The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the living world

Darwin provided a great unifying theory for biology; its visual expression is the universal tree of life. The tree concept is challenged by the occurrence of horizontal gene transfer and—as summarized in this review—by the omission of viruses. Microbial ecologists have demonstrated that viruses are the most numerous biological entities on earth, outnumbering cells by a factor of 10. Viral genomics have revealed an unexpected size and distinctness of the viral DNA sequence space. Comparative genomics has shown elements of vertical evolution in some groups of viruses. Furthermore, structural biology has demonstrated links between viruses infecting the three domains of life pointing to a very ancient origin of viruses. However, presently viruses do not find a place on the universal tree of life, which is thus only a tree of cellular life. In view of the polythetic nature of current life definitions, viruses cannot be dismissed as non-living material. On earth we have therefore at least two large DNA sequence spaces, one represented by capsid-encoding viruses and another by ribosome-encoding cells. Despite their probable distinct evolutionary origin, both spheres were and are connected by intensive two-way gene transfers.     

Defining Life: The Virus Viewpoint

Are viruses alive? Until very recently, answering this question was often negative and viruses were not considered in discussions on the origin and definition of life. This situation is rapidly changing, following several discoveries that have modified our vision of viruses. It has been recognized that viruses have played (and still play) a major innovative role in the evolution of cellular organisms. New definitions of viruses have been proposed and their position in the universal tree of life is actively discussed. Viruses are no more confused with their virions, but can be viewed as complex living entities that transform the infected cell into a novel organism—the virus—producing virions. I suggest here to define life (an historical process) as the mode of existence of ribosome encoding organisms (cells) and capsid encoding organisms (viruses) and their ancestors. I propose to define an organism as an ensemble of integrated organs (molecular or cellular) producing individuals evolving through natural selection. The origin of life on our planet would correspond to the establishment of the first organism corresponding to this definition.     

Contextual organismality: Beyond pattern to process in the emergence of organisms

Biologists have taken the concept of organism largely for granted. However, advances in the study of chimerism, symbiosis, bacterial‐eukaryote associations, and microbial behavior have prompted a redefinition of organisms as biological entities exhibiting low conflict and high cooperation among their parts. This expanded view identifies organisms in evolutionary time. However, the ecological processes, mechanisms, and traits that drive the formation of organisms remain poorly understood. Recognizing that organismality can be context dependent, we advocate elucidating the ecological contexts under which entities do or do not act as organisms. Here we develop a “contextual organismality” framework and provide examples of entities, such as honey bee colonies, tumors, and bacterial swarms, that can act as organisms under specific life history, resource, or other ecological circumstances. We suggest that context dependence may be a stepping stone to the development of increased organismal unification, as the most integrated biological entities generally show little context dependence. Recognizing that organismality is contextual can identify common patterns and testable hypotheses across different entities. The contextual organismality framework can illuminate timeless as well as pressing issues in biology, including topics as disparate as cancer emergence, genomic conflict, evolution of symbiosis, and the role of the microbiota in impacting host phenotype.     

Saccharomyces cerevisiae as a model organism: a comparative study

Background

Model organisms are used for research because they provide a framework on which to develop and optimize methods that facilitate and standardize analysis. Such organisms should be representative of the living beings for which they are to serve as proxy. However, in practice, a model organism is often selected ad hoc, and without considering its representativeness, because a systematic and rational method to include this consideration in the selection process is still lacking.

Methodology/Principal Findings

In this work we propose such a method and apply it in a pilot study of strengths and limitations of Saccharomyces cerevisiae as a model organism. The method relies on the functional classification of proteins into different biological pathways and processes and on full proteome comparisons between the putative model organism and other organisms for which we would like to extrapolate results. Here we compare S. cerevisiae to 704 other organisms from various phyla. For each organism, our results identify the pathways and processes for which S. cerevisiae is predicted to be a good model to extrapolate from. We find that animals in general and Homo sapiens in particular are some of the non-fungal organisms for which S. cerevisiae is likely to be a good model in which to study a significant fraction of common biological processes. We validate our approach by correctly predicting which organisms are phenotypically more distant from S. cerevisiae with respect to several different biological processes.

Conclusions/Significance

The method we propose could be used to choose appropriate substitute model organisms for the study of biological processes in other species that are harder to study. For example, one could identify appropriate models to study either pathologies in humans or specific biological processes in species with a long development time, such as plants.     

Life and death: a biologist's view.

