Parasites of mutualisms

Cooperation invites cheating, and nowhere is this more apparent than when different species cooperate, known as mutualism. In almost all mutualisms studied, specialist parasites have been identified that purloin the benefits that one mutualist provides another. Explaining how parasites are kept from driving mutualisms extinct remains an unsolved problem because existing theories explaining the maintenance of cooperation do not apply to parasites of mutualisms. Nonetheless, these theories can be summarized in such a way as to suggest how mutualisms can persist in the face of parasites. (1) For cooperation to occur, the recipient of a benefit must reciprocate, and the recriprocated benefit must be captured by the initial giver or its offspring. (2) For cooperation to persist, the mutualism must be re-assembled each generation. Because most mutualisms are of the "by-product' type, broadly defined, the first condition is normally always fulfilled. Thus, the maintenance of mutualism usually requires enforcement of the second condition: reliable re-assembly. Hence, I argue that the persistence of mutualism is best understood by using theories of species coexistence, because each mutualist can be considered a resource for the other, and species coexistence theory explains how multiple taxa (e.g. parasites and mutualists) can stably partition a resource over multiple generations. This approach connects the study of mutualism to theories of population regulation and helps to identify key factors that have promoted the evolution, maintenance and breakdown of mutualism. I discuss how these ideas might apply to and be tested in ant-plant, fig-wasp and yucca-moth mutualisms.     

When Punishment Pays

Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two. Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in behavioural economic games, posing a problem for existing theory which highlights the difficulty in explaining the spread and persistence of punishment. Here, I consider the apparent mismatch between theory and evidence and show by means of instructive analysis and simulation how much of the experimental evidence for punishment comes from scenarios in which punishers may expect to obtain a net benefit from punishing free-riders. In repeated games within groups, punishment works by imposing costs on defectors so that it pays them to switch to cooperating. Both punishers and non-punishers then benefit from the resulting increase in cooperation, hence investing in punishment can constitute a social dilemma. However, I show the conditions in which the benefits of increased cooperation are so great that they more than offset the costs of punishing, thereby removing the temptation to free-ride on others'' investments and making punishment explicable in terms of direct self-interest. Crucially, this is because of the leveraging effect imposed in typical studies whereby people can pay a small cost to inflict a heavy loss on a punished individual. In contrast to previous models suggesting punishment is disadvantaged when rare, I show it can invade until it comes into a producer-scrounger equilibrium with non-punishers. I conclude that adding punishment to an iterated public goods game can solve the problem of achieving cooperation by removing the social dilemma.     

A Quantitative Index of Sociality and Its Application to Group‐Living Spiders and Other Social Organisms

Species are often classified in discrete categories, such as solitary, subsocial, social and eusocial based on broad qualitative features of their social systems. Often, however, species fall between categories or species within a category may differ from one another in ways that beg for a quantitative measure of their sociality level. Here, we propose such a quantitative measure in the form of an index that is based on three fundamental features of a social system: (1) the fraction of the life cycle that individuals remain in their social group, (2) the proportion of nests in a population that contain multiple vs. solitary individuals and (3) the proportion of adult members of a group that do not reproduce, but contribute to communal activities. These are measures that should be quantifiable in most social systems, with the first two reflecting the tendencies of individuals to live in groups as a result of philopatry, grouping tendencies and intraspecific tolerance, and the third potentially reflecting the tendencies of individuals to exhibit reproductive altruism. We argue that this index can serve not only as a way of ranking species along a sociality scale, but also as a means of determining how level of sociality correlates with other aspects of the biology of a group of organisms. We illustrate the calculation of this index for the cooperative social spiders and the African mole‐rats and use it to analyse how sex ratios and interfemale spacing correlate with level of sociality in spider species in the genus Anelosimus.     

Why how and why aren’t enough: more problems with Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction

Like Laland et al., I think Mayr’s distinction is problematic, but I identify a further problem with it. I argue that Mayr’s distinction is a false dichotomy, and obscures an important question about evolutionary change. I show how this question, once revealed, sheds light on some debates in evo-devo that Laland et al.’s analysis cannot, and suggest that it provides a different view about how future integration between biological disciplines might proceed.     

