to environmental regulation, is more likely to lead to regulation consistent with global sustainability. On this premise, this paper argues that risk based approaches are essentially incompatible with approaches based on the precautionary paradigm, and that of the two, risk assessment is more likely to lead to unsustainable underprotection of the environment.     

On Being Careful What We Wish for: Some Difficulties with Operationalizing the Precautionary Principle

An important part of the Precautionary Principle is that taking action is justified for protecting public health even when there is some scientific uncertainty. We examine here the two components of this central feature of the precautionary principle, scientific uncertainty and decision making. In order to operationalize the principle we should examine the consequences of its decision rules and how they perform under various conditions. The performance of decision rules in disease screening is measured by the sensitivity and specificity of the rule, but the consequences for the patient are given by the positive and negative predictive values, determined not only by the performance of the rule by the prevalence of the disease in the population. We look at positive and negative predictive value of the Precautionary Principle from the standopoint of the costs to one or other parts of society, show that the usual rule which tends to maximize sensitivity in favor of specificity may have unexpected consequences, and demonstrate that it is sometimes possible to trade sensitivity and specificity off against each other in a way the improves both positive and negative predictive value, or worse, degrades both.We conclude by asking if certain strategies are better for one or the other kinds of uncertainty.     

The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S.

Although the statutory goals for chemical regulation are consistent with the precau tionary principle, the current U.S. regulatory program governing synthetic chemicals generally adopts little precautionary controls for the manufacture of most chemicals. For the vast majority of chemicals in use, current law places the burden of producing scientific evidence on the regulatory agency, which actually may serve to discourage companies from testing the safety of their chemicals, since the results could then be used against them in regulatory proceedings. By contrast, for a small subset of chemicals — new chemicals that belong to suspect categories — regulatory controls are quite precautionary. The result of this schizophrenic approach to chemical regulation is a regulatory system that is characterized by the absence of preventative regulation for most existing chemicals, an inequitable barrier to entry for newer safer chemicals, and a lack of information upon which to understand the safety of most chemicals in the U.S. Informal reforms of the current regulatory program are already underway to provide a more consistent and precautionary approach to chemical regulation, although to fully advance the dual goals of regulatory consistency and precaution in the regulation of chemicals, legislative action is necessary.     

Unraveling the Chimera: A Corporate View of the Precautionary Principle

Current controversy regarding how and when the precautionary principle should be applied to the introduction of new technology has created a false dichotomy, a dichotomy between conventional, risk-based decision making and an alternative paradigm that seemingly denounces risk assessment. As we compare views of the precautionary principle relative to our own operating standards for ensuring human and environmental safety, we perceive no irreconcilable conflict. Due precaution is entirely consistent with sound, cost-effective management of the risks and uncertainties inherent in new technologies. The principle guides prudent risk management actions under a prescribed set of circumstances, i.e., potentially serious or irreversible risks, or incomplete characterization (high uncertainty). In order to enable technological innovation toward a more sustainable future, it is critical that any preventative measures taken under these circumstances be provisional in nature, pending adequate risk characterization. As with all risk management decisions, we contend that the principle requires consideration of a suite of factors beyond risk assessment, including political, social, legal and cultural considerations to tailor the measures proportionately to the risk at hand. Overall, we are encouraged to find relatively broad agreement in this interpretation with a number of key multinational governmental and trade institutions.     

Is the precautionary principle unscientific?

The precautionary principle holds that we should not allow scientific uncertainty to prevent us from taking precautionary measures in response to potential threats that are irreversible and potentially disastrous. Critics of the principle claim that it deters progress and development, is excessively risk-aversive and is unscientific. This paper argues that the principle can be scientific provided that (1) the threats addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and (2) the precautionary measures adopted are reasonable. The paper also argues that one may use epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and explanatory power, to determine whether a threat is plausible, and that one may use practical considerations, such as effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, realism and consistency, to determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable.     

Germline gene editing and the precautionary principle

The precautionary principle aims to influence decision-making in contexts where some activity poses uncertain but potentially grave threats. This perfectly describes the controversy surrounding germline gene editing. This article considers whether the precautionary principle should influence how we weigh the risks and benefits of human germline interventions, focusing especially on the possible threats to the health of future generations. We distinguish between several existing forms of the precautionary principle, assess their plausibility and consider their implications for the ethics of germline modification. We also offer a novel form of the precautionary principle: the sufficientarian precautionary principle. Some plausible versions of the precautionary principle recommend placing somewhat greater weight on avoiding threats to future generations than on achieving short-term benefits. However, no plausible versions of the precautionary principle entail that we should outright reject the use germline gene editing in human reproduction and some, such as the sufficientarian version, might endorse its use.     