The strict link between life and death of an organism should be discussed and compared to the life cycles of molecules and cells that allow the organism's development and survival. Indeed, a brief consideration of the main features of biological functions reveals that they occur at widely different levels of organization, ranging from molecules to species and ecological systems, and occupying widely different spatio-temporal domains. Biological functions are characterized by the integrated motion of their constitutive parts, and operate in cyclic fashions that comprise on and off phases. The birth and death of molecules, cells, organisms or species represent a special class of cycling functions that support the life cycles of the entities that include them. Under this perspective, the life cycles of past, present and future human beings may be viewed as necessary support to the longer lasting and more widely spreading life cycles of families, nations, and civilizations. If due consideration is given to our deep mental nature, one may cherish the conclusion that past, present and future human beings may be all supporting the life cycle of a superior mental entity that includes us in the same way we include our own cellular and molecular components.     

Does Biology Need an Organism Concept?

Among biologists, there is no general agreement on exactly what entities qualify as ‘organisms’. Instead, there are multiple competing organism concepts and definitions. While some authors think this is a problem that should be corrected, others have suggested that biology does not actually need an organism concept. We argue that the organism concept is central to biology and should not be abandoned. Both organism concepts and operational definitions are useful. We review criteria used for recognizing organisms and conclude that they are not categorical but rather continuously variable. Different organism concepts are useful for addressing different questions, and it is important to be explicit about which is being used. Finally, we examine the origins of the derived state of organismality, and suggest that it may result from positive feedback between natural selection and functional integration in biological entities.     

THE SOCIAL ORGANISM: CONGRESSES,PARTIES, AND COMMITTEES

We propose that what makes an organism is nearly complete cooperation, with strong control of intraorganism conflicts, and no affiliations above the level of the organism as unified as those at the organism level. Organisms can be made up of like units, which we call fraternal organisms, or different units, making them egalitarian organisms. Previous definitions have concentrated on the factors that favor high cooperation and low conflict, or on the adapted outcomes of organismality. Our approach brings these definitions together, conceptually unifying our understanding of organismality. Although the organism is a concerted cluster of adaptations, nearly all directed toward the same end, some conflict may remain. To understand such conflict, we extend Leigh's metaphor of the parliament of genes to include parties with different interests and committees that work on particular tasks.     

Costs and benefits of genetic heterogeneity within organisms

An increasing number of studies have recently detected within-organism genetic heterogeneity suggesting that genetically homogeneous organisms may be rare. In this review, we examine the potential costs and benefits of such intraorganismal genetic heterogeneity (IGH) on the fitness of the individual. The costs of IGH include cancerous growth, parasitism, competitive interactions and developmental instability, all of which threaten the integrity of the individual while the potential benefits are increased genetic variability, size-specific processes, and synergistic interactions between genetic variants. The particular cost or benefit of IGH in a specific case depends on the organism type and the origin of the IGH. While mosaicism easily arise by genetic changes in an individual, and will be the more common type of IGH, chimerism originates by the fusion of genetically distinct entities, and is expected to be substantially rare in most organisms. Potential conflicts and synergistic effects between different genetic lineages within an individual provide an interesting example for theoretical and empirical studies of multilevel selection.     

Hierarchical selection in modular organisms

Modular organisms, such as colonial marine invertebrates and most seed plants, develop by a repetition of physically interrelated subunits colloquially called modules. Modules may include some or all features of single organisms. Modular organisms have no separate germ line; instead, several cell lineages can remain totipotent throughout the life span of the organism or the clone. Due to this somatic embryogenesis, the basic reproductive units are found at the level of the module. The products of modular repetition, i.e. physically coherent organisms, colonies and clones consisting of modules, mainly function as interactive units that modify survival and reproduction at the level of the module. Together these levels of interaction and reproduction make up a hierarchical causal system, which we frequently tend to encapsulate into a single functional unit of selection.     

Adaptation in the face of internal conflict: the paradox of the organism revisited

The paradox of the organism refers to the observation that organisms appear to function as coherent purposeful entities, despite the potential for within-organismal components like selfish genetic elements and cancer cells to erode them from within. While it is commonly accepted that organisms may pursue fitness maximisation and can be thought to hold particular agendas, there is a growing recognition that genes and cells do so as well. This can lead to evolutionary conflicts between an organism and the parts that reside within it. Here, we revisit the paradox of the organism. We first outline its conception and relationship to debates about adaptation in evolutionary biology. Second, we review the ways selfish elements may exploit organisms, and the extent to which this threatens organismal integrity. To this end, we introduce a novel classification scheme that distinguishes between selfish elements that seek to distort transmission versus those that seek to distort phenotypic traits. Our classification scheme also highlights how some selfish elements elude a multi-level selection decomposition using the Price equation. Third, we discuss how the organism can retain its status as the primary fitness-maximising agent in the face of selfish elements. The success of selfish elements is often constrained by their strategy and further limited by a combination of fitness alignment and enforcement mechanisms controlled by the organism. Finally, we argue for the need for quantitative measures of both internal conflicts and organismality.     

