A case reopened: teleology and its consequences for the units of selection discussion.

Darwinian explanations for teleology are often imprecise, and justify the occurrence of teleological features by referring to natural selection in a vague and unspecified sense. In this paper, the Darwinian account for teleology is further analyzed. It is argued that in theory only a specific form of teleology--teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preservation of the genetic program--can be explained in a naturalistic way by employing Darwin's theory of natural selection. This observation links teleology with the units of selection discussion, as for both discussions the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior is of elementary importance. According to Dawkins' analysis, the unit of selection is an active germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the teleological point of view, the unit of selection should additionally incorporate the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. It is shown that within sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. Dawkins' concept of genic selectionism cannot be maintained without violating the naturalistic claims on teleology, and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed by Dawkins and those developed in the light of teleology.     

The Medawar Lecture 2004 the truth about science

The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the 'truth hypothesis', according to which, science is generating increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely unobservable world. According to Karl Popper, although truth is the aim of science, it is impossible to justify the truth hypothesis. According to Thomas Kuhn, the truth hypothesis is false, because scientists can only describe a world that is partially constituted by their own theories and hence not mind-independent. The failure of past scientific theories has been used to argue against the truth hypothesis; the success of the best current theories has been used to argue for it. Neither argument is sound.     

A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance

I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional'and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived fromdesign. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supplyan objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentionalconcepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposesprior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almostidentical to the account of biological teleology offered by Kant in TheCritique of Judgement, with the consequence that Dennett's naturalism isuntenable. My conclusions lead to doubts concerning the legitimacy of anyaccount attempting to naturalise intentionality by extracting normativityfrom biology and also point to a novel account of biological function.     

A general definition of interpretation and its application to origin of life research

We draw on Short’s work on Peirce’s theory of signs to propose a new general definition of interpretation. Short argues that Peirce’s semiotics rests on his naturalised teleology. Our proposal extends Short’s work by modifying his definition of interpretation so as to make it more generally applicable to putatively interpretative processes in biological systems. We use our definition as the basis of an account of different kinds of misinterpretation and we discuss some questions raised by the definition by reference to parallel problems in the field of teleosemantics. We propose that interpretative responses fulfilling the criteria of our definition may be made by relatively simple molecular entities and we suggest two specific empirical applications of the definition to experimental work in the field of origin of life research. Our wider aim is to suggest that a well formulated naturalistic definition of interpretation will allow a re-evaluation of the role of semiotic phenomena in biological systems, including the generation of empirically testable hypotheses.     

Theses on Darwin.

The received view that teleology has been successfully eliminated from the modern scientific worldview is challenged. It is argued that both the theory of natural selection and molecular biology presuppose the existence of natural teleology, and so cannot explain it. A number of other issues in the foundations of biology are briefly examined, while stress is laid throughout on empirical evidence of the rational agency inherent in life. It is urged that teleology be rehabilitated and that the reigning functionalist philosophy be replaced by a realistic view of biological functions as emergent properties of living matter within a broad, selforganization framework.     

Philosophy of Biology: About the Fossilization of Disciplines and Other Embryonic Thoughts

This paper focuses on a running dispute between Werner Callebaut's naturalistic view and Filip Kolen and Gertrudis Van de Vijver's transcendentalist view on the nature of philosophy of biology and the relation of this discipline to biological sciences. It is argued that, despite differences in opinion, both positions agree that philosophy of biology's ultimate goal is to 'move' biology or at least be 'meaningful' to it. In order to make this goal clear and effective, more is needed than a polarizing debate which hardly touches upon biology. Therefore, a redirection in discussion is suggested towards a reflection on the possibilities of incorporating philosophy in interdisciplinary research, and on finding concrete research questions which are of interest both to the philosopher and to the biologist.     

Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.     

Do naturalistic enclosures provide suitable environments for zoo animals?