Underpinning the precautionary principle with evidence: A spatial concept for guiding wind power development in endangered species’ habitats

The precautionary principle is an essential guideline in decision making, particularly for regulating novel developments with unknown or insufficiently proven environmental impact. However, due to the inherent component of uncertainty it has been widely criticized for being “unscientific”, i.e. hindering progress without sufficient evidence. The consequential postulation, that precautionary measures are only justified if the addressed threats are plausible and the measures reasonable, calls for methods to guide action in the face of uncertainty. Using the example of species conservation versus wind-farm construction, an expanding development with hypothesized – but unexplored – effects on our model species the capercaillie (Tetrao urogallus), we present an approach that aims at compensating the lack of knowledge about the threat itself by making best use of the available knowledge about the object at risk. By systematically combining information drawn from population monitoring and spatial modelling with population ecological thresholds, we identified areas of different functionality and importance to metapopulation persistence and connectivity. We integrated this information into a spatial concept defining four area-categories with different implications for wind power development. Highest priority was assigned to areas covering the spatial and functional requirements of a minimum viable population, i.e. sites where the plausibility for threat is highest, the uncertainty as regards importance for the population is lowest, and thus the justification for precautionary measures is strongest. This gradated approach may also enhance public acceptance, as it attempts to avoid either error-minimization bias (i.e. being too restrictive or permissive) the precautionary principle is frequently criticized for.     

The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle, a familiar constituent of international and European environmental law, has only very recently entered the vocabulary of domestic environmental policy debates in the United States. The question naturally arises what role such a principle should play in American law. By breaking down statements of the precautionary principle into distinct ele ments, one can more readily find ways in which U.S. law reflects the precau tionary principle. This analysis reveals that American environmental law con tains precautionary elements and goals in many and varied settings, from the management of natural ecosystems, to pollution control standards, to risk assessment methodology. However, the precautionary approach appears in a highly diluted or compromised form. With rare exceptions, U.S. law balances precaution against other considerations, most importantly cost. Therefore, while precautionary elements are firmly entrenched in U.S. environmental law, it is more accurate to say that it reflects a precautionary preference rather than the precautionary principle.     

Is optimism optimal? Functional causes of apparent behavioural biases

We review the use of the terms ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ to characterize particular types of behaviour in non-human animals. Animals can certainly behave as though they are optimistic or pessimistic with respect to specific motivations, as documented by an extensive range of examples in the literature. However, in surveying such examples we find that these terms are often poorly defined and are liable to lead to confusion. Furthermore, when considering behaviour within the framework of optimal decision theory using appropriate currencies, it is often misleading to describe animals as optimistic or pessimistic. There are two common misunderstandings. First, some apparent cases of biased behaviour result from misidentifying the currencies and pay-offs the animals should be maximising. Second, actions that do not maximise short-term pay-offs have sometimes been described as optimistic or pessimistic when in fact they are optimal in the long term; we show how such situations can be understood from the perspective of bandit models. Rather than describing suboptimal, unrealistic behaviour, the terms optimism and pessimism are better restricted to informal usage. Our review highlights the importance of choosing the relevant currency when attempting to predict the action of natural selection.     

Power, precaution, Type II error and sampling design in assessment of environmental impacts

Increasingly, environmental managers attempt to incorporate precautionary principles into decision making. In any quantitative analysis of impacts, precaution is closely related to the power of the analysis to detect an impact. Designs of sampling to detect impacts are, however, complex because of natural spatial and temporal variability and the intrinsic nature of the statistical interactions which define impacts. Here, pulse and press responses and impacts that affect time courses (temporal variance) were modelled to determine the influences of increasing temporal replication—sampling more times in each of several longer periods before and again after an impact.Increasing the number of control or reference locations and number of replicate sample units at each time and place of sampling investigated the influence of spatial replication on power. From numerous scenarios of impacts, with or without natural spatial and temporal interactions (i.e. not caused by an impact), general recommendations are possible. Detecting press impacts requires maximal numbers of control locations. Shorter-term pulse impacts are best detected when the number of periods sampled is maximized. Impacts causing changes in temporal variance are most likely to be detected by sampling with the greatest possible number of periods or times within periods.To allow precautionary decision making, the type of predicted impact should be specified with its magnitude and duration. Only then can sampling be designed to be powerful, thereby allowing precautionary concepts to be invoked.     