Species concepts and the ontology of evolution

Biologists and philosophers have long recognized the importance of species, yet species concepts serve two masters, evolutionary theory on the one hand and taxonomy on the other. Much of present-day evolutionary and systematic biology has confounded these two roles primarily through use of the biological species concept. Theories require entities that are real, discrete, irreducible, and comparable. Within the neo-Darwinian synthesis, however, biological species have been treated as real or subjectively delimited entities, discrete or nondiscrete, and they are often capable of being decomposed into other, smaller units. Because of this, biological species are generally not comparable across different groups of organisms, which implies that the ontological structure of evolutionary theory requires modification. Some biologists, including proponents of the biological species concept, have argued that no species concept is universally applicable across all organisms. Such a view means, however, that the history of life cannot be embraced by a common theory of ancestry and descent if that theory uses species as its entities.These ontological and biological difficulties can be alleviated if species are defined in terms of evolutionary units. The latter are irreducible clusters of reproductively cohesive organisms that are diagnosably distinct from other such clusters. Unlike biological species, which can include two or more evolutionary units, these phylogenetic species are discrete entities in space and time and capable of being compared from one group to the next.     

Are ant supercolonies crucibles of a new major transition in evolution?

The biological hierarchy of genes, cells, organisms and societies is a fundamental reality in the living world. This hierarchy of entities did not arise ex nihilo at the origin of life, but rather has been serially generated by a succession of critical events known as ‘evolutionary transitions in individuality’ (ETIs). Given the sequential nature of ETIs, it is natural to look for candidates to form the next hierarchical tier. We analyse claims that these candidates are found among ‘supercolonies’, ant populations in which discrete nests cooperate as part of a wider collective, in ways redolent of cells in a multicellular organism. Examining earlier empirical work and new data within the recently proposed ‘Darwinian space’ framework, we offer a novel analysis of the evolutionary status of supercolonies and show how certain key conditions might be satisfied in any future process transforming these collaborative networks into true Darwinian individuals.     

Lifeness signatures and the roots of the tree of life

Do trees of life have roots? What do these roots look like? In this contribution, I argue that research on the origins of life might offer glimpses on the topology of these very roots. More specifically, I argue (1) that the roots of the tree of life go well below the level of the commonly mentioned ‘ancestral organisms’ down into the level of much simpler, minimally living entities that might be referred to as ‘protoliving systems’, and (2) that further below, a system of roots gradually dissolves into non-living matter along several functional dimensions. In between non-living and living matter, one finds physico-chemical systems that I propose to characterize by a ‘lifeness signature’. In turn, this ‘lifeness signature’ might also account for a diverse range of biochemical entities that are found to be ‘less-than-living’ yet ‘more-than-non-living’.     

PROPOSAL OF ECTOCARPUS SILICULOSUS (ECTOCARPALES,PHAEOPHYCEAE) AS A MODEL ORGANISM FOR BROWN ALGAL GENETICS AND GENOMICS1,2

The emergence of model organisms that permit the application of a powerful combination of genomic and genetic approaches has been a major factor underlying the advances that have been made in the past decade in dissecting the molecular basis of a wide range of biological processes. However, the phylogenetic distance separating marine macroalgae from these model organisms, which are mostly from the animal, fungi, and higher plant lineages, limits the latters' applicability to problems specific to macroalgal biology. There is therefore a pressing need to develop similar models for the macroalgae. Here we describe a survey of potential model brown algae in which particular attention was paid to characteristics associated with a strong potential for genomic and genetic analysis, such as a small nuclear genome size, sexuality, and a short life cycle. Flow cytometry of nuclei isolated from zoids showed that species from the Ectocarpales possess smaller haploid genomes (127–290 Mbp) than current models among the Laminariales (580–720 Mbp) and Fucales (1095–1271 Mbp). Species of the Ectocarpales may complete their life histories in as little as 6 weeks in laboratory culture and are amenable to genetic analyses. Based on this study, we propose Ectocarpus siliculosus (Dillwyn) Lyngbye as an optimal choice for a general model organism for the molecular genetics of the brown algae.     