Zoo visitors perceive naturalistic enclosures (i.e. those attempting to replicate identifiable parts of the landscape of the species' habitat) as those that best satisfy the biological needs of the animals, and ensure therefore their welfare. However, the provision of a suitable environment with the resources that will allow the animals to satisfy their main biological needs in naturalistic enclosures has never been systematically explored; instead, it has been assumed. In this study we provide evidence that supports the general idea that naturalistic designs provide suitable environments for the animals. For that purpose, we analyzed 1,381 naturalistic and non-naturalistic enclosures in 63 Spanish zoological parks. In order to assess the suitability of the environment provided within each enclosure, a number of aspects related to the animals' main biological requirements were analyzed. We found a relationship between naturalistic designs and the suitability of the environment for the species housed. Most naturalistic enclosures (77.8%) provided suitable environments for their inhabitants. Non-naturalistic ones also had suitable environments, but in a lower percentage (39.7%). These results should be taken into account during zoo inspection and accreditation appointments, where enclosure suitability must be assessed in an accurate and fast manner. In this regard, a naturalistic design can be used as an adjunct indicator of enclosure suitability, but not exclusively, as not every naturalistic enclosure was suitable for the animals, neither as an indispensable one, given that near 40% of non-naturalistic ones were appropriate for the species housed.     

The interface between medical anthropology and medical ethnobiology

Medical anthropology is concerned with both the causes and consequences of human sickness, and its various theoretical orientations can be grouped into four major approaches: medical ecology, critical medical anthropology, interpretative medical anthropology, and ethnomedicine. While medical anthropologists of all theoretical persuasions have examined why people get sick, the analysis and understanding of patterns of treatment has been largely confined to ethnomedicine. Historically, more emphasis has been placed on the personalistic or supernatural aspects of ethnomedical systems than on naturalistic or empirical components. While this focus has produced valuable insights into the role of ritual and belief in healing, it has led to the impression that traditional medicine is primarily symbolic. Moreover, it ignores the theoretical bases of traditional healing strategies and the practical means by which most of the world heals itself, namely plants. Recently there has been more interest in the empirical character of ethnomedical systems, and in this paper we consider the role that medical ethnobiology has played in this shift of focus. We begin with a brief history of medical anthropology to illuminate why naturalistic medicine was neglected for so long. We then review exemplary research in two areas of medical ethnobiology – ethnophysiology and medical ethnobotany – that address the study of naturalistic aspects of medical systems. We conclude with suggestions for future research at the interface between medical ethnobiology and medical anthropology that will contribute to both fields.     

MALDI-Mass Spectrometric Imaging for the Investigation of Metabolites in Medicago truncatula Root Nodules

Most techniques used to study small molecules, such as pharmaceutical drugs or endogenous metabolites, employ tissue extracts which require the homogenization of the tissue of interest that could potentially cause changes in the metabolic pathways being studied¹. Mass spectrometric imaging (MSI) is a powerful analytical tool that can provide spatial information of analytes within intact slices of biological tissue samples^1-5. This technique has been used extensively to study various types of compounds including proteins, peptides, lipids, and small molecules such as endogenous metabolites. With matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization (MALDI)-MSI, spatial distributions of multiple metabolites can be simultaneously detected. Herein, a method developed specifically for conducting untargeted metabolomics MSI experiments on legume roots and root nodules is presented which could reveal insights into the biological processes taking place. The method presented here shows a typical MSI workflow, from sample preparation to image acquisition, and focuses on the matrix application step, demonstrating several matrix application techniques that are useful for detecting small molecules. Once the MS images are generated, the analysis and identification of metabolites of interest is discussed and demonstrated. The standard workflow presented here can be easily modified for different tissue types, molecular species, and instrumentation.     

Current techniques in protein glycosylation analysis. A guide to their application.