Precautionary Defaults—A New Strategy for Chemical Risk Management

In order to give adequate support to risk managers, new risk assessment methods should be developed that are (1) scientifically sound, (2) simplified, and (3) suited for precautionary risk management. In this Perspective we propose that the notion of a precautionary default can be a useful tool in the development of such methods. A precautionary default is a cautious or pessimistic assumption that is used in the absence of adequate information and that should be replaced when such information is obtained. Furthermore, we point out some promising research areas for the development of such indicators, viz. connections between chemical characteristics such as persistence and effect parameters, monitoring of contaminants in polar regions, monitoring of contaminants in breast milk, application of results from (human) toxicology in ecotoxicology and vice versa, (eco)toxicological test systems that are sensitive to effects on reproduction, and the application of bioinformatic methods to complex data, both in genomic research and in ecotoxicology. We conclude that precautionary decision-making does not require less science, but to the contrary it requires more science and improved communication between scientists and risk managers.     

The ongoing invasion of African clawed frogs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Xenopus laevis</Emphasis>) in Chile: causes of concern

We review the existing data on the African clawed frog in Chile (Xenopus laevis, Pipidae) and report new and alarming information on its distribution, provide physical data on water courses and bodies that hold populations of this frog, report observations on its diet, on mass migration overland, and on predation by native birds. Our findings reveal that: (a) the spread of the invasion is currently covering 4 of the 13 regions of Chile; (b) clawed frogs are found at higher densities in artificial water bodies (ponds and dams and irrigation canals) rather than in natural lagoons or streams or rivers; (c) there is no evidence of predation on native anurans, but rather on their own larvae; (d) they face predation from native birds. Causes of concern include (a) that African clawed frogs in Chile reach both lower and higher altitudes than formerly estimated, and (b) that they are able to migrate overland to colonize other water bodies. They are spreading at a rate of 3.1–3.9?km/year in an optimistic scenario, and at a rate of 4.4–5.4?km/year in a pessimistic one. The most troubling aspects of the African clawed frog invasion in Chile involve: (a) their unaided spread through central Chilean agricultural areas, using irrigation canals and overland migration; and (b) the type of interactions that they may be establishing with native anurans (are they competitors, predators, habitat modifiers, disease vectors, or all things together?). As a precautionary action, we propose that the pet trade of African clawed frogs in Chile should be banned.     

Evaluating Co‐primary Endpoints Collectively in Clinical Trials

Often a treatment is assessed by co‐primary endpoints so that a comprehensive picture of the treatment effect can be obtained. Co‐primary endpoints can be different medical assessments angled at different aspects of a disease, therefore, are used collectively to strengthen evidence for the treatment effect. It is common sense that if a treatment is ineffective, the chance to show that the treatment is effective in all co‐primary endpoints should be small. Therefore, it may not be necessary to require all the co‐primary endpoints to be statistically significant at the 1‐sided 0.025 level to control the error rate of wrongly approving an ineffective treatment. Rather it is reasonable to allow certain variation for the p ‐values within a range close to 0.025. In this paper, statistical methods are developed to derive decision rules to evaluate co‐primary endpoints collectively. The decision rules control the error rate of wrongly accepting an ineffective treatment at the level of 0.025 for a study and the error rate at a slightly higher level for a treatment that works for all the co‐primary endpoints except perhaps one. The decision rules also control the error rates for individual endpoints. Potential applications in clinical trials are presented (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

The Precautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores,Rough Seas,and Rising Normative Tides

Law and policy implications of the precautionary principle in the field of marine environmental protection are explored in this paper in a three-part analysis. First, seven slippery aspects of the precautionary principle are highlighted, including confusion in terminology, definitional variations, definitional generalities, the spectrum of precautionary measures available, ongoing philosophical tensions and competing socioeconomic interests, debate over who should be responsible for making precautionary decisions, and limited interpretation by international tribunals. Second, the rather feeble precautionary responses to the tempestuous issues of climate change, hazardous chemicals, and overfishing are described. Third, the potential for the precautionary principle to synergize with human rights norms, such as the emerging right to a healthy environment, and other principles of sustainable development is discussed.     

The physics and neurobiology of magnetoreception

Diverse animals can detect magnetic fields but little is known about how they do so. Three main hypotheses of magnetic field perception have been proposed. Electrosensitive marine fish might detect the Earth's field through electromagnetic induction, but direct evidence that induction underlies magnetoreception in such fish has not been obtained. Studies in other animals have provided evidence that is consistent with two other mechanisms: biogenic magnetite and chemical reactions that are modulated by weak magnetic fields. Despite recent advances, however, magnetoreceptors have not been identified with certainty in any animal, and the mode of transduction for the magnetic sense remains unknown.     