Territorial cooperation and social monogamy: factors affecting intersexual behaviours in pair-living snapping shrimp

Among the factors that may contribute to the evolution of social monogamy are selection for extended mate guarding of females and selection for territorial ‘cooperation’. Many socially monogamous taxa are also territorial, with ‘partners’ sharing a single territory, suggesting that one or both partners may benefit by sharing territorial maintenance. Snapping shrimp (genus Alpheus) are socially monogamous and territorial, living in excavated burrows or with host organisms, with females performing all parental care. The territorial cooperation hypothesis predicts that male and female partners share (1) territorial defence, resulting in a reduction in the risk of eviction from the burrow, (2) burrow construction duties, such that individuals in pairs spend less time in burrow construction relative to solitary individuals, and/or (3) foraging duties, by returning food to the burrow, where it is consumed by both partners. UsingA. angulatus as a model species, a territorial defence experiment revealed that females in pairs were significantly less likely than solitary females to be evicted by female intruders, but males in pairs were not significantly less likely than solitary males to be evicted by male intruders. A subsequent experiment revealed that paired males were significantly less likely to be evicted by an intruding male if paired with sexually receptive females than if paired with nonreceptive females. Another experiment revealed that (1) paired females spent significantly more time in burrow construction than paired males, and (2) both males and females consistently returned food items to the burrow, perhaps incidentally provisioning their mates. These data suggest that social monogamy may have been selected for in part because of the advantages of territorial cooperation, as both males and females are likely to benefit by dividing the labour of territorial defence and maintenance. These tests of the territorial cooperation hypothesis are synthesized with data from tests of the extended mate-guarding hypothesis to place snapping shrimp pairing behaviour into a larger construct incorporating both the influence of ecological pressures (territoriality) and mating interactions between the sexes. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.     

How chimpanzees solve collective action problems

We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.     

On our best behavior: optimality models in human behavioral ecology

This paper discusses problems associated with the use of optimality models in human behavioral ecology. Optimality models are used in both human and non-human animal behavioral ecology to test hypotheses about the conditions generating and maintaining behavioral strategies in populations via natural selection. The way optimality models are currently used in behavioral ecology faces significant problems, which are exacerbated by employing the so-called ‘phenotypic gambit’: that is, the bet that the psychological and inheritance mechanisms responsible for behavioral strategies will be straightforward. I argue that each of several different possible ways we might interpret how optimality models are being used for humans face similar and additional problems. I suggest some ways in which human behavioral ecologists might adjust how they employ optimality models; in particular, I urge the abandonment of the phenotypic gambit in the human case.     

Costly signaling and cooperation.

We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms.     

Potential disadvantages of using socially acquired information

The acquisition and use of socially acquired information is commonly assumed to be profitable. We challenge this assumption by exploring hypothetical scenarios where the use of such information either provides no benefit or can actually be costly. First, we show that the level of incompatibility between the acquisition of personal and socially acquired information will directly affect the extent to which the use of socially acquired information can be profitable. When these two sources of information cannot be acquired simultaneously, there may be no benefit to socially acquired information. Second, we assume that a solitary individual's behavioural decisions will be based on cues revealed by its own interactions with the environment. However, in many cases, for social animals the only socially acquired information available to individuals is the behavioural actions of others that expose their decisions, rather than the cues on which these decisions were based. We argue that in such a situation the use of socially acquired information can lead to informational cascades that sometimes result in sub-optimal behaviour. From this theory of informational cascades, we predict that when erroneous cascades are costly, individuals should pay attention only to socially generated cues and not behavioural decisions. We suggest three scenarios that might be examples of informational cascades in nature.     

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation,forgiveness, and morality in animals

In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.     

Why aren’t we all hutterites?

In this paper I explore the psychology of ritual performance and present a simple graphical model that clarifies several issues in William Irons’s theory of religion as a “hard-to-fake” sign of commitment. Irons posits that religious behaviors or rituals serve as costly signals of an individual’s commitment to a religious group. Increased commitment among members of a religious group may facilitate intra-group cooperation, which is argued to be the primary adaptive benefit of religion. Here I propose a proximate explanation for how individuals are able to pay the short-term costs of ritual performance to achieve the long-term fitness benefits offered by religious groups. The model addresses three significant problems raised by Irons’s theory. First, the model explains why potential free-riders do not join religious groups even when there are significant net benefits that members of religious groups can achieve. Second, the model clarifies how costly a ritual must be to achieve stability and prevent potential free-riders from joining the religious group. Third, the model suggests why religious groups may require adherents to perform private rituals that are not observed by others. Several hypotheses generated from the model are also discussed. Richard Sosis is an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Connecticut. His research interests include the evolution of cooperation, utopian societies, and the behavioral ecology of religion. In collaboration with Bradley Ruffle (Ben Gurion University) he is currently investigating the impact of privatization and religiosity on intra-group trust within Israeli Kibbutzim.     