The importance of glycosylation in biological events and the role it plays in glycoprotein function and structure is an area in which there is growing interest. In order to understand how glycosylation affects the shape or function of a protein it is however important to have suitable techniques available to obtain structural information on the oligosaccharides attached to the protein. For many years the complexity of the structures required sophisticated analytical techniques only available to a few specialist laboratories. In many cases these techniques were not available or required a large amount of material and therefore the number of glycoproteins which were fully characterised were relatively few. In recent years there have been substantial developments in the analysis of glycosylation which has significantly changed the capability to fully characterise molecules of biological interest. A number of different techniques are available which differ in terms of their complexity, the amount of information which is available from them, the skill needed to perform them and their cost. It is now possible for many laboratories who do not specialise in glycosylation analysis to obtain some information although this may be incomplete. These developments do, however, also make complete characterisation of a glycoprotein a much less daunting task and in many cases this can be performed more easily and with less starting material than was previously required. In this review a summary will be given of current techniques and their suitability for different types of analysis will be considered.     

Relationships between exhibit naturalism,animal visibility and visitor interest in a Chinese Zoo

Efforts to meet the welfare needs of captive animals (such as the provision of environmental enrichment and naturalistic furnishings) often compromise visitors’ needs (naturalistic exhibits often decrease the visibility of animals on display even though visitors pay to view them). The literature offers different predictions about how zoo visitors respond to decreased animal visibility in naturalistic exhibits but they require further evaluation. Further, visitor research is currently confined to Europe and America and studies outside these areas are limited. This paper investigates the relationships between exhibit naturalism, animal visibility and visitor interest in a Chinese Zoo. Visitor interest was observed at both naturalistic and barren exhibit designs. The study showed that the influence of animal presence on visitor behaviours was similar at both exhibit designs. Further, visitor interest was not compromised at the naturalistic exhibit when animals were not visible. The results demonstrate that the needs of animals and visitors can be balanced at naturalistic exhibits and support the transformation of exhibits to those representing naturalistic environments.     

Taxonomie, écologie et lutte biologique

Summary It is impossible to study modern taxonomy without taking into consideration the population genetic and ecology. Thé Linnean concept of monotypic species should be replaced by the biometric study of the frequency of the variability of the biological characters (particularly morphological) used in taxonomy. The study of populations offers a larger scientific interest than the one of isolated types. It gives the possibility of caracterizing the evolution stability of the species. So, Taxonomy can help considerably in biological control. By revealing large variability species, it gives a criterion of their adjusting plasticity. But, by definition, the biological control is based on the adjusting capacity of the entomophagous insects either to a new host or to a new environment. Information given by the taxonomist on the species stability has consequently a great value in the choice and use of the Entomophagous insects. — Ecologists using biological control, expect from the taxonomist to lie more than a label, which implies the use of biometric analysis methods in Entomophagous taxonomy.      

The Return of the Replicator: What is Philosophically Significant in a General Account of Replication and Selection?

The aim of this paper is to outline a typologyof selection processes, and show that differentsub-categories have different explanatorypower. The basis of this typology of selectionprocesses is argued to be the difference ofreplication processes involved in them. Inorder to show this, I argue that: 1.Replication is necessary for selection and 2.Different types of replication lead todifferent types of selection. Finally, it isargued that this typology is philosophicallysignificant, since it contrasts cases ofselection (on the basis of the replicationprocesses involved in them) whereby selectioncauses adaptation – and, therefore, can beused in explanations of the (real or apparent)teleology of Nature – and cases in whichselection lacks such explanatory power.     

Stability and lawlikeness

There appear to be no biological regularities that have the properties traditionally associated with laws, such as an unlimited scope or holding in all or many possible background conditions. Mitchell, Lange, and others have therefore suggested redefining laws to redeem the lawlike status of biological regularities. These authors suggest that biological regularities are lawlike because they are pragmatically or paradigmatically similar to laws or stable regularities. I will review these re-definitions by arguing both that there are difficulties in applying their accounts to biology and difficulties in the accounts themselves, which suggests that the accounts are not adequate to redeem the lawlike status of biological regularities. Finally, I will suggest a new account of laws that also shows how non-laws might function in some of the roles of laws.     