Policy on Synthetic Biology: Deliberation,Probability, and the Precautionary Paradox

Synthetic biology is a cutting‐edge area of research that holds the promise of unprecedented health benefits. However, in tandem with these large prospective benefits, synthetic biology projects entail a risk of catastrophic consequences whose severity may exceed that of most ordinary human undertakings. This is due to the peculiar nature of synthetic biology as a ‘threshold technology’ which opens doors to opportunities and applications that are essentially unpredictable. Fears about these potentially unstoppable consequences have led to declarations from civil society groups calling for the use of a precautionary principle to regulate the field. Moreover, the principle is prevalent in law and international agreements. Despite widespread political recognition of a need for caution, the precautionary principle has been extensively criticized as a guide for regulatory policy. We examine a central objection to the principle: that its application entails crippling inaction and incoherence, since whatever action one takes there is always a chance that some highly improbable cataclysm will occur. In response to this difficulty, which we call the ‘precautionary paradox,’ we outline a deliberative means for arriving at threshold of probability below which potential dangers can be disregarded. In addition, we describe a Bayesian mechanism with which to assign probabilities to harmful outcomes. We argue that these steps resolve the paradox. The rehabilitated PP can thus provide a viable policy option to confront the uncharted waters of synthetic biology research.     

Using evolutionary costs to enhance the efficacy of malaria control via genetically manipulated mosquitoes

An earlier mathematical model exploring the use of genetically manipulated mosquitoes for malaria control suggested that the prevalence of malaria is reduced significantly only if almost all mosquitoes become completely resistant to malaria. Central to the model was the 'cost of resistance': the reduction of a resistant mosquito's evolutionary fitness in comparison with a sensitive one's. Here, we consider the possibility of obtaining more optimistic outcomes by taking into account the epidemiological (in addition to the evolutionary) consequences of a cost of resistance that decreases the life-span of adult mosquitoes (the most relevant parameter for the parasite's epidemiology). There are two main results. First, if despite its cost, resistance is fixed in the population, increasing the cost of resistance decreases the intensity of transmission. However, this epidemiological effect is weak if resistance is effective enough to be considered relevant for control. Second, if the cost of resistance prevents its fixation, increasing it intensifies transmission. Thus, the epidemiological effect of the cost of resistance cannot compensate for the lower frequency of resistant mosquitoes in the population. Overall, our conclusion remains pessimistic: so that genetic manipulation can become a promising method of malaria control, we need techniques that enable almost all mosquitoes to be almost completely resistant to infection.     

Sensorimotor Learning Biases Choice Behavior: A Learning Neural Field Model for Decision Making

According to a prominent view of sensorimotor processing in primates, selection and specification of possible actions are not sequential operations. Rather, a decision for an action emerges from competition between different movement plans, which are specified and selected in parallel. For action choices which are based on ambiguous sensory input, the frontoparietal sensorimotor areas are considered part of the common underlying neural substrate for selection and specification of action. These areas have been shown capable of encoding alternative spatial motor goals in parallel during movement planning, and show signatures of competitive value-based selection among these goals. Since the same network is also involved in learning sensorimotor associations, competitive action selection (decision making) should not only be driven by the sensory evidence and expected reward in favor of either action, but also by the subject''s learning history of different sensorimotor associations. Previous computational models of competitive neural decision making used predefined associations between sensory input and corresponding motor output. Such hard-wiring does not allow modeling of how decisions are influenced by sensorimotor learning or by changing reward contingencies. We present a dynamic neural field model which learns arbitrary sensorimotor associations with a reward-driven Hebbian learning algorithm. We show that the model accurately simulates the dynamics of action selection with different reward contingencies, as observed in monkey cortical recordings, and that it correctly predicted the pattern of choice errors in a control experiment. With our adaptive model we demonstrate how network plasticity, which is required for association learning and adaptation to new reward contingencies, can influence choice behavior. The field model provides an integrated and dynamic account for the operations of sensorimotor integration, working memory and action selection required for decision making in ambiguous choice situations.     

The choice between people: 'common sense' morality, and doctors

Kamm is concerned with explaining how "common sense" morality might be used in deciding about the distribution of scarce medical resources. Drawing an analogy between redirection of possible harms or threats and the allocation of health resources, she first explores how an ordinary moral agent, not a physician, might act. Using what Kamm calls the principle of irrelevant utilities (PIU), a moral agent might decide between contestants for a particular good based on "sobjectivism" (Sob), the author's term for a combination of the objective and subjective points of view. Kamm explores decision making using three versions of Sob that weigh interests and rights, equivalences, and aggregation of costs (losses). She concludes that, while ordinary moral agents functioning as social agents may act according to objective aggregated costs, physicians should be concerned with equivalents and individuals when allocating resources.