ON THE PARADIGM OF ALTRUISTIC SUICIDE IN THE UNICELLULAR WORLD

Altruistic suicide is best known in the context of programmed cell death (PCD) in multicellular individuals, which is understood as an adaptive process that contributes to the development and functionality of the organism. After the realization that PCD‐like processes can also be induced in single‐celled lineages, the paradigm of altruistic cell death has been extended to include these active cell death processes in unicellular organisms. Here, we critically evaluate the current conceptual framework and the experimental data used to support the notion of altruistic suicide in unicellular lineages, and propose new perspectives. We argue that importing the paradigm of altruistic cell death from multicellular organisms to explain active death in unicellular lineages has the potential to limit the types of questions we ask, thus biasing our understanding of the nature, origin, and maintenance of this trait. We also emphasize the need to distinguish between the benefits and the adaptive role of a trait. Lastly, we provide an alternative framework that allows for the possibility that active death in single‐celled organisms is a maladaptive trait maintained as a byproduct of selection on pro‐survival functions, but that could—under conditions in which kin/group selection can act—be co‐opted into an altruistic trait.     

Organisms and their place in biology

Summary In this paper we review the concept of organism analysing the main ideas related to it in the context of present biological theories. The discussion is focused and developed according to four key issues: individuality, organisation, autonomy and reproduction. Once these basic connections are established, a spectrum of possible entities that fall under the label ‘organism’ is looked over, with special emphasis on limit or controversial cases. The aim is to see whether they all share a set of common features and, if they do, why it is so difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of the term. Finally, we try to release somehow the tension between those hierarchical schemes proposed to account for life as a global phenomenon and those approaches that take organisms as the central target of (theoretical) biology, suggesting a possible middle-ground solution open for further research.     

MRAD: Metabolic reaction analysis database--an entity-relationship approach

The Metabolic Reaction Analysis Database (MRAD) is a relational database based on the Entity-Relationship (ER) model which combines information about organisms, biochemical pathways, reactions, enzymes, substrates, products and genes. It describes 244,596 genes in 79 organisms, 6,552 enzymes, and 3,552 reactions, 3,100 substrates, 2,866 products and 118 metabolic pathways. The MRAD graphical user interface allows for the identification of metabolic reactions which are similar and dissimilar in multiple organisms, reactions in a pathway which are missing in an organism and using any combination between one to six of the biological entities of organisms, genes, pathways, enzymes, substrates and products to determine metabolic reactions. MRAD provides a powerful and efficient tool for the construction of flux balance models for metabolic engineering applications.     

Studies on rickettsia-like organism disease of the tropical marine pearl oyster I: the fine structure and morphogenesis of pinctada maxima pathogen rickettsia-like organism

The present paper reports for the first time the discovery of a rickettsia-like organism (RLO) in the cultured tropical marine pearl oyster Pinctada maxima with mass mortality in the Hainan Province of China. This organism parasitizes the cytoplasm of host cells and forms intracytoplasmic eosinophilic inclusions. These organisms are extremely pleiomorphic in shape and average 967 x 551 nm in size, as measured in cross sections of transmission electron micrographs. The organisms exhibit clearly recognizable ultrastructural characteristics of prokaryotic bacteria-like cells, including two trilaminar membranes, an increasing electron-dense periplasmic ribosome zone, and a thread-like DNA nucleoidal structure. In addition to the above prokaryotic characteristics, the following unique biological characteristics were confirmed by TEM: (i) These organisms are usually located in host cells in two ways, namely, free in the cell cytoplasm and involved within membrane-limited phagolysosomes; (ii) The organisms exist in two morphological cell types, namely a small cell variant (SCV) and a large cell variant (LCV). The most important morphological difference between two cell types is that the SCV is obviously ribosome-rich in the periphery of the body, which makes SCV more electron-dense in the cytoplasm and narrower in the central nucleoid area than the LCV; (iii) Two propagative modes of the organisms, transverse binary fission and budding, are observed in cytoplasm and phagolysosomes of host cells under TEM, in which the budding is more often seen in phagolysosomes. These characteristics indicate that the organism is a separate species in the family Rickettsiaceae and should be classified into the genus Rickettsia. On the basis of the existence of the two propagative modes and two cell types, and intracellular location, we propose a developmental cycle for this organism which includes a vegetative differentiation stage to develop LCV by transverse binary fisson and a budding differentiation stage to develop resistant SCV. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.