Teleology and its constitutive role for biology as the science of organized systems in nature

'Nothing in biology makes sense, except in the light of teleology'. This could be the first sentence in a textbook about the methodology of biology. The fundamental concepts in biology, e.g. 'organism' and 'ecosystem', are only intelligible given a teleological framework. Since early modern times, teleology has often been considered methodologically unscientific. With the acceptance of evolutionary theory, one popular strategy for accommodating teleological reasoning was to explain it by reference to selection in the past: functions were reconstructed as 'selected effects'. But the theory of evolution obviously presupposes the existence of organisms as organized and regulated, i.e. functional systems. Therefore, evolutionary theory cannot provide the foundation for teleology. The underlying reason for the central methodological role of teleology in biology is not its potential to offer particular forms of (evolutionary) explanations for the presence of parts, but rather an ontological one: organisms and other basic biological entities do not exist as physical bodies do, as amounts of matter with a definite form. Rather, they are dynamic systems in stable equilibrium; despite changes of their matter and form (in metabolism and metamorphosis) they maintain their identity. What remains constant in these kinds of systems is their 'organization', i.e. the causal pattern of interdependence of parts with certain effects of each part being relevant for the working of the system. Teleological analysis consists in the identification of these system-relevant effects and at the same time of the system as a whole. Therefore, the identity of biological systems cannot be specified without teleological reasoning.     

Darwin's concept of final cause: neither new nor trivial

Darwin'suse of final cause accords with the Aristotelian idea of finalcauses as explanatory types – as opposed to mechanical causes, which arealways particulars. In Wright's consequence etiology, anadaptation is explained by particular events, namely, its past consequences;hence, that etiology is mechanistic at bottom. This justifies Ghiselin'scharge that such versions of teleology trivialize the subject, But a purelymechanistic explanation of an adaptation allows it to appear coincidental.Patterns of outcome, whether biological or thermodynamic, cannot be explainedbytracing causal chains, even were that possible. They are explicanda of aspecialkind. The form of their explanation, in statistical mechanics or by naturalselection, is not captured by statistical variants of the covering-law model orrelated models of explanation. In them as in classical teleology, types ofoutcome are cited to explain why there are outcomes of those types. But onlywhen types are explanatory by being selected for, as inexplanations of animal and human behavior as well as in Darwin's theory ofnatural selection, but not in statistical mechanics, is the explanationteleological. Darwin's theory is nontrivially teleological.     

Teleology in biology: Is it a cause for concern?

Evolutionary biology is distinctively forward looking or 'teleological' in its way of thought. In this, it distinguishes itself from the physical sciences. One can ask for the purpose or function of the stegoseaur's fins. One would never ask for the function of a planet. Many, including biologists, worry that such teleology is an unhappy legacy of a Christian past. Although teleology does have its roots in pre-evolutionary thought, there are good reasons why it has persisted, and there are equally good reasons why it should be cherished.     

Genes,agents and the institution of responsible action

The concern of this paper is with how the accounts of human beings and their behaviour now emerging from genetics, genomics and the new human biotechnology should be related to traditional accounts in which we identify ourselves as responsible agents, capable of choice, who normally act freely and voluntarily. The paper addresses these apparently competing accounts in terms of their functions and modes of use, and thereby arrives at a general solution to this current version of the ancient problem of free will and determinism. The causal scientific discourse of genetics and the everyday discourse of responsibility and choice do different things for us, it suggests, and should not be regarded as articulating conflicting theories. Whilst the former is oriented to the task of naturalistic explanation, the latter is predominantly, if not entirely, a medium of communication through which we affect each other and thereby mutually regulate our conduct. If this is indeed the case, then interesting implications follow concerning the proper relationship of the two kinds of account, which need no longer be regarded as incompatible with each other. And insights emerge into both the limitations and the profound importance of the contribution that genetics and genomics seem destined to make to the understanding of human behaviour.