Indirect selection and individual selection in sociobiology: my personal views on theories of social behaviour

This is the story of my involvement in sociobiological studies. I first discuss group selection models, which were common in the 1950s. I then move on to kin selection and reciprocity models, which were developed to replace group selection models and are still being used by many sociobiologists, even though I argue that they contain the same weaknesses that led group selection to be rejected. As an alternative, I present the handicap principle, an essential component in all signalling. The handicap principle is useful in understanding many components of social systems, not the least of which is why individuals invest in the benefit of other members of a social system (altruism). Copyright 2003 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd on behalf of The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.     

Patient and impatient punishers of free-riders

Costly punishment of cheaters who contribute little or nothing to a cooperating group has been extensively studied, as an effective means to enforce cooperation. The prevailing view is that individuals use punishment to retaliate against transgressions of moral standards such as fairness or equity. However, there is much debate regarding the psychological underpinnings of costly punishment. Some authors suggest that costly punishment must be a product of humans'' capacity for reasoning, self-control and long-term planning, whereas others argue that it is the result of an impulsive, present-oriented emotional drive. Here, we explore the inter-temporal preferences of punishers in a multilateral cooperation game and show that both interpretations might be right, as we can identify two different types of punishment: punishment of free-riders by cooperators, which is predicted by patience (future orientation); and free-riders'' punishment of other free-riders, which is predicted by impatience (present orientation). Therefore, the picture is more complex as punishment by free-riders probably comes not from a reaction against a moral transgression, but instead from a competitive, spiteful drive. Thus, punishment grounded on morals may be related to lasting or delayed psychological incentives, whereas punishment triggered by competitive desires may be linked to short-run aspirations. These results indicate that the individual''s time horizon is relevant for the type of social behaviour she opts for. Integrating such differences in inter-temporal preferences and the social behaviour of agents might help to achieve a better understanding of how human cooperation and punishment behaviour has evolved.     

Direct fitness correlates and thermal consequences of facultative aggregation in a desert lizard

Social aggregation is a common behavioral phenomenon thought to evolve through adaptive benefits to group living. Comparing fitness differences between aggregated and solitary individuals in nature - necessary to infer an evolutionary benefit to living in groups - has proven difficult because communally-living species tend to be obligately social and behaviorally complex. However, these differences and the mechanisms driving them are critical to understanding how solitary individuals transition to group living, as well as how and why nascent social systems change over time. Here we demonstrate that facultative aggregation in a reptile (the Desert Night Lizard, Xantusia vigilis) confers direct reproductive success and survival advantages and that thermal benefits of winter huddling disproportionately benefit small juveniles, which can favor delayed dispersal of offspring and the formation of kin groups. Using climate projection models, however, we estimate that future aggregation in night lizards could decline more than 50% due to warmer temperatures. Our results support the theory that transitions to group living arise from direct benefits to social individuals and offer a clear mechanism for the origin of kin groups through juvenile philopatry. The temperature dependence of aggregation in this and other taxa suggests that environmental variation may be a powerful but underappreciated force in the rapid transition between social and solitary behavior.     

WHAT CAN HISTORY DO FOR BIOETHICS?

This article details the relationship between history and bioethics. I argue that historians' reluctance to engage with bioethics rests on a misreading of the field as solely reducible to applied ethics, and overlooks previous enthusiasm for historical perspectives. I claim that seeing bioethics as its practitioners see it – as an interdisciplinary meeting ground – should encourage historians to collaborate in greater numbers. I conclude by outlining how bioethics might benefit from new histories of the field, and how historians can lend a fresh perspective to bioethical debates.     

Non-kin cooperation in bats

Many bats are extremely social. In some cases, individuals remain together for years or even decades and engage in mutually beneficial behaviours among non-related individuals. Here, we summarize ways in which unrelated bats cooperate while roosting, foraging, feeding or caring for offspring. For each situation, we ask if cooperation involves an investment, and if so, what mechanisms might ensure a return. While some cooperative outcomes are likely a by-product of selfish behaviour as they are in many other vertebrates, we explain how cooperative investments can occur in several situations and are particularly evident in food sharing among common vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) and alloparental care by greater spear-nosed bats (Phyllostomus hastatus). Fieldwork and experiments on vampire bats indicate that sharing blood with non-kin expands the number of possible donors beyond kin and promotes reciprocal help by strengthening long-term social bonds. Similarly, more than 25 years of recapture data and field observations of greater spear-nosed bats reveal multiple cooperative investments occurring within stable groups of non-kin. These studies illustrate how bats can serve as models for understanding how cooperation is regulated in social vertebrates.     

Free-Riding Behavior in Vaccination Decisions: An Experimental Study

Individual decision-making regarding vaccination may be affected by the vaccination choices of others. As vaccination produces externalities reducing transmission of a disease, it can provide an incentive for individuals to be free-riders who benefit from the vaccination of others while avoiding the cost of vaccination. This study examined an individual''s decision about vaccination in a group setting for a hypothetical disease that is called “influenza” using a computerized experimental game. In the game, interactions with others are allowed. We found that higher observed vaccination rate within the group during the previous round of the game decreased the likelihood of an individual''s vaccination acceptance, indicating the existence of free-riding behavior. The free-riding behavior was observed regardless of parameter conditions on the characteristics of the influenza and vaccine. We also found that other predictors of vaccination uptake included an individual''s own influenza exposure in previous rounds increasing the likelihood of vaccination acceptance, consistent with existing empirical studies. Influenza prevalence among other group members during the previous round did not have a statistically significant effect on vaccination acceptance in the current round once vaccination rate in the previous round was controlled for.     

A theory of leadership in human cooperative groups

Two types of models aim to account the origins of rank differentiation and social hierarchy in human societies. Conflict models suggest that the formation of social hierarchies is synonymous with the establishment of relationships of coercive social dominance and exploitation. Voluntary or 'integrative' models, on the other hand, suggest that rank differentiation - the differentiation of leader from follower, ruler from ruled, or state from subject - may sometimes be preferred over more egalitarian social arrangements as a solution to the challenges of life in social groups, such as conflict over resources, coordination failures, and free-riding in cooperative relationships. Little formal theoretical work, however, has established whether and under what conditions individuals would indeed prefer the establishment of more hierarchical relationships over more egalitarian alternatives. This paper provides an evolutionary game theoretical model for the acceptance of leadership in cooperative groups. We propose that the effort of a leader can reduce the likelihood that cooperation fails due to free-riding or coordination errors, and that under some circumstances, individuals would prefer to cooperate in a group under the supervision of a leader who receives a share of the group's productivity than to work in an unsupervised group. We suggest, in particular, that this becomes an optimal solution for individual decision makers when the number of group members required for collective action exceeds the maximum group size at which leaderless cooperation is viable.     

Reproductive plasticity in Polistes paper wasp workers and the evolutionary origins of sociality

Regulatory pathways in solitary species provide the raw materials for the evolution of sociality. Therefore, comparing the mechanisms that mediate reproductive plasticity in social species and their solitary ancestors can provide insight into the evolutionary origin of sociality. In many solitary insects, the effect of juvenile hormone (JH) on fertility is mediated through the fat body; individuals in good physical condition show a stronger fertility response to JH than individuals in poor physical condition. Here, we test whether a similar, condition-dependent JH response mediates fertility in workers of the primitively eusocial Polistes dominulus wasps. We test how body weight, JH, and adult nutrition influence worker ovarian development. Both JH-treatment and adult nutrition dramatically increased ovarian development. Body weight also influenced ovarian development, as large workers developed more eggs than smaller workers. Body weight and fat are strongly linked in P. dominulus workers, so these results suggest that the fat-dependent JH responsiveness common in solitary insects is conserved in social wasps. The simple, ancestral relationship between reproductive investment and physical condition may facilitate cooperation by allowing workers to adaptively allocate energy into reproduction based on their probability of successfully becoming a queen.     

Individual variation behind the evolution of cooperation

Life on Earth has two remarkable properties. The first is variation: even apart from the vast number of extant species, there are considerable differences between individuals within a single species. The second property is cooperation. It is surprising that until recently the interactions between these two properties have rarely been addressed from an evolutionary point of view. Here, I concentrate on how inter-individual differences influence the evolution of cooperation. First, I deal with cases where individuality is maintained by random processes like mutation or phenotypic noise. Second, I examine when differences in state cause differences in behaviour. Finally, I investigate the effects of individual role specialization. Variation can be important in several ways. Increased random variation can change the expectation about cooperativeness of future partners, altering behaviour in a current relationship. Differences in state may serve as a book-keeping mechanism that is necessary for the evolution of reciprocity. If the cost of cooperation can depend on state then strategic regulation of state makes it possible to coerce partners to cooperate. If conditions force individuals to specialize, cooperation becomes more valuable. My review of theoretical models suggests that variation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation.